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The Making of Quilengues: Violence, Enslavement and Resistance in the interior of 
Benguela, 1600-1830 is a history of small-scale societies in West Central Africa during the age of 
the Atlantic slave trade, starting with the oldest references to Mbangala nomadic warriors that 
inhabited the region to the latest references about the soba of Socoval, the most powerful African 
ruler of Quilengues. There are three main themes in this dissertation. One is the political and 
cultural composition of the immediate backlands of Benguela from the seventeenth to the 
nineteenth centuries. A second topic is that of the long historical process of Portugal’s “conquest” 
of this area during the period under scrutiny. Lastly, this dissertation explores the role of both 
locals and foreigners in the development of the Atlantic slave trade from Benguela. 
While a considerable portion of the historiography on West Central Africa focuses either 
on Portuguese commercial and cultural penetration into the interior or on the “kingdoms” of Kongo 
and Ndongo, this dissertation is centred on the history of small-scale decentralized societies 
scattered throughout one extensive area in the backlands of Benguela, that is Quilengues. These 
are social formations often ignored or understudied in favor of the history of larger and centralized 
political units. One of the goals of this doctoral dissertation is to highlight different reactions and 
responses from local African rulers and their peoples to the economic stimuli emanating from the 
coast after the official arrival of the Portuguese in the early seventeenth century.  A second 
objective is to advance an Africanist perspective of the history of Quilengues where Africans are 
agents of their own history, thus moving beyond a simple analysis of Portuguese penetration into 
the interior of West Central Africa. Indeed, a critical reading of the extant colonial documentation 
through an Africanist lens provides a unique glimpse into the political strategies adopted by 
African societies to resist and adapt to the changing times. 
Colonialist historians, mainly concerned with questions relating to Portuguese penetration 
into the “kingdoms” of Angola and Benguela and the consolidation of “colonial power”, tend to 
see a vassalage treaty as a sheer act of subjugation of African authorities, disregarding the different 
aspects of resistance that it entails. This usually occurs because they envision this historical process 
as a dispute between two sides: Portuguese colonizers conquering and imposing themselves onto 
subjugated African authorities. However, the African political landscape was very complex, 
especially in the backlands of Benguela, a region populated by numerous African independent and 
autonomous polities built around lineages and through kinship structures that established 
temporary alliances and dependencies with one another. 
This dissertation shows that resistance, in its varied forms, was a fundamental factor that 
slowed down Portuguese “colonial ambitions” in the interior of Benguela. As evidenced here, 
Portuguese “explorers” arrived in West Central Africa with a clear project of conquest and 
colonization. However, logistic limitations and local resistance delayed such a process until the 
early twentieth century, when the Portuguese overcame most of these limitations (such as 
transportation and communications), and found themselves in a better position to effectively 
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A history of small-scale societies in West Central Africa  
during the age of the Atlantic slave trade 
 
West Central Africa is a geopolitical region of the African continent characterized by its 
relations with the Atlantic world since the fifteenth century. The peoples who inhabited this region 
experienced similar historical processes related to the arrival of European travelers on their coast. 
But those same processes also differentiate these peoples from those of Central and West Africa. 
The boundaries and composition of West Central Africa may vary depending on the author or 
source consulted: but that said, it usually centres on what is today geographically represented by 
the Republic of Angola. On the coast, it extends roughly from the Republic of Congo southwards 
to northern Namibia. Its extension into the interior of the continent, on the other hand, varies 
greatly, depending on local geographic and environmental features. 
The peoples of West Central Africa were virtually isolated from other parts of sub-Saharan 
Africa because of some of these same geographic and environmental features. For instance, the 
dense equatorial forest to the north (Congo) and the desert terrains of the south (Namibia) framed 
the areas where most local societies developed. Far into the interior, in Central Africa, large 
centralized political powers (such as Lunda and Luba) also served as barriers to the peoples living 
within West Central Africa. Some historians have argued that the arrival of the Portuguese in this 
part of the continent “opened up connections” with the “Old World”: that is, unprecedented 
relations were thereby established with Europe1.   
Although the history of pre-twentieth century West Central Africa has received more 
attention from scholars in the last few decades, there is still much to be uncovered about the small-
scale societies that inhabited the region. Much of the recent historiography still focusses on two 
different but interconnected processes: the centralization and disruption of the African “kingdoms” 
of Kongo and Ndongo during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; and the Portuguese presence 
on the coast and their penetration into the interior from 1575 onwards. In spite of some important 
                                                 
1 According to John K. Thornton, Africa and Africans in the Making of the Atlantic World, 1400-1680 (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press, 1992), 13, the “opening” of the Atlantic meant the intensification of relations between 
Europe and West Africa, but it represented the arrival in a “new world” in West Central Africa, similar to what 
happened in the Americas.  
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exceptions2, little has been written on the history of small-scale decentralized societies before 
1850.  
Even though the territory of Quilengues (Map 1) appears in eighteenth and nineteenth-
century colonial reports as the largest and most populated “province” in the interior of Benguela, 
it has not yet attracted the attention of historians. In the whole corpus of Ralph Delgado, still the 
premier (if colonialist) historian of Benguela, one finds but one chapter specifically devoted to 
Quilengues3. Further information regarding Quilengues may be found dispersed in accounts 
penned by missionaries and in memoires written by travellers, not to mention official reports 
composed by military personnel. Yet, the fact remains that no scholarship on the political and 
cultural composition of this area exists. The lack of a specific historiography on Quilengues has, 
not surprisingly, consistently generated misconceptions about the peoples that occupied its 
territory and the history of such occupation. Historians and anthropologists present diverse and, 
quite often, overlapping narratives about this particular area and its inhabitants.  
Autonomous political entities in the interior of Benguela (sobas) developed different 
responses to the arrival of Europeans on the coast, with some embracing the commercial and 
cultural novelties brought from abroad. A constant flow of foreign commodities into Benguela 
subsequently changed consumption patterns in the interior, while access to luxury goods (such as 
textiles and alcohol) had a deep impact on local customs regarding cattle distribution, the major 
strategy for political control prior to the seventeenth century. Thus, local “patron-client” relations 
established between lineages and local rulers changed drastically with the penetration of slave 
merchants from the coast laden with imported goods4.  
The Portuguese project of “conquest” of Angola and Benguela relied on the signing of 
treaties of vassalage with African rulers. These treaties imposed a series of obligations upon sobas 
(including payment of tribute and military support) and were usually only accepted after military 
defeat. Nevertheless, there are cases of sobas who voluntarily turned themselves into vassals of 
                                                 
2 Jan Vansina, How Societies are Born: Governance in West Central Africa before 1600 (Charlottesville and London: 
University of Virginia Press, 2004).  
3 Ralph Delgado, Ao Sul do Cuanza: Ocupação e aproveitamento do antigo reino de Benguela, 1843-1942, Vol. 1 
(Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional. 1940), 281-307. 
4 As David Birmingham, The Portuguese Conquest of Angola (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 3, frames it: 
“When the Portuguese opened trade-routes across the ocean the attention of the peoples of the region swung round 
and began to focus on the new coastal outlets”.   
3 
 
the Portuguese. A soba could choose to become a Portuguese vassal, for example, to secure 
protection from rivals or even from Luso-African slaving raids. Other African rulers saw 
advantages in opening commercial relations with the Portuguese and greatly valued the luxury 
goods brought by Luso-African caravans to their sobados or polities. Therefore, one of the goals 
in writing this doctoral dissertation is to highlight different reactions and responses from local 
African rulers and their peoples to the economic stimuli emanating from the coast. A second 
objective is to advance an Africanist perspective of the history of Quilengues where Africans are 
agents of their own history, thus moving beyond a simple analysis of Portuguese penetration into 
the interior of Angola. Indeed, a critical reading of the extant colonial documentation through an 
Africanist approach provides a unique glimpse into the political strategies used by African 
societies to resist and adapt to the changing times.  
This dissertation focuses on the history of the interior of Benguela from the beginning of 
the seventeenth century to the end of the so-called “legal” slave trade in 1830, following the trail 
left by the documentation, starting with the oldest references to nomadic warriors (Mbangala) that 
inhabited the region to the latest references about the soba of Socoval, the most powerful African 
ruler of Quilengues, as an independent polity. Three main themes will thus be developed in this 
dissertation. One is the political and cultural composition of the immediate backlands of Benguela 
from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. A second topic is that of the long historical 
process of Portugal’s “conquest” of this area during the period under scrutiny. Lastly, a third theme 
to be explored is the role of both locals and foreigners in the development of the Atlantic slave 
trade. Let us now reflect on some important theoretical concepts to be used in the elaboration of 
this dissertation, as well as some of the historiographic discussions that will guide it.  
 
Theoretical framework: “conquest” in a “pre-colonial” world 
It is important to highlight some aspects of the theoretical framework used in this 
dissertation to think through the historical processes experienced by the peoples who inhabited 
Quilengues from the seventeenth to the first half of the nineteenth centuries. First, one must 
understand that this was a “pre-colonial” context, despite Portuguese colonial assertions to the 
contrary. As we will see below, there were logistical limitations that, together with constant acts 
of resistance and “rebellion” on the part of local African rulers, slowed the process of colonization 
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in the interior of Benguela. That said, I try to avoid the use of terms such as “pre-colonial”, 
“colonial” and “post-colonial” as periodization for the History of Africa because they have been 
largely imposed by westerners. I do recognize that these terms might be useful to discuss the level 
of Portuguese control and African “submission” during the first centuries of contact. But, as will 
be shown during different moments in the following chapters, the colonization of the backlands of 
Benguela (and indeed in all of Angola) was a slow process that took centuries to complete. Hence, 
I prefer to use the concept of “conquest” to refer to this “pre-colonial” period in the History of 
Angola, an era characterized by Portuguese and Luso-African forces periodically attempting to 
usurp the autonomy and sovereignty of African rulers in the interior of Benguela5.  
The idea that the Portuguese occupation of Angola, including the interior of Benguela, was 
a long process of “conquest” is not a novelty, although historians disagree as to its length. It is 
quite common to find references on the “conquest of Angola” as constituted by a period between 
Portuguese arrival in the mid-sixteenth century and the downfall of the kingdom of Ndongo in the 
early decades of the following century6. But, in the particular case of the backlands of Benguela, I 
here argue that the timeline should be extended until the end of the nineteenth century7. Indeed, 
the colonization of the areas behind the town of Benguela was only consolidated following the 
wars of “pacification” that took place at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
One of the most important Portuguese colonial historians of the nineteenth century, 
Joaquim José Lopes de Lima, theorized about the three main Portuguese strategies of expansion 
overseas. The first consisted in founding “trading posts” (feitorias) in coastal regions aimed 
exclusively at developing commercial relations with local authorities, with no intention of 
penetration inland or occupying territory. This, according to Lopes de Lima, was the model 
implemented in places like Bissau and Cacheu, in West Africa. Establishing a “colony”, on the 
other hand, was a more complex enterprise, one that included the participation of Portuguese 
nobles (fidalgos) who received royal privileges and exemptions to explore certain territories, 
moved with their families and serfs to these landscapes, and reproduced a semblance of Portuguese 
                                                 
5 I have previously discussed these issues in Estevam C. Thompson, “Fontes coloniais para uma história pré-colonial 
de Benguela, sécs. XVII a XIX”, Africana Studia, No. 25 (2015): 33-69. 
6 For a good example, see Birmingham, The Portuguese Conquest of Angola. See also Chapter 4 below. 
7 At least one Portuguese colonial historian, Gastão Sousa Dias, Páginas da história de Angola, Cadernos Coloniais 
No. 60 (Lisboa: Cosmos, 1939), 22, recognized early on that Portuguese control over “Angolan” territories was largely 
nominal before the Conference of Berlin (1884-1885).  
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society away from home. In Lopes de Lima’s point of view, such was the case of the Atlantic 
islands of Madeira, Azores and Cape Verde8.  The third strategy was effective “conquest” 
(Conquista), which consisted in the military occupation of territories where the Portuguese found 
strong local rulers that could not be easily defeated. As a result, “conquest” became a long-term 
military investment that required the participation of local authorities with whom the Portuguese 
could share the burden of administration. It is precisely within this context that the “kingdoms” of 
Angola and Benguela9 emerge as perfect examples of “conquests” until the nineteenth century10. 
As Jan Vansina reminds us, “conquest” can mean different things, from a series of raids to the 
military annihilation of an enemy. But, the history of conquest is also, usually, followed by that of 
revolts: hence it does not end conflict, let alone contradictions11.  
As mentioned above, a considerable portion of the historiography on West Central Africa 
focuses either on Portuguese commercial and cultural penetration into the interior or on the 
“kingdoms” of Kongo and Ndongo. My dissertation, on the other hand, is centred on the history 
of small-scale decentralized societies scattered throughout one area in the backlands of Benguela, 
social formations often ignored or understudied in favor of the history of larger and centralized 
political units. As will be seen below, the persistence of these small-scale societies in the interior 
of Benguela is related to environmental and ecological conditions specific to the area, which placed 
limits both on their dimension and their location. Small itinerant pastoralist groups occupied arid 
and desert areas, while more populous agropastoralist communities built hamlets (libatas) around 
local rivers and lakes. As Jan Vansina explains, these conditions “discouraged the elaboration of 
larger scale social units, for it easily induced local collaboration while discouraging strong 
monocephalic government because it was all too easy for the discontented to strike out on their 
own and settle somewhere else”12.  
  My research has been greatly influenced by the work of several clusters of literati. One of 
these includes historians of “pre-colonial” West Central Africa (that is before the 1880s) such as 
                                                 
8 José Joaquim Lopes de Lima, Ensaios sobre a statistica das possessões portuguezas na África Occidental e Oriental; 
Ásia Occidental; China, e na Oceania, vol. 3 (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1846), 93.  
9 While Benguela could be considered a “commercial outpost” (feitoria) during early attempts at occupation, it soon 
became a place of “conquest”. On Benguela as a feitoria, see Aida Freudenthal, “Benguela: de feitoria à cidade 
colonial”, Fontes e Estudos, Revista do Arquivo Nacional de Angola, No. 06-07, Luanda (2011): 197-229. 
10 Lima, Ensaios sobre a statistica..., 93.  
11 Jan Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savanna (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), 18. 
12 Vansina, How Societies are Born, 217, 259. 
6 
 
Jan Vansina, David Birmingham, Joseph C. Miller, John K. Thornton, José C. Curto, Anne Hilton, 
Linda M. Heywood, Beatrix Heintze, Catarina Madeira Santos, Thomas Desch-Obi, Roquinaldo 
Ferreira, Mariana P. Candido and Daniel Domingues da Silva. These scholars have shown multiple 
ways through which to understand the “pre-colonial” past of this region by asking important 
questions regarding the motivations and desires of African communities involved in various 
historical processes, even when largely using European-generated documentation. A second group 
of literati is represented by colonialist historians from the seventeenth through the twentieth 
centuries whose work remain crucial for any scholar of pre-1880s West Central Africa. Although 
their writings are imbued with colonialist and imperialist views, exalting the “Portuguese civilizing 
mission” in the region, a critical approach to their work can generate valuable information when 
writing a History of Angola from an Africanist perspective. Indeed, their work sometimes provides 
primary documentation that is no longer extant. Among these colonialist historians one finds: 
Antonio de Oliveira de Cadornega, Elias Alexandre da Silva, José Joaquim Lopes de Lima, 
Raimundo Matos, J. C. Feo Cardozo de Castellobranco e Torres, Luciano Cordeiro, Alfredo 
Felner, Carlos Couto, Gastão Dias, and others. The most important, for my research, has certainly 
been Ralph Delgado, a prolific Angolan-born author who collected and published the most 
important collection of historical information about Quilengues and its relation to neighboring 
areas. No less important for my work has been a third cluster of literati made up of twentieth 
century ethnographers such as Augusto Bastos, Carlos Estermann, Wilfrid Hambly, Gladwyn 
Childs, José Redinha, and Alvin Urquhart. Their work remains of great value especially, in this 
particular case, to identify peoples and their migratory movements. The concepts they adopt and 
the representations they imprint upon their “objects of study”, however, also need to be approached 
critically. Hence, I will not use colonialist categories such as “race”, “tribe”, “primitive” and others 
(in the same vein) commonly used by such ethnographers. Neither will I draw upon the concept of 
“ethnicity” as a fixed category: I prefer to see different “ethnolinguistic groups” as historical and 
social constructs, and not as biological entities.   
 
On “ethnicity” and “ethnic” labels  
Ethnographers and historians from the late-nineteenth and early twentieth century tended 
to see the different small-scale communities inhabiting the interior of Benguela, not to mention 
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other parts of the African continent, as belonging to different “tribes” (see Chapter 1). I avoid using 
the concept of “tribe” throughout this dissertation due to its theoretical limitations and historical 
stigma: used in colonial times to identify those considered “primitives” by “evolutionary” models, 
such paradigms have been refuted since the mid-twentieth century; moreover, it is also a concept 
connected to pseudo-scientific “racial” ideologies that have similarly been long debunked13.  
Nevertheless, in order to maximize the ethnographic and historiographic secondary sources 
supporting this dissertation, one is sometimes forced to refer to such “tribal” and “ethnic” labels 
in order to make an argument drawing upon those authors. Similarly, when dealing with primary 
sources from the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, I sometimes have to refer to the very 
“ethnic” labels given to peoples living in the interior of Benguela by Luso-African settlers (such 
as “Muquilengues”). In both cases, it is important to recognize that these “ethnic” labels were 
attempts by outsiders to make sense of the multitude of languages and traditions that populated the 
interior. In this attempt to “organize” information about the different peoples of in the interior of 
Benguela, these “outsiders”, Luso-African settlers and European ethnographers alike, sometime 
made up their own “ethnicities” and helped to create new identities14.   
This doctoral dissertation is, thus, not concerned with “Kilenges” as an “ethnic” group, but 
rather about writing the history of the territory of Quilengues and the various peoples who 
inhabited it over time. I will not engage in a profound discussion on the validity of ethnographic 
labels and anthropological concepts preferring, instead, to establish a theoretical framework that 
allows my research to address the issue of the existence of peoples from different cultural 
backgrounds in one and the same territory. I intend to instrumentalize these concepts and labels 
only to address what I see as most important for this dissertation: to attest for the plural and 
multifaceted character of the peoples that occupied Quilengues before the later 1800s.  
Traditionally, the study of ethnicities (Ethnography) sought to measure traits and patterns 
to establish the difference between “races” and “tribes”. This method of analysis was usually 
applied to groups that accepted their ethnic label by self-identification or as an outside imposition, 
but did not work to address those groups that did not accept the ethnic label given to them. “Race”, 
another category of analysis much used by ethnographers, virtually disappeared from 
                                                 
13 For a critique of the use of the term “tribe” by historians of Africa, see Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savanna, 14-16.  




anthropological discourse in the 1950s, especially after the fall of Physical Anthropology and 
Forensic Anthropology as acceptable scientific fields. Together with the concept of “race”, that of 
“tribe” was put aside by most anthropologists in the second half of the twentieth century15. The 
alternative to replace the naturalized biological concept of “race” and its sociopolitical artificial 
unit “tribe” was the development of the concept of “ethnicity”. It did not take long, however, for 
criticism to arise about the static and monolithic view that some anthropologists still had of the 
“ethnic-cultural units” they began to study.  
As the anthropologist Fredrick Barth (1969) alerted, “though the naive assumption that 
each tribe and people has maintained its culture through a bellicose ignorance of its neighbours is 
no longer entertained, the simplistic view that geographical and social isolation have been the 
critical factors in sustaining cultural diversity persists”16. He tackled the idea that different human 
populations that remained isolated from each other created individual and disconnected cultures, 
each of them conditioned and determined by their environments and ecologies. Every “tribe” 
would be, therefore, an entire cultural and linguistic unit that generated a specific type of society. 
Over time, the limitations of the concept of “tribes” as isolated and fixed cultural units, with no or 
little mobility, became clear to anthropologists. Cultural boundaries are not erased by the fact that 
people constantly cross them: or, as Barth puts it, ethnic distinctions do not depend on the absence 
of mobility, contact and information. Actually, stable and persisting social relations maintained 
across cultural boundaries are only possible precisely because of dichotomized ethnic statuses. 
Instead of focusing on the “cultural stuff” that made up ethnicities, Barth proposed a focus on the 
boundaries of these ethnic groups. He paid especial attention to cases in which members of a group 
maintained their identity even in interaction with other groups. After all, “ethnic groups were not 
merely or necessarily based on the occupation of exclusive territories”17.  
According to this methodology, ethnic boundaries canalize social life since the 
identification of another person as a fellow member of an “ethnic group” implies a sharing of 
criteria of judgement and evaluation. At the same time, the identification of others as strangers 
belonging to other “ethnic groups” also shows criteria, for it implies the recognition of limitation 
                                                 
15 Susan Emley Keefe, “Introduction”, in Negotiating Ethnicity: The Impact of Anthropological Theory and Practice, 
Susan Keefe ed., NAPA Bulletin No. 8 (Arlington: American Anthropological Association, 1989), 5-6. 
16 Fredrick Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural Difference (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1969), 9. 
17 Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, 9-16. 
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and restriction. Barth argues that these “ethnic groups” only persist as significant units if they 
imply difference in behaviour. Interaction between different groups, therefore, is essential for the 
creation of ethnicities and allows the persistence of cultural differences among different groups18.  
Barth’s position that ethnic identification arises from groups adapting to socioeconomic 
niches, and then recognizing their particularities and differences from other groups, has been 
scrutinized and criticized for decades. This is particular the case of his view that ethnicity resides 
in a group’s construction of social boundaries between “us” and “them”. In other words, critics 
point out that ethnicity should not be taken as inherently relational, and that by “locating the forces 
of ethnicization at the social borders of groups, [Barth’s methodology] draws attention towards 
explaining intergroup distinctions, and away from the internal dynamics of how groups form and 
change” [italics in the original]19. 
According to his critics, Barth’s methodology fails when treating an “ethnic group” as 
effectively homogeneous. They refute his understanding of “ethnicity” as a group of people with 
the same language and a common economic orientation, having close daily interactions, who are 
able to create cultural features and forms that underline their difference from their neighbors. Such 
an understanding, Barth’s critics denounce, leads to the naturalization of ethnic ideologies and the 
creation of the “tribalism model”, which is imposed top-down, whether by European, Luso-African 
or African elites. “Europeans who arrived with a view of African societies as inherently tribal often 
then facilitated the process of making them so”20. By following the methodology developed by 
Barth and analysing the historical process of classification of “tribes” by colonial powers, one ends 
up by concluding that African ethnicities are exclusive European creations. 
Hence, the first definitions of “ethnic group” used by anthropologists to replace the 
imprecise colonial label of “tribe” still equated culture, language and society. It did not, 
consequently, differ much from the concept of “race” that was rejected, following the mid-
twentieth-century, by the scientific community. Anthropologists and historians are now aware that 
language and ethnicity are not interchangeable words, that these concepts are not enough to define 
                                                 
18 Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries, 15-16. 
19 Bill Bravman, Making Ethnic Ways: Communities and their Transformations in Taita, Kenya, 1800-1950 
(Portsmouth: Heinemann, 1998), 9-10. 
20 Bravman, Making Ethnic Ways, 10-11. 
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a society, and that equating language, culture and society is a “fatal error” of analysis21. 
Nevertheless, language is still not completely disconnected from culture. Although it does not 
define culture, language is a fundamental element of any culture. Moreover, as imprecise as 
anthropological categories of measurement of ethnicity might be (such as language), they do 
facilitate analysis of patterns of difference between groups22. They cannot be dismissed in any 
academic work that intends to highlight cultural plurality and social diversity. Thus, while I will 
occasionally make use of some “ethnic” labels in the pages that follow, particularly when sources 
make use of them or for the sake of writing and understanding, I neither adopt these markers as 
fixed identities nor do I not seek to turn this dissertation into a study about “ethnicities” in the 
interior of Benguela.  
 
Violence and the “slaving frontier”  
According to current estimates, around 12.5 million African slaves were sold to Atlantic 
slaving networks from 1501 to 186623, of which around 5.6 million slaves left the coast of West 
Central Africa24. After the establishment of Luso-African settlements on the coast, Luanda in 1575 
                                                 
21 Vansina, How Societies are Born, 60. 
22 Keefe, “Introduction”, 5. See also Paul E. Lovejoy, “Methodology through the Ethnic Lens: The Study of Atlantic 
Africa”, in Sources and Methods in African History: Spoken, Written, Unearthed, Toyin Falola and Christian Jennings, 
eds. (Austin: University of Rochester Press, 2003), 105-117. 
23 See estimates for slave exports in David Eltis, et al., The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade Database, 
https://slavevoyages.org/assessment/estimates, (last access, 11 September 2020).  
24 For more estimates about the slave trade from West Central Africa, see Herbert S. Klein, “The Portuguese Slave 
Trade from Angola in the 18th Century”, Journal of Economic History, XXXII (1972): 849-918; Joseph C. Miller, 
“The Slave Trade in Congo and Angola”, in The African Diaspora: Interpretive Essays, Martin L. Kilson and Robert 
I. Rotberg, eds. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 75-113; Joseph C. Miller, Way of Death: Merchant 
Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade, 1730-1830 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988); Joseph C. 
Miller, “Legal Portuguese slaving from Angola. Some preliminary indications of volume and direction”, Revue 
Franfaise d'Histoire d' Outre Mer, 62, n. 226-227 (1975): 135-176; Joseph C. Miller, “The Numbers, Origins, and 
Destinations of Slaves in the Eighteenth Century Angolan Slave Trade”, Social Science History, 13, n. 4 (1989): 381-
419; José C. Curto, “A Quantitative Re-assessment of the Legal Portuguese Slave Trade from Luanda, Angola, 1710-
1830,” African Economic History, 20 (1992): 1-25; José C. Curto, “The Legal Portuguese Slave Trade from Benguela, 
Angola, 1730-1828: A Quantitative Re-Appraisal,” África, 16-17, no. 1 (1993/1994): 101-116; David Eltis, “The 
Volume and Structure of the Transatlantic Slave Trade: A Reassessment”, The William and Mary Quarterly, 58, n. 1 
(2001): 17-46; José C. Curto, “Another Look at the Slave Trade from Benguela: What We Know and What We Do 
Not Know”, Portuguese Studies Review, Vol. 23, No. 2 (2015): 9-26: Roquinaldo Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange 
in the Atlantic World: Angola and Brazil during the Era of the Slave Trade (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2012); Roquinaldo Ferreira, “The Suppression of the Slave Trade and Slave Departures from Angola, 1830s-1860s,” 
in David Eltis and David Richardson, eds., Extending the Frontiers: Essays on the New Transatlantic Slave Trade 
Database (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008), 313-334; Roquinaldo Ferreira, “Dos Sertões ao Atlântico: 
Tráfico Ilegal de Escravos e Comércio Lícito em Angola, 1830-1860” (M.A. Dissertation, Universidade Federal do 
Rio de Janeiro, 1996); Daniel Domingues da Silva, “The Transatlantic Slave Trade from Angola: A Port-by-Port 
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and Benguela in 1617, the slave trade became a main economic activity in much of West Central 
Africa until the mid-nineteenth century. During this period, a combination of local and foreign 
slavers and traders transformed West Central Africa into the most important exporting region in 
the history of the Atlantic slave trade. The eighteenth century, in particular, saw Luso-African 
caravans enter into the interior of the continent and open new slave markets and trading routes. 
Since the 1960s, this historical process of penetration has become one of the most important themes 
for Angolanist historians. David Birmingham, for example, has written extensively on the 
“conquest of Angola” and the subsequent development of peaceful commercial relations between 
Luso-African settlers and their itinerant traders (pumbeiros and sertanejos25), on one hand, and 
local African rulers under direct Portuguese influence, on the other. His most significant argument 
is that the centres of slave supply gradually moved eastwards with these caravans, as itinerant 
traders advanced further and further inland in search of captives26. In the 1980s, Joseph C. Miller 
built upon Birmingham’s view of the process by elaborating his own thesis on a “moving frontier 
zone of slaving violence” heading eastward with the penetration of slaving caravans: the “wars of 
slaving” would only come to an end through the “heart of the continent” with the advent of colonial 
rule at the end of the nineteenth century”27. According to this thesis, as the violent methods of 
slave acquisition moved further inland, the areas within its boundaries became zones of relatively 
                                                 
Estimate of Slaves Embarked, 1701-1867,” International Journal of African Historical Studies, 46, n. 1 (2013): 105-
122; Daniel Domingues da Silva,. The Atlantic Slave Trade from West Central Africa, 1780-1867 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
25 Pumbeiros or pombeiros (from pumbo, meaning “market”) were “black” itinerant traders, often enslaved persons, 
who served as agents for “white” merchants (sertanejos) in the interior (sertões) of Angola and Benguela. While both 
sertanejos and pumbeiros could lead caravans, there were some African territories, like Humbe, in the southern interior 
of Benguela, where only pumbeiros could enter: this because they were “barefoot blacks” (pretos descalços), meaning 
that they were not considered complete outsiders. Despite the fact that some sertanejos were “black” and born in 
Benguela, they were often considered “white” outsiders by Africans because they wore European clothes and traded 
in European products. These sertanejos had partnerships with “white” businessmen (negociantes) in the coastal 
settlements from whom they acquired imported goods to exchange for captives. Due to the spike in violent conflicts 
related to increased slaving in the interior of Angola during the early seventeenth century, Governor Luis Mendes de 
Vasconcelos (1620) prohibited the participation of “white” and “Europeanized blacks” (pretos calçados) in trading 
activities throughout the sertões, undertaking that were to be delegated to pumbeiros. For more on pumbeiros, see 
Lima, Ensaios sobre a statistica..., 63; Ernest G. Ravenstein, The Stange Adventures of Andrew Battell of Leigh, in 
Angola and the Adjoining Regions. (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1901), 164. See also Miller, Way of Death, 190; 
David Birmingham, Trade and Conflict in Angola: The Mbundu and Their Neighbours Under the Influence of the 
Portuguese, 1483-1790 (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 17 – Note 1. 
26 Despite arguing for the development of mostly peaceful commercial relations between African rulers and Luso-
African settlers in Angola, Birmingham, Trade and Conflict in Angola, 133-136, recognized the continuation of 
violence as means to acquire enslaved individuals. As he has pondered: “It was frequently the case, however, that 
governors used officials and army officers to trade for them in the back-country, where their forceful methods of 
obtaining slaves disrupted a system of more or less peaceful negotiation used by the pumbeiros”.  
27 Miller, Way of Death, 141.  
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peaceful commercial negotiations. According to Miller, moreover, the expansion of the “slaving 
frontier” inland meant that the enslaved individuals sold to Atlantic markets in the late eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries came predominantly from areas deep in the interior of West Central 
Africa, hundreds and hundreds of kilometers away from the exporting regions on the coast28.   
Over the course of the last two to three decades, on the other hand, other historians of 
Angola have been placing far greater emphasis on zones in the backlands and near interior of 
Benguela, including areas such as Quilengues and Caconda, as significant suppliers of slaves 
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This new generation of Angolanists have 
questioned the idea of an ever-expanding “slaving frontier” and the end of slaving operations in 
areas close to the coast, many of them under Portuguese “vassalage”. They have also shown that, 
contrary to the “slaving frontier” thesis, a considerable number of slaves exported from Benguela 
(and Angola) in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did not originate in the “heart” of the 
continent29.  The last three chapters of this dissertation tackle the “slaving frontier” thesis and the 
criticisms it has received over the last few decades, showing the continuation of violence and wars 
in the near interior of Benguela, as well the importance of Quilengues as a supplier of captives to 
the Atlantic slave trade, thus corroborating the recent historiography on the theme. The wars 
against the soba of Socoval presented in these chapters are, in particular, a clear example of the 
betrayal and capitulation of a former ally and the enslavement of his people by Luso-African 
slavers (usually military officers in position of authority), who were sold in large numbers to Brazil 
at the end of the eighteenth century. However, I also argue that we should not completely abandon 
the “slaving frontier” thesis. Rather, we should improve upon it by including other movements of 
local enslaving networks in the areas under Portuguese direct influence. As this dissertation shows, 
constant “waves” of slaving campaigns hit the areas within the “slaving frontier”, keeping these 
territories as relevant suppliers of captives throughout the centuries. Hence, although the “slaving 
                                                 
28 Although Miller, Way of Death, 150-151, elaborated his “slaving frontier” thesis having Luanda and the interior of 
Angola as the centre of his analysis, he also considered its advance in the backlands of Benguela, which he dubbed 
“the southern wing of the slaving frontier”.  
29 José C. Curto, “Rethinking the Origin of Slaves in West Central Africa”, in Changing Horizons of African History, 
Awet T. Weldemichael, Anthony A. Lee and Edward A. Alpers, eds. (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2017), 23-47; 
Silva, The Atlantic Slave Trade from West Central Africa, 1780-1867, 18-19, 73-99; Candido, An African Slaving Port 
and the Atlantic World: Benguela and its Hinterland (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 198-214; 
Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World, 52-87. 
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frontier” did expand eastwards, as plenty of sources attest, the zones within its boundaries 
remained important suppliers of slaves. These two views are, in effect, not mutually exclusive.      
 
A note about spelling  
Spelling is always an important issue when dealing with the history of Angola, including 
Benguela and its interior, because different spellings of the same name or word can represent 
different historical contexts related to its use. Therefore, I use “Kakonda” in relation to the 
seventeenth-century African ruler and “Caconda” in reference to the Luso-African presídio30. As 
I discuss in Chapter 1, the spelling of “Quilengues” and not “Kilengues” is a methodological choice 
on my part to highlight the Luso-African origin of the concept during the “invention” of this 
territory. So far, I have collected nineteen different spellings for “Quilengues” as a geographical 
reference and sixteen versions related to cultural references (Appendix 9). There are additional 
concerns about the spelling of rivers and other geographical references, some of which exhibit 
more than a few different formats. Hence, I chose to adopt the spelling of the national languages 
from where these geographical references come. Hence, I use Cunene (not Kunene) and Cuanza 
(not Kwanza). 
 
Primary Sources and Methodology 
I have used different sets of published and unpublished primary sources to write this 
dissertation, varying from African oral traditions to Portuguese official colonial documentation. 
Among the published sources, one finds series of collections and official publications by 
Portuguese colonial and overseas institutions: Arquivos de Angola, Angolana, Boletim Oficial de 
Angola, Monumenta Missionaria Africana, Annaes Marítimos e Coloneaes, Annaes do Conselho 
                                                 
30 Presídio (plural presídios) were Luso-African fortifications, some more imposing than others, built throughout 
Angola and Benguela that became centres of Portuguese commercial and political influence. Presídio was also a 
Portuguese “colonial” administrative division usually commanded by a military officer (capitão-mor). According to 
Rafael Bluteau, Diccionario da Lingua Portugueza, Tomo 1 (Lisboa: Simão Thaddeo Ferreira, 1789), 239, the term 
was further used to identify a unit of soldiers who secured an outpost (gente da guarnição de uma praça. O que serve 
de guarda, apoio e de conservar). Moreover, the term presídio identified not only the “fortress” and its military 
personnel, but also the residences of local settlers (moradores), and the African vassals under its jurisdiction. Contrary 
to what is affirmed by Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 282, Quilengues was not a presídio, 
but a districto, another “colonial” administrative division characterized by the lack of permanent military personnel.   
14 
 
Ultramarino, Boletim da Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa, and Fontes e Estudos, among 
others. There are also several important documents published by colonialist historians such as 
Ralph Delgado, Alfredo Felner, Castellobranco e Torres, Silva Correa, as highlighted above. The 
unpublished sources, in turn, consist of manuscripts dating from the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries from archives in three different continents. In the case of repositories in Angola, the most 
important documents used below are held at the Arquivo Nacional de Angola (ANA) in Luanda, 
although parish records from the Arquivo do Bispado de Luanda (ABL) have also proven helpful. 
In Portugal, the most significant repository is certainly the Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (AHU) 
in Lisbon, but smaller collections of importance are also found at the Biblioteca Nacional de 
Lisboa (BNL) and the Biblioteca Pública de Évora (BPE).  In Brazil, the holdings of the Arquivo 
do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro (AIHGB) and the Biblioteca Nacional (BNRJ), both 
in Rio de Janeiro, are further invaluable, as well.  I have individually referenced all primary sources 
used in this thesis and classified them by archive, reference numbers and date. In cases where 
documents have no title, I have made up an informative title so as to facilitate referencing (see 
Bibliography under Unpublished Primary Sources).  
All of the documentation used throughout this dissertation has been digitized over decades 
by the Angola Resgate Group, of which I am a member, and is available through the Harriet 
Tubman Institute (Toronto). I have selected and transcribed hundreds of these documents and 
organized them by date and area of provenance or reference, including Quilengues, Dombe 
Grande, Caconda, and Benguela, in order to develop a more thorough understanding of the 
historical processes under analysis. Still, only part of these documents has made it into this work: 
hundreds of other transcribed documents will underpin other studies, still in the future. Also 
excluded from this current analysis are the extant post-1797 censuses for Quilengues: the length 
of this dissertation would have fallen outside of acceptable parameters with the integration of these, 
otherwise, valuable data.   
 
Thesis Summary  
This dissertation is divided into five chapters, followed by a conclusion attempting to make 
sense of the several arguments made therein. The first chapter – The land and the people(s) – is 
about the geographic and “ethnographic” compositions of Quilengues. Here, I try to determine its 
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geographical extension during different historical moments, using extant cartographic data to 
analyse recurrent changes over time. Great part of the sources in this chapter consists of colonial 
documentation and ethnographic works from the eighteenth to the twentieth centuries concerning 
the “administrative” division of the lands in interior Benguela according to “colonial” officials and 
their attempts to classify the different peoples that occupied these territories. I also use a collection 
of historical maps from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to identify the main rivers and 
geographical features of West Central Africa, as well as to try to determine the location of some 
local polities. I argue in this, Chapter 1, that Quilengues was a Luso-African invention based on 
their distorted understanding of the local political and “ethnolinguistic” landscapes. Although there 
is undoubtedly a reference to the Tyilenge peoples, Quilengues was composed by a variety of 
peoples, some of whom had migrated from other parts of West Central Africa and found refuge in 
the lowlands of Quilengues, locally known as Mbuelo. This chapter also points to the fact that this 
outside attempt to understand and “organize” the multifaceted cultural reality of the interior of 
Benguela led to the creation of “ethnic” labels and the forging of new identities. For example, the 
ethnographer Carlos Estermann applied the “ethnic” label of Nyaneka-Khumbi to groups of people 
who did not share a same identity and who still question this classification today. Worse still, he 
singlehandedly changed the name of the peoples of Mbuelo (Bangala) because of misconceptions 
about the history of the Imbangala of Kasanje, which help to cover-up the historical connections 
between these two groups and their movements of migration to different parts of Benguela and 
Angola. 
The second chapter – Early history of Quilengues – deals with one of the most important 
and misunderstood historical processes of West Central Africa in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries: the rise and expansion of the Mbangala bands. This chapter reveals the sociopolitical 
landscape of the interior of Benguela before the arrival of the Portuguese, tackling the 
misconceptions about different groups of roaming warriors in Africa, identified as one and the 
same group because of their military abilities and their supposed taste for human flesh. In this 
chapter, I use a series of sources from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries to identify these 
different groups and analyse the twentieth and twenty-first century historiographic debates on the 
issue. I start by explaining the cacophony of legends about “cannibal” warriors who roamed the 
entire African continent (Jagas, Mane, Sumba, Zimba, Galas, etc.) and supposedly came from a 
“nation of savages” in inner Africa. I identify the origins of some of these stories and some of their 
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promotors, such as the Catholic missionary, not to mention slave trader, Father Baltasar Barreira. 
I show the historical discussion about the differences between the Jagas who attacked the 
“kingdom” of Kongo in the sixteenth century and the Mbangala bands who worked alongside the 
Portuguese in the development of the slave trade during the seventeenth century. Finally, I also 
engage upon a major discussion advocating a historiographical revision on the origins of the 
Mbangala because of the realization that the oral tradition recounting the “exodus of Kinguri” was 
a nineteenth-century Mbangala addition to Lunda traditions. Hence, previous explanations based 
on these oral traditions have to be revised: they can no longer be used as historical references for 
either the origins of the Imbangala of Kasanje nor the expansion of the Lunda commonwealth. I 
conclude the chapter by providing evidence on the rise of Mbangala bands in Quilengues and other 
documentary references for at least three waves of migrations from Quilengues to other parts of 
West Central Africa.  
The third chapter – Foreign intervention and the rise of the Atlantic slave trade in Benguela 
– shows how Portuguese traders and Mbangala warriors worked together for the consolidation of 
the Atlantic slave trade in the area. I use published primary sources and colonial historiography to 
analyse the process of the arrival of the Portuguese on the coast of Benguela, from their failed 
attempts in Benguela-a-Velha (1587) to the foundation of São Filipe of Benguela (1617), and the 
first slaving expeditions promoted by the two first governors of Benguela in association with local 
Mbangala warlords. I challenge recent historiography that denies the participation and importance 
of the Mbangala in Benguela, showing it is mistakenly based on old misconceptions about who 
the Jagas were and about the origins of the Imbangala of Kasanje, as explained in the previous 
chapter. Hence, the Jagas that appear in many colonial references were mostly Mbangala warlords: 
they appear under the same term later used to identify some local enemies of the Luso-Africans. 
The chapter also shows the process of occupation of different parts of the coast of Benguela and 
the first incursions into Quilengues, including the building and rebuilding of the presídio of 
Caconda in three different parts of the interior. Chapter 3 ends with the surge in slave exports from 
Benguela in the last decade of the eighteenth century and the strategies used by local slavers to 
increase the supply of captives to their Atlantic connections.    
The fourth chapter – Conquest, vassalage and African political power – deals with the 
Portuguese strategies of occupation of Angola, based on the signing of treaties of vassalage with 
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local authorities, and the different meanings that these treaties had in the African context. I use 
primary sources from Angola, Portugal and Brazil to show how the development of the Atlantic 
slave trade in Benguela led to changes in patterns of consumption and relocated the centres of 
wealth from cattle in the interior to slaves on the coast. I also argue for the Portuguese limitations 
to “colonize” the interior of Benguela, showing it remained a “conquest” under dispute during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Due to limitations in transport and communications, the 
“colonizers” could not maintain control over “conquered” lands and had to make agreements with 
defeated African rulers. Hence, I contend that these treaties of vassalage should not be understood 
as mere colonial tools of African subjugation, but rather as eventual instruments of resistance.  I 
further maintain that despite the supposed “legal” protections given to the African vassals of 
Portugal and their peoples, anyone in the interior of Benguela could become victim of the Atlantic 
slave trade. Indeed, I effectively show how the soba of Socoval, the most important political entity 
in Quilengues from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, became an “enemy” following 
disputes with slavers positioned as regents of Quilengues. The latter arrested the soba and raided 
his people, despite the fact that he was an old ally of the Portuguese. This chapter also shows how 
slavers in positions of authority acted in total disregard of the orders of their superiors to preserve 
peace in the interior and, instead, used the military personnel under their command to advance 
their private slaving operations.      
The evidence presented in Chapter 4 corroborates and advances recent critiques from 
historians of West Central Africa against Miller’s classic “slaving frontier” thesis. As the chapter 
shows, the internalization of the slave trade in Angola and Benguela did not mean the end of violent 
slaving operations in areas close to the coast, such as Quilengues. Also, the continued existence of 
slaving operations in Quilengues further weakens the argument that slaves exported to Brazil in 
the nineteenth century came from societies far in the interior of the continent. That said, I also 
assert that we should not abandon the “slaving frontier” thesis entirely, but rather expand it to 
include the permanence of violent means (such as slaving raids) to acquire slaves in territories like 
Quilengues and Caconda, despite the continued penetration of Luso-African itinerant traders 
deeper into the continent. Slavers in positions of authority continued to promote slaving campaigns 
in these areas, despite the existence of peaceful commercial relations with local communities as 
well. As the case of the soba of Socoval attests, the diplomatic and commercial relations between 
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African rulers and Luso-African settlers varied greatly in time: thus, any discussion of this process 
must be guided by specific historical evidence so as to avoid generalizations. 
The fifth chapter – Strategies of resistance in Quilengues in the first half of the nineteenth 
century – advances the arguments of the previous chapter (on violence and the slave trade) and 
shows the strategies developed by African rulers in the interior of Benguela to protect themselves 
and their peoples from the slaving operations that wrought havoc upon their lands. They adopted 
tactics that varied from espionage and guerilla warfare to the manipulation of resources that 
blocked the advance of slaving caravans (because of the lack of porters) and forced them to retreat 
due to a lack of supplies. This chapter also shows the great complexity of the political landscape 
in the backlands of Benguela, where different African polities made secret treaties to take revenge 
on old disputes with neighboring rulers. Although Luso-Africans settlers and colonial historians 
tended to divide these African polities and their political alliances in relation to their broad “ethnic” 
labels, including “Mundombes” and “Muquilengues”, the primary sources show that these African 
alliances could include peoples from different parts and “ethnic” backgrounds. A substantial 
portion of the chapter focuses on one military expedition against Quilengues during 1811-1812, 
led by a “black” local slaver (Captain Diniz), to “punish” the soba of Socoval and his local allies 
for “insubordination” and attacks promoted against African vassals in Dombe Grande. African 
rulers in Quilengues understood that this was a slaving operation, disguised as a “punitive” 
expedition, and united against the invasion. This episode exposes the violence of Luso-African 
slavers against local populations behind the “slaving frontier” and reveals the different African 
strategies of defence, ranging from direct conflict to complete avoidance of conflict. Finally, the 
chapter focuses on the community of slave traders in Benguela, the consequences of the 
independence of Brazil from Portugal to their commercial and social networks, and the negative 
impact that news about the end of the slave trade had not only among Luso-African and Brazilian 
slavers, but also among African rulers. Consequently, the prospect of ending the slave trade ignited 
new cycles of violence in the backlands of Benguela. 
Thus, the history of the interior of Benguela between the seventeenth and the nineteenth 
century is one marked by violence, enslavement and resistance. Violence preceded the arrival of 
the Portuguese on the coast of Benguela, but it was undoubtedly boosted by increasing Atlantic 
demand for enslaved Africans. Violence was the main tool of enslavement, which in the hands of 
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both local and foreign agents of the Atlantic trade could take the form of wars, raids and 
kidnappings. Violence and enslavement, however, triggered resistance and sponsored strategies of 
defence on the part of African rulers, who learned to exploit the logistic limitations of the otherwise 





The land and the people(s) 
 
In a colonial report from 179931, the governor of Benguela, Alexandre José Botelho de 
Vasconcelos (1796-1800), stated that the Province of Quilengues was the largest of all seven 
provinces32 that composed the Captaincy of Benguela (Map 1). It was also the one with the highest 
number of people and heads of cattle. The governor described Quilengues as bordering the 
provinces of Benguela, Caconda and Galangue, and extending south as far as Cabo Negro (latitude 
15º50’S). Inland, the territory of Quilengues stretched to the lands of Humbe, in the inner basin of 
the Cunene River. Important sobados33 of southern Benguela, including Quipungo, Huíla, 
Humpata, Njau, Mulondo, Gambos, Handa and Humbe, as well as smaller communities of 
nomadic herders like the Mucuandos, Mucubaes, Mocorocas, and Muchanhamas formed the 
political and cultural landscape of this huge territory (Appendix 10). The Portuguese claimed to 
control all of it, although their access was effectively banned in many of those places34.   
Although colonial officials35, ethnographers36 and novelists37 of Angola have portrayed the 
“Quilengues” (or “Kilenges”) as a single “tribe”38, I argue that they were not a distinct 
                                                 
31  Alexandre Jose Botelho de Vasconcelos, “Descripção da Capitania de Benguella, suas Províncias, Povos, Rios mais 
caudelosos, Minas de Ferro, e Enxofre, e outras particularidades que tem, mais consideráveis, por Alexandre José 
Botelho de Vasconcellos, 5º governador, em Benguella 1º d’Agosto em 1799”, Annaes Marítimos e Coloniaes, 4ª. 
Série, Parte Não Oficial (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1844), 150. 
32 Although the governor of Benguela, Alexandre José Botelho de Vasconcelos, divided the Captaincy of Benguela 
into “seven provinces”, they were technically two “presídios” (Benguela and Caconda) and five “districtos” 
(Quilengues, Huambo, Bailundo, Bihé, Galangue), as founded by the governor of Angola Inocêncio de Sousa 
Coutinho in 1769. Quilengues maintained its status of “district” until 1870, when it became a municipality. For more, 
see Chapter 2.  
33 Sobado is the territory under control of the soba (local African ruler).  
34 For instance, in the lands of the Humbe, “whites” were not allowed to enter until 1844, when itinerant traders, 
including the explorer Bernadino José Brochado, were allowed to enter the sobado of Mulondo, as long as he used a 
kind of “sarong” (traditional garment) instead of trousers: Bernardino José Brochado, “Descripção das terras do 
Humbe, Camba, Mulondo, Quanhama, e outras, contendo uma idéia da sua população, seus costumes, vestuários, 
etc.”, Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino, parte não oficial, Série I, Novembro (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1855), 188. 
See also, José Falcão, A Questão do Zaire (Coimbra: J. Diogo Pires, 1883), 86. 
35 Carlos Roma Machado de Faria e Maia, Colonização do planalto de Huíla e Moçamedes (Lisboa: Typographia 
Universal, 1919); Mario Milheiros, Notas de Etnografia Angolana: Esboço para um estudo etnográfico das tribos de 
Angola, 1ª. Ed. (Luanda: Edição do Mensário Administrativo, 1951).   
36 Carlos Duparquet, Viagens a Cimbebásia (Luanda, Museu de Angola: 1953); José de Oliveira Ferreira Diniz, 
Populações Indígenas de Angola (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 1918). 
37 Jorge Arrimar, O Planalto dos Pássaros (Porto: Campo das Letras, 2002); Guilherme de Alaya Monteiro, A 
Conquista do Sertão (Alfragide: Casa das Letras, 2012).  
38 I chose not to work with the concept of “tribe” because of its colonialist connotation. I do reproduce the term when 
used by one of the authors of the bibliography, but always in between quotation marks to clarify it is an inadequate 
analytical category. For more, see Introduction. 
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ethnolinguistic group until at least the late nineteenth century. Indeed, the documentation presented 
here identifies a mosaic of different “ethic groups”39 living within the district of Quilengues. This 
included local sobados of the region, such as Socoval and Lumbimbe, but also a great number of 
exiled polities to the south from Humbe known as the “Muhumbe potentates”. Hence, my thesis 
focuses on the study of the territory of Quilengues as a Luso-African invention and the historical 
processes experienced by the different peoples who inhabited it until about 1830. It is not a thesis 
about the “Kilenge people” per se.  
Beginning in 1769, the Portuguese colonial administration tried to create new outposts in 
the interior of Benguela. However, as was the case before, it held little information about the 
sertões40. Colonial knowledge about the terrain was very limited even in areas close to the town 
of São Filipe de Benguela. This problem increased in relation to the southern portion of the 
Captaincy. The lands in the interior of Cabo Negro were explored by a series of expeditions 
launched by the Baron of Moçamedes (governor of the Colony of Angola during 1784-1790) in 
178541. These ventures mapped the southern coast until Angra dos Negros (15º10’S) by land and 
sea. The land expedition also explored the interior before returning to São Filipe de Benguela. In 
1785, another venture explored the sertões of Quilengues down to Cabo Negro. The data collected 
during these expeditions generated a series of maps of the interior Benguela that filled in a blank 
in the Portuguese cartography of West Central Africa, and was later reproduced in maps made by 
other European cartographers42. As a result of the foundation of the new “provinces” of 
                                                 
39 As I mentioned above, I avoid using the concept of “tribe” due to its theoretical limitations and historical stigmas. 
Nevertheless, as previously discussed in the introduction of this dissertation, there are also limitations in the use of 
“ethnic” labels. For more, see Introduction  
40 According to Rafael Bluteau, Diccionario da Lingua Portugueza, Tomo 1 (Lisboa: Simão Thaddeo Ferreira, 1789), 
396, “sertão” (“sertões” in plural) is the “core of the lands”, “the bushes away from the coast”, opposite to “maritime” 
and “coastal” areas. In a poetic sense, sertão is the place where things are “more ardent”. I chose to use the Portuguese 
term “sertões” instead of “hinterland”. The sertões, in the sense used here, are all the lands beyond Portuguese control. 
Many of them were actually unknown to the Portuguese colonial administration until the twentieth century. For those 
areas close to the coast but outside of Portuguese control, I adopt the use of the term “backlands” 
41 For more on the expedition to Cabo Negro in 1785, see Chapter 3. See also “Relação da viagem que fiz desta cidade 
de Benguela para as do Lovar, no anno de 1794”, Documento No. 21, in Alfredo Albuquerque Felner, Angola: 
Apontamentos sobre a colonização dos planaltos e litoral do sul de Angola, 3 Vols. (Lisboa: Agência Geral das 
Colônias, 1940), 236-237; Augusto Antonio de Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola, 1784-1791”, 
Boletim da Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa, 7ª série, (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1887), 417-453.  
42 J. Walker, “Map of the Coast and Interior of Congo, Angola and Benguela” (1822), in Thomas Edward Bowdich. 
An Account of the Discoveries of the Portuguese in the Interior of Angola and Mozambique (London: John Booth, 
1824); Philippe Vandermaelen, “Benguela Afrique” (1827), in Atlas universel de geographie physique, politique, 
statistique et mineralogique... (Bruxelles, 1827). 
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Moçamedes and Huíla in the 1840s and 1850s43, the size and importance of Quilengues was 
reduced drastically44.    
The territories in the sertões of São Filipe de Benguela – between the central plateau and 
the Chela Mountain Range – were locally known as Mbuelo, a word the Portuguese translated as 
“países de baixo”, or the lowlands45. The independent polities of Mbuelo were often in conflict 
with those of Caconda (Kakonda), Huambo (Wambo), Bailundo (Mbailundo), Bihé (Viye)46, 
located in zones of higher elevation known as the Nano and further into the plateau47. For centuries, 
the Mbuelo had been an intersection for groups of African migrants. Since at least the end of the 
first millennia, there were extensive cultural exchanges among the peoples of Central Africa living 
between parallels 5º-8º S and 18º-20º S, which extends from the rivers Congo/Zaire and Kasai in 
the north to the rivers Cunene and Zambezi in the south. Quilengues, in particular, was a major 
migratory corridor that connected Benguela to places as far as the Okavango Delta, in today’s 
northern Namibia48. 
                                                 
43 For more about the foundation of the districts of Moçamedes and Huíla, see Antonio Joaquim Guimarães Jr., 
Memória sobre a exploração da costa ao sul de Benguella, na África Occidental, e fundação do primeiro 
estabelecimento commercial na Bahia de Moçamedes (Lisboa, Typographia de L.C.A., 1842); Jose Bento Ferreira de 
Almeida, Moçamedes (Lisboa: Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa, 1880); F. M. Bordalo, “Viagens na África e na 
América”, in O Panorama; jornal literário e instructivo (Lisboa, Typographia do Panorama, 1854), 227-228; Maia, 
Colonização do planalto de Huíla e Moçamedes. See also José C. Curto and Arshad Desai, “The Early Demography 
of Moçamedes, 1839-1869: A Preliminary Analysis”, Historae, Vol. 10, No. 2 (2019): 11-32. 
44 As we will see below, mid-nineteenth century Quilengues had lost a large portion of its territory as described by 
Governor Vasconcelos in 1799. Besides losing land to the new provinces of Moçamedes and Huíla, the district of 
Quilengues also lost the lands of Humbe, further to the south (Cunene Basin). By the 1850s, according to the itinerant 
trader and explorer Bernardino José Brochado, “Notícia de alguns territórios, e dos povos que os habitam, situados na 
parte meridional da Província de Angola”, Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino, parte não oficial, Série I, Dezembro 
(Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1855), 204, Quilengues was reduced to the territory between Dombe Grande (northwest, 
close to the coast), Nano (east highlands) and Huíla (south). 
45 Gastão Sousa Dias, Um grande missionário: Padre Ernesto Lecomte. Coleção Pelo Império, No. 115 (Lisboa: 
Agência Geral das Colônias, 1946), 13, included the southern regions of Quipungo, Luceque and even the highlands 
of Huíla as part of Mbuelo.  
46 I chose to use the Luso-African version for the names of the places in the interior of Benguela. There are a few 
exceptions when I use both versions, such as Caconda and Kakonda, in which the former is used to identify the Luso-
African presídio and the latter to identify the African potentate.   
47 José Maria de Lacerda, “Observações sobre a viagem da costa d’Angola a costa de Moçambique, 1797”, in Annaes 
Marítimos e Coloneaes, 4ª série, parte não oficial (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1844), 198; Ernesto Lecomte, “No 
Cubango: Comunicação a Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa, em 3 de junho de 1889”, Boletim da Sociedade de 
Geographia de Lisboa, 8ª série, No 7 (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1889), 346-358; R. F. Burton, The Lands of 
Cazembe (London: John Murray, 1873), 24; Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a colonização... Vol. 1, 123; 
Duparquet, Viagens a Cimbebásia, 64. 
48 Jan Vansina, “Communications between Angola and East Central Africa before c. 1700,” in Angola on the Move: 
Transport Routes, Communications and History, Beatrix Heintze and Achim von Oppen, eds. (Frankfurt am Main: 
Verlag Otto Lembeck, 2008), 130-143; Joseph C. Miller, “Angola central e sul por volta de 1840”, Estudos Afro-
Asiáticos, No. 32, December (1997): 5  
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Since the object of this study is Quilengues as a territory, it is necessary to make a careful 
analysis of its dimension and composition over time. I argue that the size of Quilengues decreased 
along with its importance throughout the nineteenth century. At the end of the eighteenth century, 
the district of Quilengues was a huge territory because it included the lands that would later become 
the districts of Moçamedes and Huíla. After the foundation of the coastal town of Moçamedes in 
1840, the size of the district of Quilengues was significantly reduced. The arrival of new 
Portuguese-speaking settlers in Huíla during the 1850s also helped decrease its importance as an 
intermediary with the sobados of southern Benguela (Humpata, Quipungo, Gambos, Canina, Njau, 
etc.). Following the construction of the Benguela Railroad in 1899, Quilengues also lost its 
relevance as an intersection between the central plateau and the coast. By the twentieth century, 
what was once the largest district of the Captaincy of Benguela was reduced to the status of a 
municipality within the Province of Huíla.  
This chapter begins by defining the general location and composition of “Quilengues of 
Benguela”, distinguishing it from other locations in Angola with similar names. It discusses the 
origins of the name Quilengues (or Kilenges) and its diverse meanings, highlighting its plural form 
(“os Quilengues”) as an indicator of its political and cultural plurality.  
I trace the many transformations suffered by the territories in the interior of Benguela 
through a close analysis of colonial maps from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries 
(Appendices). These cartographic sources provide valuable information about the composition and 
extension of Quilengues over time, and allow a better understanding of this historical process. 
Despite being politically driven discourses about the past, as with other written documents, these 
maps are valuable sources for the writing of history and should be treated with the same and critical 
approach given to other sources. The chapter therefore provides a close analysis of a series of 
historical maps of Benguela and its interior from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with 
special attention given to its physical, political and cultural markers.  
This chapter then discusses the topographic, hydrographic, and “ethnographic” features of 
Quilengues, linking its different environmental and ecological characteristics to the development 
of various economies and polities. I briefly show how the rise of agropastoralist communities in 
the interior of Benguela and the cultural choices followed by each of them, which generated 
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particular collective imaginations and oral traditions, led to the rise of institutions of governance 
and the formation of complex societies. 
Finally, the chapter analyses the ethnolinguistic composition of the peoples who inhabited 
Quilengues. Although the territories in the interior of Benguela are usually identified as the lands 
of the Ovimbundu people, numerous other ethnolinguistic groups lived in the region prior to the 
twentieth century. These different groups of peoples, including the Nyaneka, Nkhumbi, Handa, 
Ngambwe, Muso, Ndombe and the Mbundu, did not remain fixed and isolated in particular 
territories. On the contrary, they moved about constantly, interacting with one another and with 
other groups that migrated through or into their territories. This chapter shows the ethnographic 
and linguistic complexity of Quilengues; and I argue that such complexity arose from centuries of 
cultural interactions between the several peoples that occupied the interior of Benguela. Thus, the 
ethnolinguistic similarities and differences of the peoples of Quilengues resulted from recurrent 
waves of migrations, long-term multicultural movements of expansions and constrictions, and not 
from the unidirectional diffusion of ideas from the central plateau (Nano) to the lowlands 
(Mbuelo), as recorded by some oral traditions.    
The creation of the ethnic label “Nyaneka-Nkhumbi” by the missionary and ethnographer 
Carlos Estermann in the beginning of the twentieth century to identify the peoples living in the 
lowlands of Mbuelo helped cover up the presence of these Mbangala warriors in Quilengues, to 
the point that some historians have argued that they were not a relevant group in Benguela and its 
interior49. I will briefly show the history of the invention of the term “Nyaneka-Nkhumbi” and 
how it replaced the identity of “Mbangala”, which despite being imprecise (since it was not even 
an “ethnic identity”), bears great historical relevance.  
 
Quilengues or Kilenge?  
The origin of the name “Quilengues” is a matter that deserves some attention. There are 
different meanings and many spellings for this word (Appendix 9). Art historian Carl Haenlein, 
for instance, has defined “kilengi” as a Bantu word from Congo (Zaire) that means “joy arising 
                                                 
49 Mariana P. Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World: Benguela and its Hinterland (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 40-41 
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through beauty”50. There are also documental references to an animal from the sertões of Benguela 
called “Quilengue”, although it is not clear what kind of animal it was51. Most of the historical 
references to “Quilengues”, however, are related to a region in the interior of São Filipe de 
Benguela (upper Coporolo River) inhabited by groups of Mbangala warlords erroneously called 
“jagas” by Luso-Africans (Chapter 2).  
The oldest reference to the territory of Quilengues comes from Antonio de Cadornega’s 
História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, which was completed in 1680. In the last tome of this 
three-volume work, Cadornega made three separate references to Quilengues, all of them 
portraying it as a territory inhabited by many powerful “jagas”52. He first cited the “Província do 
Gemge” in the interior of the coastal town of Benguela, a place inhabited by quilombos53 of Jagas 
called “Quillengas”54. In another reference, Cadornega wrote about the “Província dos Quilongas” 
(plural form), which he identified as a separate region from the “Província dos Quimbundos” (also 
plural) and from the “Província de Hoila”55. Some pages later, he mentioned “os Quilengas” 
(plural), which this time he identified as part of the “Quimbundos56” living in the interior of 
Benguela. Cadornega depicted the region of the Quilengas as having many sobas (“muitos sovas”), 
                                                 
50 Carl Haenlein, “Kilengi”, in Christopher D. Roy, Kilengi: African Art from the Bareiss Family Collection (Seattle: 
University of Washington Press, 1997), 11.  
51 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 53, Doc. 43-A, “Carta para o Secretário de Estado da Marinha e do Ultramar Francisco 
Xavier de Mendonça Furtado”, (1 August 1769); BNL, Códice 8743, fls. 77-78, “Carta para o Ilmo. Exmo. Snr. 
Manoel da Cunha e Menezes, Governador de Pernambuco”, (30 November 1769); BNL, Códice 8743, fls. 78v-80, 
“Ordem por que se há de governar o Capitão Manoel Antonio Tavares, que vai em um navio de Sua Majestade 
conduzir a sua real presença treze zebras, um quilengue, um carneiro, quatro corsas e vários viveiros de pássaros” (30 
November 1769). 
52 See also Ralph Delgado, O Reino de Benguela: do descobrimento à criação do governo subalterno (Lisboa: Ed. do 
Autor, 1945), 157; Gladwyn M. Childs, “The Peoples of Angola in the Seventeenth Century According to Cadornega”, 
The Journal of African History, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1960): 275. 
53 Quilombos or Kilombos were Mbangala military camps built around religious ritualistic practices. According to Jan 
Vansina, “Quilombos on São Tomé, or in Search of Original Sources”, History in Africa, Vol. 23 (1996): 453, the first 
known appearance of the word “quilombo” was in a 1622 letter from Governor João Correia de Sousa, despite previous 
descriptions since the beginning of the seventeenth century given by Andrew Battell about this kind of fortified 
encampament of the Mbangala. For more, see Chapter 2.  
54 Antonio de Oliveira de Cadornega, História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, 1680, vol. 3 (Lisboa, Agência Geral do 
Ultramar, [1680] 1972), 168.  
55 Cadornega, História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, 232.  
56 The term “Quimbundo” is misplaced here, because Cadornega is referring to the people of the central plateau 
(Nano), who in the twentieth century will be labeled “Ovimbundo”. The terms commonly used in colonial documents 
to identify the peoples of the central plateau from the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries were “Mbundu” or 
“Munano”, but sometimes the term “Quimbundo” was used as well. See also Paulo Martins Pinheiro de Lacerda, 
“Notícia da cidade de São Filippe de Benguella e dos costumes dos gentios habitantes daquele sertão” (10 November 
1797), Annaes Marítimos e Coloneaes, 5ª série (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1845), 486-491; Antonio da Silva Porto, 




thus suggesting that it did not constitute a single socio-political entity, but was rather comprised 
by a number of smaller polities. He included a certain sova Angolo from the province of “Hila” as 
part of the Quimbundos living in the interior of the town of Benguela57.  
Ethnographers have referred to the territory and the peoples of Quilengues in various ways. 
They have also pointed out some differences in the name in an attempt to understand its origins. 
In 1934, the ethnographer Wilfrid Hambly wrote about the “Ovimbundu of Elende” in reference 
to the peoples of Quilengues58. Two decades later, José Redinha explained the name “Kilengues” 
as an adaptation of “Tyilengue”, which he considered an ethnic group of its own, different from 
Kakondas, Gandas, Nganguelas, etc.59. In 1960, Gladwyn M. Childs also referred to the word 
“Tyilengue” in relation to Quilengues, but used the variant “Chilengues” as well60. One year later, 
Carlos Estermann suggested that the name Quilengues was related to the “Tyilengue-Humbi” and 
the “Tyilengue-Muso”. He also then made reference to the tyilombo tyoviholo, a term related to the 
military camp (kilombo) of the ovi-holo in Quilengues. Estermann also pointed to another 
“tyilombo” of Tyilengue warlords in the lands of Catala (Katala). It was also known as tyilombo 
tyonongoma, or the “quilombo of drums”61. All of these references indicate that the Quilengues 
(Kilenges, Tyilengue or Chilengues) were groups of warriors from different “ethnic” backgrounds 
who established independent polities that occupied large portions of the interior of Benguela.   
It is also important to reflect on the implications behind the use of “Quilengues” with the 
“q” rather than “Kilenges” with the “k”. Several ethnographers62 and historians63 have adopted the 
use of the terms “Kilengue” and “Kilengi” (with the “k”), implying there was a proper “African 
origin” for both the name and the ethnic label. Such is also the case for “Kakonda”, “Kisama” or 
“Kasanji”, names that the Portuguese appropriated and turned into “Caconda”, “Quissama” and 
                                                 
57 Cadornega, História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, 250. 
58 Wilfrid D Hambly, The Ovimbundu of Angola (Chicago, 1934), 129-142. 
59 José Redinha, Coleção Etnográfica (Luanda: Museu de Angola, 1955), 40. 
60 Childs, “The Peoples of Angola in the Seventeenth Century According to Cadornega”, 242 
61 Carlos Estermann, Ethnography of Southwestern Angola: The Nyaneka-Nkumbi Ethnic Group, Vol. II (New 
York/London: Africana Publishing Company, [1961] 1979), 19. 
62 Redinha, Coleção Etnográfica; Estermann, Ethnography of Southwestern Angola, Vol II. 
63 Joseph C. Miller, Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade, 1730-1830 (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1988); Rosa Cruz e Silva, “The Saga of Kakonda and Kilengues. Relations between 
Benguela and its Interior, 1791-1796”, in José C. Curto and Paul E. Lovejoy eds., Enslaving Connections: Changing 
Cultures of Africa and Brazil during the Era of Slavery (New York: Humanity Books, 2004), 249-263; Thomas J. 
Desch-Obi, Fighting for Honor: The History of African Martial Art Traditions in the Atlantic World (Columbia: The 
University of South Carolina Press, 2008); Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World.  
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“Cassange”. Angolan etnographers have commonly used the standardized “African spelling” (with 
“k”) in reference to African potentates, and the “Portuguese version” (with “c” or “q”) to describe 
areas occupied by Portuguese and Luso-Africans64. Hence, “Kakonda” or “Kasanji” refer to the 
sobados, while “Caconda” and “Cassange” are used to identify the Luso-African settlements in 
the same regions.  
In the case of Quilengues, a name derived from Tyilengue or Otchilenge, the use of the 
spelling with “k” instead of “q” suggests an African origin for the name of the region prior to the 
arrival of the Portuguese, thus obscuring the history of the making of Quilengues from the 
seventeenth century onwards. I argue that the geographical and even ethnographical meanings of 
“Quilengues” are largely outside impositions that did not exist prior to the arrival of the Portuguese 
in the region in the early seventeenth century. Hence, there was no original African version for 
“Quilengues” with “k” (such as Kisama and Quissama). Instead, Quilengues should be understood 
as a Luso-African corruption of local terms (such as Tyilengue, Otchilenge, Chilengue or even 
Elenge).        
Another important issue involving the word “Quilengues” concerns its usage in the plural 
form. According to the references at hand, there is no single “Quilengue”, but rather only 
“Quilengues” (os Quilengues). This suggests that the multiethnic features of the region were well 
known even as early as the seventeenth century. It also suggests that Quilengues had always been 
a territory occupied by multiple important African rulers65. Hence, the plurality of “Quilengues” 
is reflected in its own name.  
 
Quilengues of Benguela  
There was not only one Quilengues in West Central Africa. In the case of Angola and 
Benguela, it is not rare to find similar names in colonial documents referencing to different places. 
There are, for instance, at least three “Cubal” rivers in Benguela (Quicombo-Cubal, Cubal da 
Hanya, Cubal de Namibe), while the name “Ngola” can be found in the district of Quilengues and 
                                                 
64 For instance, Augusto Bastos, “Traços gerais sobre a Ethnographia do Districto de Benguella”, Boletim da 
Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa, série 26, (1908): 9-13.  
65 See also Jan Vansina, How Societies are Born: Governance in West Central Africa before 1600 (Charlottesville and 
London: University of Virginia Press, 2004), 190.  
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Huíla in contexts that were different from those used by the rulers of Ndongo (Angola)66. Hence, 
beyond Quilengues of Benguela there was another “Quilengues” located between the rivers Bengo 
(or Zenza) and Ucua, in the northern part of the Colony of Angola67.  
The region dubbed Quilengues in the northern part of the Colony of Angola, also called 
Quilengues-Ngongi, Quilengues de Golungo or Zenza e Quilengues, was part of the district of 
Zenza do Golungo68. According to the memoir written on the governor of Angola, Luis Motta Feo 
(1816-1819), the district of Zenza e Quilengues was part of a large district to the north of the 
Cuanza River simply called Golungo69. Yet, other sources attested it was a district created much 
earlier, in the sixteenth century. The mid-nineteenth century traveller and bureaucrat Francisco 
Travassos Valdez, for example, registered that the first governor of Angola, Paulo Dias de Novais, 
founded the district of Zenza e Quilengues in 158270.   
In the nineteenth century, the Portuguese colonial administration divided Zenza do 
Golungo into three districts (Golungo Alto, Zenza e Quilengues and Dembos) in an attempt to 
better control it. In the late 1810s, Governor Motta Feo registered that the district of Zenza e 
Quilengues had a total of 741 houses and 7,117 moradores (inhabitants) and there were 71 vassal 
sobas71 in the region72. During the 1850s, according to Valdez, there were 5,000 inhabitants in the 
district, ruled by fourteen sobas73. 
                                                 
66 For more on the use of “Ngola” among the peoples of Quilengues and Huíla, see Vansina, How Societies are Born, 
193. 
67 The Portuguese historian Carlos Couto, Os Capitães-Mores de Angola no Século XVIII (Luanda: Instituto de 
Investigação Científica de Angola, 1972), 117, mistook the two Quilengues, placing the districts of Zenza and 
Quilengues within the Captaincy of Benguela.  
68 Manoel Antonio Brito, “Notícia de alguns dos districtos de que se compõe esta província” Annaes do Conselho 
Ultramarino, parte não oficial, Série II (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1867), 83-86; João Vieira Carneiro, 
“Observações relativas a vários objectos que lhe parecem não exactos no 3º volume dos Ensaios sobre a Estatística 
das Possessões Portuguesas na África Occidental pelo Concelheiro José Joaquim Lopes de Lima” in Annaes do 
Conselho Ultramarino, parte não oficial, Série II (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1867), 172-179.  
69 J. C. Feo Cardozo de Castellobranco Torres, Memórias contendo a biographia do vice-almirante Luiz da Mota Feo 
Torres: A história dos governadores e capitaens generaes de Angola, desde 1575 até 1825 (Paris: Fantin, 1825), 362-
363. 
70 Francisco Travassos Valdez, Six Years of a Traveller’s Life in Western Africa, Volume 2 (London: Hurst and 
Blackett, 1861), 287. 
71 “Vassal sobas” were African rulers who associated themselves to the Portuguese colonial administration through 
the signing of vassalage treaties. These treaties were based on old medieval European traditions, but also incorporated 
African customs over time. For more about “vassalage” and “vassal sobas”, see Chapter 4. 
72 Torres, Memórias contendo a biografia..., 362-363; Raimundo da Cunha Matos, Compêndio histórico das 
possessões de Portugal na África (Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional, [c.1835] 1963), 320. 
73 Valdez, Six Years of a Traveller’s Life in Western Africa, Vol. 2, 286-287. 
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Although the southern region, in the upper Coporolo River, was already known as 
Quilengues since at least mid-seventeenth century, Francisco Inocêncio de Sousa Coutinho, 
governor of Angola during 1764-1772, officially created the district of Quilengues of Benguela 
around the settlement of Salvaterra dos Magos in 1769. The district incorporated new territories 
over time. It became so extensive that it was often presented as two complementary territories: 
“Quilengues e Sambos” and “Quilengues e Huíla”. Quilengues e Sambos related to the highlands 
of Quilengues, the regions of Ganda, Bembes and Hanya. Quilengues e Huíla, on the other hand, 
represented the southern regions, including the sobados of Huíla, Humpata, Njau, Quipungo, 
Mulondo74.  
Quilengues e Sambos comprised an especially extensive territory in the interior of the 
Benguela. The lands of Sambos were located between the sobados of Huambo and Bihé, far into 
the lands of the Nano75. Hence, the district of Quilengues e Sambos included a massive part of the 
Angolan central plateau, complicating all attempts to define precise borders for Quilengues. As 
such, Quilengues was part of the Nano, as the Nano was part of Quilengues. Yet, at least one 
colonial historian chose to include the region of Bihé along with both Quilengues, defining 
“Quilengues e Sambos, Quilengues e Huíla, e Bihé” as a single district within the jurisdiction of 
Benguela76. 
The district of Quilengues e Huíla included the lands in the interior of Angra dos Negros, 
which in the 1840s would become the district of Moçamedes (today Namibe). At the time of the 
publication of the memoirs of Governor Mota Feo (1825), there was already an incipient port in 
Moçamedes (13ºS), but with no colonial apparatus, not even a military detachment. According to 
this governor, the deep involvement of the populations of Quilengues e Huíla in the Atlantic slave 
trade was the main reason behind the failure of alternative forms of economic development based 
on agriculture, fishing and mining. He concluded that the slave trade took away the necessary 
                                                 
74 Torres, Memórias contendo a biografia..., 369; Matos, Compêndio histórico das possessões de Portugal na África, 
324-325.  
75 Porto, Viagens e Apontamentos, Vol. 1, 364 – note 110. See also Edward Weller, “Mapa do Itinerário do Major 
Serpa Pinto de Benguella ao Bihé, 1877-1878”, in Alexandre Alberto de Serpa Pinto, Como eu atravessei a África: A 
carabina d’el-rei, Parte 1 (Londres: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington, 1881); Antonio Augusto de Oliveira, 
“Carta de Angola, contendo indicações de produção e salubridade, 1885”, in Comissão de Cartographia de Portugal 
(Biblioteca Nacional de Portugal). 
76 Raimundo da Cunha Matos, Compêndio histórico das possessões de Portugal na África, 324. 
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labour force and imposed a routine of violence and fear among the local populations, which 
hindered all attempts at effective colonization77.  
 
Colonial cartography of West Central Africa 
The first problem in writing a history of Quilengues is determining its borders. Extant 
reports show different boundaries and describe altered political realities inside and around 
Quilengues. Such constant reshaping of the territory derived not only from internal disputes among 
African autonomous warlords (jagas, sobas and other potentates) in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, but also because of the Portuguese colonial project to conquer the so-called 
“hinterland”78. Hence, the continuous process of land appropriation and reconfiguration of its 
borders makes it difficult for historians to identify the territorial extension of Quilengues over time, 
let alone its socio-political composition.  
The Portuguese colonial project in Angola and Benguela was grounded in the 
reconfiguration of African territories through the imposition of new geographic markers. This new 
colonial geography relied on scientific measurements such as latitude and longitude, and thus 
abandoned African spatial perceptions and traditional landmarks79. It was a symbolic conquest of 
the land. The Portuguese slowly mutated African lands into a European-occupied territory by 
sketching maps and drawing frontiers. Therefore, the maps of Angola and Benguela from the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries relate more to a colonial project than to reality on the ground.  
                                                 
77 Torres, Memórias contendo a biografia..., 371-375; Almeida, Moçamedes, 48.  
78 I chose not to use the term “hinterland” because it is a concept loaded with colonial bias. The “hinterland” was but 
a subordinate space to the “centre of power” emerging from the coast. It was usually used by the Portuguese to claim 
control over lands the colonial administration had little knowledge about. During the Conference of Berlin (1884-
1885) the Portuguese tried to impose the concept of “hinterland” to guarantee control over virtually unlimited 
extensions of land to the interior of the continent, in a futile attempt to gain mandate over the territories between the 
“colonies” of Angola and Mozambique. For the “absurdity” of the concept of hinterland during the “Scramble of 
Africa”, see Godfrey N. Uzoigwe, “European Partition and Conquest of Africa: An Overview”, in General History of 
Africa, Volume VII. Africa under Colonial Domination, 1880-1935, Albert Adu Boahen, ed. (Berkeley: UNESCO / 
University of California Press, 1985), 19-44.  See also André Suchet, “The concept of hinterland in geography: A state 
of the art”, Ería: Revista Cuatrimestral de Geografía, Año 37, Vol. 2 (2017): 125-130; Maria Emília Madeira Santos, 
Nos caminhos de África: serventia e posse (Angola, século XIX) (Lisboa: Instituto de Investigação Científica Tropical, 
1998), 386-400.  
79 Isabel Castro Henriques, Os Pilares da Diferença: Relações Portugal-África, séculos XV-XX (Lisbon: 
Caleidoscópio, 2004), 10-12; Maria Emília Madeira Santos, “A cartografia dos poderes: da matriz africana à 
organização colonial do espaço”, Africana Studia, No. 9 (2006): 129-131. 
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It took time, however, for Portuguese cartographers to have enough data about the interior 
of Benguela to be able to erase the African markers from them. During the centuries of attempted 
penetration, it was of great strategic importance for the colonial administration to know the 
location of Africans polities, especially their enemies (often dubbed jagas). The representation of 
African authorities in colonial maps served also as an instrument of legitimization of recently 
created Luso-African settlements80. Represented side by side in colonial maps, African traditional 
sites of power conferred legitimacy upon new Luso-African settlements often located in the same 
vicinity and inheriting the same name. This was the case of Kasanje (Cassange) in the interior of 
Angola and Kakonda (Caconda) in the interior of Benguela. These references to African powers 
were slowly replaced by an almost exclusively colonial version of the territory with the 
consolidation of colonialism in the twentieth century, which included the replacement of local 
names by Portuguese ones (Huambo, for example, was renamed Nova Lisboa). 
Political entities in the interior of Benguela, like many others in southern Africa, did not 
occupy fixed and well-delimited territories. Their lands and borders were largely determined by 
the current sites of their sobados and by the roads that connected them81. It was not rare for a 
sobado to move to a new site with the emergence of a new soba82. In fact, military campaigns and 
slaving raids often ended with the burning of residences (libatas) and fortified corrals (quipacas83), 
which served as an incentive for the relocation of the community following the reestablishment of 
peace. In 1796, for instance, the soba of Socoval requested authorization from the governor of 
Benguela to move his libatas to a new territory outside Quilengues to avoid recurrent violence 
perpetrated by slavers in the region (Chapter 4).  
Thus, the borders of African territories, such as those in the interior of Angola and 
Benguela, were not static because the powers that defined them were “alive”. Frontiers changed 
                                                 
80 Santos, “A cartografia dos poderes”, 134. 
81 Luc Cambrezy, “De l’information geographique à la représentation cartographique. Une liaison subordinnée à une 
certaine vision de l’espace”, in La cartographie en débat: Représenter convaincre, Luc Cambrezy and René de 
Maximy, eds. (Paris: Karthala-Orstom, 1995), 138.  
82 Santos, “A cartografia dos poderes”, 133. 
83 Quipacas were fortifications made of trunks of trees and thorny bushes, and covered with adobe, used by the 
Africans to protect themselves and their cattle. According to one description, quipacas were surrounded by tall walls 
with holes through which African warriors could aim and attack their enemies with arrows and guns, in case of a siege. 
Some had tunnels and hidden passages were used by African warriors to leave the fortification unnoticed to acquire 
supplies (including water from nearby rivers) and attack their enemies by surprise: Torres, Memórias contendo a 
biographia..., 268. See also Estevam C. Thompson, “Kilombos, quipacas and impuris: African fortifications in the 
wars of conquest in Benguela” (forthcoming).  
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following the necessities of people. In areas where the environment could not be controlled to 
facilitate sedentarization, the borders of a particular political entity were constantly being 
reshaped. The prevalence of perennial rivers and the recurrence of long droughts in the interior of 
Benguela exacerbated the mobile character of these semi-nomadic agropastoralist societies. It is 
particularly difficult to identify the location of small and independent pastoralist polities in the 
sertões, such as the Mucuandos, because of their nomadic characteristics. One student of Angola’s 
cartography has explained that territorial borders migrated with their peoples84.   
Although the colonial documentation persistently pronounces Portuguese authority over 
large portions of the interior of the Captaincy of Benguela, reality was that the knowledge and the 
effective control of the lands in the sertões belonged to Africans85. The latter fully limited and 
conditioned the access of outsiders by controlling the supply of porters and guides (Chapter 5). 
Moreover, at least until the mid-nineteenth century, the roads that connected the interior to the 
coast were under the effective control of African authorities86. 
 
The maps of Benguela in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries  
Cartography was largely used by the Portuguese colonial administration to classify and 
“organize” African populations in the interior of Benguela. Isabel Castro Henriques has argued 
that this exercise of identifying and registering the location of different “tribes” through ethnic and 
linguistic markers ultimately led to the creation of many of African “ethnicities”87. Instead of the 
natural “chaos” of having multiethnic groups occupying the same spaces, colonial cartography 
sought to impose “order” by presenting local populations as belonging to “autonomous cultural 
units”. Thus, political and ethnographic maps of Angola and Benguela imposed an artificial 
classification upon African social and cultural landscapes.   
Although the ultimate goal of colonial cartographers was to purge their work of African 
markers once they could replace them with scientific markers, or simply with Portuguese names, 
                                                 
84 Santos, “A cartografia dos poderes”, 132. 
85 Isabel Castro Henriques, Os Pilares da Diferença, 68. 
86 Santos, “A cartografia dos poderes”, 133. 
87 Isabel Castro Henriques, Território e Identidade: a construção da Angola colonial, c.1872-1926 (Lisboa: 
Universidade de Lisboa, 2004), 34. 
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the maps of Angola from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries still had African powers and 
knowledge impressed upon them. Over time, these references to African geographic and cultural 
markers were slowly replaced by colonial “discoveries” emanating from increasing scientific 
expeditions into the interior of the continent88. Not surprisingly, Africanist scholars have 
denounced the uncritical acceptance by some historians that the “map” and the “territory” are in 
“perfect coincidence”89.   
I make use of historical maps of Benguela to track the changes in the spatial and 
ethnolinguistic composition of Quilengues over time, paying special attention to physical and 
cultural references for that territory and the peoples that inhabited it. Dozens of historical maps of 
Africa, Angola and more specifically Benguela, produced between the seventeenth and the 
twentieth centuries, are available for analysis. By “reading” this historical cartography and 
reproducing the information on new georeferenced maps90, it has been possible to create a new 
cartographical representation of the interior of Benguela. The analysis of old and new maps, 
followed by their comparison with other historical accounts, allows for a better understanding of 
the political, social, and cultural processes under scrutiny in this thesis. A small sample of the great 
number of historical maps are reproduced in the Appendices, as well as snapshots of parts of the 
selected maps (Appendices). Others are not included in the Appendices, but are cited in footnotes 
and in the Bibliography under Cartographic Sources.  
The first map to be analyzed here is a general map of Africa from early eighteenth century 
(Appendix 1) drawn by the French cartographer Guillaume de L’Isle (1675-1726) and entitled 
“L’Afrique” (1708)91. This map presented innovations and a series of corrections compared to 
previous cartographic representations of Africa, like the disappearance of the mythical connection 
                                                 
88 Santos, Nos caminhos de África, 488-494. See also Antonio Augusto de Oliveira, “Carta das possessões portuguezas 
da Africa meridional segundo as convenções celebradas em 1891”, Comissão de Cartographia de Portugal (Paris: 
Erhard Frères Rue Denfert-Rochereau, 1891). 
89 Santos, “A cartografia dos poderes”, 129-131; Henriques, Território e Identidade, 10-15; Ilídio do Amaral, 
“Algumas reflexões de um geógrafo em torno do tema: memória e História, A construção das identidades”, IV 
Encontro Internacional sobre História de Angola, Luanda (2010): 10. 
90 Together with geographer Maria Cristina Fernandes, I have used the information collected from the historical 
cartography presented in this dissertation to produce georeferenced maps of Angola and Benguela from the 
seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries, which includes the location of Luso-African settlements and some major 
African polities. See Maps 1 to 4.  
91 Guillaume de L’Isle, “L' Afrique: Dressée sur les observations de Mrs. de l’Academie Royyale des Sciences, et 




between the rivers Nile and Zambezi and of the existence of internal islands in the Monomotapa 
(Mwene-a-Mutapa)92. Nonetheless, it still contains several mistakes, such as the location of the 
kingdom of Benin (West Africa) neighboring the Kingdom of Loango, as well as the narrow 
internal distance between Angola and Mozambique.  
The cartographer de L’Isle (Delisle) had access to some long-lost Portuguese map of the 
“kingdoms” of Loango, Kongo, Angola and Benguela, from which he acquired the data for his 
own map93. He used a mix of French and Portuguese to write this information. The three major 
rivers of West Central Africa are represented in the map – Congo/Zaire, Cuanza (Coanza) and 
Cunene (Cuneni) – showing their trajectory into African territories in the far interior, such as the 
Kingdom of Matamba (Appendix 1.1). The map also brings information about the presídios of 
Angola: Muxima (Muchinia), Massangano (Maʃangano), Cambambe, Ambaca (Emuaca), and 
Pungo-a-Ndongo (Mapungo das Pedras). 
The territory of the Captaincy of Benguela (identified in this map as “Kingdom of 
Benguela”) is delimited by the rivers Longa to the north and Coporolo (Gubororo) to the south. 
The map shows the presence of three fortifications on the coast of Benguela: Benguela Velha 
(north), St. Philippe ou Benguela (central) and Dante (south), the latter being where the port town 
of Moçamedes was to be founded in 1840 (Angra dos Negros). Below Benguela, one finds the 
“country of Huíla” (“Pays d’Ohyla”), at the inner basin of the Cunene River, also described as “Le 
Grande Riviere”. Beyond the Cunene River, the lands are marked as belonging to Muzumbo 
Acalunga. Further south from this entire region highlighted in green, de L’Isle included the 
legendary “Kingdom of Mataman” or “Climbebi”94.   
In this same map, at the border of the so called “kingdoms” of Angola and Benguela, far 
into the interior, one finds the “Jagas ou Giagas”, a reference to the Mbangala warriors who 
roamed the sertões and later founded the kingdom of Kasanji. They are located below the 
“Kingdom of Matamba”, ruled by the warrior-queen Ginga (Nzinga), who became leader of a 
“Jaga” (Mbangala) army. There is another land of “Jagas” across the Cunene River, north from 
the lands of Muzumbo Acalunga (also a Jaga), where de L’Isle wrote “Iaga”. As we will see in 
                                                 
92 Avelino Teixeira da Mota, “Os portugueses e a cartografia antiga da África Central, 1550-1800”, Boletim da 
Academia de Ciências de Lisboa, Vol. 35 (1963): 24. 
93 Mota, “Os portugueses e a cartografia antiga da África Central”, 24-26. 
94 For more about the “kingdom of Mataman”, see Chapter 2.  
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Chapter 2, the northern Mbangala warriors who settled in Kasanje were not the only ones moving 
about in the sertões of Benguela. Another branch of (southern) Mbangala bands migrated towards 
the Cunene River and the kingdom of Mataman (Cimbebasia) in the middle of the sixteenth century 
(Map 2).  
Although this map does not have much information about the polities in the interior of 
Benguela, the Coporolo River, which happens to be the main access to Quilengues, is represented 
and identified as an important water way. The same does not happen with other important local 
rivers, such as the Marimbombo or the Catumbela. The reference to the “Kingdom of Mataman” 
is also important and suggests that the memory about the invasion of Cimbebasia by Mbangala 
bands of warriors had not yet been erased. The 1708 map clearly shows that the sertões 
surrounding the so-called “Kingdom of Benguela” were then occupied by a series of Jaga 
warlords, including “Muzumbo Acalunga”. This is also a reference to the Mbangala, as we shall 
see in Chapter 2.  
The map of the kingdoms of Kongo, Angola and Benguela from 1754 (Appendix 2) 
produced by the French cartographer Jacques Nicolas Bellin (1703-1754)95, a member of the 
Académie de Marine and of the Royal Society of London, contains the first cartographic reference 
to the “Province de Jenje ou les Quillenjes” (Appendix 2.1). It is a reference to Cadornega’s 
“Gemge” from 1680. Quilengues was located between the rivers “Gubororo” (Coporolo) and 
“Guiamboka”, and the margin of the upper Cunene River. The Coporolo is represented by Bellin 
as the largest river in the Captaincy of Benguela, an imprecise information that has the objective 
of highlighting its importance in connecting the interior and the coast. It crosses the entirety of the 
sertões from Quilengues to the Atlantic shore south of the land of “les Quimbondos”. At its mouth, 
the river receives two names: the local one, Gubororo, and its Portuguese version, “Rio S. 
François” (sic). This river crosses the lands of the Jaga Kakonda, attesting that “Kakonda” was 
originally located within the lowlands of Quilengues (in Bongo), not on the central plateau.     
This 1754 map registers the existence of several political entities in the interior of 
Benguela, many of them classified as “Jagas”. Jaga Kakonda, Jaga Kalemba and Jaga Kahinka, 
are all located between the Coporolo River (north) and Cabo Negro (south). This region represents 
                                                 
95 Nicolas Bellin, “Carte des royaumes de Congo, Angola et Benguela avec les pays voisins tiré de l'Anglois, 1754”, 
in Digital Collection of African Maps at the Standford University Library. 
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the part of southern Quilengues that would become the districts of Moçamedes and Huíla in the 
mid-nineteenth century. Across the Cunene River (Kuneni), Bellin locates a certain Jaga Kakoquo 
and a large portion of land identified simply as the country of Jaga Kasanje (Pays des Jagga 
Kassanji). There is, nonetheless, another reference to the “residence” of yet another Jaga Kasanje 
above the Cuanza River (identified as Quanza).  
On Bellin’s map, the Province of Huíla (Province d’Ohila) lies beyond the Cunene River 
and is identified as the domain of Mazumbo Akalunga. There is a short text in French informing 
that these were the closest lands to the sea (qui son les plus proches de la mer), although the 
territory is not bordering the coast. To the south of Cabo Negro, where de L’Isle identified the 
kingdom of Mataman in 1708, Bellin registers only the presence of “savages”. This suggests that 
the Mbangala expansion southwards had long disrupted the memory about Mataman, together with 
the political and social landscape of the region, and left it depopulated and surrounded by “Jaga” 
warlords. 
The third map analysed is the most important Portuguese cartographic representation of 
the kingdoms of Kongo, Angola and Benguela in the eighteenth century (Appendix 3). It was 
drawn in 1790 by the Portuguese Lieutenant Colonel and Royal Engineer Luis Cândido Cordeiro 
Pinheiro Furtado (1750-1822)96. He was the commander responsible for the expedition sent by 
Baron Moçamedes to Cabo Negro to map the southern coast from São Filipe de Benguela to Angra 
dos Negros by land and sea (Chapter 3).  It was probably based on a preliminary map97 with 
information about the interior of southern Quilengues (later Moçamedes and Huíla) collected by 
the 1785 expedition98.  
The information collected in 1785 about the routes and lands of the interior of Quilengues 
filled a blank spot in the maps of West Central Africa. The new data (derrota99) was compiled 
                                                 
96 Francisco Cândido Cordeiro Pinheiro Furtado, “Carta geographica da costa occidental da África” (1790), in Torres, 
Memórias contendo a biographia..., unpaginated. 
97 Francisco Cândido Cordeiro Pinheiro Furtado, “Mappa de huma parte da costa occidental de África compreendida 
entre a cidade de São Felipe de Benguela e a Anciada das Areas” (1785), Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (Lisboa), 
AHU, CARTm, 001, D.278. 
98 For more about the process of production of Furtado’s map after the expeditions to southern Angola in 1785, see 
Gastão Sousa Dias, Pioneiros de Angola: Explorações portuguesas no sul de Angola, séculos XVII e XVIII. Coleção 
Pelo Império, No. 42 (Lisboa: Agência Geral das Colônias, 1937), 51-56. See also Chapter 3.  
99 Although the word “derrota” means “defeat” in modern Portuguese, in the eighteenth century it had a different 
meaning. According to Bluteau, Diccionario da Lingua Portugueza, Vol. 1, 381, “derrota” meant “to take route to”, 
either by sea or land. It was also related to the “route” of armies (rota do exército). In the context of territorial 
37 
 
with existing cartographic information from Kongo and Angola, and led to the production of the 
most complete map of the region until the second half of the nineteenth century. The map made in 
1790 was published in the 1825 memoir published on Governor Motta Feo100. The English explorer 
and writer Thomas Edward Bowdich (1791-1824) reproduced most of the cartographic 
information compiled by Furtado in a map produced in 1822101 and published two years later in 
his book An Account of the Discoveries of the Portuguese in the Interior of Angola and 
Mozambique (1824). 
For the first time, a map of Benguela registered some of the most important sobados of the 
interior with relative precision: Quizamba, Quilumata, Socoval, Caluquembe, Tinde, Quitata, 
Quiaca, Quipungo, Canina, Njau, among many others (Appendix 3.1). Furtado’s 1790 map also 
contains detailed hydrographic data, including even some small perennial rivers in desert areas. 
The Coporolo River, once again, received especial attention. It stretches from the region of the 
presídio of Old Caconda (Caconda Velha) to the coast. The map also shows the Calunga River, 
one of Coporolo’s main tributaries, and its connection to the settlement of Quilengues (Cap. Mor 
de Quilengues) and the powerful sobados of Socoval and Calunga.  
On the coast, close to the mouth of the Coporolo River, Furtado registered the existence of 
a place called Muene Calunga’s Cove (Enseada de Muene Calgª.), which suggests the river was 
used to connect the coast to the lands of sobas Calunga and Socoval, both suppliers of slaves in 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Calunga’s Cove was close to Equimina beach, a place 
known as a point of contraband. Caravans with smuggled slaves from Quilengues could descend 
the Equimina River to meet contrabandists on the coast. In the 1790 map, the Equimina River 
receives a mixed name, “São João de Quimina”.   
South of Cabo Negro, Furtado’s map shows the desert region inhabited by “savages” 
(Appendix 3.2). In the Cunene basin, the land of Humbe (terras do Humbe) is indicated with the 
added information that it was an area supplying slaves and ivory. On the other side of the Cunene 
River, one finds Big Humbe (Humbe Grande). Furtado describes it as territory prohibited to both 
                                                 
explorations, the term “derrota” was used in the sense of gathering information about the route taken, thus revealing 
the landscape. The data collected by these “derrotas” were among the most important sources of eighteenth and 
nineteenth century Cartography.   
100 For another version of this same map made in 1791, see Santos, Nos caminhos de África, 199. 
101 Walker, “Map of the Coast and Interior of Congo, Angola and Benguela, 1822”. 
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“whites” and Europeanized “blacks” (negros calçados). Throughout the entire map, small 
drawings of walled villages (kilombos) adorn the sertões, but the term “Jaga” has completely 
disappeared102.  
Furtado’s map is the best reference for the interior of Benguela in the late eighteenth 
century, despite having a series of geographical and ethnographical errors. Among the latter, one 
finds Coporolo’s extension much larger than it should be, the location of the Mocorocas on a 
specific strip on land close the coast, and the position of Salvaterra dos Magos around the same 
latitude (15ºS) as Angra dos Negros. Even with these mistakes resulting from technological 
limitations, and probably some miscalculation on the part of those who collected the data, there is 
no more precise map of Benguela before 1880. In fact, cartographic knowledge about the 
“kingdoms” of Kongo, Angola and Benguela decreased throughout the nineteenth century, since 
Cartography is a science deeply influenced by political and economic changes. I argue that the 
decrease in the importance of Benguela following the Independence of Brazil (1822) and the 
prohibition of the Atlantic slave trade (1830) led to the decline in cartographic knowledge about 
the interior of West Central Africa. The constant changes in the political landscape of the sertões, 
with the disappearance of some sobados and the foundation of new ones, demanded constant input 
of new data.  
Two Portuguese maps produced and published in the middle of the nineteenth century 
exemplify this deterioration of knowledge about the sertões following the last period of the trans-
Atlantic slave trade. With its end in the 1850s, many traders left the region and there was little 
interest in Portugal to invest in Benguela. In fact, there was an increasing number of colonial 
officials in Portugal in the 1860s who opposed any colonial penetration in the interior of the West 
Central Africa. They even discussed the relevance of maintaining military outposts in regions 
distant from the coast, such as Malanje and Duque de Bragança, deep in the interior of Angola, or 
Quilengues and Caconda in the sertões of Benguela. These regions and the Luso-Africans who 
inhabited them, either in colonial settlements or in private encampments, were isolated from the 
coast and from each other, which made them highly dependent on the development of good 
relations with local sobas who controlled those lands. Colonial officials back in Portugal charged 
that Luso-African colonists under their command could not be trusted because of their involvement 
                                                 
102 See also Vansina, How Societies are Born, 145. 
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in the slave trade. Hence, the geopolitical strategy of the Portuguese in Angola and Benguela in 
the 1860s was to retreat to the coast103.  
This loss of interest and knowledge about the interior of the “Portuguese colonial 
possessions” in West Central Africa is evident in cartographic works produced between the 1840s 
and 1860s. For instance, the map of the kingdoms of Angola and Benguela (Appendix 4) published 
in 1846 by the Portuguese colonial historian José Joaquim Lopes de Lima (1797-1852) has less 
information than Furtado’s maps from the end of the previous century104. Moreover, the position 
of the settlement of Quilengues is at odds with previous maps, as is the location of Caconda, the 
only presídio in the interior of Benguela (Appendix 4.1).  
The hydrographic data of Lima’s map is also less precise. The Coporolo River lost its real 
tributaries, and became connected to the Equimina River (now simply called “São João”) through 
an inexistent lake. The prominence of Equimina in this 1846 map suggests increased importance 
for this point of embarkation to smuggle slaves after 1830. The region of Humbe is portrayed 
somewhere beyond the Cunene River and comes with information about the prohibition of 
“whites” and Europeanized “blacks” (“pretos calçados”), a reason conveniently explaining the 
cartographer’s little knowledge about it (Appendix 4.2). It also informs that the region used to 
provide slaves, but now ivory was its main export. The label “Jaga” is now reserved exclusively 
for the ruler of Cassange, in Angola.  
The map of the kingdoms of Angola and Benguela (Appendix 5) by Manuel Antonio de 
Castro (1860)105 is even less precise than Lima’s, although it seems to be a reproduction of the 
latter. Like in the previous map, the locations of the presidio of Caconda and of the settlement of 
Quilengues are misplaced (Appendix 5.1). This map also shows a Quimina River in the region of 
Moçamedes (actually the Giraul River), which is a clear misplacement of the the Equimina River 
(also São João de Equimina). There is, however, another São João River that together with the 
Coporolo River flow into a lake to which there are no previous references. This could mean that, 
although much of the cartographic knowledge about the region had been lost, the Equimina River 
                                                 
103 Santos, Nos caminhos de África, 386. 
104 José Joaquim Lopes de Lima, “Carta geographica dos reinos de Angola e Benguella, 1846”, in Ensaios sobre a 
statistica das possessões portuguezas na África Occidental e Oriental; Ásia Occidental; China, e na Oceania, Vol. 3 
(Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1846).  




and the beach at its mouth remained important references for the contraband of slaves during the 
decades following the prohibition of the trans-Atlantic slave trade. Similar to Lima’s map, the label 
“Jaga” appears in Castro as related only to Kasanje. 
Renewed Portuguese colonial impetus during the 1870s and 1880s demanded the 
development of further cartographic knowledge about the interior of West Central Africa. These 
maps would also follow the new scientific methods and standards of the end of the century106. 
Until this moment, even the borders of the main districts of Angola and Benguela had not been 
fixed, and were based on “limits of tolerance” recognized by both the Portuguese colonial 
administration and African authorities107. To respond to this new colonial demand for maps of 
Africa, the Portuguese created the Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa during the International 
Congress of Geography held in Paris in 1875 and, at the same event, the Portuguese Commission 
of Cartography (Comissão Permanente de Cartographia de Portugal)108.  
With the advent of the Conference of Berlin (1884-1885), Portugal rushed to produce a 
series of new detailed maps of Angola and Benguela. The cartographer Antonio Augusto 
d’Oliveira was put in charge of the project. The first of these was the Carta de Angola (Appendix 
6) from 1885 containing information on agricultural production and areas considered unhealthy 
for settlement109. It is quite precise and contains good topographic and hydrographic data. The 
coast is covered with names of rivers, beaches, capes, bays and other sites of interest. The interior 
also have much information, as the map shows the location of both African polities such as 
Huambo, Bailundo, Huíla, and Humbe, and colonial administrative areas, including Dombe 
Grande, Caconda, and Moçamedes (Appendix 6.1). The district of Quilengues is accurately 
depicted, and the map shows the location of the sobado of Socoval (Socobala). The rivers Calunga 
and Coporolo are also accurately represented. Here, the Equimina River regained its real location 
and dimensions.   
                                                 
106 Santos, Nos caminhos de África, 351-352. 
107 Santos, Nos caminhos de África, 391. 
108 Santos, Nos caminhos de África, 367-373; H. Gabriel Mendes, “As origens da Comissão de Cartografia e a ação 
determinante de José Julio Rodrigues, Luciano Cordeiro e Francisco Antonio de Brito Limpo: A história política das 
explorações africanas de Hermenegildo Capelo, Roberto Ivens e Serpa Pinto”. Centro de Estudos de Cartografia 
Antiga (Lisboa: Junta de Investigações Científicas do Ultramar, 1982), 1-44.  
109 Oliveira, “Carta de Angola, contendo indicações de produção e salubridade, 1885”. 
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This 1885 map also brings information about the main agricultural and mineral productions 
of Angola, Benguela and Moçamedes, dividing these areas into counties (conselhos). The divisions 
presented for the “counties” of Benguela are, in fact, much more realistic than other official 
divisions, in terms of describing areas effectively occupied by “white” settlers. They were 
Benguella, Caconda, Catumbella, Dombe Grande, Egito and Quilengues. The recently created 
district of Moçamedes was divided into the counties of Bumbo (Capangombe), Gambos, Huíla, 
Humbe, Humpata and Moçamedes. The crops produced in the “counties” of Benguela consisted 
of cotton, coffee, sugarcane, tobacco, wheat, maize, manioc, potato, rice and pastures for the cattle. 
The mineral products were gold, iron, copper, brimstone, mineral salt and petroleum. The map 
also included information about the existence of important commodities extracted from trees, such 
as liconde110 (imbondeiro), palm oil (palmas), rubber (licongue), etc.  
The map from 1885 still shows productive terrains on the coast and in the interior, as well 
as the areas considered not suited for European settlement. The valleys of Calunga and Coporolo 
in Quilengues were considered especially dangerous, as were the basins of the rivers Quicombo, 
Egito, Cavaco, Catumbela and Equimina. The region of Capangombe (Huíla) – in the upper Giraul 
River – was also considered insalubrious. The map still presents some ethnolinguistic labels mixed 
with information on small and large African political entities, such as Mucuando, Mucoroca, 
Quanhama, Caluquembe, Quipungo, Mulondo, and Handa. Finally, it included information about 
the recent expedition led by the colonial explorers Hermenegildo Capello and Roberto Ivens 
(1884), showing the regions they were penetrating at the time of the production of the map. This 
unexplored region, beyond the Cunene River, features as a blank spot in the middle of the map.  
                                                 
110 “Liconde”, “licondo”, “aliconde”, or “licomte” are Luso-African corruptions of the Bakongo word “nkondo”, the 
name of a large and fibrous African tree known as “baobab” in other parts of the continent. In Kimbundo, this tree is 
known as “mbondo”, which was later corrupted by the Luso-Africans in Angola and became “imbondeiro”. Liconde 
and licomte are also commonly used in reference to the fiber extracted from the bark of that tree. This fiber had 
different applications, from the production of textiles and paper to military purposes. In Angola, soldiers used a wisp 
of liconde (lanadas de liconde) in the sockets of their guns. See ANA, Códice 443, fl. 55, “Ofício para regente de 
Quilengues António Pires Louzada”, (15 October 1800); ANA, Códice 443, fl. 70v-72, “Ofício dirigido ao regente de 
Quilengues João Vieira de Andrade”, (11 March 1801); ANA, Códice 525, fls. 40, “Ofício do Chefe do Estado Maior 
Jose Herculano Ferreira de Horta”, (9 July 1838). For more about Liconde, see also Manuel Alves de Castro Francina, 
“Viagem a Cazengo pelo Quanza, e regresso por terra”, Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino, parte não oficial, Série I 
(Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1867), 432; Joachim John Monteiro, Angola and the River Congo, Vol. 1 (London: 
MacMillan and Co., 1875), 78; Conde de Ficalho, Plantas úteis da África portuguesa (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 
1884), 100-102; Ben Zacheu, Costumes angolenses (Lisboa: Companhia Nacional Editora, 1890), 22, 31-33; E.G. 
Ravenstein, The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battell of Leigh, in Angola and the Adjoining Regions. (London: The 
Hakluyt Society, 1901), 24 - note 1.  
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In the following year, the Portuguese Commission of Cartography produced a major map 
of their possessions in Africa, with detailed information about the interior of Angola entitled “Carta 
da Africa Meridional Portuguesa” (Appendix 7) of 1886111. It shares much of the data with the 
map from 1885, but now included the areas recently explored by Capello and Ivens. In fact, it 
included not only the trajectory of both expeditions led by these explorers (1877-80 and 1884-85), 
but also the routes taken by other explorers as well, including Serpa Pinto (1877-78), Silva Porto 
(1853-54 and 1882-83), Rodrigues Graça (1843-1846), and José Maria de Lacerda (1798), among 
others (Appendix 7.1). This map showed the “colonies” of Angola and Mozambique connected as 
one continental Portuguese possession, a representation that became known as the rose-coloured 
map (o mapa cor-de-rosa)112.  
The “British Ultimatum of 1890”113 destroyed the Portuguese rose-coloured colonial 
ambitions over the territories between Angola and Mozambique. In the same year, the Portuguese 
Commission of Cartography issued a map114 surrendering the central African territories under 
dispute to the British. Portuguese cartographers literally yielded their symbolic “pink territories” 
in central Africa to the British by recoloring the Portuguese possessions in blue. In 1891, the 
Commission issued yet another map of Portuguese southern Africa containing the new northern 
borders negotiated with the British and the Belgians in that year  
In this latter map (Appendix 8) entitled “Carta das possessões portuguezas da Africa 
meridional segundo as convenções celebradas em 1891”115, the Portuguese resumed the use of 
pink colour to represent their African possessions. Although borders were still under dispute, 
Angola already resembles its current shape. The data about the interior is the same presented in 
the previous two maps (Appendix 8.1). The old territory of Benguela is now divided into Benguela 
                                                 
111 Antonio Augusto de Oliveira, “Carta da Africa Meridional portuguesa, 1886”, Comissão de Cartographia de 
Portugal (Paris: Erhard Frères Rue Denfert-Rochereau, 1886). 
112 For more on the “rose-colored map”, see Santos, Nos caminhos de África, 400-423; See also Ralph Delgado, 
História de Angola, Vol. 2 (Luanda: Banco de Angola, 1948), 47.  
113 This ultimatum consisted of a memorandum sent by Lord Salisbury to the Portuguese government on 11 January 
1890 telling them to withdraw their colonial troops from the regions of Mashoba and Matabeleland (later Rhodesia) 
and the Shire-Nyasa region (Malawi). For more on the the British Ultimatum and the end of the “rose-coloured map”, 
see Marquês de Lavradio, Portugal em África Depois de 1851: Subsídios para a História (Lisboa: Agência Geral das 
Colônias, 1936); Miguel Patrício, “Do Ultimatum de 1890 ao Tratado Luso-Britânico de 1891”, Revista do Instituto 
de Direito Brasileiro, No. 10, Ano 2 (2013): 372-413.  
114 This map is not reproduced here for lack of space. A published version appears in Santos, Nos caminhos de África, 
422.  
115 Oliveira, “Carta das possessões portuguezas”. 
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and Moçamedes. The district of Quilengues does not exist anymore, only the settlement, which 
was no longer called Salvaterra dos Magos. The hydrographic data distinguishes perennial from 
intermittent streams and is quite precise, despite some important omissions, such as the Calunga 
River, which is shown simply as Coporolo. The Equimina River is still present, although there is 
no mention of its name. The beach of Equimina is no longer identified either, once it had lost its 
importance as an alternative point of embarkation for smuggled slaves.    
 
The environment and the landscape  
When Europeans arrived in Benguela early in the seventeenth century, Africans had 
already long occupied the best territories inland, most of them located on the central plateau. Local 
communities had been roaming the interior of the continent for centuries, looking for the most 
suitable places for human settlement. Most of them chose to settle on the margins of lakes and 
intermittent rivers both on the plateau and in the lowlands116. Availability of water, however, was 
not the only important characteristic to determine the best site for the development of a community. 
Suitable soil for crops and land with natural pasture were also essential for the development of 
these agropastoralist communities in the interior of Benguela. Many of them also chose to settle 
close to the rocky hills on the edge of the plateau, in places easier to defend than the open plains 
and valleys117. 
Although the areas surrounding rivers and valleys presented some of the necessary 
conditions for human settlement, they could also prove to be insalubrious due to the presence of 
mosquitoes carrying diseases like malaria118. Portuguese colonial documentation often portrays 
São Filipe de Benguela as an unhealthy coastal town where many Europeans perished. This 
unsound environment was believed to be a consequence of “corrupted air”. The truth is that the 
                                                 
116 Bastos, “Traços gerais sobre a Ethnographia do Districto de Benguella”, 50; João Francisco Garcia, “Explorações 
no sul de Benguela”, Annaes Marítimos e Coloneaes, 4ª série (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1844), 247; Alvin W. 
Urquhart, Patterns of Settlement and Subsistence in Southwestern Angola (Washington DC: National Academy of 
Sciences, 1963), 83-84; Miller, “Angola central e sul por volta de 1840”, 2. 
117 Urquhart, Patterns of Settlement and Subsistence in Southwestern Angola, 41; Guimarães Jr., Memória sobre a 
exploração da costa ao sul de Benguella, 12. 
118 Despite being portrayed as a “healthy” region, especially in comparison with the coastal areas, cases of illnesses in 
Quilengues increased during the rainy season because the wet weather led to the proliferation of mosquitos. There 
was also a higher incidence of inflammatory eye diseases, considered to be the most common affliction of the 
inhabitants of Quilengues: Bordalo, “Viagens na África e na América”, 227-228.  
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site chosen by Luso-African colonists to build their coastal settlement was known by Africans to 
be an unhealthy place to live. That explains why foreigners found no major African settlement in 
the swampy coast. The most important African villages could be found neither on the coast of 
Benguela, nor on its immediate semi-arid backlands119. 
São Filipe de Benguela was built close to a perennial stream of water locally called 
Marimbombo (renamed as Cavaco) that gave the Portuguese the wrong impression it could provide 
the necessary water for their settlement. The German physician Georg Tams visited the port town 
in the early 1840s and reported on the unwholesome environment he found there, which afflicted 
Europeans and Africans alike. Those who could, transferred their residences to areas in the interior 
(some as far as 30 days away) and only visited the port town when business demanded, returning 
to their houses elsewhere as soon as possible120.    
The sertanejo and ethnographer Antonio Francisco Nogueira, writing in the late 1870s, 
affirmed that all efforts to drain swamps, channel rivers and cut down bushes would not be enough 
to destroy the causes of Benguela’s insalubrity: “The nature of the soil, the disposition of the 
mountains and the flow of rivers are not conditions easy to modify”121. Tams concluded that the 
only reason Europeans settled in the unhealthy coastal regions of both Luanda and Benguela was 
the Atlantic slave trade122.  
To the north of São Filipe, there is larger river called Catumbela, where the dwellers of São 
Filipe de Benguela had farms (arimos) that provided provisions for the city, as well as good part 
of its potable water123. Europeans also believed Catumbela to have “healthier air”, which could 
help with the recovery of sick people. In 1808, for example, the governor of Benguela, Joaquim 
Vieira de Abreu e Paiva, moved to the region of Catumbela to recover from an illness124.  
The Coporolo River, located to the south of the city of Benguela, was one of the most 
important gateways to the lands occupied by sobas (sobados) and “jagas” (jagados). While the 
                                                 
119 Miller, “Angola central e sul por volta de 1840”, 23. 
120 George Tams, Visita às possessões portuguesas na costa ocidental da África, Vol. 1 (Porto: Typographia da 
Revista, 1850), 119-122. 
121 Antonio F. Nogueira, A raça negra sob o ponto de vista da civilisação da África: usos e costumes de alguns povos 
gentílicos do interior de Moçamedes (Lisboa: Typographia Nova Minerva, 1881), 186. 
122 Tams, Visita às possessões portuguesas na costa ocidental da África, Vol. 2, 86. 
123 Tams, Visita às possessões portuguesas na costa ocidental da África, Vol. 2, 112-113.  
124 ANA, Códice 445, n.p., “Carta do Regente de Quilengues Manoel Barbosa de Mello de 23 de Abril, recebida em 
5 de maio de 1808”, (23 April 1808).  
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Valley of Coporolo on the coast was considered a “corrupted” environment prone to diseases, the 
region of upper Coporolo, known as the Valley of Calunga, had better water and a lower incidence 
of disease125.  
  Quilengues was at the intersection of the dry lands of the coast and the wet highlands, and 
thus presented both features. The Austrian botanist Frederico Welwitsch (1806-1872) depicted 
these three different landscapes of the interior of Benguela as follows: the first was characterised 
by aridity and lack of vegetation; the second for its freshness and the lux of their inhabitants; the 
third was marked by its variety and elegance126.  
Most of the country in the immediate interior of Benguela was sandy and arid, 
characterized by irregular rainfall127. Great part of the lowlands of Quilengues lay on calcareous 
and sandy terrain made of lithosols and fersialitic soil (sometimes called lateritic soil), common to 
semi-arid regions that experience extensive periods of drought. It is a soil with poor organic matter, 
but becomes suitable for farming if combined with manure128, which the peoples of Quilengues 
had plenty of access to due to the importance of cattle in their economy and society129. Proper 
irrigation and treatment of the land makes this type of soil suitable for the cultivation of tropical 
products such as sugarcane, palm trees, cacao, and coffee, among others130.  
As the altitude increases, the terrain becomes siliceous rock and the soil paraferralitic (with 
high levels of iron). The mountain range that extends from Chela to the northern part of Quilengues 
is formed by granite cliffs, which at higher levels are covered with quartzite. On the plateau, the 
                                                 
125 Falcão, A Questão do Zaire, 83-84, 105; Bastos, “Traços gerais sobre a Ethnographia do Districto de Benguella”, 
50; Estermann, Ethnography of Southwestern Angola, Vol. II, 4; Miller, “Angola central e sul por volta de 1840”, 3. 
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soil is composed of yellow and red clay, which is much more fertile than the soil in the lowlands. 
The existence of more rivers and higher annual pluviometric levels complete the positive scenario 
for agriculture on the highlands131.  
Part of the coastal region was made of sandy hills, alternated by broad plains, covered by 
thorny vegetation, grass and some scattered imbondeiros (Adansonia digitata), locally known as 
omukua, and often called baobab132. The vegetation only became thicker close to the riverbanks. 
The mountainous regions were covered by bushes and large trees. There were also many palm 
trees. On the central plateau, the main characteristic was the great variety of vegetation. The 
number of rivers increased greatly on the highlands and gave birth to green meadows. It was a 
region that featured all the “splendour of the tropical zone”133. A great part of the vegetation of 
Quilengues was composed of an open forest (Brachystegia-lsoberlinia woodland) known locally 
as miombo, or mato-de-panda in Portuguese134.  
Benguela has a dry and wet season. The botanist Welwitsch, who was part of a scientific 
expedition to Moçamedes and Huíla between 1853 and 1860, compared the climate of Benguela 
to that of Portugal, which he considered diametrically opposite, since in Benguela the hotter part 
of the year started in September. However, the period of rains was similar to that of Portugal, from 
September to the end of April. Hence, while in Portugal the rains fell during the colder part of the 
year, in Benguela it rained during the hotter season135.  
In Benguela, therefore, the rainy season extends roughly from October to April, and the 
dry season (cacimbo136) from May to September137. While in the lowlands the pluviometric levels 
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137 In Kongo, the dry and cool season between May and September (often hungry dry season) was called “Kimbangala” 
and was considered the favorite one for war because conditions for traveling and fighting were better and because 
there was no agricultural activity: Anne Hilton, The Kingdom of Kongo (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 5; John K. 




do not exceed 100mm in the rainiest month (March), in the highlands it reaches 350mm138. The 
dry period was considered the best time for military expeditions because the roads were good and 
the rivers not flooded. During the rainy season, the weather could change quite quickly and catch 
caravans and troops by surprise, forcing them to camp wherever they were until conditions 
changed. The dry season was also the moment for wars between African potentates, especially in 
years of extended drought, when entire communities were forced to look for water and grazing 
grounds for their cattle, as well as fertile land for their crops139. 
As the latitude increases southwards, the weather becomes drier and the terrain more arid, 
until it finally turns into a desert around the Cabo Negro region, beyond the Coroca River (Deserto 
de Moçamedes)140. In the interior of Moçamedes, the rainy season also starts in September and 
rain becomes heavier and more frequent during the months of February and March.  The rains, 
however, have no regularity. Some years, it rains three or four times, in others, not a drop141. The 
Chela Mountain Range (Serra da Chela), part of the great African escarpment, divides the dry part 
of Moçamedes from the green highlands of Huíla142. 
The major sobados of the Chela region were located in the highlands of Huíla, also called 
the “highlands of Munda”143. Similar to the plateau, these higher grounds of Huíla had better soils, 
bigger trees and greater rainfall144. The large herds of cattle, however, were kept in the drier plains 
of the lowlands of Huíla.  Similar to Quilengues, this was the proper place for cattle ranching 
(miombo). South of the lands of Huíla, there lies the broad sandy floodplains of Humbe, which 
combines broken terrains suitable for grazing herds with flooded riverbanks that allowed for the 
development of agriculture145. 
                                                 
138 República de Angola, Atlas Geográfico, Vol. 1, 21.    
139 Lacerda, “Observações sobre a viagem da costa d’Angola a costa de Moçambique, 1797”, 202. 
140 U.S. Corps of Engineers, “Map of Benguela, Africa, 1968”, Army Map Service (Washington D.C.). 
141 Baptista, “Terrenos e agricultura do districto de Moçamedes”, 579. 
142 Urquhart, Patterns of Settlement and Subsistence in Southwestern Angola, 2. 
143 Munda is a location on the base of the Chela mountain range (18º-12ºS), in the interior of Cape Negro: U.S. Corps 
of Engineers, “Map of Benguela, Africa, 1968”. See also Falcão, A Questão do Zaire, 84, 105; Hermanegildo Capello 
and Robert Ivens, De Angola à contra-costa: Descripção de uma viagem atravez do continente africano, Vol. 1 
(Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1886), 151; Garcia, “Explorações no sul de Benguela”, 248;  
144 Duparquet, Viagens a Cimbebásia, 61-63; Urquhart, Patterns of Settlement and Subsistence in Southwestern 
Angola, 65-66; Capello and Ivens, De Angola à contra-costa, Vol. 1, 149-150; Miller, “Angola central e sul por volta 
de 1840”, 3. 
145 Miller, “Angola central e sul por volta de 1840”, 3 
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Weather and access to permanent sources of water directly influenced the economies and 
alimentary habits of the peoples dwelling in the interior of Benguela. In the wetter lands of the 
plateau, there was full development of agriculture. In the dry lands, the economy and social life 
revolved around livestock. It was possible to find potable water in drier areas by digging the banks 
of dry rivers146, and the peoples that occupied this environment, such as the Mucubaes and 
Mocorocas, dug wells in the sand (cassímas) to collect water for themselves and their cattle147. 
Hence, while agriculture demanded a sedentary community with regular access to water, cattle 
were mobile and could be taken to other areas in case of droughts and in periods of war. Quilengues 
had a mix of these two economies, with both cattle and agriculture playing major roles.  
 
Agropastoralist societies of Quilengues 
The environmental particularities of Quilengues, including in this case the regions of 
Moçamedes (arid and semi-arid), Huíla (wet highlands), and Humbe (dry pastures and fertile 
floodplains), influenced the consolidation of different economies among the African communities 
that occupied this vast territory from the first millennium onwards. The peoples inhabiting 
Quilengues formed economies as diversified as the landscapes they occupied. These different 
environments predisposed the rise of sedentary agropastoralists in valleys and river basins, in 
contrast with full-fledged nomadic pastoralists living in the dry lands of southern Benguela. 
Sedentarization and stockbreeding sponsored the foundation of new institutions of governance in 
the beginning of the second millennium that launched a long historical process of centralization of 
political power all over West Central Africa.  
Jan Vansina has argued that the process of centralization of political power among the 
agropastoralist societies of Quilengues, however, cannot be seen as an ineluctable outcome of 
sedentarization. Although ethnographers from the nineteenth century148 have claimed that 
“monocephalic government” was imported into Quilengues from the kingdoms of the plateau – 
                                                 
146 Guimarães Jr., Memória sobre a exploração da costa ao sul de Benguella, 6. 
147 Garcia, “Explorações no sul de Benguela”, 241; Lacerda, “Observações sobre a viagem da costa d’Angola a costa 
de Moçambique, 1797”, 201. 
148 Nogueira, A raça negra sob o ponto de vista da civilisação da África; See also Alfred Hauenstein, “L'Ombala de 
Caluquembe: Histoire, traditions, coutumes et rites des familles royales deCaluquembe, de la tribu des Ovimbundu 
(Angola)”, Anthropos, Bd. 58, H. 1/2 (1963): 47-120. 
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based on oral traditions from the Otyilenge (indeed from the Nyaneka of Quilengues) and from the 
Nkhumbi of Caluquembe – Vansina doubts that the agropastoralist communities of the lowlands 
of Quilengues simply incorporated institutions of governance from sedentary societies of the 
plateau. He wondered: “How was it possible for a whole complex system of governance to be 
transferred wholesale from a country of farmers to one where livestock was extremely important? 
It cannot be assumed then that the monocephalic form of governance from the planalto [plateau] 
was imported”149. 
For purposes of this study, I have adopted Vansina’s thesis that the different political 
entities of Quilengues were formed by a slow historical process involving the rise of powerful 
headmen with great amounts of livestock who spread their influence by loaning cattle to other 
headmen with whom they had developed kinship ties by marrying one of their “daughters”. In 
rough terms, this was an exchange of women for cattle. This position rejects the idea of a 
“wholesale transference” of political structures of governance (in this case the institution of 
soba150) from the central plateau to the different peoples inhabiting the lowlands of Quilengues, 
an idea which featured as part of the collective imagination of the peoples of the region, as we will 
see below.  
This long process of foundation of political entities in the interior of Benguela began with 
the introduction of cereal crops and the subsequent sedentarization of local communities, two basic 
steps for the creation of more complex forms of governance. The arrival of both cereal crops and 
cattle in the second half of the first millennium happened through the same corridors of migration 
connecting southern Zambia to the Okavango Delta, and from there to the southern portion of 
Benguela. From there, these novelties crossed the Cunene River and spread within the region, 
following the course of that and other important rivers, such as the Caculuvar (Map 1). With the 
                                                 
149 Vansina, How Societies are Born, 135-137.  
150 The title of “soba” (also “somá”, “sova” or “homphá”) derived from “ohámba”, meaning “he who surpasses all 
others”, is a designation still in use among Herero and Ndonga peoples. Its use can be traced back to the eleventh 
century among the peoples of the central plateau, which suggests that the title was invented some time after the 
introduction of large herds of bovine cattle in southern Benguela. The hoarding of cattle and the expansion of the 
herds (through raising and raiding) allowed the sobas to attract more servants and clients: Vansina, How Societies are 
Born, 141; Desch-Obi, Fighting for Honor, 19; Carlos Estermann, “Notas etnográficas sobre os povos indígenas do 
Distrito de Huíla”, Boletim Geral das Colónias, Fevereiro (1935): 62. Besides the more generic title of “soba”, 
Nogueira, A raça negra sob o ponto de vista da civilisação da África, 125, registers different hereditary titles for 
different ethnic groups. The Hamba called their rulers “Gongas”, the Mulondo used the term “Pumbas”, the Nkhumbi 
used “Xiahungos”, the Ngambwe used “Pahos” and the Lupolo used “Nangollos”. 
50 
 
adoption of cereal agriculture, African villages increased from a dozen individuals to 
agglomerations with more than a hundred people. It was a cultural incorporation of great 
significance and that caused social and political transformation, comparable only to the 
introduction of pastoralism in the following centuries151.   
The first cereal crops to be adopted by the peoples of the Cunene basin were sorghum 
(massambala) and millet (massango)152. They remained the two most important cereal crops in the 
interior of Benguela until the nineteenth century, although some other crops introduced by Luso-
Africans became very popular among African communities, mainly beans (mucunde), maize 
(epungu) and manioc153. Wheat was also produced in higher altitudes like Catala (Caconda), but 
was a commodity reserved for the consumption of Luso-Africans154. Other agricultural products 
brought from abroad also remained restricted to Luso-Africans settlements and farms (libatas) of 
Quilengues155, such as oranges, lemons and even grapes156.  
In the southern part of Quilengues, on the highlands of the Huíla, agriculture was highly 
developed and yielded bountiful crops157. The region of Capangombe158, at the foot of the Chela 
Mountain Range, had features similar to those of Salvaterra dos Magos and proved to be similarly 
                                                 
151 Vansina, How Societies are Born, 76-77; Kathryn M. de Luna, Collecting Food, Cultivating People: Subsistence 
and Society in Central Africa (New Haven/London: Yale University Press, 2016), 75; Miller, “Angola central e sul 
por volta de 1840”, 5.  
152 For more on massango and massambala, see Lost Crops of Africa, Vol. 1, Board on Science and Technology for 
International Development, F.R. Ruskin, ed. (Washington D.C.: National Academy Press, 1996).  
153 Lacerda, “Observações sobre a viagem da costa d’Angola a costa de Moçambique, 1797”, 192; Brochado, “Notícia 
de alguns territórios...”, 189-204; Milheiros, Notas de Etnografia Angolana, 65-69; Miller, “Angola central e sul por 
volta de 1840”, 44-45; Jan Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savanna (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), 21; 
Vellut, “The Congo Basin and Angola”, 296-298. 
154 Making bread with local wheat for “white” settlers, for instance, became a major goal for the governor of Angola, 
Francisco Inocêncio de Sousa Coutinho, in his project of colonization of the interior of Benguela in the eighteenth 
century: AHU, Angola, 1ª Secção, Cx. 56, Doc. 79, “Memórias do governador de Angola Francisco Inocêncio de 
Souza Coutinho ao novo governador D. António de Lancastre”, (26 November 1772). See also Garcia, “Explorações 
no sul de Benguela”, 252; Ralph Delgado, Ao Sul do Cuanza: Ocupação e aproveitamento do antigo reino de 
Benguela, 1843-1942, Vol. 1 (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional. 1940), 237.  
155 According to the Angolan writer Antonio de Assis Jr., Dicionário Kimbundu-Português: linguístico, botânico, 
histórico e corográfico (Luanda: Argente, Santos e Cia, n/d [19--]), 127, the word kilénge means horticulture 
(horticola, hortense), and the expression mukua kilénge means “from the vegetable gardens” (das hortas). 
156 Lacerda, “Observações sobre a viagem da costa d’Angola a costa de Moçambique, 1797”, 192; Antonio de 
Saldanha da Gama, Memórias sobre as colônias portuguesas situadas na costa occidental d’África (Paris: 
Typographia de Casimir, 1839), 74; Brochado, “Notícia de alguns territórios...”, 204; Baptista, “Terrenos e agricultura 
do districto de Moçamedes”, 579-607. 
157 Baptista, “Terrenos e agricultura do districto de Moçamedes”, 601-604. 
158 According to Capello and Ivens, De Angola à contra-costa, Vol. 1, 139-140, there were three trails to ascend from 
Capangombe to Huíla. For more about Capangombe, see Duparquet, Viagens a Cimbebásia, 58-61. 
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productive in the nineteenth century. Sorghum and millet were also the two most appreciated cereal 
crops in Huíla. After the 1840s, Portuguese-speaking farmers, from places like Madeira and 
Pernambuco159, introduced imported crops such as sugarcane, coffee, potato, grains, beans, 
oranges, tangerines, limes, lemons, apples, pears, quinces, and even olives and berries. There was 
also a small production of sugarcane brandy (aguardente) and potato spirits, which was locally 
consumed and traded. Nevertheless, this production of recently imported crops was reserved to 
very small portions of lands under the control of Luso-African settlers160.  
The fertile lands of the floodplains of Humbe in the inner Cunene Basin were mainly used 
as grazing grounds for large amounts of cattle. Only a portion was used for subsistence agriculture 
carried out by women, whether free or enslaved. These subsistence crops were consumed locally, 
while cattle, on the other hand, was a commodity much valued by Luso-Africans settled in the 
provinces of Huíla and Moçamedes161. 
The great promoter of social and political change among the peoples dwelling the interior 
of Benguela, as we have seen previously, was the introduction of large herds of bovine cattle 
around the tenth century, which promoted the development of new structures of governance and 
the rise of sobas in the following century. Since then, cattle raising and cattle raiding162 became 
the most important economic activities of the communities living within Quilengues. The social, 
political and economic structures of these communities were profoundly transformed by the 
increase in stockbreeding, including farming itself. Management of large herds of cattle was 
integrated into, or rather juxtaposed on, the previous agricultural economy in a symbiotic way: 
while the cattle could feed on the stubble left after the harvest, it provided the necessary manure 
for the development of better crops163.  
                                                 
159 For more on these immigrants, see Gastão Sousa Dias, Povoamento de Angola, Cadernos Coloniais, No. 41 (Lisboa: 
Editora Cosmos, 1936). 
160 Baptista, “Terrenos e agricultura do districto de Moçamedes”, 579-607; Gama, Memórias sobre as colônias 
portuguesas situadas na costa occidental d’África, 79; Urquhart, Patterns of Settlement and Subsistence in 
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161 Baptista, “Terrenos e agricultura do districto de Moçamedes”, 579. 
162 For more about ritualistic cattle raids in southern West Central Africa, see Marta Salokoski, “Symbolic Power of 
Kings in Pre-Colonial Ovambo Societies” (Licensiate Thesis in Sociology / Social Anthropology, University of 
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Livestock was not only a source of food and wealth, but was, as we saw above, the basis 
of the political and social networks among the peoples of the interior of Benguela. Those who 
owned much cattle built patron-client relationships with surrounding communities by loaning 
animals and developing kinship ties with those responsible for raising and protecting the herds164. 
The division of cattle among surrounding allies and clients was also necessary to avoid the 
consumption of entire pastures at once and the spread of disease to healthy flocks. Cattle herding 
was quite labour intensive and demanded the participation of considerable numbers of individuals 
dedicated exclusively to it165. 
The possession and hoarding of livestock created a strong social hierarchy in which patrons 
controlled clients who herded cattle for them, while both groups ruled over their “cattleless 
servants”. Loaned animals gave material substance to the political structure of these societies166. 
Social and political power was in the hands of the cattle owners because people’s livelihood 
ultimately depended on livestock. As Vansina puts it: “Everyone’s survival depended on herds, 
yet herds were owned by individuals and hence everyone else came to be dependent on them”167. 
Since possessing cattle was the main strategy for the accumulation of wealth among these Africans, 
cattle hoarding was a means for social mobility. Exchanges and loaning of cattle also became 
essential for a wide range of social transactions, such as marriage or the payment of fines and 
debts168. 
Cattle raising was common among all the societies in the interior of Benguela, but those 
living on the lowlands had a longer tradition of herding than did the peoples of the central 
plateau169. The peoples from Quilengues (“Muquilengues”) and Dombe Grande (“Mundombes”) 
were considered some of the best herders of the interior of Benguela. They raised not only bovine 
cattle, but also lots of sheep. The “Muquilengues” were also praised for their chickens. The 
                                                 
164 Miller, “Angola central e sul por volta de 1840”, 9. 
165 According to Urquhart, Patterns of Settlement and Subsistence in Southwestern Angola, 108, many of these 
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“Mucuandos”, nomadic peoples that occupied the dry portions between the coast and the territory 
of Quilengues, were also regarded as great herders of both cows and sheep, the latter especially 
adapted to the thorny bushes that covered the regions they inhabited170.  
Despite the fact that cattle were the base of political and economic power in different parts 
of the interior of Benguela, their utility was not similar everywhere. In the mid-twentieth century, 
the cultural geographer Frederick Simmons noticed that the people from the central plateau did 
not milk their cattle, using it only as source of beef, despite the fact they had plenty of “milkable 
animals”171. On the other hand, all peoples living south of the central plateau consumed dairy 
products172.  Physiological limitation to absorb lactose played an important role in the development 
of cultural and social practices related to the consumption of dairy products or the exclusive use 
of cattle for meat. These practices later acquired lasting significance due to “subsequent 
sociopolitical developments in both the milking and non-milking areas”173. Lactase persistence, or 
the capacity to process lactose, was thus a genetic trait that diffused among milk-drinking 
populations living in regions where cattle had been the main source of nutrition since its 
introduction, and especially in areas where early horticulture and the later introduction of cereal 
crops had been hindered by environmental conditions174.  
Most peoples of Quilengues drank milk and consumed sour milk gruels made with 
available grains (mainly sorghum) or tuberculous roots (manioc and sweet potato). They also 
produced butter (glidi or gunde), which they used as a condiment and to hydrate their skin and 
prepare complex hairstyles175. On the highlands of the central plateau, where agriculture was fully 
developed, roots and grains largely replaced the consumption of milk and gruels and hence allowed 
                                                 
170 Bastos, “Traços gerais sobre a Ethnographia do Districto de Benguella”, 55, 91-92; Miller, “Angola central e sul 
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171 Frederick Simmons, “The Non-Milking Area of Africa”, Anthropos, Bd. 49, H. 1/2 (1954): 59. 
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173 Vansina, How Societies are Born, 87.  
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de vista da civilisação da África, 262. 
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the spread of lactose intolerant individuals who raised sheep and bovine cattle but did not milk 
them176.  
Moreover, the agropastoralist communities of Quilengues did not dismiss the ancient 
practices of hunting, fishing and food-gathering. These activities were common and complemented 
agriculture and pastoralism177. The peoples of Quilengues were regarded as great hunters, making 
use of fire and dogs as tactics for hunting big game178. Local populations also gathered fruits such 
as maquobe (laranja do mato), nombe, munhande, matundo, and gongo, the latter used to make a 
kind of wine consumed annually between the months of February and April179.  
Joseph C. Miller calculated the enormous demographic impact of drought, diseases and 
famine in the interior of Angola and argued that if the slave trade had not taken millions of 
individuals from their homelands and killed an uncountable number of others in the process, the 
environment would have nonetheless hindered demographic growth180. In the case of Quilengues 
however, as we will see in chapters 3, 4 and 5, the causes for the great famines experienced in the 
backlands of Benguela during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were not only the 
irregularity in rainfall and extended periods of drought. The peoples who occupied these regions 
had long developed strategies to cope with the challenges of the weather and the ecology they 
inhabited, including practices such as transhumance181 and constant migratory movements. The 
main cause of widespread famines in Quilengues was, ultimately, the same one behind the 
underdevelopment of agriculture: war182.  
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Notas de Etnografia Angolana, 63.  
177 Vellut, “The Congo Basin and Angola”, 296; Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savanna, 24.  
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na África e na América”, 227-228; Miller, “Angola central e sul por volta de 1840”, 18. While referring to the lands 
of the Humbe, Nogueira, A raça negra sob o ponto de vista da civilisação da África, 265, affirmed that there was no 
hunger among these peoples, and they only lacked food because of extended periods of drought (grandes secas) and 
war, the latter classified as their “greatest calamity”. 
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Ethnicity and migration in Quilengues  
The political development of small communities in Quilengues after the introduction of 
large herds of cattle around the tenth century and the rise of institutions of governance in the 
following one as evidenced by the rise of the title of soba led to the foundation of large villages 
and the improvement in contacts between different political entities (sobados). The intensification 
in farming and herding, as well as the growth of societies, led to an increase in travel and trade. 
Travelers fostered not only the exchange of goods, but also of ideas and practices. The result was 
the development of social and cultural complexity throughout the interior. The sertões of 
Benguela, however, were not made of a unified society, but of a series of communities knitted 
together by institutions of governance183. 
This section will deal with the imposition of the ethnic label “Nyaneka-Nkhumbi” to 
identify the peoples that inhabited Quilengues and how its use erased not only their cultural 
particularities, but also their previous common history as descendants of the Mbangala warriors 
with whom they shared common cultural features and who their neighbours recognized as 
members of the same group.  The Mbangala, however, were not an ethnic group, but rather 
marauding bands of warriors that roamed the interior of Benguela attacking kinship-based societies 
and causing mayhem since at least mid-sixteenth century. Their fast spread and the power of their 
military institution (kilombo) caused a profound impact on their victims, who were forced to adapt 
to new strategies of war and adopt their tactics and military organization in order to survive the 
wave of social and cultural transformations caused by the rise of these bands of marauders with no 
ethnic affiliations (Chapter 2).   
In the 1950s, the Alsatian ethnographer and Catholic missionary Carlos (Charles) 
Estermann consolidated the use of the label “Nyaneka-Nkhumbi” to identify multi-ethnolinguistic 
groups in the interior of Benguela who had common cultural and historical ties to one another due 
to their relations with the Mbangala. This label has since then been criticized for homogenizing 
different ethnolinguistic groups in Quilengues and for erasing their ties to the Mbangala.  
By the time of the arrival of the Portuguese on the coast of Benguela at the beginning of 
the seventeenth century, the sociopolitical landscape of Quilengues was composed of clusters of 
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villages of varied sizes and ethnolinguistic groups. While some comprised several hundred people, 
others had less than fifty individuals. A sobado was defined by its collection of tributary peoples 
and the size of its herds. Hence, the soba valued and depended on his subjects. We may say that 
the territory of a sobado had less relevance than its population and herds of cattle since the constant 
changes in the political alliances of a soba provoked changes in its size and borders184.  
Ethnographers and anthropologists from the end of the nineteenth century and beginning 
of the twentieth century were baffled by the ethnolinguistic complexity of the interior of Benguela, 
and struggled to classify and “organize” this plural reality. Although most succeeded in presenting 
their individual visions of the ethnolinguistic landscape of Benguela, whenever one attempts to 
combine this ethnographic literature into one text, the resulting product is as confusing as reality 
itself, due to overlapping definitions about who these peoples were185.  
The ethnolinguistic complexity of Benguela is also depicted in a series of ethnographic 
maps from the twentieth century. Similar to the political maps discussed above, these were 
ideologically driven discourses and did not represent reality on the ground. They are imprecise 
representations of African territories aimed at organizing reality into colonial standards. A series 
of these ethnographic maps are available and are referenced in the Bibliography (Cartographic 
Sources).  
The most complete work on the Nyaneka-Nkhumbi of Quilengues is present in the second 
volume of the three-part work by Carlos Estermann (1896-1976), entitled The Ethnography of 
Southwestern Angola: The Nyaneka-Nkumbi Ethnic Group, published in Portuguese in 1961 and 
in English in 1979186. Also singificant is his 1935 article “Notas etnográficas sobre os povos 
indígenas do Districto de Huíla” published in the Boletim Geral das Colónias187. Estermann 
arrived in Angola in 1924 and by 1933 occupied the position of Vicar of Chela and head of the 
Catholic missions in Huíla. He died in Angola in 1976.  
                                                 
184 Santos, “A cartografia dos poderes”, 132. 
185 For some examples, see Nogueira, A raça negra sob o ponto de vista da civilisação da África; Bastos, “Traços 
gerais sobre a Ethnographia do Districto de Benguella”; Diniz, Populações Indígenas de Angola; Estermann, 
Ethnography of Southwestern Angola, Vol. II; Redinha, Coleção Etnográfica.  
186 Estermann, Ethnography of Southwestern Angola, Vol. II. 
187 Estermann, “Notas etnográficas sobre os povos indígenas do Distrito de Huíla”, 41-69. 
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While writing his volume on the Nyaneka-Nkhumbi, Estermann consulted the writings of 
other missionaries, including Father Afonso Maria Lang, who worked in the Huíla Missions from 
1890 to 1942. Another missionary, Father Eugenio Dekindt, provided both colleagues with 
precious information about these “tribes”. The writings of Fathers Aucopt and Villain were 
consulted as well. Estermann also made use of the notes left by Count Rohan-Chabot, who led a 
scientific expedition to Huíla between 1912 and 1913. Finally, he referred to Antonio Francisco 
Nogueira’s Raça Negra (1881).  
The label “Nyaneka-Nkhumbi” given by Estermann to the peoples that occupied the large 
territory of Quilengues (including Huíla and Humbe) presents a series of theoretical and practical 
limitations. Besides being a colonialist term, its adoption tends to homogenize the societies it 
encompasses. As historian Thomas Desch-Obi puts it, the Nyaneka-Nkhumbi label is “problematic 
in that it is neither indigenous nor inclusive”188. Although I do not adopt it to identify the different 
peoples of Quilengues, it is important to understand its meaning and analyse the supposed 
connections between these two groups, which also have several subdivisions, as we shall see 
below.   
The Nkhumbi, as the name suggests, came originally from the lands of Humbe, in the inner 
Cunene basin. According to Estermann, the main Nkhumbi “sub-tribes” were located along the 
Caculuvar River, down to its confluence with the Cunene, in the region of the sobado of Humbe 
(Map 3). Mulondo, to the north of Humbe, was also an important Nkhumbi community. Other 
Nkhumbi peoples (including Ndongona, Kwakwa and Ambo) occupied the lands on the east banks 
of the Cunene River and the Cuvelai Delta 189. For the ethnographer Jose Redinha (1905-1983), 
the Nkhumbi was an ethnic group composed of agropastoralist societies, which included the 
Humbis, Donguenas, Hingos, Handos, Quipungos and Quilengue-humbis190. In Nogueira’s 
classification, the “Ban-Kumbi” were divided into five groups, with the main one being the 
“original” Ban-Kumbi, plus the Ba-Kamba, Ba-Mullondo, Ba-Handa and the Ba-Dipá-
Xinbungo191.  
                                                 
188 Desch-Obi, “Engolo”, 2-3.  
189 Estermann, Ethnography of Southwestern Angola, Vol. II, 7-9.  
190 Redinha, Coleção Etnográfica, 39. 
191 Nogueira, A raça negra sob o ponto de vista da civilisação da África, 255. 
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The Nyaneka, on the other hand, were mainly located in Huíla (Mwila), Handa and Gambos 
(Ngambwe), with some presence in the regions of Jau (Njau), Quihita (Kihita) and Pocolo. 
Estermann includes the areas of Humpata, Quipungo (Tyipungu) and Hoque, the latter inhabited 
mainly by the Handa192. According to Nogueira, the “Ba-Nhaneca” were composed of seven 
distinct peoples: Ban-Gambue, Ban-Xipungo, Ban-Lupollo, Ban-Jau, and Ban-Pata (all 
independent polities), plus the Ba-Habe and the Ba-Xihita (tributaries of the Ban-Gambue)193.  
As mentioned before, some oral traditions allege that the Nyaneka migrated from the north, 
meaning they originated from the central plateau, and not from the Cunene basin. In Nogueira’s 
view, both groups migrated from the plateau after being expelled by the Ovimbundu (“Bin-Bundu” 
or “Ba-Nano”). He also believed the Nyaneka-Nkhumbi spoke Umbundu (on-bundo). Nogueira 
extracted this information from local oral traditions194. But as I argued earlier, based on Vansina’s 
research, this tradition of transference of the peoples from the highlands of the central plateau to 
the lowlands of Quilengues seems to refer to later migratory movements, probably in the 
nineteenth century.  
Migratory movements and transhumance195 sponsored the rise of different identities that 
with time consolidated as “ethnic” labels. This happened with the Nkhumbi that left the lands of 
Cunene basin to “become” Nyaneka in Huíla. Other Nyaneka groups followed along the rivers 
Coporolo and Catumbela until they reached the coast, where they merged with pre-existing 
Ndombe communities. Mixed clusters of Nyaneka and Nkhumbi peoples thus occupied the interior 
of Benguela by the time the first Portuguese slavers arrived in the region. They controlled the lands 
around the rivers in the interior, such as Coporolo and Calunga, and opened the trading routes that 
connected Humbe to Quilengues, which helped the consolidation and development of some 
important sobados located along the way, such as Quipungo196. 
                                                 
192 Estermann, Ethnography of Southwestern Angola, Vol. II, 7-9; Redinha, Coleção Etnográfica, 41; Diniz, 
Populações Indígenas de Angola, 401 
193 Nogueira, A raça negra sob o ponto de vista da civilisação da África, 255. 
194 Nogueira, A raça negra sob o ponto de vista da civilisação da África, 255-256; Diniz, Populações Indígenas de 
Angola, 401. Umbundu is also called the “Bunda language from Benguela” by some ethnographers. The peoples of 
Quilengues and Dombe would then speak a dialect of the Bunda language: Bastos, “Traços gerais sobre a Ethnographia 
do Districto de Benguella”, 6-8. 
195 According to Diniz, Populações Indígenas de Angola, 430, the Nyaneka (Vanyanekas) were not nomadic people, 
since only their herders migrated seasonally (transhumance) to find grazing grounds for their cattle.  
196 Miller, “Angola central e sul por volta de 1840”, 8, 41.  
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The development of this great number of ethnolinguistic groups in the interior of Benguela 
resulted from a long process of slow migratory movements that lasted centuries. When referring 
to massive migratory movements, however, one should not imagine people crossing territories and 
climatic zones “as the crow flies” 197. These migratory movements did not head in a direct path to 
their destiny, but were rather a series of resettlements in new environments that demanded slow 
adaptation and occasionally retreat to previously occupied areas. Recurrent movements of 
expansions and constrictions marked the “rhythm” of history in the lowlands, as well as in the 
highlands198.  
Transhumance and other forms of seasonal migration were methods for spreading language 
and ethnic identities to new regions. The displacement of herds from the grazing grounds closer to 
home during the dry seasons led to the occupation of new areas with green pastures by the 
agropastoralist communities of Quilengues. In years of extended droughts, herders from 
agropastoralist societies could stay up to eleven months away from home. These grazing 
expeditions led people from the lowlands to look for pasture on the wetter lands of central plateau, 
which led to cultural exchanges between the peoples ascending from Quilengues and Huíla and 
the Mbundu populations of the central plateau199. This created a superficial homogeneity among 
different ethnic groups that led ethnographers and anthropologists to apply the generic label of 
“Ovimbundu” to groups such as the Ndombe and the Tyilenge200.  
In his classic work about the Nyaneka-Nkhumbi, Estermann presented a list of ten “tribes” that 
supposedly composed this ethnic group201:  
1. The Nyaneka (Ovanyaneka), subdivided into the Mwila (Ovamwila) and the Ngambwe 
(Ovangambwe). 
2. The Nkumbi (Ovankumbt), including the Kamba (Ovakamba), the Tyiteve (Ovatyiteve), 
and the Mulondo (Ovamulondo). 
3. The Ndongona (Ovandongona). 
4. The Hinga (Ovahinga). 
5. The Kwankwa (Ovakwankwa). 
6. The Randa of Mupa (Ovahanda). 
                                                 
197 Vansina, How Societies are Born, 42.    
198 Miller, “Angola central e sul por volta de 1840”, 2. See also Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savanna, 17.  
199 Vansina, How Societies are Born, 83-85. 
200 Candido, African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 242-243, has argued that the use of the ethnic label 
“Ovimbundo” is proper for the twentieth century. Milheiros, Notas de Etnografia Angolana, 10, used the term 
“Umbundu” as an “ethnic label”, instead of the language they speak. 
201 Estermann, Ethnography of Southwestern Angola, Vol. II, 7.  
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7. The Randa of Quipungo (Ovahanda). 
8. The Tyipungu (Ovatyipungu). 
9. The Tyilenge-Humbi (Ovatyilenge-Humbi). 
10. The Tyilenge-Muso (Ovatyilenge-Muso). 
 
The two last “tribes” in Estermann’s list settled on the margins of the Calunga River, near 
where a Luso-African settlement named Salvaterra dos Magos would be built in the eighteenth 
century. The Tyilenge-Muso (Quilengue-Muchó) considered the Tyilenge-Humbi (Quilengue-
Honó) to be invaders. The first group (Muso) was regarded by ethnographers from the beginning 
of the twentieth century as the “Tyilenge of pure race”202. According to José Redinha, the 
Tyilenge-Muso (Quilengues-musos) were part of the Herero “race”, together with Chavicuas, 
Dumbos, Guendelengos, Ndombes e Cuandos. All of these Herero descendants were famous for 
their bold and rapacious character (caráter atrevido e rapinante), which led them to engage in 
constant conflicts with neighboring communities203. They were grouped around two main 
ombalas204: Socoval and Impulo205.  The sobado of Socoval was the most important political entity 
of Quilengues from at least the beginning of the eighteenth century to the end of the nineteenth 
century (Chapter 4).   
The Tyilenge-Muso would have arrived first in Quilengues. They were mainly stock-
herders who, like other Herero groups such as the Cuando (“Va-kwandu” or “Mucuandos”), 
arrived from arid coastal areas. The Tyilengue-Humbi were agropastoralist that slowly moved 
north from the highlands of Huíla (Chela) until they reached the lowlands of Quilengues, or 
Mbuelo (Map 1). Both “tribes” did not occupy well-delimitated territories, but were rather 
intertwined with one another and with other ethnic groups. As Estermann explains: “it is not easy 
to mark out the area of this tribe [Tyilengue-Humbi], since it is not continuous but is cut up by 
enclaves of Tylenge-Muso and even of Kwandu, a people that does not belong to this ethnic 
group”206. According to Augusto Bastos, the Tyilengue-Humbi were among the African groups 
that better adapted to the presence of the Portuguese, along with “Bihenos, Bailundos and 
                                                 
202 Bastos, “Traços gerais sobre a Ethnographia do Districto de Benguella”, 45-46. 
203 Redinha, Coleção Etnográfica, 42. 
204 According to Porto, Viagens e Apontamentos, Vol. 1, 239 – note 1, 361 – note 87, the term “Ombala” was used to 
identify the “capital” of the sobados. See also Desch-Obi, “Engolo”, 47-52. 
205 Estermann, Ethnography of Southwestern Angola, Vol. II, 9-10.   
206 Estermann, Ethnography of Southwestern Angola, Vol. II, 10.  
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Cacondas”. From the point of view of colonialists, these were precisely the “tribes” better suited 
for “assimilation” and with better chance of becoming “civilized”207.  
The existence of the Nyaneka-Nkhumbi ethnic group has been recently questioned and 
deconstructed by African anthropologists from communities forced under this label208. As Rosa 
Melo has argued, the amalgamation of groups like Handa, Muila, Ngambwe and Muso together 
with the Nyaneka and the Nkhumbi is not beneficial for any of them, because it erases the cultural 
particularities of each of these groups209. This includes the manifested opinion of local people 
about which ethnic group they belong to210.  
The rejection of the term “Nyaneka-Nkhumbi” by those belonging to the communities 
whom this “ethnic” label is supposed to identify reinforces the argument for the use of another 
term to refer to the peoples that occupied Quilengues since at least the seventeenth century. Despite 
containing its own limitations, the adoption of the term “Mbangala” (also Bangala) unveils a 
common historical process experienced by multiple small societies from the interior of 
Benguela211.  
 
The “Bangala”  
The Mbangala were marauding bands of warriors that spread out from Quilengues in 
multiple migratory movements starting sometime in the sixteenth century212. Some Mbangala 
bands moved northwards thorough the geographical corridor of Seles (between the plateau and the 
coast) and met Europeans on the left margin of the Cuvo River by 1600. Some of them sold their 
                                                 
207 Bastos, “Traços gerais sobre a Ethnographia do Districto de Benguella”, 47-50. 
208 The anthropologist Rosa Maria Amélia João de Melo identifies herself as belonging to the Handa “ethnicity” and 
has written about the cultural practices of this group. See Rosa Maria Amélia João Melo, “Mulher é aquela que comeu 
o boi: o efuko e a construção do género no grupo étnico Handa”, Lusotopie, XII, Nos. 1-2 (2005): 139-160.    
209 Frieda-Nela Williams, Precolonial Communities of Southwestern Africa: A History of Owambo Kingdoms, 1600-
1920, 2nd Ed. (Windhoek, National Archives of Namibia, [1991] 1994), 82-89, identify the peoples of the Ovamboland 
as closely related to the Nyaneka-Nkhumbi.  
210 Rosa Maria Amélia João Melo, “Nyaneka-Nkhumbi: uma carapuça que não serve aos Handa, nem aos Nyaneka, 
nem aos Nkhumbi”, Cadernos de Estudos Africanos, Nos. 7-8 (2005): 159-161, 173.  
211 Joseph C. Miller, “The Imbangala and the Chronology of Early Central African History”, The Journal of African 
History, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1972): 561, makes a brief analysis of the Portuguese corruption of the Bantu term “Bângala” 
into “Imbangála”. 
212 John K. Thornton, Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 1500-1800 (London: UCL Press, 1999), 102, summarises the 
Mbangala as “marauding bands, headed by military officers who lived by permanently pillaging the countryside. They 
grew and replenished their losses through incorporating people, especially adolescent boys, whom they captured in 
their raids, and at least initially were said to practise infanticide and cannibalism”. 
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services to the Portuguese as both slave hunters and mercenaries in the wars of conquest against 
the kingdoms of Ndongo and Kongo. Other bands spread through the lands of Kisama and Libolo. 
A second wave of migrant warriors left Quilengues and marched up the central plateau, spreading 
amongst the peoples of Nano and Ngalange. A third wave of Mbangala warriors attacked the 
peoples living on the inner Cunene basin, a territory known then as Mataman, later founding 
Humbe-Inene (Map 2).  
Although they are often recognized for their military abilities and warfare superiority in 
relation to other African polities213, the main characteristic of the Mbangala was their rejection of 
the lineage-based institutions of the societies from which they originated. This radical rejection of 
the lineage led to the symbolic destruction of all family ties within their main institution, the 
kilombo. In practical terms, this symbolic destruction of lineage meant the rejection of their natural 
offspring and the incorporation of youngsters kidnapped from raided communities into their bands 
of warriors. Soon, stories of infanticide, human sacrifice and cannibalism became the main 
European reference to the Mbangala, which tainted the use of the term. The term “Mbangala” had 
also a pejorative meaning among certain African communities, who identified them as “thieves” 
and “vagabonds”, since their major activities were raiding villages, stealing cattle and destroying 
palm trees in order to make wine. Despite its pejorative meaning, I have chosen to adopt the term 
“Mbangala” because of its historical importance in the context of this thesis. 
In the introduction of his book about the Nyaneka-Nkhumbi, Estermann affirmed that the 
Mbangala (Bangala) possessed a “fairly well-defined ethnic unity” and an observable “linguistic 
cohesion”214. Despite such apparent “cohesion” in the composition of this large aggregate of 
peoples that occupied Quilengues, there was no unifying term broadly accepted by ethnographers 
to define this “ethnic” group, as was the case of the Ambo (Ova-Ambo)215. Therefore, Estermann 
decided to identify this group of people(s) by the generic term “Nyaneka-Nkhumbi”.  
There were, however, two terms largely used by neighboring polities to identify the peoples 
that composed the Nyaneka-Nkhumbi “ethnicity”: Ova-Mbuelo and Ova-Mbangala. While the 
                                                 
213 Miller, “Angola central e sul por volta de 1840”, 13, points out that the Mbangala militaristic qualities gave their 
warlords overwhelming advantages over more traditional leaders (sobas and macotas) who had been trained to display 
skills related to agriculture (such as rainmaking) and not war. 
214 Estermann, Ethnography of Southwestern Angola, Vol. II, 1. 
215 Not to be mistaken with Huambo, from the central plateau, sometimes written in the same way.   
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term Mbuelo (low country) was used among the Mbundu peoples of the central plateau216  to refer 
to their neighbors “from below”, the Kwanyama (from the Cuvelai Delta) used the term Mbangala 
to designate those who inhabited the lands to the west, in the inner Cunene basin. Estermann 
declined to use the term Mbuelo because he realized this classification included different 
ethnolinguistic groups, including Herero217.  
Estermann believed at first that “Bangala” should be the term of choice for ethnographers 
that, like himself, wanted to put some “order into the varied and complicated nomenclature of 
southern Angola”218. He had previously adopted it in his 1935 essay about the “indigenous” 
peoples of Huíla219. In that article, Estermann classified the peoples in the interior of Huíla as being 
members of the Bantu “race”, divided into three ethnic groups: the Ova-Ambo, the Ova-Herero 
and the Ova-Mbangala. The ethnographic map published in this same article divided the 
“Bangalas” into nine “tribes”: Hingas, Handas, Donguenas, Humbis, Mulondos, Capelongos, 
Nyanecas, Tyipungos, and Handas [again]220. 
In the introduction to his 1961 book on the Nyaneka-Nkhumbi, Estermann mentioned his 
previous choice to use the term “Bangala”. He explained he had adopted it in his 1935 article 
because he then believed it was a reliable label to identify “tribes” of the interior of Benguela that 
shared cultural and historical similarities221. Still, he later dropped its use to avoid confusion 
                                                 
216 “Mbundu peoples of the central plateau” was an eighteenth-century generic label given to the peoples living in the 
interior of Benguela, especially in the highlands of Nano. In the nineteenth century, they would be identified as 
“Ovimbundu” (Umbundu speakers): Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 292-293. “Mdundu” 
was also a generic label used in the interior of Angola to identify the people of the kingdom of Ndongo. Nevertheless, 
as Adriano Parreira, Economia e sociedade em Angola na época da rainha Jinga, século XVII (Lisboa: Estampa, 
1990), 175, notes that the kingdom of Ndongo was not a territory reserved to a single “ethnicity”, hence there should 
be no automatic association between Ndongo and Mdundu either. 
217 Carlos Estermann, Ethnography of Southwestern Angola: The Non-Bantu Peoples. The Ambo Ethnic Group, Vol. 
I (New York/London: Africana Publishing Company, [1957] 1976), 140, argued that “Bangala was the generic term 
used by the Ambo to refer to the peoples beyond the Cunene. Bwela designates the Ngangela”. According to Desch-
Obi, “Engolo”, 3, the term “Bangala” was problematic for being “too inclusive”. 
218 Estermann, Ethnography of Southwestern Angola, Vol. II, 2. 
219 In a previous article, Estermann, “Notas etnográficas sobre os povos indígenas do Distrito de Huíla”, 44, defended 
the use of the term “Bângala” as a “very convenient generic term”. The colonial explorer and ethnographer Henrique 
Augusto Dias de Carvalho, Ethnographia e história tradicional dos povos da Lunda (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 
1890), 85; used this same term in reference to the Mbangala of Kasanji, who he mistakenly considered descendants 
of the peoples of Lunda. He recorded that the term “Kibangala” (Quibangala) was the singular form (one individual), 
while “Akibangala” (Aquibangala) was the plural form. See also Diniz, Populações Indígenas de Angola, 98,   
220 Estermann, “Notas etnográficas sobre os povos indígenas do Distrito de Huíla”, 49. See also Estermann, 
Ethnography of Southwestern Angola, Vol. I, 92. 
221 Estermann, Ethnography of Southwestern Angola, Vol. II, 2, indicates that “For that reason I did use it in a little 
essay and in the ethnic outline that accompanied it (Estermann, 1935)”. 
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between the “Bangala” from Benguela and the “Imbangala” from Angola (Malanje), the latter 
believed to be descendants from the legendary Lunda warrior Kinguri. As we will see in the next 
chapter, this historiographical error has endured for centuries and led scholars to separate these 
two Mbangala groups (northern and southern) as different “ethnicities”. 
Estermann mentioned that other ethnographers222, including Gladwyn M. Childs, had used 
the term “Bangala”, always in quotation marks, to identify the peoples occupying the southern 
portion of the interior of Benguela. In his books about the Ovimbundu (Umbundu speakers)223, 
Childs affirmed that they belonged to the same linguistic group as their southern neighbors: the 
Ambo, the Herero and the “Bangala”. Their northern and eastern neighbors, however, belonged to 
other linguistic groups224. He then added, in a footnote, that a further attempt to establish 
connexions with neighbouring “tribes” was in order. Childs showed that the Nganda, the Ndombe, 
the Humbi and the Cilengi all belonged to the “Bangala” group. The Kalukembe, in turn, although 
part to the “Ovimbundu” had more similarities with the “Bangala” than with their own ethnic 
group225.  
Estermann understood that the term “Bangala” was connected to an “unconscious 
historical memory” spread among the peoples of Huíla, but he could not reconstruct such 
history226.  For Childs, the Bangala not only occupied the district of Huíla, which in the twentieth 
century included Quilengues, but also adjoining districts227. While Estermann completely dropped 
the use of the term “Bangala” in favor of the ethnic label “Nyaneka-Nkhumbi”, Childs kept using 
                                                 
222 See also Hermann Baumann and Diedrich Westermann, Les peuples et les civilisations de l’Afrique, L. Homburger 
trans. (Paris: Payot, 1948). 
223 Gladwyn M. Childs, Umbundu Kingship and Character: being a description of social structure and individual 
development of the Ovimbundu of Angola, with observations concerning the bearing on the enterprise of Christian 
missions of certain phases of the life and culture described (London: International African Institute / Oxford 
University Press, 1949); See also Gladwyn M. Childs, Kinship and Character of the Ovimbundu (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1969). 
224 A broad linguistic family called Njila gave origin to the majority of the languages in the interior of Angola and 
Benguela, including Nyaneka, Nkhumbi, Ndombe, Umbundu and Kimbundu, among others. The similarity between 
the languages of the sertões of Benguela arises not only from centuries of interactions between the societies of Mbuelo 
and Nano, but also because they all belong the same ancestral Njila language: Vansina, How Societies are Born, 6. 
225 Childs, Kinship and Character of the Ovimbundu, 169, 175 – note 4, 176-179. According to Vansina, How Societies 
are Born, 198 – map 22, “The Jaga Corridor”, Kalukembe (Caluquembe) was on the northern limit of the milk-
drinking populations of Benguela.  
226 Estermann, Ethnography of Southwestern Angola, Vol. II, 2. 
227 Childs, Kinship and Character of the Ovimbundu, 179. In a previous article, Childs, “The Peoples of Angola in the 
Seventeenth Century According to Cadornega”, 277, had accepted the use of the label “Nyaneka-Nkhimbi” given by 
Estermann to identify the “Bangala” groups.  
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the term “Bangala” for those southern groups inland from Benguela, and “Imbangala” for the 
northern ones from Angola228.    
Historians interested in the linguistic complexities of the peoples in the interior of 
Benguela, such as Jan Vansina and Thomas Desch-Obi, have argued for rise of the Mbangala in 
the region of Quilengues. Vansina (2004) showed that the main clues for solving this issue came 
from linguistics and from the methodology of “words and things”229. This included not only the 
denomination of Bangala given by their neighbors, but also their relation to their mythical leader 
Kinguri (from nguri, the “lion”). Although the term “nguri” was understood for centuries as 
originating from the “Jaga language” of Mbangala bands supposedly migrating out of Lunda 
(Chapter 2), ethnographers such as Alfred Hauenstein did not find the term “nguri” among the 
Nkhumbi or in standard Umbundu (the language of the peoples of the central plateau). However, 
he confirmed that the term was used among the Nyaneka and in the lands of Hanya (Hanha), on 
the northern limits of Quilengues230.  
Vansina analysed the vocabulary gathered by Antonio Nogueira among the Nkhumbi in 
the 1850s, in which the term “Chimbangala” translated to “vagabond” or “vagrant”. Although this 
term did not exist in Umbundu, it could be found among the Nyaneka with a similar meaning, 
“robber” (salteador). The term was also used in Kwanyama (Quanhama) to designate both 
Nkhumbi and Nyaneka “tribes”231. Vansina further cited the 1797 report by Paulo Pinheiro de 
                                                 
228 Estermann, Ethnography of Southwestern Angola, Vol. II, 2; Childs, Kinship and Character of the Ovimbundu, 
179, 186. Although Childs, “The Peoples of Angola in the Seventeenth Century According to Cadornega”, 277, had 
previously accepted the label “Nyaneka-Nkhumbi”, he maintained the use of the term “Bangala” (with quotation 
marks) in his book.   
229 For more on this methodology of “words and things”, see Jan Vansina, Paths in the Rainforest: Toward a History 
of Political Tradition in Equatorial Africa (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), 3-33; Vansina, How 
Societies are Born, 5-11. 
230 Alfred Hauenstein, Les Hanya: description d’un groupe ethnique Bantou de l’Angola (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 
1967), 248. 




Lacerda232, in which the colonial explorer stated that while the “Quimbundos”233 did not eat human 
flesh, the “Quimbangalas” did234.  
Finally, Vansina identified the ethnonym “Bangala” with the toponym “Benguela”235. 
Hence, the “kingdom of Benguela” would be the land of the Bangala. There are other terms in 
Portuguese (from Brazil) that follow this same pattern of connections. For instance, the term 
“banguela” translates to “toothless”236, which is a reference to the ritual of extracting frontal teeth 
(okukulwa) done by the Bangala warriors and inherited by other peoples of Benguela237. We may 
also include in this list of related words the term “bengala”, which in English translates to “cane”. 
According to Henrique de Carvalho, the sobas had tall curved sticks named bengalas, carried by 
one of his officials (merininho) during the collection of tributes, which were used both as a symbol 
of authority and as a club to hit those who refused to pay tributes238. As historian Desch-Obi 
showed, Bangala warlords used carrying sticks and “elegant canes” as both symbols of power and 
actual weapons239.  
                                                 
232 Paulo Martins Pinheiro de Lacerda, “Notícia da cidade de São Filippe de Benguella e dos costumes dos gentios 
habitantes daquele sertão” (10 November 1797), Annaes Marítimos e Coloneaes, 5ª série (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 
1845), 488.  
233 This is another case in which the term “Quimbundo” is misused to identify the peoples of Nano (Banano, Mbundu 
or Ovimbundo).  
234 As we will see in the next chapter, the Mbangala bands were infamous for rituals involving the consumption of 
human flesh. See Chapter 2.  
235 Vansina, How Societies are Born, 197 – note 109. Miller, “The Imbangala and the Chronology of Early Central 
African History”, 561, had previously dismissed the relations between the terms “Imbangala”, “Banguela” and 
“Benguela”. 
236 The term “banguela” cannot be found in eighteenth-century Portuguese dictionaries and it is not much used in 
Portugal, but rather in Brazil. The Portuguese prefer to use the term “desdentado” for “toothless”. 
237 For more on the okukulwa, see Estermann, Ethnography of Southwestern Angola, Vol. II, 43; Bastos, “Traços 
gerais sobre a Ethnographia do Districto de Benguella”, 44; Diniz, Populações Indígenas de Angola, 33, 124, 170, 
521; Milheiros, Notas de Etnografia Angolana, 44-58, 143. According to Capello and Ivens, De Angola à contra-
costa, Vol. 1, 174, 194, it was possible to identify from which “family” an individual belonged in Huíla just by 
checking the different forms of teeth extractions practiced by each group. According to Melo, “Nyaneka-Nkhumbi”, 
165-167, this practice is still important for members of some communities in the interior of Benguela today. According 
to Antonio de Oliveira de Cadornega, História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, 1680, vol. 3 (Lisboa: Agência Geral do 
Ultramar, [1680] 1972), 225 – note 17, 276, 338, 403, 451, the jaga removed their teeth very carefully by hitting some 
small stick with rocks, suggesting they were valious ingredients for witchcraft rituals. He also recorded that peoples 
of the interior of Angola (Ambundo) celebrated the first appearance of their children’s lower teeth, but if the upper 
teeth grew first the child could be killed.  
238 Diniz, Populações Indígenas de Angola, 98.  
239 According to Desch-Obi, Fighting for Honor, 145, sticks were seen as weapons of honor among the Kunene peoples 
(that is the Mbangala), and its use symbolised male domination over cattle and lesser people. According to Carvalho, 
Ethnographia e história tradicional dos povos da Lunda, 86, the soba’s auxiliary (meirinho) responsible for the 
collection of tribute carried a “cane” (bengala) with which he hit those who refused to pay. See also Diniz, Populações 
Indígenas de Angola, 98. 
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Desch-Obi also temporarily adopted the use of the term “Bangala” to identify the peoples 
of southern Benguela, from the Huíla highlands to the floodplains of the Cunene River. In his 2000 
PhD dissertation, he researched an African martial art, Engolo, which the historian believes 
originated in the region of Quilengues (Kilengues) and was associated with Mbangala warriors. 
Similar to Estermann, Desch-Obi complained that he could not find another term to identify this 
large group of peoples that belong to “a common historical sphere of extended cross-cultural 
interaction”. He noticed that “the term Bangala may have fallen out of use by their own 
descendants who mixed with subjugated pastoralists, but the term is still employed by their 
Kwanyama neighbors who were subjugated by them”240. As with Childs, this historian adopted 
the term “Imbangala” for those from Angola, in order to avoid misunderstandings.  
In his book Fighting for Honor (2008), Desch-Obi replaced the term “Bangala” by 
“Kunene peoples”, which he defined as composed by the Handa de Mupa, Handa de Kipungu, 
Mutana, Mulondo, Kiteve, Kamba, Kilenges-Humbe, Kilengues-Muso, Ngambwe, Mwila 
(Nyaneka), and Kipungu. He excluded the Ndongona, Hinga and Kwakwa, considering them 
another branch of the Cimbebasian languages241. Desch-Obi disclosed that the reason for dropping 
the term “Bangala” was not technical, but rather the concern in using a term that can be considered 
pejorative nowadays. He also avoided using Estermann’s label “Nyaneka-Nkhumbi” for being 
erroneous and colonialist242.  
Though Estermann’s main intention was to coin a term that could cope with the complexity 
of the ethnic identities in the southern interior of Benguela, his label “Nyaneka-Nkhumbi” has 
actually homogenized this complexity while erasing the history of their interactions. Before 
permanently dropping the use of the term “Bangala” to identify the peoples of southern Benguela, 
Estermann exposed his frustration: “To repeat, it is with regret that I have dropped a term 
[Bangala] having such historical flavor, so easy and practical to use” 243. 
                                                 
240 Desch-Obi, “Engolo”, 2.  
241 For more on the classification of Cimbebasian languages, see Anita Pfouts, “Economy and Society in Northern 
Namibia 500 BCE to 1800 CE: A Linguistic Approach” (PhD Dissertation, University of California, 2003).  
242 Desch-Obi, Fighting for Honor, 229 – note 4.  
243 Estermann, Ethnography of Southwestern Angola, Vol. II, 3. 
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The main problem for the use of Mbangala (Bangala or Imbangala), however, is related to 
historiographical misunderstanding about the “origins”244 and composition of these bands of 
warriors. Different from the Mbangala groups who settled in Malanje (Matamba and Kasanje), but 
remaining connected to their history through the use of their “ethnic” label of “Imbangala”, those 
who remained inland from Benguela – on the central plateau, in the lowlands, or on the inner 
Cunene basin – mixed with local societies, thus “diluting” their identity and their historical ties to 
the Mbangala warriors245.   
 
Conclusion 
The territory of Quilengues was a Luso-African invention that varied in size and ethnic 
composition throughout the centuries, a transformation recorded in colonial reports and 
cartographic sources. It featured as the largest district of the Captaincy of Benguela in the 
eighteenth century, composed by a multitude of decentralized communities that shared several 
cultural features despite their linguistic and political idiosyncrasies. The diverse landscapes and 
environmental conditions presented by each part of this extensive territory gave rise to different 
economies and social organizations.  
This chapter has tracked information about the political and ethnolinguistic composition of 
Quilengues using a variety of historiographic, ethnographic and cartographic sources, which 
evidence the multiplicity of peoples and political entities living within this region. The peoples 
living within Quilengues did not form an “ethnicity” (Kilenge) until at least mid-nineteenth 
century, and organized themselves into decentralized and independent polities connected with each 
other through lineage structures and temporary political alliances. Since the tenth century 
agropastoralist communities spread out in constant migratory movements (expansions and 
constrictions), as their members searched for water and grazing grounds for their cattle. In time, 
                                                 
244 I choose to put the word “origin” in quotation marks to highlight that there is no singular place or time for the 
beginning of a complex historical process such as the rise of the Mbangala. Similarly, I avoid calling Quilengues their 
“homeland” to avert any fixation of the institution of the kilombo (nomadic by definition) as if an immobile point in 
a map.  
245 I adopted the idea of the “dilution” of Mbangala bands into local lineage-based communities from John K. 
Thornton, “Religious and Ceremonial Life in the Kongo and Mbundu Areas, 1500-1700”, in Central Africans and 
Cultural Transformations in the American Diaspora, Linda M. Heywood, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 82. Jan Vansina, “The Foundation of the Kingdom of Kasanje”, The Journal of African History, Vol. 4, 
No. 3 (1963): 368, points to the Mbangala “mixing” with local “pacific, sedentary, agricultural people. 
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war and ritualistic raids also connected the inhabitants of the highlands of the central plateau 
(Nano) and those of the lowlands of Quilengues (Mbuelo), the latter identified by local traditions 
and linguistic studies as related to the multiethnic group of the Mbangala (Bangala).  
As we will see in the next chapter, the rise and expansion of the Mbangala bands out of 
Quilengues features as one of the most important historical process of West Central Africa in the 





Early history of Quilengues 
 
The Mbangala were bands of marauders and mercenaries that spread throughout the so-
called “kingdoms” of Angola and Benguela in the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They 
were composed of nomadic warriors with no kinship association, who organized themselves 
around a military and religious institution called “kilombo”; hence, the Mbangala can also be 
considered a martial cult. Different from other African polities that drew their authority and 
political organization from ancestor veneration, through lineage-based rituals and structures of 
power supported by kinship ties, the kilombo of the Mbangala was structured around initiation rites 
and on the denial of ancestry. The head of each Mbangala band had to prove his power and skills 
as military leader by presiding over rituals such as cattle raiding, kidnapping of individuals from 
other groups and the sacrifice of animals and humans.   
This Chapter 2 will discuss the “origins” and composition of early Mbangala warrior bands 
and their expansion throughout West Central Africa246. It begins by differentiating the Mbangala 
from other groups of “cannibal warriors”, who according to stories spread by European mariners 
and Christian missionaries had come from a single “nation of savages” in the “torrid lands” of 
Inner Ethiopia. I highlight, in particular, the role played by the Jesuit Baltasar Barreira in the 
consolidation of the legendary connection between these “cannibals” of the kingdoms of Kongo 
and Angola with those from Serra Leoa247. Inspired by these legends, European chroniclers 
combined different reports of attacks of various bands of warriors (Mande, Gala, Jaga, Zimba, 
Mbangala) in unrelated parts of Africa (Serra Leoa, Zambeze, Kongo, Angola, Benguela) into a 
single tale. The wars against these “cannibals” were always justifiable in the eyes of missionaries 
and slave traders.  
Secondly, this chapter will tackle two major historiographical misconceptions about the 
Mbangala. The first one concerns their classification as part of the Jaga, another group of “cannibal 
                                                 
246 The themes addressed in this chapter were developed as I thought of the consequences of some misconceptions 
about the history of the Mbangala, especially regarding what I call “the fall of Kinguri” (see below). I attempt to 
develop a new narrative for their rise and expansion from Quilengues to different parts of Angola and Benguela in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries by refining the arguments of other historians and anthropologists.  
247 According to George Brooks, Eurafricans in Western Africa: Commerce, Social Status, Gender, and Religious 
Observance from the Sixteenth to the Eighteenth Century (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2003), xii, Serra Leoa 
corresponded to the coastal territory between Cape Verga and the Sherbro River and should not be mistaken with 
modern-day nation of Sierra Leone.  
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warriors” who invaded Kongo in the second half of the sixteenth century and whose name became 
a Luso-African label used to identify some of their African enemies (“os jagas”), as well as a title 
for Mbangala warlords, such as Jaga Kasanje. The second misconception relates to oral traditions 
about the “Exodus of Kinguri”. It concerns centuries of debates about the connections between the 
Mbangala of Kasanje and the Lunda through the mythical hero “Kinguri, the lion”: the Mbangala 
of Kasanje, labelled Imbangala in the historiography, are still often considered the “original” 
Mbangala group and the direct descendants of the followers of Kinguri, who had left the Lunda 
commonwealth248 with their leader and later settled in the western (left) banks of the Cuango River, 
where they founded the kilombo of Kasanje.  
The fall of the “Exodus of Kinguri” thesis has put in question the chronology of the rise of 
various polities in Central Africa, such as Lunda, Luba, Kioko (Quioco), Songo, Shinje and 
Minungo, since the supposed Mbangala migration out of Lunda and the establishment of contacts 
with the Portuguese has served as the historical reference for the elaboration of such chronologies. 
I argue that the debunking of the myth of Kinguri’s exodus and its unveiling as a nineteenth-
century addition to the oral traditions of both the Lunda and the Mbangala of Kasanje have 
jeopardized all previous analysis about the “origins” and composition of the so-called Imbangala. 
It also serves as a warning to historians about the complexity of working with oral traditions and 
the dangers in validating such traditions as historical events without fully comprehending their 
geneses.  
After dealing with those two major misconceptions about the history of the Mbangala, I 
will tackle their expansion, taking into consideration historical accounts and linguistic analysis to 
propose that the Mbangala bands left the region of Quilengues in migratory waves that took them 
to diverse parts of West Central Africa. I argue that there are historical references for at least three 
simultaneous Mbangala migratory movements out of Quilengues, starting in the second half of the 
sixteenth century. As briefly mentioned in the previous chapter, some of these bands marched 
                                                 
248 The Lunda “empire” was, in fact, a confederation of states or a commonwealth, to which the Portuguese usually 
referred as the states of the Muatiânvua. The term Mwaant-a-Yaav (or Mwata Yanvo) was a reference to the title of 
the ruler of the Lunda commonwealth since at least the eighteenth century: Jan Vansina and Eva Sebestyen, “Angola’s 
Eastern Hinterland in the 1750s: A Text Edition and Translation of Manoel Correia Leitão’s Voyage, (1755-1756)”, 
History in Africa, Vol. 26 (1999): 355; Beatrix Heintze, “Translocal ‘Kinship’ Relations in Central African Politics 
of the 19th Century”, Translocality: The Study pf Globalising Processes from a Southern Perspective, in Ulrike Freitag 
and Achim von Oppen (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 180; John K. Thornton, “The Chronology and Causes of Lunda 
Expansion to the West, c. 1700-1852”, Zambian Journal of History, Vol. 1 (1981): 3.  
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northwards, while others moved south (Map 2). Although this is my own attempt to provide a new 
explanation for a theme already subjected to much discussion, my hypothesis for the rise and 
expansion of the Mbangala has been partially presented by several other authors, some of whom 
struggled to interpret the data available to them based on the myth of Kinguri’s exodus. In fact, 
my contribution is but an attempt to refine some ideas already presented by other scholars.  
 
“A nation of savages” 
The Mbangala bands that roamed the interior of the so-called kingdoms of Angola and 
Benguela in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are often mistakenly called “jagas” in several 
historical accounts, as well as in part of the historiography. The confusion between these two bands 
of roaming warriors from West Central Africa resulted from the combination of different 
Portuguese accounts about “vicious” attacks led by different warrior bands in Kongo/Angola, as 
well as in other parts of the continent. The Jaga and the Mbangala were treated as one single group 
for centuries, which led to misconceptions about their identities, “origins” and compositions249.  
The Jaga warriors became notorious for invading the kingdom of Kongo in 1568250, forcing 
the mani-Kongo to flee with his court251 and request help from his Portuguese allies settled in 
                                                 
249 Joseph C. Miller, “Requiem for the Jaga”, Cahiers d’études africaines, Vol. 13, No. 49 (1973): 121, showed that 
twentieth-century historians such as Robert Collins (Africa History: Text and Reading, 1971) still reproduced the 
sixteenth-century belief that the Jaga moved south after the invasion of Kongo to become the Mbangala in Angola. 
Collins never reviewed his position and reproduced the exact same opinion criticized by Miller in the 1970s in a more 
recent book: Robert O. Collins, African History in Documents: Central and South African History, 5th ed. (Princeton: 
Markus Wiener Publishers, 2015), 5-6.   
250 For more about the Jaga invasion of Kongo, see Antonio de Oliveira de Cadornega, História Geral das Guerras 
Angolanas, 1680, vol. 1 (Lisboa: Agência Geral do Ultramar, [1680] 1972), 12-13 – note 1. 
251 According to Lopes/Pigafetta, the king of Kongo (mani-Kongo) had to flee to an island in the Zaire River (Horse 
Island) after the destruction of his capital (mbanza-Kongo). He was accompanied by his main “nobles” and by the 
Portuguese priests who lived in his court. His remaining subjects sought refuge in the mountains, many of who died 
for lack of food and “other necessities”. The Jaga raided and destroyed the city, setting everything on fire, including 
the church before leaving. Many subjects of the mani-Kongo were sold to Luso-African slavers, including “some of 
royal blood”: Filippo Pigafetta, A Report of the Kingdom of Congo and of the surrounding countries, 96-98. See also 
Anne Hilton, The Kingdom of Kongo (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 69-70.   
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Luanda252. The Jaga marched into Kongo from the east253, probably departing from the lands of 
Yaka254, in the lower Cuango River255 (Map 2). The information that the Jaga came from Yaka 
seemed to be confirmed by oral traditions collected in the nineteenth-century about the origin of 
the Mbangala from Lunda (also east of the Cuango River, but to the south of Yaka)256. These oral 
                                                 
252 The Portuguese sent Captain Francisco de Gouveia in 1570 to help the forces of the mani-Kongo expel the Jaga 
from their kingdom: Manuel Ferreira Ribeiro, Homenagem aos heróis que precederam Brito Capello e Roberto Ivens 
na exploração da África Austral, 1484-1877 (Lisboa: Lallemant Freres, 1885), 8-9; Luciano Cordeiro, Viagens, 
explorações e conquistas dos portuguezes: da Mina ao Cabo Negro, segundo Garcia Mendes Castello Branco. 
Coleção de documentos, 1574-1620, vol. 1 (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1881), 9. Hermanegildo Capello, and Robert 
Ivens. De Angola à contra-costa: Descripção de uma viagem atravez do continente africano, Vol. 1 (Lisboa: Imprensa 
Nacional, 1886), 26, called Francisco de Gouveia “the victor of the Jaggas” (vencedor). In fact, it took several years 
for a combined Kongo-Portuguese military force to succeed in driving the Jaga out of mbanza-Kongo. The victory 
over the Jaga was largely credited to the Portuguese use of firearms, according to contemporary reports, because the 
invaders panicked at the sound of gunshots and ran away from the battlefield: Miller, “Requiem for the Jaga”, 121; 
John K. Thornton, “A Resurrection of the Jaga”, Cahiers d'études africaines, Vol. 18, No. 69 (1978): 223-224; Anne 
Hilton, “The Jaga Reconsidered”, The Journal of African History, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1981): 192; John K. Thornton, “The 
Art of War in Angola, 1575-1680”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 30, No. 2, April (1988): 373-
375. 
253 Lopes/Pigafetta affirmed the Jaga came from the east through the province of Mbata (Batta): Filippo Pigafetta, A 
Report of the Kingdom of Congo and of the surrounding countries, 96. See also Miller, “Requiem for the Jaga”, 149; 
Hilton, “The Jaga Reconsidered”, 197; Thornton, “A Resurrection of the Jaga”, 223-224; Joseph C. Miller, 
“Thanatopsis”, Cahiers d'Études Africaines, Vol. 18, No. 69/70 (1978): 230.  
254 According to Thornton, “A Resurrection of the Jaga”, 224, the Jaga were related to the Yaka. According to Gladwyn 
M. Childs, “The Peoples of Angola in the Seventeenth Century According to Cadornega”, The Journal of African 
History, Vol. 1, No. 2 (1960): 274, “Iaca” was one of the names used to identify the Jaga who invaded Kongo. See 
also Conde de Ficalho, Plantas úteis da África portuguesa (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1884), 47.  
255Antonio de Oliveira de Cadornega, História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, 1680, vol. 3 (Lisboa: Agência Geral do 
Ultramar, [1680] 1972), 189-193, 278, connected the Majacas (Mayaka or Muyakas) to the Jaga of Kongo. Hilton, 
“The Jaga Reconsidered”, 197-198, raised the possibility that the Jaga invasion resulted from the developing slave 
trade of Makoko, ruler of the Tyo, in the region of the middle Congo/Zaire River dubbed Stanley Pool by the 
Europeans. The Jaga would thus be ancestors of the Majacas, a group located in the lower middle Cuango River. 
Hilton also highlighted Cadornega’s reference about the Majacas as “ferocious and valorous people” among the 
“nations of the kingdom of Kongo”. See also Childs, “The Peoples of Angola in the Seventeenth Century According 
to Cadornega”, 275; Miller, “Requiem for the Jaga”, 145-146. According to Thornton, “A Resurrection of the Jaga”, 
224-225, the Majaka were a splinter group of the original Yaka of the sixteenth century. Other references to the 
Majacas can be found in João de Andrade Corvo, Estudo sobre as províncias ultramarinas, Vol. 1 (Lisboa: Academia 
Real de Ciências, 1883), 47; Visconde de Paiva Manso, História do Congo: Documentos, Obra Posthuma (Lisboa: 
Typographia da Academia, 1877), 267-268, 286.  
256 Thornton, A History of West Central Africa to 1850 , 75-76, 103-106, and 113-114, maintains that the “Jaga” who 
invaded Kongo in the sixteenth century originated in the empire of Mwene Muji, which at that time controlled the 
right bank of the Kwango River. Mwene Muji broke up in the late sixteenth or early seventeenth century, and the 
kingdom of Yaka emerged from the southern end of its ruins, as sixteenth and seventeenth century written sources 
show and nineteenth century oral tradition peripherally supports. The term “Jaga” in Portuguese was then used to 
define any group of rootless people, including in c. 1570 sources in Kongo to describe raiders who lived north of the 
Congo River in a completely different direction from the invaders. The Mbangala were also classified, in this system, 
as being jagas, although they had no connection with the invaders of Kongo either from the east or the north. They 
also had no connection with the Lunda Commonwealth, which had not yet achieved more than local success by the 
1680s. As with Vansina and Desch-Obi, Thornton posits that the Mbangala probably originated in Quilengues and 
that by the early seventeenth century they were found widely in the Umbundu speaking area, including in Kakonda, 
Sumbi, Songo, and here and there in the central highlands. Once on the move, their ranks filled quickly with non-
Umbundu speakers, so that by the time Kasanje consolidated in its final home, it was largely Kimbundu-
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traditions preserved by both the Lunda and the Mbangala of Kasanje told of the exodus of Kinguri 
(the “lion”), who left Lunda with a group of followers and moved into the “kingdom of Angola”, 
where they made contact with Luso-Africans. The descendants of Kinguri later founded a 
permanent kilombo in Kasanje and became known as the Imbangala (see more below).  
The Mbangala bands, however, only became a threat to the peoples living in the interior of 
the kingdom of Angola (Ndongo) decades after the disappearance of the Jaga who invaded 
mbanza-Kongo257. Thus, most of the references to “jagas” in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
century should be understood as references to different Mbangala warlords. The Portuguese began 
to refer to the Mbangala bands they met in the seventeenth century as “jagas” because of some 
similarities displayed by both groups258. Both of them were described as “skillful and vicious 
warriors” from the east who raided the western lands, burning all villages they found in their path. 
They both also disrupted the social order and created waves of refugees who spread throughout 
West Central Africa. Above all, both groups were accused of devouring a great part of their 
enemies and prisoners of war.  
The characterization of African warriors as “cannibals” was a common element in stories 
told by Portuguese mariners and missionaries who visited Africa from the sixteenth to the 
nineteenth century. European readers avidly consumed these stories containing taboos such as 
                                                 
speaking. Thornton’s interpretation of the rise of the Mbangala, as bands of warriors and not as an ethnic group 
originating in Quilengues, thus reinforces my own understanding of their relevance for the history of Benguela and its 
interior. Moreover, as the complementary sources presented in this chapter also show, we can now date the Mbangala 
presence and follow some of their migratory movements throughout the interior of Benguela from at least the late-
sixteenth century. 
257 “Mbanza” or “banza” are terms used to define cities; hence, mbanza-Kongo was the “capital” of Kongo: Beatrix 
Heintze, Fontes para a história de Angola do século XVII, Vol. 1 (Stuttgart: Franz Weiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH, 
1985), 115; Childs, “The Peoples of Angola in the Seventeenth Century According to Cadornega”, 275.  
258 According to José Joaquim Lopes de Lima, Ensaios sobre a statistica das possessões portuguezas na África 
Occidental e Oriental; Ásia Occidental; China, e na Oceania, vol. 3 (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1846), xxxv, the 
“Jagas” or “Jacas” were nomadic warriors from the interior of Africa who constantly relocated their military 
encampments (quilombos), spreading war throughout the continent and eventually working as mercenaries for the 
Portuguese. See also Filippo Pigafetta, A Report of the Kingdom of Congo and of the surrounding countries, 129; John 
Mair, A Brief Survey of the Terraqueous Globe (Edinburgh: Bell & Creech, 1775), 257-258.  
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human sacrifice259 and cannibalism260, which consequently helped to shape their representations 
about Africans as “savages”261. Moreover, the characterization of all Africans as “cannibals” 
served European colonial ambitions in the continent by giving them a supposed moral and 
civilizational superiority262. 
Although Africans were often portrayed as cannibals in historical accounts from the 
sixteenth century onwards263, Europeans have also been accused of practicing both 
                                                 
259 Many of the stories about human sacrifice could also have been exaggerated by European outsiders. David 
Livingstone, Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa (London: John Murray, 1857), 317, argued that 
people in the Mwaant yaav refuted the stories of human sacrifice described by Manuel Caetano Pereira, a Portuguese 
merchant who visited the region in 1796.   
260 Miller, “Requiem for the Jaga”, 135, argued that cannibalism on the scale required to produce the effects attributed 
by the Portuguese to the Jaga has never been documented anywhere in the world, which would configure proof that 
the majority of these stories were fabrications.  
261 Isabel Castro Henriques, Os Pilares da Diferença: Relações Portugal-África, séculos XV-XX (Lisbon: 
Caleidoscópio, 2004), 234-235, has argued that the “African cannibal” is a European creation from the sixteenth 
century onwards. She does not deny the existence of the practice in Africa, but points out that Europeans only began 
paying attention to such practices after hearing stories of cannibalism from Spanish travellers in the Caribbean, from 
where the word “cannibal” originated. She has shown that no European traveller who sailed to Africa before the 
sixteenth century reported cases of cannibalism among the peoples with whom they made contact. These included 
Diogo Gomes (1456), Cá da Mosto (1455-1457), Eustache de La Fosse (1479-1480), Duarte Pacheco Pereira (1506-
1508) and Valentim Fernandes (1506-1517). Other historians do not believe in real practices of cannibalism among 
the people of Kongo, attesting only for the existing of symbolic cannibalism: Antonio Luis Alves Ferronha, 
“Comentário: uma questão de olhar”, in Relação do Reino do Congo e das terras circunvizinhas, Filippo Pigafetta, 
ed. (Lisboa: Alfa, 1989), 130, used a history on Kongo written by an anonymous author (which can be found in the 
archives of the National Library in Lisbon) to dismiss reports about cannibalism. See Anônimo, História do Reino do 
Congo, Biblioteca Nacional de Lisboa: ms. 8080, secção de reservados: Book 1, Chapter V. According to Miller, 
“Requiem for the Jaga”, 121-149, stories about cannibals, especially those concerning the Jaga, were Portuguese 
fabrications. See also Paulo Jorge de Sousa Pinto, “Em torno de um problema de identidade: os ‘Jagas’ na História do 
Congo e Angola”, Mare Liberum, No. 18/19 (1999–2000): 193-241. 
262 Henriques, Os Pilares da Diferença, 225-244, has argued that the Portuguese preserved the “ghost” of African 
cannibalism alive in their representations of Africa to justify their colonial intervention in places like Angola. They 
sought to naturalize cannibalistic practices of certain groups as inherent to all Africans. The representation of the 
“African cannibal” in the Portuguese mentality and political discourse lasted well into the twentieth century, as shown 
by Henriques’ work. She reinforced her argument by pointing out that in the year 2000 a Portuguese politician and 
member of the European Parliament, Carlos Candal, used the term “cannibal” in reference to an Angolan minister. 
See also Isabel Castro Henriques, Percursos da Modernidade em Angola. Dinâmicas Comerciais e Transformações 
Sociais no Século XIX (Lisbon: Instituto de Investigação Científica e Tropical, 1997), 38. Miller, “Requiem for the 
Jaga”, 134 – note 2, also argued that cannibalism was used by apologists of the Atlantic slave trade and the Portuguese 
colonial presence in the African continent.  
263 Lopes/Pigafetta are responsible for the first report about cannibals in Africa: Filippo Pigafetta, A Report of the 
Kingdom of Congo and of the surrounding countries, 28, 96. See also Henriques, Os Pilares da Diferença, 235. 
Cordeiro, Viagens, explorações e conquistas dos portuguezes, Vol. 1, 16-17, also mentions the early-sixteenth century 
capitão-mor Balthasar Rebello Aragão as a major advertiser of stories about Jaga cannibals. 
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anthropophagy264 as a strategy of survival265, and symbolic cannibalism266. Moreover, the Atlantic 
slave trade could be understood as another form of cannibalism of African bodies, once the slave 
market “devoured” the slaves267. Moreover, slavers were often perceived as witches in Kongo, 
while the belief in “white cannibals” or “white man-eaters” was widespread in Atlantic Africa268.  
Stories about “African cannibals” were also often used by slavers as an argument in favor 
of the Atlantic slave trade. They justified their commercial activity as rather merciful in face of 
certain cannibalism. Hence, apologists of the trade argued that captives had a better fate in the 
hands of European slave traders than in those of their African captors269. As Joseph C. Miller 
explains: 
“Both private merchants and public officials used it [cannibalism] to defend the 
morality of the slave trade by pointing to the bellies of the ‘Jaga’ as the only 
alternative fate awaiting the oppressed Mbundu and Kongo villagers. Gory 
description of ‘Jaga’ feasting on the flesh of loyal subjects of the Portuguese Crown 
effectively carried the message that the slave trade, bad as it was, might save its 
victim from an even worse end”270.    
                                                 
264 Some scholars prefer to use the term “anthropophagy” instead of “cannibalism” because of the strong negative 
connotation of the latter. However, others defend the use of “anthropophagy” to refer to any form of consumption of 
human flesh, including cases of extreme survival, reserving the term “cannibalism” for the ritualistic consumption of 
human flesh. For more about this discussion, see Henriques, Os Pilares da Diferença, 225 – note 1.   
265 Although there are no stories about African cannibals before the sixteenth century, there is at least one known 
report of Portuguese victims of a shipwreck in the coast of Mozambique in the late fifteenth century who captured and 
ate African individuals in order to survive: Bernardo Gomes de Brito, História Trágico- Marítima, Vol. 1 (Lisboa: 
Officina da Congregação do Oratório, 1735), 122-123; See also Henriques, Os Pilares da Diferença, 235 – note 19. 
266 Both the symbolic and real acts of eating human flesh were elements of witchcraft rituals: John K. Thornton, 
“Cannibals, Witches and Slave Traders in the Atlantic World”, The William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 2, April 
(2003): 208. For more about the socialization of anthropophagic practices and the transition from real to symbolic 
cannibalism in Western societies, see Henriques, Os Pilares da Diferença, 226-231. 
267 The “illegal” enslavement of African individuals was somewhat morally comparable to devouring enemies: 
Cordeiro, Viagens, explorações e conquistas dos portuguezes, vol. 6, 23. Also, cannibalism was deeply rooted as an 
“idiom for exploitation” in the mentality of the peoples of West Central Africa: Thornton, “Cannibals, Witches and 
Slave Traders in the Atlantic World”, 275. 
268 Some slaves believed that Europeans were going to devour them once they arrived at their destination: Philip 
Curtin, Africa Remembered: Narratives by West Africans from the Era of the Slave Trade (Madison: University of 
Wisconsin, 1967), 331; Thornton, “Cannibals, Witches and Slave Traders in the Atlantic World”, 273-286; See also 
Rosalind Shaw, Memories of the Slave Trade: Ritual and the Historical Imagination in Sierra Leone (Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 2002), 226-232.  
269 This is the argument used by an anonymous Brazilian apologist of the slave trade in the first paragraph of his 1838 
defence of the Atlantic slave trade: Anonymous, Memória sobre o commercio de escravos, em que se pretende mostrar 
que este tráfico he para elles, antes hum bem do que hum mal (Rio de Janeiro: Typographia Villeneuve e Cia, 1838), 
5. See also Miller, “Requiem for the Jaga”, 134 – note 2. 
270 Miller, “Requiem for the Jaga”, 133-134. See also Henriques, Os Pilares da Diferença, 239-240; Ferronha, 
“Comentário: uma questão de olhar”, 130. 
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Despite attempts on the part of European writers and scholars to naturalize cannibalism as 
a common cultural trait among Africans271, the act of eating an enemy was not taken lightly. 
Indeed, cannibalism was considered a taboo and a hideous crime by most African societies, as was 
the case in the kingdom of Kongo272. Hence, we may dismiss Portuguese descriptions of African 
warriors feasting on the flesh of their victims273, as well as the representations of African butcher 
shops with human parts for sale274, as exaggerations275 intended to confirm the European biased 
narrative about a supposed “African savagery”276.   
                                                 
271 David Birmingham, Central Africa to 1870: Zambezia, Zaire and the South Atlantic (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1981), 34, has highlighted that some anthropologists who study the Mbangala tend to treat their 
cannibalism as a fixed cultural trait that could be traced to source. According to Childs, “The Peoples of Angola in 
the Seventeenth Century According to Cadornega”, 276, “Cannibalism is said to be a custom of Jaga Cassanji, but not 
of the whole group, as Battell had reported. Umbundu tradition ascribed cannibalism to the founders of some of their 
kingdoms, and until this day Umbundu kings were required to ‘eat the old one’”. 
272 In 1613, the mani-Kongo complained that the governors of Angola were sending “jagas” (that is Mbangala 
mercenaries) into his lands after slaves: Joseph C. Miller, “The Imbangala and the Chronology of Early Central African 
History”, The Journal of African History, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1972): 566. In 1617, the ruler of Kongo also wrote to the 
Vatican similarly complaining that the Portuguese were hunting slaves in his kingdom with the help of the Giagas, 
meaning Mbangala bands. He further alerted the Pope that his fellow Christians had made an alliance with a “nation 
of such barbarous people” who fed on human flesh: “Carta do Rei do Congo a Paulo V”, No. 100 (25 December 1617), 
in Monumenta Missionaria Africana (henceforth MMA): África Ocidental, 1611-1621, 1st series, Vol. 6, Antonio 
Brásio, ed. (Lisboa: Agência Geral do Ultramar, 1955), 290. These complaints from rulers of Kongo continued 
throughout the seventeenth century. See also José Rivair Macedo, “Jagas, canibalismo e ‘guerra preta’: os Mbangalas, 
entre o mito europeu e as realidades da África Central do século XVII”. História, São Paulo, Vol. 23, No. 1 Jan/Jun 
(2013): 63-64; Thornton, A History of West Central Africa to 1850, 138.   
273 According to Portuguese explorers, the ritual of acceptance of a new warlord (Jaga) among the Mbangala of 
Kasanje involved a series of sacrifices and a feast of human flesh, called the “banquet of Kinguri”: Hermenegildo 
Capello and Roberto Ivens, From Benguella to the Territory of Yacca, 1877-1880, Vol. 1 (London: Sampson, Low, 
Marston, Searle and Rivington, [1881]1882), 300-301. Cadornega, História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, Vol. 3, 
225, informs that the Jaga appreciated a drink made with human internal parts [or brain?] (miollos de gente) mixed 
with herbs.  
274 According to Lopes/Pigafetta, “they [Jaga] have shambles for human flesh, as we have of animals, even eating the 
enemies they have killed in battle, and selling their slaves they can get a good price for them; if not, they give them to 
the butcher, who cuts them in pieces, and then sell them to be roasted or boiled”: Filippo Pigafetta, A Report of the 
Kingdom of Congo and of the surrounding countries, 28. A similar description can be found in the document entitled 
“A Angola Portuguesa e as regiões circunvizinhas: descrição topográfica e histórica da ocupação portuguesa”, (c. 4 
August 1630), in Heintze, Fontes para a história de Angola do século XVII, Vol. 1, 212. According to João dos Santos, 
Ethiopia Oriental: vária História de cousas notáveis do Oriente, Mello Azevedo, ed. (Lisboa: Escriptorio da Empreza, 
1892), 229, there were reports of similar shops selling human flesh in Eastern Africa, among the Zimba of the Tete 
River. See also Henriques, Os Pilares da Diferença, 235-236.  
275 See the English physician and abolitionist Thomas Masterman Winterbottom, An account of native Africans in the 
neighborhood of Sierra Leone, Vol. 1 (London: Printed by Whittinham, 1803), 166. See also Philip Curtin, The Image 
of Africa (London: MacMillan, 1965), 210, who dismissed most of the stories of cannibalism as European 
exaggerations and affirmed the people he met in Sierra Leone appeared “struck with horror when questioned on the 
subject [of cannibalism]”. 
276 The jagas could also use the widespread fear of cannibals against their enemies and even allies. According to 
Beatrix Heintze, “Propaganda concerning ‘Man-Eaters’ in West-Central Africa in the Second Half of the Nineteenth 
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A cacophony of stories about other vicious attacks of “cannibal warriors” in different parts 
of Africa added to the confusion about jagas and Mbangala bands. Sixteenth-century Portuguese 
mariners began spreading tales about “African cannibals” as if they belonged to the same “nation 
of savages”277.  Missionaries, colonial officials and other travellers reported attacks in different 
parts of the continent, including the Mane in Serra Leoa, the Gala in Abyssinia, the Zimba in the 
Zambezi, the Jaga in Kongo, and the Mbangala in Angola and Benguela, with an increasing 
certainty that they had a common origin278. These “savages” supposedly shared the same cultural 
and military features279, which included violent warfare tactics and their supposed taste for human 
flesh280.  
A good part of the interior of the African continent remained unknown to outsiders and 
virtually out of reach for European colonial forces until the late nineteenth century. This lack of 
access reflected upon their overall knowledge about the central lands of the continent. Although 
European cartographers had been perfecting their understanding about the shape of Africa and its 
coastal territories for centuries, regions far in the interior were still a blank spot in their maps 
(Appendix 1).  
European cartographers and geographers often divided the African continent into two large 
territories, both generically labelled Ǣthiopia (Ethiopia Superior and Ethiopia Inferior), meaning 
“land of the blacks”281. According to their understanding of the interior of the African continent, 
which dated back to Ptolemy, great part of Ethiopia Inferior was in the “Torrid Zone” (below the 
                                                 
Century”, Paideuma: Mitteilungen zur Kulturkunde, No. 49 (2003): 127, the Mbangala were well aware of this fear, 
and used it to leverage their commercial and diplomatic negotiations. See also Isabel Castro Henriques, O pássaro 
do mel: Estudos de História Africana (Lisboa: Colibri, 2006), 39-56. Thomas J Desch-Obi, Fighting for Honor: The 
History of African Martial Art Traditions in the Atlantic World (Columbia: The University of South Carolina Press, 
2008), 24, argues that the symbolic practices of infanticide and cannibalism made the Mbangala appear as 
“nonhumans or superhumans in the eyes of their opponents”, allowing them to “frighten their opponents into 
submission without serious opposition”. See also Thornton, A History of West Central Africa to 1850, 201.  
277 Miller, “Requiem for the Jaga”, 122; Jan Vansina, “On Ravenstein’s edition of Battell’s Adventures in Angola and 
Loango”, History in Africa, Vol. 34 (2007): 132-143. 
278 Jared Staller, “Rivalry and Reformation Politics: Reflections on Andrew Battell’s Jaga Materials Printed by Samuel 
Purchas from 1613 to 1625”. History in Africa, Vol. 43(2016): 19. 
279 Childs, “The Peoples of Angola in the Seventeenth Century According to Cadornega”, 275; Jan Vansina, Kingdoms 
of the Savanna (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1966), 66-67.  
280 According to Walter Rodney, “A Reconsideration of the Mane Invasions of Sierra Leone”, The Journal of African 
History, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1967): 223, the fact that the Jaga, Mane and Zimba peoples had cannibalistic practices made 
the Portuguese identify them as one group. 
281 Mair, A Brief Survey of the Terraqueous Globe, 253-254.    
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Equator) and formed a vast country inhabited by a nation of “Ǣthiopian cannibals”282. This 
supposed “country of savages” was bordered by Abyssinia to the north and limited by the 
Mountains of the Moon (Montes Luna283) to the south, in the Mwene-Muji Empire284. The 
kingdom of Kongo285 was located to the west of the so-called “Torrid Zone”, while the lands of 
Zanzibar (Zanguebar) laid to the east. The tales about the “warrior cannibals of Inner Ethiopia”286 
stated they roamed the whole continent spreading war and destruction287.      
                                                 
282“História da residência dos padres da Companhia de Jesus em Angola, e cousas tocantes ao Reino, e Conquista”, 
No. 132 (1 May 1594), in MMA, 1st series, Vol. 4, 546 – note 1. See also Mair, A Brief Survey of the Terraqueous 
Globe, 257. 
283 Miller, “Requiem for the Jaga”, 137 – map 2, 139, suggested the “Mountains of the Moon” could be located in 
Matamba, in the region currently called “Baixa de Cassanje”.   
284 According to Lopes/Pigafetta, the Jaga lived on the borders of the “Kingdom of Moenhe Muge”. According to 
eighteenth-century maps, the Empire of Mwene-Muji (Monemugi or Mono-Emugi) occupied great part of the so-called 
“Torrid Zone” of Inner Africa: Filippo Pigafetta, A Report of the Kingdom of Congo and of the surrounding countries, 
62, 96. See also Appendix 1. Mwene-Muji became legendary among European travellers and explorers for its isolation, 
as it remained closed to outsiders until the late nineteenth century. According to late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century sources, it was composed by the kingdoms of Mujaco, Makoko, Cingiro, Cambate, Alaba and Monemugi 
proper: Universal Dictionary of Arts and Sciences, Including the Latest Discoveries and Improvements of All Nations, 
Vol. 15 (London: Vernor, Hood and Sharpe, 1807), 168; See also Samuel Purchas, Purchas His Pilgrimage, 2nd ed. 
(London: Printed by William Stansby for Henrie Fetherstone, 1614), 669, 703; John Walker, Elements of Geography 
and of Natural and Civil History (London: Darton and Harvey, 1795), 494; Mair, A Brief Survey of the Terraqueous 
Globe, 257-258; In the Atlas Geographus, Africa, Vol. IV (London: Printed by John Nutt, 1714), 607-609, the “Empire 
of Monemugi” is portrayed as neighboring the “Torrid Zone”, not as part of it. For a recent take on Mwene-Muji, see 
Thornton, A History of West Central Africa to 1850, 63-64.  
285 According to Lopes/Pigafetta, the kingdom of Kongo was composed of six provinces: Bamba, Sogno, Sundi, 
Pango, Batta and Pemba: Filippo Pigafetta, A Report of the Kingdom of Congo and of the surrounding countries; 
drawn out of the writings and discourses of the Portuguese Duarte Lopes, 1591, Margarite Hutchinson, ed. (London: 
John Murray, [1591] 1881), 43.  
286 According to the division adopted by eighteenth century geographers, Inner Ethiopia or Ethiopia Inland was a vast 
country that comprehended the greatest part of Ethiopia Inferior: Mair, A Brief Survey of the Terraqueous Globe, 257.  
287 Francisco Breyner (Conde de Ficalho) pointed out the similarities in the attacks perpetrated by the Gala in 
Abyssinia, the Zimba in Mozambique, the Jaga in Kongo and the Sumba in Sierra Leone. He also suggested there 
must have been some major historical event in Inner Ethiopia in the mid-sixteenth century to put in motion the peoples 
who lived in the core of the continent and cause them to advance onto more peaceful and cultured societies who lived 
closer to the coast: Conde de Ficalho, Plantas úteis da África portuguesa, 50-51 – note 1. A few decades earlier, Lima, 
Ensaios sobre a statistica das possessões portuguezas..., vol. 3, 200 – note 1, had made a similar argument.  
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The reference to the Mbangala mythical founding hero as “the lion” (nguri)288 and his 
origins in the “mountain of the lion”289 was also responsible for much of the confusion surrounding 
the “origins” and composition of the Mbangala bands. Throughout the sixteenth century, 
Portuguese sailors and missionaries travelling the Atlantic coast of Africa began connecting the 
stories about the Jaga/Mbangala of Kongo and Angola with the Mane warriors290 of Serra Leoa 
(Portuguese for “mountain of the lion”), thus confirming a supposed common origin for both bands 
of warriors291. As the legends about “African cannibal warriors” spread among European travellers 
and missionaries, the Jaga/Mbangala became increasingly associated with the Mane292, who were 
also called Sumba293. 
Superficial similarities between the Jaga/Mbangala and the Mane/Sumba soon became 
pseudo-proof of their association294. For example, the ethnic label “Mane” was linked to the 
Kikongo term “mani” (ruler), while the Sumba of Serra Leoa and the Sumbi who inhabited the 
                                                 
288 Although historians and anthropologist often translate the term nguri as “lion”, the Angolan writer Antonio de 
Assis Jr., Dicionário Kimbundu-Português: linguístico, botânico, histórico e corográfico (Luanda: Argente, Santos e 
Cia, n/d [19--]), 47, 134, presented different translations for terms associated with “ancestry” and “origins”. In his 
view, nguri means “father”, “procreator”, progenitor”, “that which produces a generation”. He also translates it as 
“trunk” and “root”, as well as “large mammal that eats rotten meat” and “large wolf”, which reminds the description 
of a hyena, not a lion. The term unguri means “originality”, “place of departure” or yet “of such origin”. The term 
kinguri is translated as “ancestral trunk”, “person who originated the family”, “genitor”, “precedent” or yet “place of 
origin of the roots of a plant”, “that which procreates and germinates” and finally “ascendant”. The linguist István 
Fodor Introduction to the History of Umbundu: L. Magyar’s Records (1859) and the Later Sources (Budapest: 
Akadémiai Kiadó, 1983), 222, also translates onguri as “wolf”, but this time from Umbundu.  
289 As Christopher C. Wrigley, “Myths of the Savanna”, Journal of African History, Vol. 15, No. 1 (1974): 134, has 
pointed out, it is not rare to find references to “mountains of lions” all over Africa. For instance, a range of hills located 
between the “two Imbangala states of Kasanje and Matamba” was called “Nguri”. See also John Barbot, A Description 
of the Coasts of North and South-Guinea and of Ethiopia Inferior, vulgarly Angola (London: Churchill, 1732), 96.   
290 The Mane (Mani) were warrior bands who conquered the territory previously occupied by the Sape people (today’s 
Sierra Leone and Republic of Guinea): Rodney, “A Reconsideration of the Mane Invasions of Sierra Leone”, 219. 
According to Almada/Köpke, the Sape people (Sapes) became strong warriors in order to resist the attacks of the 
Mane (also called Sumba), who invaded their lands in the sixteenth century. Although the Sape were not accused of 
practicing cannibalism (as did the Mane, the Jaga and the Mbangala) they had the tradition to file their teeth (similar 
to the Mbangala), which the Mane did not: André Álvares de Almada, Tratado breve dos rios de Guiné do Cabo 
Verde, desde o rio Sagana até aos baixos de Sant’Anna, 1594, Diogo Köpke ed. (Porto: Typographia Commercial 
Portuense, [1594] 1841), 80.  
291 Lopes/Pigafetta connected Kinguri and his origins on “the mountain of the lion” to “Serra Leoa” in West Africa: 
Filippo Pigafetta, A Report of the Kingdom of Congo and of the surrounding countries, 6.  
292 Filippo Pigafetta, A Report of the Kingdom of Congo and of the surrounding countries, 157-158 – note 96. See also 
Miller, “Requiem for the Jaga”, 122-126; Staller, “Rivalry and Reformation Politics”, 19. 
293 According to Rodney, “A Reconsideration of the Mane Invasions of Sierra Leone”, 223, most of the early writers 
distinguished between the Mane proper and their armed forces, the Sumba: “Those forces [Sumba] were said to be 
cannibals, the word ‘Sumba’ meaning precisely ‘an eater of human flesh’”. 
294 According to Vansina, “On Ravenstein’s edition of Battell’s Adventures in Angola and Loango”, 344, the idea that 
the Jaga came from Serra Leoa was later extended to the Mbangala.  
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coast of Benguela were associated as one group295. Even the final syllables “gala” from the word 
Mbangala were presented as evidence of a supposed connection with the Gala who terrorized 
Abyssinia296.  
 
The priest and the cannibals 
The main person responsible for the association between Jaga/Mbangala and Mane/Sumba, 
and later other “cannibal warriors” of Africa, was Baltasar Barreira (1538-1612), a Jesuit 
missionary who spent years in both West Central Africa (Kongo/Angola) and West Africa (Sierra 
Leone/Guinea297) in the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth centuries. The stories 
of cannibal warriors spread by Father Baltasar would inspire many other writers from the sixteenth 
to the nineteenth century. A closer look into his life sheds light on the creation of such stories and 
the commercial intentions behind them. I argue that the spread of stories about “cannibal warriors” 
was used as a justification for the conquest and enslavement of these “savages”.   
Father Baltasar Barreira was a missionary deeply involved in the Atlantic slave trade and 
in the Portuguese wars of conquest in the African territories where he served298. He was convinced 
that the evangelization of Africans in Angola and Serra Leoa would only be an effective enterprise 
under the weight of Portuguese arms and with the protection of its military fortifications299. He 
                                                 
295 Miller, “Requiem for the Jaga”, 123 – note 6; Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savanna, 66-67. According to Antonio de 
Oliveira de Cadornega, História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, 1680, vol. 2 (Lisboa: Agência Geral do Ultramar, 
[1680] 1972), 43-44, the Sumbi were the cannibal bands who in 1645 massacred the forces led by Domingos Lopes 
de Sequeira somewhere between the rivers Cuvo and Longa. See also Ralph Delgado, Ao Sul do Cuanza: Ocupação 
e aproveitamento do antigo reino de Benguela, 1843-1942, Vol. 2 (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1940), 421, 459-460.  
296 Father João Bermudes was responsible for the first descriptions of the attacked perpetrated by the Gala against the 
Portuguese in Abyssinia: Ernest G. Ravenstein, The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battell of Leigh, in Angola and 
the Adjoining Regions (London: The Hakluyt Society, 1901), 149-153. The connection between Bangala and Gala 
was also established by Henrique Augusto Dias de Carvalho, Ethnographia e história tradicional dos povos da Lunda 
(Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1890), 86. See also Miller, “Requiem for the Jaga”, 123.  
297 Samuel Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, or Purchas His Pilgrimes: Containing the History of the World in Sea 
Voyages and Lande Travells by Englishmen and Others, vol. 9 (Glasgow: James MacLehose and Sons, 1905), 260, 
explains that Guinea is a name given to all the Atlantic coast of Africa, from Senegal (16º N) to Angola (13º S). It is 
usually divided into two parts, and Lower Guinea (from Angola to Kongo) and Higher Guinea (from Kongo to 
Senegal), with the latter also called Upper Guinea. The islands of Cape Verde (called Arsinarium by Ptolemy) are 
located in Higher Guinea.  
298 Linda M. Heywood, Njinga of Angola: Africa’s Warrior Queen (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017), 40. 
299 Batalsar Barreira entered the Company of Jesus in 1556 and lectured a course on “humanities” for more than a 
decade in Évora. He became famous among his fellow Jesuits in Portugal for his dedication to the sick during the 
plague of 1569, which affected him as well. Having survived the plague after intrusive surgery, Barreira was sent to 
recover in the Azores Islands in 1570. He integrated a group of Jesuits who were responsible for the foundation of a 
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lived in West Central Africa for ten years, working to evangelize the people of the region300. He 
not proselytized in Angola, but travelled to the kingdom of Kongo as well301. When he visited 
mbanza-Kongo, called São Salvador do Congo by the Portuguese, in the end of the sixteenth 
century302, the memory about the vicious attack perpetrated by the Jaga was still fresh in 
everyone’s mind303. This was around the same period that Duarte Lopes visited the kingdom of 
Kongo304. 
The Jesuit served the first governor of Angola, Paulo Dias de Novais, as adviser and 
intermediary with African rulers305. He became a passionate proponent of the defeat and conquest 
of Ndongo306, as well as the burning of idols307 and the conversion of all African rulers to 
Christianity through baptism308. He played a very important role in the invasion of Cambambe in 
                                                 
religious school in the Azores. In 1579, at the age of 41, Father Barreira travelled to the African continent for the first 
time. He was sent to Angola to replace deceased Jesuit missionaries who had accompanied the first governor, Paulo 
Dias de Novais: José Augusto Duarte Leitão, “A missão do Padre Baltasar Barreira no Reino de Angola, 1580-1592, 
Lusitania Sacra, 2ª série, No. 5 (1993): 46-49, 91. 
300  “Carta do Padre Manuel Rodrigues ao Geral da Companhia”, No. 97 (29 July 1579), in MMA, 1st series, Vol. 15, 
261-262; See also Francisco Rodrigues, História da Companhia de Jesus na Assistência de Portugal: A fundação da 
Província Portuguesa, Tomo 1, Vol. 1 (Porto: Apostolado da Imprensa, 1931), 473.  
301 “Carta do Padre Baltasar Afonso para o Padre Miguel de Sousa”, No. 46 (4 July 1581) in MMA, 1st series, Vol. 3, 
198-207; “Informação sobre o Reino de Angola e das suas minas de prata e sal”, No. 140 (Séc. XVI), in MMA, 1st 
series, Vol. 15, 368-373.  
302 Rodrigues, História da Companhia de Jesus na Assistência de Portugal, Tomo 1, Vol. 1, 473; Leitão, “A missão 
do Padre Baltasar Barreira no Reino de Angola”, 50. 
303 The expulsion of the Jaga led to the acceptance of vassalage on the part of the mani-Kongo: Cordeiro, Viagens, 
explorações e conquistas dos portuguezes, vol. 1, 9; Beatrix Heintze, Fontes para a história de Angola do século 
XVII, Vol. 2 (Stuttgart: Franz Weiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH, 1985), 85 – note 29. 
304 Rodney, “A Reconsideration of the Mane Invasions of Sierra Leone”, 223; Miller, “Requiem for the Jaga”, 123; 
See also Fernão Guerreiro, Ralaçam annual das cousas que fizeram os padres da Companhia de Iesus nas partes da 
Índia nas partes da Índia Oriental e no Brasil, Angola, Cabo Verde, Guiné, nos annos de seiscentos e dous e seiscentos 
e três (Lisboa: Jorge Rodrigues Impressor, 1605), 270.  
305 “Carta de Paulo Dias de Novais e dos conquistadores de Angola” No. 119 (26 June 1587), in MMA, 1st series, Vol. 
4, Vol. 15, 311-313.  
306 According to Leitão, “A missão do Padre Baltasar Barreira no Reino de Angola”, 58-60, Father Barreira understood 
that it was very difficult to ensure the subjugation of the sobas only by force of arms and considered their conversion 
to Christianity through baptism the best chance to maintain control over them. Thus, he presented himself to African 
rulers as a “nganga” (spiritual healer and diviner) of a stronger God. 
307 “Carta do Padre Baltasar Barreira para o Provincial”, No. 65 (20 November 1583) in MMA, 1st series, Vol. 4, Vol. 
3, 256-259. Father Baltasar also preached in favor of the burning of idols in Serra Leoa: Brooks, Eurafricans in 
Western Africa, 95.   
308 Father Barreira proudly informed his superiors that he was able to baptize 400 individuals in Ndongo in just one 
day, which was followed by the burning of uncountable idols: “Carta do Padre Baltasar Barreira para o Padre Sebastião 
de Morais”, No. 47 (31 January 1582) in MMA, 1st series, Vol. 3, 208-211.  
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1580-1581309, when he organized reinforcement troops to rescue Governor Novais310. His 
participation in the conquest of Cambambe made him famous among Luso-Africans and Africans 
alike, to the point where one of the defeated sobas (Songa) asked for Father Barreira to baptize 
him personally311. All of these wars generated a great amount of captives for the Atlantic slave 
trade. 
When Luso-African troops defeated the Ndongo forces in the “battle of Talandongo” 
(1583)312, Father Barreira’s presence in the frontline was considered miraculous and decisive for 
their victory313. Governor Novais recognized the importance of the Jesuit’s service to the conquest 
of Angola by donating vast portions of land along the northern (right) banks of the Cuanza River 
to the Company of Jesus314. 
During the following years, Father Barreira maintained his support for the destruction of 
Ndongo315. His participation in the wars of conquest and the slave trade was so intense that his 
superiors in Lisbon began to think it was excessive316. Governor Novais, on the other hand, 
                                                 
309 “História da residência dos padres da Companhia de Jesus em Angola, e cousas tocantes ao Reino, e Conquista”, 
No. 132 (1 May 1594), in MMA, 1st series, Vol. 4, 568. 
310 Ndongo warriors defeated the Luso-African troops commanded by Governor Novais in their first attempt to conquer 
Cambambe in 1580, despite help sent by the mani-Kongo to their Christian allies upon Father Barreira’s request. Many 
of the defeated soldiers abandoned their commander in Cambambe and retreated to Luanda. As he watched the Luso-
African troops entering the city, Father Barreira “insurged against defeatism” and recruited the necessary men to 
rescue the governor in Cambambe. Reinforcements left Luanda in June of 1581 accompanied by the priest, who was 
praised by Governor Novais as “a military hero and godsend”: Leitão, “A missão do Padre Baltasar Barreira no Reino 
de Angola”, 49-57. See also “Carta do Padre Baltasar Barreira para o Provincial”, No. 65 (20 November 1583) in 
MMA, 1st series, Vol. 3, 256-259; “Carta do Padre Baltasar Afonso”, No. 79 (19 January 1585) in MMA, 1st series, 
Vol. 3, 311-313. 
311 Songa was baptized and renamed Dom Paulo, while his son became Constantino and his brother Dom Tomé. Dom 
Paulo became a powerful ally of the Portuguese, commanding an army of more than five thousand warriors: “Carta 
de Francisco de Sotomaior a El-Rei D. João IV”, No. 122 (4 December 1645), in MMA, 1st series, Vol. 9, 398-411. 
See also Leitão, “A missão do Padre Baltasar Barreira no Reino de Angola”, 57-58; Heywood, Njinga of Angola, 31.  
312 “História da residência dos padres da Companhia de Jesus em Angola, e cousas tocantes ao Reino, e Conquista”, 
No. 132 (1 May 1594), in MMA, 1st series, Vol. 4, 567-568.  
313 “Carta dos Padres da Companhia ao Governador de Angola”, No. 192 (1 November 1678), in MMA, 1st series, 
Vol. 13, 455-464. Even the death of seven Luso-African soldiers was attributed to the moment the priest ceased 
interceding with the blessings: Leitão, “A missão do Padre Baltasar Barreira no Reino de Angola”, 60. 
314 “Carta de doação de Paulo Dias de Novais ao Padre Baltasar Barreira”, No. 102 (11 July 1583), in MMA, 1st series, 
Vol. 15, 279. See also Heywood, Njinga of Angola, 29; “Carta de Sesmaria de Paulo Dias de Novais”, No. 107 (15 
Ago 1584), MMA, 1st series, Vol. 4, 433-439; Leitão, “A missão do Padre Baltasar Barreira no Reino de Angola”, 60 
– note 85. 
315 “Carta do Padre Baltasar Barreira”, No. 86 (14 May 1586) in MMA, 1st series, Vol. 3, 328-331. 
316 In 1585, the Provincial de Portugal, Sebastião de Morais, complained that Father Barreira was deeply involved 
with Governor Novais and the “war of conquest of Angola”: Leitão, “A missão do Padre Baltasar Barreira no Reino 
de Angola”, 66. Father Barreira defended that Angola was the most secure place in Africa to buy slaves: Heywood, 
Njinga of Angola, 40.  
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defended his presence in Angola and his involvement in the military campaigns as God’s grace317. 
Beyond the donation of lands, the governor “gave” the Jesuits seven sobas, which meant that these 
African rulers should pay tribute to the Jesuits as their “vassals”318. This generated much envy on 
the part of the other conquistadores, who pressured Father Barreira “to return the sobas”319. 
However, according to the Jesuits, these same sobas rebelled in order to remain under the 
“vassalage” of the missionaries, and the conquistadores were forced to withdraw their ambitions 
and request the Jesuits to keep their sobas under control320.  
Father Barreira returned to Lisbon 1593, after a short passage in Brazil321. During his 
period in Portugal, he wrote a memoir of his time as head of the Jesuit Mission in Angola, in which 
he showed overall disappointment with the experience. He argued that there was little chance for 
the mission’s success in the region, not only because of the lack of interest on the part of many 
African rulers to convert to Christianity322, but also because of the local priests and their rejection 
to work with the Jesuits. Ironically, the priest-slaver accused his colleagues of being “idiots” and 
caring only for “worldly goods”323.  
In 1595, Father Barreira was in Madrid324 defending his ideas about the conquest of Angola 
when a delegation from the kingdom of Kongo arrived at the capital. Since Father Barreira had 
been chosen as a possible candidate to become the first Bishop of Kongo and Angola, king D. 
                                                 
317 The supposed “grace” came in the form of resupplies, since Father Barreira acquired gunpowder from the Luso-
Africans settled in São Thomé for the Portuguese forces in Massangano: “Carta do Padre Baltasar Afonso”, No. 68 
(16 April 1584) in MMA, 1st series, Vol. 3, 265-266; “Carta do Padre Baltasar Afonso”, No. 70 (23 June 1584) in 
MMA, 1st series, Vol. 3, 269-270. 
318 The Jesuits received 300 slaves annually from their “vassal” sobas as taxes, besides their share of captives after the 
military campaigns: Leitão, “A missão do Padre Baltasar Barreira no Reino de Angola”, 71. 
319 “Requerimento do Padre Baltasar Barreira a D. Francisco de Almeida, No. 124 (15 September 1592), MMA, 1st 
series, Vol. 15, 323-327. 
320 “Requerimento dos conquistadores de Angola sobre os sobas dos padres Jesuitas”, No. 118 (26 June 1587), in 
MMA, 1st series, Vol. 15, 308-310; “Carta de Paulo Dias de Novais e dos conquistadores de Angola” No. 119 (26 
June 1587), in MMA, 1st series, Vol. 15, 311-313. 
321 Some sources affirm that Father Barreira was summoned back to Lisbon in 1589, while others claim he was forced 
to return to Portugal at the end of 1592 because the new governor, João Furtado Mendonça, feared the power and 
influence he had in Angola: Rodrigues, História da Companhia de Jesus na Assistência de Portugal, Tomo 1, Vol. 1, 
473; Leitão, “A missão do Padre Baltasar Barreira no Reino de Angola”, 50, 84 – note 203. 
322 Part of Father Barreira’s disappointment was related to the limited reach of his teaching his African congregation, 
due to their “ignorance” about the afterlife and for their resistance to the idea of hell as a real place: Brooks, 
Eurafricans in Western Africa, 26. 
323 “Lembranças do Padre Baltasar Barreira para o Padre Provincial dos Jesuítas” No. 128 (1593), in MMA, 1st series, 
Vol. 15, 341-342. Miller, “Requiem for the Jaga”, 147, has argued that missionaries, especially the Jesuits, were often 
in conflict with the regular religious orders. Although he makes this argument for Kongo, this was also the case for 
Angola, as evidenced by Father Barreira’s own words.  
324 Madrid was then capital of the Iberian Union (1580-1640). 
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Filipe II proposed that he should accompany the Kongolese delegation in their return to Africa. 
The proposal, however, was met with resistance on the part of the delegation. Some feared the 
priest would try to impose his control over Kongo as he had done in Angola325. Father Baltasar 
Barreira would never return to West Central Africa326.  
Father Barreira was sent, nonetheless, on a new mission to the African continent at the 
beginning of the seventeenth century, as head of a group of missionaries tasked with opening a 
religious school in Cape Verde to train missionaries from continental Africa327. He was also to 
establish contacts and keep good relations with the neighboring rulers of the continental lands. The 
Jesuits ultimate goal was to create a Catholic community that could rival both the visiting 
Protestant merchants and the local Muslim communities in West Africa328. He arrived in Cape 
Verde in July 1604329 and by the end of that same year laid foot in Serra Leoa for the first time330. 
Father Barreira subsequently visited Cacheu, Bissau, Guinala, Biguba, Pogomo, and Buré331. 
Similar to what he did in Angola, the priest tried to persuade the king of Portugal to conquer the 
territory of Serra Leoa332. 
                                                 
325 Leitão, “A missão do Padre Baltasar Barreira no Reino de Angola”, 87-88. 
326 One can argue that he never meant to return to West Central Africa, since he had already advised his superiors to 
give up on Christianising the dry lands of Angola and to send missionaries to Kongo, Brazil or another place where 
their work could be more fruitful: “Lembranças do Padre Baltasar Barreira para o Padre Provincial dos Jesuítas” No. 
128 (1593), in MMA, 1st series, Vol. 15, 341-342; “Carta do Padre Baltasar Barreira ao Provincial da Companhia de 
Jesus”, No. 34 (20 February 1606), in MMA, 2nd series, Vol. 4, 97-113.  
327 “Carta do Padre Baltasar Barreira ao Provincial dos Jesuítas” No. 90 (12 February 1609), MMA, 2nd series, Vol. 4, 
97-113; “Carta do Padre Baltasar Barreira ao Padre Andre Alvares”, No. 95 (9 May 1609), in MMA, 2nd series, Vol. 
4, 348-353; “Carta do Padre Baltasar Barreira ao Provincial de Portugal, No. 102 (6 May 1610), in MMA, 2nd series, 
Vol. 4, 406-408. 
328 Leitão, “A missão do Padre Baltasar Barreira no Reino de Angola”, 89.  
329 “Carta do Padre Baltasar Barreira ao Provincial de Portugal”, No. 18 (22 July 1604), in MMA, 2nd series, Vol. 4, 
41-49; “Carta do Padre Baltasar Barreira ao Padre Antonio Mascarenhas”, No. 15 (16 March 1604), in MMA, 2nd 
series, Vol. 4, 35-37. See also Rodrigues, História da Companhia de Jesus na Assistência de Portugal, Tomo 1, Vol. 
1, 473; Graça Maria Correia de Castro, O percurso Geográfico e Missionário de Baltasar Barreira em Cado Verde, 
Guiné, Serra Leoa (Lisboa: Sociedade Histórica da Independência de Portugal, 2001), 42. 
330 “Carta do Padre Baltasar Barreira ao Assistente Padre João Álvares”, No. 24 (14 May 1605) in MMA, 2nd series, 
Vol. 4, 70-72; Castro, O percurso Geográfico e Missionário de Baltasar Barreira, 86. 
331 “Carta do Padre Baltasar Barreira ao Padre Manuel de Barros”, No. 20 (28 January 1605), in MMA, 2nd series, Vol. 
4, 52-59; “Carta do Padre Baltasar Barreira ao Provincial da Companhia de Jesus”, No. 34 (20 February 1606), in 
MMA, 2nd series, Vol. 4, 97-113; “Carta do Padre Baltasar Barreira”, No. 203 (6 October 1605), in MMA, 2nd series, 
Vol. 7, 624-628; See also Brooks, Eurafricans in Western Africa, 73, 80. 
332 “Carta do Padre Baltasar Barreira ao Padre João Álvares” No. 45 (1 August 1606), in MMA, 2nd series, Vol. 4, 
159-174; “Carta do Padre Baltasar Barreira ao Padre João Álvares” No. 101 (8 January 1610), in MMA, 2nd series, 
Vol. 4, 399-405; See also Brooks, Eurafricans in Western Africa, 81.  
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By the end of the following year, he had baptized the “king” of Serra Leoa, Dom Felipe de 
Leão, and several of his “nobles”333. In 1607, another ruler of Serra Leoa, “king” Fatema, was also 
baptized as Dom Pedro334. In that same year, Father Barreira launched an expedition into Futa 
Jalon in an attempt to baptize Mansa Canda, but the local ruler refused conversion335. Samuel 
Purchas saw with contempt the Jesuits’ presence among “Wizards and Sorceress” of Serra Leoa, 
and accused Father Barreira of making “wicked abuse of Baptism” as a tool of conversion, 
especially when baptising “sometimes seven hundred” slaves at once, who were “washed without 
any Doctrine of Christian duties premised, and presently transported to Brazil or India, ignorant of 
all things”336. 
While in Serra Leoa, Father Barreira also established contact with the neighboring “king” 
Farma of Logos, who showed interest in having a priest in his “kingdom” and promised to build a 
church for that end337. A report sent to Portugal after the priest’s death evidences that Barreira was 
deeply involved in the slave trade and was responsible for trading imported goods with the people 
of Logos338. After the Jesuit’s death, Farma complained to the new priests that they did not bring 
him any merchandise, like Father Barreira used to do: the new priests replied that their main 
concern was to convert and save lives, not to trade339.  
                                                 
333 “Carta ânua do Padre Baltasar Barreira ao Provincial de Portugal”, No. 100 (1 January 1610), in MMA, 2nd series, 
Vol. 4, 363-398; “Carta do Rei de Serra Leoa a El-Rei de Portugal”, No. 36 (25 February 1606), in MMA, 2nd series, 
Vol. 4, 126-127; See also Samuel Purchas, Purchas His Pilgrimage, 4th ed. (London: Printed by William Stansby for 
Henrie Fetherstone, 1626), 721.   
334 “Carta do Padre Baltasar Barreira ao Provincial da Companhia de Jesus”, No. 34 (20 February 1606), MMA, 2nd 
series, Vol. 4, 97-113. According to Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, vol. 9, 266, king Fatema was the last member of 
the “man-eating nation”, and became a zealous Christian after his conversion. See also Leitão, “A missão do Padre 
Baltasar Barreira no Reino de Angola”, 90; Castro, O percurso Geográfico e Missionário de Baltasar Barreira, 114-
118.  
335 Brooks, Eurafricans in Western Africa, 95.  
336 “Carta do Padre Manoel de Almeida ao Provincial da Companhia de Jesus”, No. 72 (11 June 1607), in MMA, 2nd 
series, Vol. 4, 278-282.  
337 Father Baltasar believed the conversion should start by the “gentile king”, who was the one who could inforce the 
faith over his people: Castro, O percurso Geográfico e Missionário de Baltasar Barreira, 37-38; Jocasta Juliet Oliveira 
Martins, “As cartas do Padre Baltasar Barreira: fontes para o estuda da religião na Costa da Guiné (século XVII)”, 
Temporalidades, V. 6, No. 3, (2014): 144. 
338 Leitão, “A missão do Padre Baltasar Barreira no Reino de Angola”, 72, also suggested that Father Barreira was 
involved with the slave trade during his years in Angola and that he acquired goods from Brazil at a good price because 
of tax exemption given to the Jesuits.  
339 Father Baltasar Barreira never returned to Europe, having died in Cape Verde in 1612. In a report to his superiors 
in Portugal from October of 1613, Father Sebastião Gomes informed that Barreira’s death caused great commotion, 
because he was deeply loved and admired by his local followers: “Carta do Padre Sebastião Gomes ao Provincial de 
Portugal”, No. 127 (October, 1613), in MMA, 2nd series, Vol. 4, 512-514, 520, 528, 540. See also Rodrigues, História 
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Father Barreira was the main person responsible for comparisons between different warrior 
bands, implying they had a common source. He registered that the same “Jacas” in Kongo were 
called “Grindas” in Angola, “Zimbas” in India, that is East Africa, and “Galas” in the Ethiopia of 
Prestes John. In Serra Leoa, according to the Jesuit, these cannibal warriors had taken the name of 
“Çumbas” (Sumbas) or “Manes”340. 
 
The classic sources about the “cannibal warriors” of Inner Ethiopia 
As I have argued earlier, the amalgamation of different warrior bands into one single army 
of “Jaga cannibals” was combined with the myth of the “nation of savages” from Inner Ethiopia 
to provide justification for the conquest of African territories and the enslavement of their peoples. 
After all, wars against the jagas were “just” because they were a diabolic and impious people341. 
Father Barreira was involved in both activities (conquest and slave trade) in Angola and Kongo, 
as well as in Cape Verde and Serra Leoa. His stories about the Jaga/Mbangala and the 
Mane/Sumba influenced some of the most important sources about both West Africa and West 
Central African from the end of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth century. They were 
often incorporated into those narratives by their editors342, who had access to reports from 
explorers and missionaries in Africa343. They include André Álvares d’Almada (edited by Diogo 
                                                 
da Companhia de Jesus na Assistência de Portugal, Tomo 1, Vol. 1, 473; Leitão, “A missão do Padre Baltasar Barreira 
no Reino de Angola”, 90. 
340 Guerreiro, Ralaçam annual das cousas que fizeram os padres da Companhia de Iesus..., 255. See also Almada, 
Tratado breve dos rios de Guiné do Cabo Verde, 107-108; Barbot, A Description of the Coasts of North and South-
Guinea and of Ethiopia Inferior, 96-97; Cordeiro, Viagens, explorações e conquistas dos portuguezes, Vol. 1, 46-47 
– note 1; Capello and Ivens, De Angola à contra-costa, Vol. 1, 46; Conde de Ficalho, Plantas úteis da África 
portuguesa, 46-51; R. Avelot, “Les Grands Mouvements de Peuples en Afrique: Jaga et Zimba”, Bulletin de 
Géographie Historique et Descriptive, Nos. 1-2 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1912), 75.  
341 “A Angola Portuguesa e as regiões circunvizinhas: descrição topográfica e histórica da ocupação portuguesa”, (c. 
4 August 1630) in Heintze, Fontes para a história de Angola do século XVII, Vol. 1, 212. 
342 According to Miller, “Requiem for the Jaga”, 131, Pigafetta added much information to Lopes’ report based on 
other sources available to him, including the connection between the warriors of Guinea (Mane) and Kongo (Jaga). 
See also Vansina, “On Ravenstein’s edition of Battell’s Adventures in Angola and Loango”, 345. Miller, Kings and 
Kinsmen: Early Mbundu States in Angola (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1976), 177-178 – note 6, believed the same was 
true for the references to Sierra Leone found in Andrew Battell’s description of his time living among the Mbangala. 
Although Battell might have referred to the origins of Kinguri in the “mountains of the lion” (Serra do Leão, in 
Portuguese) the association with Sierra Leone in West Africa was an addition by his editor, Samuel Purchas. See also 
Beatrix Heintze, Angola nos séculos XVI e XVII (Viseu: Kilombelombe, 2007), 40.  
343 I agree with Vansina, “On Ravenstein’s edition of Battell’s Adventures in Angola and Loango”, 345, that Jesuit 
missionaries, even more than sailors, played a major role in the spreading of these stories about the Jaga in Serra Leoa, 
as well as in Angola. 
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Köpke344) and Duarte Lopes (edited by Filippo Pigafetta345) at the end of the sixteenth century, as 
well as Andrew Battell at the beginning of the seventeenth century (edited by Samuel Purchas346 
and Ernest Ravenstein347).  
Although he did not mention Father Barreira by name, Samuel Purchas (in another of his 
books) regarded the Jesuits as responsible for the belief the Mane came from the Jaga and that they 
were comparable to the Grindas, Zimbas and Galas, similar to the classification provided by Father 
Barreira. The Jaga would have left their homeland in around 1550 and “pierced to these parts of 
Sierra Leone”348. Besides all the warrior bands cited by Father Barreira, the Jaga/Mbangala were 
compared to many other African groups, such as the Zulu, the Anziku, the Teke, the Mayaka, the 
Baga, the Azande, the Fang, the Ashanti, the Fanti, the Dahomey, the Benin, the Chaga and the 
Masai349.  
By the end of the sixteenth century, the belief in a single source for all “savages” who 
raided Kongo and Serra Leoa became part of the “common lore of the Portuguese maritime 
community” and its “clerical adjuncts”350. This information was reproduced among Portuguese 
writers until the nineteenth century351 and cited by historians of West Africa352 and West Central 
Africa353 in the twentieth century. Let us take a closer look at the information on the “jagas” 
provided by Lopes/Pigafetta (1591), Almada/Köpke (1594), Battell/Purchas (1614), Battell/ 
                                                 
344 Almada, Tratado breve dos rios de Guiné do Cabo Verde, 107-108. 
345 Filippo Pigafetta, A Report of the Kingdom of Congo and of the surrounding countries, 157-158 – note 96.  
346 Purchas, Purchas His Pilgrimage, 2nd ed., 699.  
347 Ravenstein, The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battell of Leigh, 19.  
348 Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, vol. 9, 266. See also Vansina, “On Ravenstein’s edition of Battell’s Adventures in 
Angola and Loango”, 345. 
349 Ravenstein, The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battell of Leigh, 149; Conde de Ficalho, Plantas úteis da África 
portuguesa, 46-47; Avelot, “Les Grands Mouvements de Peuples en Afrique”, 75-216; Vansina, Kingdoms of the 
Savanna, 66-67; Paola Ivanov, “Cannibals, Warriors, Conquerors, and Colonizers: Western Perceptions and Azande 
Historiography”, History in Africa, Vol. 29 (2002): 138; Walter Rodney, A History of the Upper Guinea Coast, 1545-
1800 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 43; T.C.I. Ryan, “The Economics of Human Sacrifice”, African Economic 
History Review, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1975): 1; Miller, “Requiem for the Jaga”, 130, 144-145; Staller, “Rivalry and 
Reformation Politics”, 17; Hilton, The Kingdom of Kongo, 69-71. 
350 Miller, “Requiem for the Jaga”, 123.  
351 Barbot, A Description of the Coasts of North and South-Guinea and of Ethiopia Inferior,  96-97; Conde de Ficalho, 
Plantas úteis da África portuguesa, 50; Ravenstein, The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battell of Leigh, 84 – note 2.   
352 Peter Kup, A History of Sierra Leone, 1400-1787 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), 129-130; 
Rodney, “A Reconsideration of the Mane Invasions of Sierra Leone”, 223; Rodney, A History of the Upper Guinea 
Coast, 43. 
353 David Birmingham, “Speculations on the Kingdom of Kongo”, Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana, 
Vol. 8 (1965): 10; Jan Vansina, “More on the Invasions of Kongo and Angola by the Jaga and the Lunda”, The Journal 
of African History, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1966): 422; Staller, “Rivalry and Reformation Politics”, 19. 
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Ravenstein (1901), and Cavazzi (1687) to see how these legends about “cannibal” warriors have 
influenced these important sources. 
According to Lopes/Pigafetta, the Jaga was a “cruel and murderous race” made of “very 
savage and warlike people” who came from the lands on the boarder of the Mwene-Muji Empire354. 
There is also reference to the Nile River crossing the Jaga homeland and the mythical lake in Inner 
Africa355, which was believed to the source of both the rivers Nile and Zambezi356. After the attack 
on Kongo, the Jaga would have returned to their homeland in the core of Africa357. 
Pigafetta registered that Lopes also compared the Jaga to the Arabs, because of their 
nomadic lives and long-distance migrations358. “They went wandering up and down, putting to fire 
and sword, and spoiling and robbing every part of the country through which they passed, till they 
reached Kongo”. Moreover, the Jaga were admired for being very courageous and valiant in battle, 
and feared for their viciousness and cannibalistic habits359. 
According to Almada/Köpke, the Mane/Sumba who invaded Serra Leoa were a derivation 
of the Jaga warriors who had invaded mbanza-Kongo in 1568. In their version of the events, the 
Jaga left their homeland somewhere in Inner Ethiopia, close to the mythical source of the Nile 
River, to attack Kongo: but instead of retreating home afterwards, they marched north to Serra 
Leoa. Legend had it that the Mane/Sumba represented just the vanguard of the huge Jaga army, 
                                                 
354 Filippo Pigafetta, A Report of the Kingdom of Congo and of the surrounding countries, 158-159. According to 
Corvo, Estudo sobre as províncias ultramarinas, Vol. 1, 47, the Jagas came from the Empire of Mwene-Muji. Others 
defended that the territory of Mwene-Muji belonged to the Zimbas: Ravenstein, The Strange Adventures of Andrew 
Battell of Leigh, xvi; Capello and Ivens, De Angola à contra-costa, Vol. 1, 46.  
355 According to Lopes/Pigafetta, the Jaga were also called Agag in Inner Africa: Filippo Pigafetta, A Report of the 
Kingdom of Congo and of the surrounding countries, 62. See also Purchas, Purchas His Pilgrimage, 2nd ed., 669; João 
Antonio Cavazzi, Descrição histórica dos três reinos de Congo, Matamba e Angola, Graciano Maria de Luguzzano 
ed., Vol. 1 (Lisboa: Junta de Investigações do Ultramar, [1687]1965), 125; Conde de Ficalho, Plantas úteis da África 
portuguesa, 49.  
356 The existence of this mythical lake of the Nile (in reality, a wrong assessment of the lakes Tanganyika and Nyasa) 
was a mistake that endured well into the nineteenth century, even after European explorers had confirmed its non-
existence. The Irish Geographer William Desborough Cooley (1795-1883) was a passionate defender this mythical 
central African lake: William Cooley, Inner Africa Laid Open (London: Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 
1852); See also Richard Burton, The Lands of Cazembe (London: John Murray, 1873), 45 – note 1; Richard Burton, 
The Lake Regions of Central Africa, 2 Vols. (London: Longman, Green Longman and Roberts, 1860); Richard Burton 
and James McQueen, The Nile Basin (London: Tinsley Brothers, 1864); Filippo Pigafetta, A Report of the Kingdom 
of Congo and of the surrounding countries, 161. 
357 Filippo Pigafetta, A Report of the Kingdom of Congo and of the surrounding countries, 99.  
358 The Jagas were praised for their “extraordinary mobility”: Alfredo Albuquerque Felner, Angola: Apontamentos 
sobre a ocupação e início do estabelecimento dos Portugueses no Congo, Angola e Benguela, extraído de documentos 
históricos (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade, 1933), 304.  
359 Filippo Pigafetta, A Report of the Kingdom of Congo and of the surrounding countries, 62 
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despite the fact they had been active in Serra Leoa for more than 40 years. The rest of their troops 
were still on their way from Kongo to West Africa360.    
About a decade later, Köpke added a note in his book about the legendary lands of Inner 
Ethiopia from where the “cannibal warriors” migrated to attack the peoples living in areas closer 
to the sea. He reproduced the information found in the writings of Father Barreira, equating the 
Sumbas (Çumbas) from Serra Leoa (also called Mane) with the Iacas from Kongo, the Gindas 
from Angola, the Zimbas from India and the Gallas from Ethiopia of Prestes João. According to 
this description, these marauders cooked their enemies with palm oil and palm heart before eating 
their flesh. They were also accused of destroying the palm trees to make wine, which is a strong 
reference to the Mbangala way of life361.    
In the version presented by Battell/Purchas in the early seventeenth century (later re-edited 
by Ravenstein), the Gagas (or Gindes) came from Serra Leoa and “dispersed themselves as general 
pestilence and common scourge through most parts of Ethiopia”. Ravenstein noticed, however, 
that Purchas might have been the one responsible for the insertion of this information about the 
origins of the Jaga based on what he had read in Lopes/Pigafetta362.    
In an appendix to his book, Ravenstein deals more extensively with the Jaga, showing 
different theories for their “origins” and composition. According to his understanding, the Jaga 
(known as Bangala in Angola) were predatory man-eating bands who invaded agricultural districts 
near the seacoast. He did not believe in the theory they were part of “inland tribes” or related to 
other bands of warriors of Africa. Ravenstein opined that Lopes was wrong to affirm that the Jaga 
came from Inner Ethiopia (Mwene-Muji), but that this was in fact the homeland of the Zimbas, a 
different group who invaded East Africa (Kilwa and Mombasa) in the end of the sixteenth century. 
Finally, he considered the idea that Jagas, Iacas, Gindes, Zimbas, Galas and Sumbes belonged to 
the same nation of savages “an absurd confusion”. Ravenstein also referred to the legends of 
                                                 
360 Almada, Tratado breve dos rios de Guiné do Cabo Verde, 81-85; Rodney, “A Reconsideration of the Mane 
Invasions of Sierra Leone”, 223.  
361 Almada, Tratado breve dos rios de Guiné do Cabo Verde, 107-108. See also Rodney, “A Reconsideration of the 
Mane Invasions of Sierra Leone”, 223. Miller, Kings and Kinsmen, 178, argued that the Mbangala “destructive 
methods of obtaining palm wine distinguished them from local peoples, who tapped the standing trees rather than 
felling them”. 
362 Ravenstein, The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battell of Leigh, 19 – note 4, 33, 83 – note 3. See also Miller, Kings 




Kinguri as collected by Henrique Dias de Carvalho and Antonio Rodrigues Neves. In the end, he 
confessed his inability “to evolve the truth of these conflicting statements” about the origins of the 
Jaga, concluding that “Jaga” was a title assumed “by the leaders of predatory hordes of very diverse 
origin in order to inspire terror in the hearts of peaceful tribes”363.  
The Italian Capuchin missionary Giovani Cavazzi, who collected oral traditions from the 
Mbangala of Matamba, also wrote about the origins of the Jaga/Mbangala, more specifically about 
the warriors who migrated from the central plateau of Benguela into the interior of Angola, and 
later settled in the lands of Matamba (Baixa do Cassange, nowadays Malange)364. Cavazzi 
presented two main “opinions” about the origins of the Jaga. The first one asserted they originated 
in one of the provinces of Mwene-Muji, close to the mythical source of the rivers Nile and Zaire. 
This opinion was based on the fact they used to be called “Jacas” or “Ngajacas”, a group that 
would have come originally from Inner Ethiopia365. He included the children of Ethiopia (“the 
Troglodyte peoples, the Rozographs, Isographs and the barbarous and inhuman Cinici”), the Cafre 
and the Mumba as members of the peoples of Kongo (Moxicongos)366.  
The second opinion asserted that the Jaga were bands of thieves from West Africa (10º N), 
originating around a mountain range close to the Atlantic coast locally known as the “mountains 
of the lion”. Cavazzi adopted a combination of those two opinions. He stated that although the 
second opinion that they came from Serra Leoa seemed more plausible, the first opinion about 
their origins in Inner Ethiopia allowed a better explanation for the “Jaga” presence on both the 
eastern and western coasts of Africa367.  
Similar to the Jesuit Father Barreira, the Italian Capuchin combined references about 
several bands of African warriors, in this case Jacas, Ngajacas, Aiaca, Nsidos, Njindos, Muzimbo 
and Quibângalas, into one single group that roamed throughout much of the continent and 
                                                 
363 Ravenstein, The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battell of Leigh, 149-153. See also Vansina, “On Ravenstein’s 
edition of Battell’s Adventures in Angola and Loango”, 344.  
364 Cavazzi, Descrição histórica dos três reinos de Congo, Matamba e Angola, Vol. 1. See also Giovanni Antonio 
Cavazzi, “Missione evangelica al Regno de Congo, 1668” (MSS Araldi, Modena.  3 vols:  A, B, C). 
http://www.bu.edu/afam/faculty/john-thornton/john-thorntons-african-texts (last access, 11 September 2020). 
365 Cavazzi, Descrição histórica dos três reinos de Congo, Matamba e Angola, Vol. 1, 174. 
366 Cavazzi, “Missione evangelica al Regno de Congo, 1668”, Book I, Chapter 1. See also John K. Thornton, “New 
Light on Cavazzi’s Seventeenth-Century Description of Kongo”, History in Africa, Vol. 6 (1979): 253-255.       
367 Cavazzi, Descrição histórica dos três reinos de Congo, Matamba e Angola, Vol. 1, 174-175. 
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perpetrated attacks in West Africa, East Africa and West Central Africa368. There are, however, 
important differences in Cavazzi’s version, since the Capuchin acquired most of his knowledge 
about the “jagas” from his contact with Queen Nzinga-a-Mbande369 and the Mbangala of 
Matamba, who claimed they had migrated out of the central plateau and not from Lunda, as in the 
latter oral traditions about Kinguri. In Cavazzi’s version about the origins of the Jaga/Mbangala, 
their leader was called Zimbo (Ximbo) and there is no mention about Kinguri. This will be an 
important detail to bear in mind while reading about the Mbangala waves of migration out of 
Quilengues (see below).  
In Cavazzi’s version of events, Zimbo and one of his wives, Temba-a-Ndumba, led their 
followers (called Muzimbo370) from their homeland in Inner Ethiopia to attack the kingdom of 
Kongo, killing men as well as beasts and turning that kingdom into a desert. After the attack, they 
marched to Eastern Ethiopia (Abyssinia), following the Zambezi River (and the mythical 
connection to the Nile) until they reached the home of the Mumba people. Since the Mumba were 
also a “naturally barbarous nation”, it did not take much for them to abandon their nomadic life 
and join the “jagas”, forming a 15-thousand strong army. Together, they marched through the 
Empire of Mwene-Muji (Monemugi), “putting everything to fire and sword”371, until they reached 
the Eastern Ocean and the Portuguese fortress of Tete372.  
                                                 
368 Cavazzi, Descrição histórica dos três reinos de Congo, Matamba e Angola, Vol. 1, 175. 
369 Queen Nzinga-a-Mbande (also Njinga, Jinga, Ginga) was a seventeenth-century Mbundu monarch who ruled 
Ndongo and Matamba. She was the daughter of Mbande-a-Ngola-Kiluanji, sovereign of Ndongo, and sister of Ngola-
a-Mbande. Nzinga-a-Mbande’s first appearance in the historical record dates back to 1621-22, when she arrived in 
Luanda as Ngola-a-Mbande’s emissary, during which she established and alliance with the Portuguese and engaged 
in diplomatic relations with them by accepting baptism from Jesuit priests: she was renamed dona Ana de Sousa. For 
more about Nzinga-a-Mbande, see Joseph C. Miller, “Nzinga of Matamba in a New Perspective”, The Journal of 
African History, Vol 16, No. 2 (1975): 201-216; Roy Arthur Glasgow, Nzinga: Resistência Africana à Investida do 
Colonialismo Português em Angola, 1582-1663 (São Paulo: Perspectiva, 1982); Adriano Parreira, Economia e 
sociedade em Angola na época da rainha Jinga, século XVII (Lisboa: Estampa, 1990); John K. Thornton, “Legitimacy 
and Political Power: Queen Njinga, 1624-1663”, The Journal of African History, Vol. 32, No. 1 (1991): 25-40; 
Inocência Mata, ed., A rainha Nzinga Mbandi: história, memória e mito (Lisboa: Edições Colibri, 2012); Heywood, 
Njinga of Angola; Selma Pantoja, “Njinga a Mbande: Power and War in 17th-Century Angola” in Oxford Research 
Encyclopedia of African History (Oxford: Oxford Press, 2020), 1-28; Estevam C. Thompson, “Nzinga, Queen”, in 
Encyclopedia of African Colonial Conflicts, Timothy Stapleton, ed., Vol. 2 (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2017), 508-
512. 
370 According to Cavazzi, Descrição histórica dos três reinos de Congo, Matamba e Angola, Vol. 1, 175 – note 3, 
177, Muzimbo (plural Azimbo) was the name given to the followers of Zimbo before they settled in Matamba. 
371 This is the same expression used by Lopes/Pigafetta when refering to the “Jaggas”: Filippo Pigafetta, A Report of 
the Kingdom of Congo and of the surrounding countries, 96. 
372 Cavazzi, Descrição histórica dos três reinos de Congo, Matamba e Angola, Vol. 1, 124-125. See also Cadornega, 
História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, Vol. 3, 222-230.  
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While in Eastern Africa, the Jaga (under Zimbo’s leadership) also invaded the island of 
Kilwa (Quiloa) with the help of a traitor, killing over three thousand people and enslaving the rest 
of the inhabitants of the island. Afterwards, they moved to attack the Mombasa Island (Mombace), 
which was occupied by Muslims (Moors), but were halted by a stronger resistance. Only after the 
interference of Portuguese ships, which Cavazzi interpreted as divine intervention, were Zimbo 
and his warriors successful in their invasion. After this second victory, Zimbo’s troops moved 
north and invaded Melinde, but they managed to hinder the advance of the Jaga warriors with the 
help of the Mosegunij373. 
After being defeated, Zimbo retreated with his remaining troops through the “country of 
the Cafres beyond the beaches of Mozambique”374 until they reached the Cape of Good Hope. 
From there, Zimbo would have marched northwards until he reached the inner Cunene basin and 
settled around the Chela Mountain Range (17ºS). According to the tradition Cavazzi collected 
from the Mbangala of Matamba, Zimbo sent his “generals” in different directions to conquer new 
lands and rebuild his army. One of them, Ndonji (Donji), marched up the central plateau with his 
troops until he reached the land of the Ngangela (Ganguela). Ndonji’s wife, Mussassa, bore him a 
daughter who he named Temba-a-Ndumba after Zimbo’s wife375. She would become queen of the 
Mbangala on the central plateau, and responsible for the creation of the yijila376 (laws) and the 
ritual of the maji-a-samba377.  
                                                 
373 Cavazzi, “Missione evangelica al Regno de Congo, 1668”, Book I, Chapter 1; Cavazzi, Descrição histórica dos 
três reinos de Congo, Matamba e Angola, Vol. 1, 122-124. Similar information can be found in Purchas, Hakluytus 
Posthumus, vol. 9, 244-245.  
374 The lands of Cafre (Cafri) today belong to parts of Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi and the interior of Mozambique 
and Tanzania. It is represented as a blank area in many maps, at times containing the mythical lake of the Nile and its 
islands.  
375 Cavazzi, Descrição histórica dos três reinos de Congo, Matamba e Angola, Vol. 1, 174-178. See also David 
Birmingham, “The Date and Significance of the Imbangala Invasion of Angola”, The Journal of African History, Vol. 
6, No. 2 (1965): 145; Heywood, Njinga of Angola, 121-122; Thornton, A History of West Central Africa to 1850, 189. 
376 The yijila (singular kijila) were the laws of the kilombo regarding the destruction of lineage and ancestry. These 
included the prohibition of bearing children inside the kilombo (in order to avoid the rise of lineage structures), which 
European missionaries often interpreted as an order to kill all children: Cavazzi, Descrição histórica dos três reinos 
de Congo, Matamba e Angola, Vol. 1, 180. See also Miller, Kings and Kinsmen, 162-163; Heywood, Njinga of Angola, 
120-127. 
377 The maji-a-samba was a ritual supposedly implemented by Temba-a-Ndumba among the Mbangala of the central 
plateau that had the double objective of reinforcing their commitment to the destruction of lineage structures and 
protecting their warriors against all enemies, whether in the physical or in the spiritual world. Temba-a-Ndumba put 
her own child into a large mortar and pounded the infant until she reduced it to a mass of flash and blood. She added 
roots and herbs to it and boiled to obtain a “magic” unguent. After smearing the maji-a-samba on themselves, the 
Mbangala warriors would have their bodies “closed” and protected from all harm: Cavazzi, Descrição histórica dos 
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Cavazzi’s version with Zimbo as head of the Jaga/Muzimbas378 became an important 
reference for historians and geographers in the following centuries. Samuel Purchas, for example, 
compared the Zimbas to the Jaga, but did not mistake them as being one single group379. The 
Portuguese historian José Joaquim Lopes de Lima, in turn, reproduced much of the Capuchin’s 
version in his mid-nineteenth century work. He used the terms “Jagas” and “Zimbas” 
synonymously380, registered that the “Zimbos” were responsible for the invasion of Kongo381, and, 
at the same time, used the name “jagas” to refer to the Mbangala bands that roamed the southern 
lands, including the “kingdom of Benguela” (Províncias do Sul)382.   
In his book published in 1845, the Italian physician and explorer Tito Omboni, who visited 
Angola between 1834-1835 and probably had access to a pre-published version of Lopes de Lima’s 
work, reproduced most of Cavazzi’s information about the Jaga/Mbangala being led by Zimbo. 
This included the invasion of the kingdom of Kongo, their presence in West Africa and East Africa, 
as well as the foundation of a kilombo on the margins of the Cunene River, in the land of Humbe. 
Tito’s version also included the migration of the Mbangala from the Cunene basin to the central 
plateau, the stories about Queen Temba-a-Ndumba, and their later occupation of the lands of 
Matamba383.  
The late nineteenth century Portuguese explorers Hermanegildo Capello and Robert Ivens 
also adopted Cavazzi’s version of the origin of the “jagas” (Jaggas) and their leader Zimbo, who 
they dubbed the “African Attila”. They believed that the “jagas” were formed of different tribes, 
and that they were responsible for the assassination of one of the first Christian missionaries in 
                                                 
três reinos de Congo, Matamba e Angola, Vol. 1, 177-178. See also Miller, Kings and Kinsmen, 162-163; Thornton, 
“Legitimacy and Political Power”, 32; Heywood, Njinga of Angola, 121-124. 
378 Cavazzi probably learned about the stories of the Muzimbas, the “cannibal warriors” in Eastern Africa, from the 
seventeenth-century Portuguese chronicler Father João dos Santos. Father Santos recorded that across the Tete River 
there were casts of “Cafres”, called Zimbas or Muzimbas, who ate human flesh. He also wrote on the existence of 
butcher shops selling human flesh in East Africa, similar to stories spread by sailors and missionaries on the the 
western coast of Africa: Santos, Ethiopia Oriental, Vol. 1, 229, 322-325.   
379 Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, vol. 9, 244. 
380 Lima, Ensaios sobre a statistica das possessões portuguezas..., vol. 3, 1 – note 1. See also Cordeiro, Viagens, 
explorações e conquistas dos portuguezes, Vol. 1, 9.    
381 In a note about the Jaga, Lima, Ensaios sobre a statistica das possessões portuguezas..., vol. 3, xxxv – note 1, 
affirmed that they were called “Zimbos” in Kongo and that some of them had settled down in places like Kasanje and 
Bailundo. 
382 Lima, Ensaios sobre a statistica das possessões portuguezas..., vol. 3, 3-4.  
383 Tito Omboni, Viaggi nell’Africa occidentale (Milano: Stabilimento Civelli, 1845), 146.  
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Angola in the 1530s. They also believed that Zimbo and his followers settled down on the margins 
of the Cunene, where he founded a kilombo that would later become the capital of Humbe384. 
In fact, Capello and Ivens refuted the thesis that the “jagas” came from the east, as reported 
by Duarte Lopes and Álvares d’Almada. Rather they argued in favor of traditions showing old 
relationship between the “jagas” and the Nkhumbi (“Ban-kumbi”)385. Capello and Ivens had been 
influenced by the writings of the Portuguese ethnographer Antonio Nogueira386, who highlighted 
cultural similarities between the Nyaneka (“Ban-nhaneca”) and the Nkhumbi (“Ban-kumbi”), that 
is the Mbangala387. 
While discussing the origins of the peoples that occupied the Cunene basin, Capello and 
Ivens mentioned the existence of a powerful state in the region of Ovampo and the Cubango called 
“Ma-tchona” that had been conquered by Zimbo. The “jagas” raided them, enslaving and selling 
as many as they could to the Portuguese, while forcing the rest to flee to desert areas388. This last 
reference related to the Mbangala invasion of Cimbebasia and the destruction of Mataman, as we 
shall see below.  
 
Death and resurrection of the Jaga 
Although twentieth-century scholars have dismissed all references about a “nation of 
savages” in Inner Africa as the homeland of “African cannibals”, as well as the supposed 
connections between warrior bands from Guinea/Serra Leoa and Kongo/Angola389, there remains 
                                                 
384 Capello and Ivens, De Angola à contra-costa, Vol. 1, 43, 216-217. See also Delgado, Ao Sul do Cuanza, Vol. 2, 
152-153.  
385 Capello and Ivens were aware that Nyaneka and Nkhumbi were descendants of the Mbangala (Jaggas), but 
confessed that they were confused by the information regarding the Jagga as coming from areas so far north from the 
lower Cunene. It was puzzling for them that the peoples who lived in the area between the Cunene basin and the Chela 
Mountain Range shared similar cultural features with the Imbangala (including burial ceremonies and the practice of 
circumcision). They proposed that the Nyaneka-Nkhumbi were direct descendants of the “Jaggas”:  Capello and Ivens, 
De Angola à contra-costa, Vol. 1, 324-326.  
386 Antonio F. Nogueira, A raça negra sob o ponto de vista da civilisação da África: usos e costumes de alguns povos 
gentílicos do interior de Mossamedes (Lisboa: Typographia Nova Minerva, 1881). 
387 Capello and Ivens, De Angola à contra-costa, Vol. 1, 217-219.  
388 According to Capello and Ivens, De Angola à contra-costa, Vol. 1, 326, the Ma-tchona mixed with the Damara 
and the “Bushmen”, the latter a reference to the Herero peoples. This is a clear reference to the invasion of Cimbebasia 
by the southern Mbangala bands and the destruction of the Mataman people (see below).    
389 For an analysis on how twentieth-century historians rejected the connections between Guinea/Serra Leoa and 
Kongo/Angola, see Vansina, “On Ravenstein’s edition of Battell’s Adventures in Angola and Loango”, 344-345. 
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much misunderstanding about who were the Jaga that terrorized West Central Africa since the 
sixteenth century. Indeed, the different versions of the history of the Jaga warriors who invaded 
the kingdom of Kongo in 1568 became so imbricated and so confusing at times, their own 
existence has become a matter of discussion.  
In the 1960’s, David Birmingham390 and Jan Vansina391 quickly recognized the distinctions 
between the Jaga and the Mbangala. Miller’s 1969-1970 research on the Mbangala further 
confirmed that they were distinct groups. He showed that superficial similarities between different 
groups became pseudo-evidence for their common origin and that European preconceived 
representations of “African savages” played an important role in the consolidation of the “Jaga 
myth”. Miller argued that all reported appearances of “jagas” south of the Cuanza were in fact 
accounts of Mbangala bands392.  
Historians of Kongo, such as John K. Thornton and Anne Hilton, praised Miller for finally 
separating the Jaga from the Mbangala after centuries of confusion. He had shown that the term 
Jaga in sixteenth-century Kongo did not mean the same as “Jaga” or “jagas” in seventeenth-
century Angola393. It became also clear that many of the elements in the tales about “jagas” derived 
from contemporary images of Africa394.  
Nonetheless, in the process of distinguishing them form the Mbangala, Miller almost 
“eliminated” the Jaga.  In a controversial article published in 1973, the same year during which he 
submitted his doctoral dissertation395, he deconstructed the tales about the Jaga and the 
comparisons with other groups of “cannibal warriors” and concluded they were a European 
invention396. In his opinion, slave smugglers actively engaged in avoiding the royal duties on slave 
exports from Kongo and Angola had invented the myth of the “Jaga cannibal warriors” to justify 
                                                 
390 David Birmingham, Trade and Conflict in Angola: The Mbundu and Their Neighbours Under the Influence of the 
Portuguese, 1483-1790 (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 64-65 
391 Vansina, “More on the Invasions of Kongo and Angola by the Jaga and the Lunda”, 421-429. 
392 Miller, “Requiem for the Jaga”, 121. See also Heintze, Fontes para a história de Angola do século XVII, Vol. 1, 7. 
393 Thornton, “A Resurrection of the Jaga”, 223. 
394 Hilton, “The Jaga Reconsidered”, 191-202. 
395 Joseph C. Miller, “Kings and Kinsmen: The Imbangala Impact on the Mbundu of Angola” (PhD Dissertation, 
University of Wisconsin, 1972).  
396 Miller, “Requiem for the Jaga”, 121, argued that “few myths about Africa or Africans have achieved greater fame 
on the basis of less evidence than stories of the sixteenth and seventeenth century ‘Jaga’ invasions of Kongo and 
Angola”. He went on to affirm that “careful analysis of the sources for early Kongo and Angola history suggests that 
no such ‘Jaga’ ever existed outside the imaginations of missionaries, slave dealers, and Government officials who 
created these mythical cannibals to justify or conceal their own activities in Africa”.  
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the obvious difference between the large number of slaves captured in the interior and the smaller 
numbers officially declared at the customs houses on the coast. “The missing slaves, of course, left 
Africa illegally, but the illicit traders explained the discrepancy by accusing the ‘Jaga’ of having 
eaten them”397.  
Miller considered Duarte Lopes the originator of the myth of the Jaga, pointing to his 
involvement in the slave trade in Kongo as his reason for spreading the tale about the invasion of 
cannibal warriors and the participation of the Portuguese in their expulsion from mbanza-
Kongo398. Moreover, in his analysis, the tales about the Jaga gained a new meaning in the late 
nineteenth century, when Portugal attempted to establish the legal basis for its claim for rights over 
commerce at the mouth of the Congo River against the challenges of its European adversaries. The 
Portuguese argued that the mani-Kongo, Dom Álvaro I, had declared his subservience to them in 
a vassalage treaty after Gouveia’s rescue mission in the 1570s399. Hence, in order to guarantee 
exclusive access to the Congo basin amidst the “scramble”, the Portuguese resurrected the Jaga400.   
Historians of Kongo reacted to Miller’s requiem for the Jaga. Thornton published an article 
in 1978 claiming that Miller had “gone a bit too far”401 in removing them from the history of the 
kingdom of Kongo402. He dismissed Miller’s hypothesis that the Jaga came from Tyo or Matamba, 
because of the direction taken by the bands during the invasion through Mbata, and asserted that 
there was no reason to doubt their origins in the lands of Yaka, along the Cuango River403. In 1981, 
it was Anne Hilton’s turn to reconsider the position of the Jaga in the history of Kongo. Although 
she agreed with Miller’s arguments showing that many elements of the descriptions and stories 
told by sailors and missionaries about the Jaga derived from European stereotypes, she did not 
believe it was sufficient to prove the Jaga invasion was a fabrication404.  
                                                 
397 Miller, “Requiem for the Jaga”, 134.  
398 Miller, “Requiem for the Jaga”, 148.  
399 On the acceptance of vassalage by the mani-Kongo after the expulsion of the Jaga, see Heintze, Fontes para a 
história de Angola do século XVII, Vol. 2, 85 – note 29; See also Cordeiro, Viagens, explorações e conquistas dos 
portuguezes, Vol. 1, 9. 
400 Miller, “Requiem for the Jaga”, 135.  
401 Thornton, “A Resurrection of the Jaga”, 223. For a recent discussion of the Jaga invasion of mbanza-Kongo, see 
Thornton, A History of West Central Africa to 1850, 74-83. 
402 For Miller’s reply to Thornton, see Miller, “Thanatopsis”, 229-231. 
403 Thornton, “A Resurrection of the Jaga”, 223-224.  
404 Hilton, “The Jaga Reconsidered”, 192. 
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Miller had dismissed the reports about the origins of the Jaga coming from the east and 
located the enemy within the kingdom of Kongo, indicating other centers of power (Nsundi and 
Mbata) that could have been responsible for the invasion. These invaders would have managed to 
destroy mbanza-Kongo with the help of yet other local groups, including the Mbangala of 
Matamba and the Tyo (Teke or Anziku405) from the Congo/Zaire River, next to Stanley Pool406. 
They could also be identified as the Makoko, who in the mid-sixteenth century were “Tyo 
speakers”. In the seventeenth century, they became the Muyaka (Majaca), whose ancestors 
according to Hilton might have been implicated in the invasion of Kongo in 1568407.  
Hilton also dismissed the participation of the Mbangala of Matamba in the Jaga invasion, 
pointing out for the unlikely existence of a slave-trade route between mbanza-Kongo and Matamba 
(Baixa de Cassanje), which, according to Miller408, could have triggered a dispute between the 
parts. Moreover, she reinforced the validity of the Lopes/Pigafetta description of the invasion from 
the east (Mbata), thereby agreeing with Thornton’s position409.  
Furthermore, Hilton dismissed Miller’s idea that the “Jaga myth” was an invention of 
slavers trying to improve their commercial position or trying to escape the taxes charged over their 
business. They had actually acquired more freedom to deal slaves after the expulsion of the Jaga 
from Kongo, as the mani-Kongo lost control over the coastal regions. In effect, she also showed 
that, overall, the power of the mani-Kongo did not diminish with the presence of Portuguese slavers 
in areas formally under his control. Although he had lost his monopoly over the slave trade at the 
coast, the development of the Atlantic trade and the opening of new slave-routes from Makoko to 
                                                 
405 Miller, “Requiem for the Jaga”, 130, 144-145; Birmingham, “Speculations on the Kingdom of Kongo”, 3; Vansina, 
“On Ravenstein’s edition of Battell’s Adventures in Angola and Loango”, 332. For more about the Teke/Anziku, see 
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been the first village to be raided, like it happened in the seventeenth century, and not Mbata. If the attack came from 
Makoko (Tyo), Nsundi would have been the first village raided. 
99 
 
Luanda through mbanza-Kongo compensated for any possible loss and strengthened the authority 
of the mani-Kongo410.  
By the end of the twentieth century, historians of West Central Africa had reinterpreted the 
participation of the Jaga in the history of Kongo separate from that of the Mbangala bands. It 
became common understanding that all the “jagas” located south of the Cuanza River were indeed 
different Mbangala warrior bands organized around the kilombo, although there was still much 
debate about the origins of these Mbangala and their movement of expansion throughout the 
kingdoms of Benguela and Angola411. 
The geographer Ernest Ravenstein (Battell’s second editor) had already cracked part of the 
century-old puzzle about the composition of the “jagas” when he affirmed that “Jaka” was a 
military title, and “by no means the name of a people”412. Portuguese colonial historians agreed 
that the “jagas” were not a “distinct family”, but a “collective of individuals from different 
tribes”413 who had been brought up and trained to make war, and nothing else414. As Thornton 
explained, the Portuguese “had the tendency to apply the name of the first invaders to all 
subsequent invasions which appeared the same, and ultimately, to all ethnic groups, even if they 
were unrelated to the original invaders”415. 
This discussion led historians to understand and use the terms Jaga, “Jaga” and “jagas” in 
different and (at times) complementary ways. Firstly, there were the “original” Jaga, that is the 
bands responsible for the invasion of Kongo416. The term “jagas” (plural form) became a generic 
                                                 
410 Hilton, “The Jaga Reconsidered”, 200-202. See also Jan Vansina, “Long-Distance Trade-Routes in Central Africa”, 
The Journal of African History, Vol. 3, No. 3 (1962): 382. 
411 John K. Thornton, Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 1500-1800 (London: UCL Press, 1999), 101-102; Pinto, “Em torno 
de um problema de identidade”, 193-241; Heintze, “Translocal ‘Kinship’ Relations in Central African Politics of the 
19th Century”, 189. For a recent alternative view on the rise of the Mbangala bands, see Thornton, A History of West 
Central Africa to 1850, 103-106.  
412 Ravenstein, The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battell of Leigh, 149. 
413 Hence, this discussion was not started in the 1960s, as suggested in Fábio Baqueiro Figueiredo, “Tradição, 
invenção, história: notas sobre a ‘controvérsia Jaga’”, Perspectiva Histórica, No. 8, julho/dezembro (2016): 72, who 
also refers to the Jaga were some sort of “ethnic designation”.  
414 Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a ocupação..., 207. According to Cadornega, História Geral das Guerras 
Angolanas, Vol. 3, 400, the Jaga Kasanje’s kilombo was made of people from various ethnicities and languages. See 
also Lima, Ensaios sobre a statistica das possessões portuguezas..., vol. 3, xxxv – note 1; Pinto, “Em torno de um 
problema de identidade”, 193-241; Staller, “Rivalry and Reformation Politics”, 12. 
415 Thornton, “A Resurrection of the Jaga”, 224. 
416 According to Thornton, “A Resurrection of the Jaga”, 226, the different forms of referring to the “Jaga” in, 
Portuguese, Italian and Kikongo (Jaga, Giaca and Ayaka) bear clear connection with the Yaka (from Niara and 
Cuango). Nevertheless, he also connected the Mbangala of Kasanje (Imbangala) to this term.  
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reference for groups of “cannibal warriors”, mainly the Mbangala, but also Zimbas, Sumbas, Galas 
in other parts of the continent417, while “Jaga” (singular form) came to be understood as the title 
for Mbangala warlords (such as Jaga Kasanje)418. Moreover, the term is sometimes reserved for 
the enemies of the Portuguese and Luso-Africans419, the antonym of soba420. The term “jagas” 
could yet be used to define any mercenaries who sold their service to the highest bidder421.   
Cadornega’s History of Angola contains good examples of the many contexts and uses of 
the terms “Jaga” and “jagas”. Overall, the Portuguese fought on the side of the “sobas” (allies) 
and against the “jagas” (enemies)422, but the reality of African warfare could prove much more 
complex that this423. The Portuguese depended on the support of “jagas” for their protection away 
from their coastal centres of power424. Jaga Kasanje, for instance, was a great ally of the 
Portuguese and fought along side them even against other Mbangala warlords, such as Nzinga-a-
Mbande425, who also had an army of “jagas” of her own426. It is possible thus to find Portuguese 
references about “our Jaga”427, as well as distinction between “allied jagas” and “enemy jagas”428. 
                                                 
417 According to Hilton, “The Jaga Reconsidered”, 197, the peoples of Kongo used the term “Jaga” partly in the general 
sense of “foreigner” or “brigand”. Thornton, A History of West Central Africa to 1850, 138, 177 points to another 
group of “cannibal” warriors in the region of Bukkameale that were neither Jaga nor Mbangala. See also Thornton, 
“A Resurrection of the Jaga”, 223-227. 
418 Heintze, Fontes para a história de Angola do século XVII, Vol. 1, 63.  
419 Joseph C. Miller, “Central Africa During the Era of the Slave Trade, c. 1490-1850”, in Central Africans and 
Cultural Transformations in the American Diaspora, Linda M. Heywood, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 50 – note 61, has suggested that the term “Jaga” was used in reference to African resistance, as well as 
“quilombo”. See also Jan Vansina, “Quilombos on São Tomé, or in Search of Original Sources”, History in Africa, 
Vol. 23 (1996): 453-459.  
420 Although Cadornega did not explain the difference between Sovas and Jagas, he suggested that the former were 
hereditary chiefs of definite polities, whereas the latter were conquerors on their way to new conquests: Childs, “The 
Peoples of Angola in the Seventeenth Century According to Cadornega”, 275. 
421 Cadornega, História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, Vol. 2, 91 
422 Cadornega, História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, Vol. 2, 582, 586.  
423 Although Mariana Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World: Benguela and its Hinterland (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 57-60, maintains that the terms “jaga” and “soba” were “self-evident in 
the Portuguese world of the seventeenth century”, this does not seem to be the case. She also argued that the Portuguese 
employed the term in reference to “nameless enemies, whose political and social structure was foreign to the 
Portuguese”, ignoring the cases in which “jagas” were their close allies. In a later article, Mariana Candido, “Jagas e 
Sobas no ‘Reino de Benguela: Vassalagem e criação de novas categorias políticas e sociais no contexto da expansão 
portuguesa na África durante os séculos XVI e XVII”, in Alexandre Ribeiro, Alexsander Gebara and Marina Berthet, 
eds. África: histórias conectadas (Niterói: PPGH-UFF, 2014), 73, suggests that the “sobas” allies of the Portuguese 
and the “jagas” represented opposition to the Portuguese colonial presence in Angola.  
424 Cadornega, História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, Vol. 1, 424.  
425 Cadornega, História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, Vol. 2, 591 
426 Cadornega, História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, Vol. 2, 211.  
427 Cadornega, História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, Vol. 3, 220. 
428 Cadornega, História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, Vol. 1, 352. Ralph Delgado, O Reino de Benguela: do 
descobrimento à criação do governo subalterno (Lisboa: Ed. do Autor, 1945), 70-71, also used the term “allied Jaga” 
(Jaga aliado) a couple of times. 
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Sometimes sobas could also be considered enemies (“rebel sobas”), who the Luso-Africans fought 
with the assistance of “troops of jagas”429. Indeed, African rulers (sobas) also hired the services 
of “jagas” to defeat local enemies430. Finally, one must also consider that the “jagas” (that is 
Mbangala) were great commercial partners of the Portuguese since the seventeenth century 
(especially Jaga Kasanje)431.  
The “resurrection” of the Jaga led to a better understanding about other bands of warriors 
that roamed West Central Africa in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. It became clear for 
historians writing in the 1970s that only a small portion of the “jagas” found in reports, documents 
and in the historiography related directly to the Jaga who invaded mbanza-Kongo in 1568. The 
rest are references to Mbangala bands that spread out from Quilengues to different parts of the 
kingdoms of Benguela and Angola, and gradually “diluted” into local communities.  
We will now turn to another serious misunderstanding about the history of the Mbangala, 
more specifically the Imbangala of Kasanje. Portuguese explorers collected oral traditions about 
the “origins” of the Imbangala among the Lunda in the nineteenth century, which historians in the 
twentieth century confirmed as historical events. The section that follows on the fall of the theory 
on the “Exodus of Kinguri” serves not only to clarify the history of the Mbangala, but as a warning 
to the complexity of working with oral traditions.   
 
The fall of the “Exodus of Kinguri” 
During the eighteenth and much of the nineteenth centuries, the Mbangala of Kasanje 
became the main intermediaries between the Luso-Africans of Angola and the Lunda 
commonwealth432, the largest political entity in territory (if not in population) of Central Africa 
before the twentieth century. In the seventeenth century, many Mbangala bands had abandoned 
their nomadic way of life and the denial of lineage structures and settled down in the lands of 
                                                 
429 Cadornega, História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, Vol. 2, 42-43, informs that Diogo Gomes de Morales used the 
service of the “Jagas from Benguela” against the “rebel Sovas” of the Province of Libolo.  
430 Cadornega, História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, Vol. 2, 123 
431 Cadornega, História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, Vol. 2, 79 
432 Jan Vansina, “Government in Kasai before the Lunda”, The international Journal of African Historical Studies, 
Vol. 31, No. 1 (1998): 1-22, forges the concept of “Lunda commonwealth”. 
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Kasanje. They later became an “ethnicity” of their own (Imbangala) and the main historical 
reference for all Mbangala groups.  
The “Imbangala” founded a permanent kilombo in Kasanje, which became their “capital”, 
and built a market or pumbo with the same name some distance away to trade with Luso-Africans, 
who were not authorized to travel further east433. The Mbangala of Kasanje thus managed to hinder 
foreign advance on their lands for centuries, as well as to block direct contacts between the Lunda 
(their main commercial partners in the interior) and Luso-African merchants until the second half 
of the nineteenth century434.     
During the nineteenth century, many Portuguese merchants and explorers435 visited the 
lands of Kasanje, including Antonio Rodrigues Neves436, who compiled one of the most important 
versions of the Mbangala oral traditions about their Lunda origins. By the end of the century, 
another expedition led by Henrique Dias de Carvalho managed to cross the lands controlled by the 
Mbangala of Kasanje into the states of Muatiânvua. He was able to collect similar oral traditions 
                                                 
433 Birmingham, Trade and Conflict in Angola, 147. There were also other important slave markets under Kasanje’s 
supervision in the late seventeenth century, such as the one in Holo, a small independent polity to the north, in the 
“border” with Matamba: Joseph C. Miller, Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade, 1730-
1830 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 212-223, 236. The market of Kasanje was attacked by Luso-
African forces in 1836 and two years later the presídio of Duque de Bragança was built on the access road to the 
market as an attempt by the Portuguese colonial administration to control the flow of caravans. For more on the market 
of Kasanje, see Jean-Luc Vellut, “Notes sur le Lunda et la frontiere Luso-Africaine, 1700-1900”, Études d’Histoire 
Africaine, No. 3 (1972): 94. See also José C. Curto, “Jeribita in the relations between the colony of Angola and the 
Kingdom of Kasanje”, Anais de História do Além Mar, Vol. XIV, (2013): 301-325; Henriques, Percursos da 
Modernidade em Angola, 365-366.  
434 Heintze, “Translocal ‘Kinship’ Relations in Central African Politics of the 19th Century”, 181; Curto, “Jeribita in 
the relations between the colony of Angola and the Kingdom of Kasanje”, 308-309. 
435 The list of explorers who visited Kasanje in late eighteenth and throughout the nineteenth century includes: 
Francisco José Maria de Lacerda, “Observações sobre a viagem da costa d’Angola a costa de Moçambique, 1797”, 
Annaes Marítimos e Coloneaes, 4ª série, parte não oficial (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1844), 187-214; José 
Rodrigues Graça, “Expedição ao Muatyanvua”, Boletim da Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa, 9ª série, Nos. 8-9 
(Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1890), 367-468; Manuel Alves de Castro Francina, “Viagem a Cazengo pelo Quanza, e 
regresso por terra”, Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino, parte não oficial, Série I (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1867), 
432-464; Otto H. Schütt, Reisen im Südwestlichen Becken des Congo (Berlin: Verlag Von Dietrich Reimer, 1881); 
Hermenegildo Capello and Roberto Ivens, From Benguella to the Territory of Yacca, 1877-1880, 2 Vols. (London: 
Sampson, Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington, [1881]1882). Although J. B. Douville, Voyage au Congo et dans 
l’intérieur de l’Afrique Equinoxiale fait dans les années 1828, 1829 et 1830 (Paris, Chez Jules Renouard Libraire: 
1832) may feature among these expeditions, there are some doubts if he really visited all regions he claims to have. 
For more, see Joseph C. Miller, “A Note on Jean-Baptiste Douville”, Cahiers d’études africaines, Vol. 13, No. 49 
(1973): 150-153. Some of the most important Luso-African expeditions to the Lunda commonwealth have been 
translated into English: for example, Captain Francisco Jose Maria de Lacerda’s journey to Cazembe (1798) and the 
journey of the Luso-African itinerary merchants (pumbeiros) P. Baptista and Amaro José from Angola to Tete (upper 
Zambeze) appear in Burton, The Lands of Cazembe.  
436 Antonio Rodrigues Neves, Memória da expedição a Cassange em 1850, África Occidental (Lisboa: Silviana, 1854).  
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about Kinguri, but this time directly from the Lunda437. These two versions of the oral tradition of 
Kinguri remain the main sources used by historians and anthropologists to study the “origins” of 
the Imbangala: hence there is merit in taking a closer look on both of them.  
Antonio Rodrigues Neves, who was part of an expedition to the lands of the Mbangala of 
Kasanje in 1850 led by Francisco de Salles Ferreira, had the rare opportunity of witnessing the 
installation of a new ruler as head of the Mbangala of Kasanje. He had also the chance to talk to 
the elders (macotas438) of Kasanje from whom he collected the oral tradition concerning Kinguri’s 
departure from Lunda, as well as stories about their first contact with the Portuguese, to whom the 
Mbangala offered their service in the early seventeenth century. This alliance between Mbangala 
and Portuguese forces led, according to the tradition, to the defeat of Ndongo and the subsequent 
settlement of the followers of Kinguri in the region of Kasanje439.   
Henrique Dias de Carvalho, one of the first Portuguese explorer to reach the states of 
Muatiânvua440, compiled the Lunda version of the oral tradition on the departure of Kinguri and 
his later settling in the interior of Angola. Carvalho commanded an official expedition to the Lunda 
commonwealth between 1884 and 1888 sponsored by the Portuguese colonial state and supported 
by the Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa, an institution of which he was an honorary member 
and that published his first reports about his expedition in 1886441.  
                                                 
437 The Lunda oral tradition about Kinguri’s exodus was collected by Henrique Dias de Carvalho during his expedition 
to the Muatiânvua (1884-1888): Henrique Augusto Dias de Carvalho, Expedição Portuguesa a Muatiânvua, 1884-
1888: Descrição da viagem à Mussumba do Muatiânvua, 4 Vols. (Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional, 1890-94); Carvalho, 
Ethnographia e história tradicional dos povos da Lunda, 86-112. See also José de Oliveira Ferreira Diniz, Populações 
Indígenas de Angola (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 1918), 119-123. 
438 Macotas (makota) were elders who served as advisers of the sobas: Heintze, Fontes para a história de Angola do 
século XVII, Vol. 1, 120. 
439 Neves, Memória da expedição a Cassange em 1850.  
440 The states of Muatiânvua are represented Antonio Augusto de Oliveira, “Carta da Africa Meridional portuguesa, 
1886”, Comissão de Cartographia de Portugal (Paris: Erhard Frères Rue Denfert-Rochereau, 1886), Appendix 7. 
441 Henrique Augusto Dias de Carvalho, “Expedição ao Muata Yanvo” (Cartas à Sociedade de Geographia), Boletim 
da Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa, Ser. 6, No. 3 (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1888), 130-146. 
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After his return to Portugal, Carvalho published a collection of four books about the 
expedition to Muatiânvua442 (as well as an ethnographic album of photos443), a book about the 
Lunda commonwealth444, a practical guide on how to speak the Lunda language445, and an 
ethnographic study of the peoples of Lunda, which included information about their version of 
their own history446. In 1898, Carvalho further published a book specifically about the history of 
the sobado of Kasanje, or as he called it, the “Jagado de Cassange”447. He also became a passionate 
advocate for the Portuguese colonial occupation of the lands of the Lunda commonwealth448 and 
wrote about the possibility of the commercial and agricultural exploitation of these regions449.  
Carvalho tried to popularize the stories about the African territories that he visited by 
publishing a sort of popular journal, África Ilustrada, which he defined as an “archive of useful 
knowledge”. It was a publication dedicated to “artists and workers, who work, produce and want 
to instruct themselves about what is convenient to know about Africa” 450. The legend of Kinguri 
was published in the first volume of África Ilustrada (1892), together with information on the 
political, social and cultural characteristics of the Lunda (Muatiânvua). 
                                                 
442 Henrique Augusto Dias de Carvalho, Expedição Portuguesa a Muatiânvua, 1884-1888: Descrição da viagem à 
Mussumba do Muatiânvua, Vol. 1. De Luanda a Cuango (Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional, 1890); Henrique Augusto Dias 
de Carvalho, Expedição Portuguesa a Muatiânvua, 1884-1888: Descrição da viagem à Mussumba do Muatiânvua, 
Vol. 2. De Cuango ao Chipaca (Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional, 1892); Henrique Augusto Dias de Carvalho, Expedição 
Portuguesa a Muatiânvua, 1884-1888: Descrição da viagem à Mussumba do Muatiânvua, Vol. 3. De Chipaca a 
Liembe (Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional, 1893); Henrique Augusto Dias de Carvalho, Expedição Portuguesa a 
Muatiânvua, 1884-1888: Descrição da viagem à Mussumba do Muatiânvua, Vol. 4. De Luembe a Calanhi (Lisboa, 
Imprensa Nacional, 1894).  
443 Henrique Augusto Dias de Carvalho, Álbum da Expedição ao Muatiânvua (1890). See also Teresa Mendes Flores, 
“As fotografias da expedição portuguesa ao Muatiânvuo, 1884-1888”, Revista de Comunicação e Linguagens, No. 47 
(2017): 53-77.  
444 Henrique Augusto Dias de Carvalho, A Lunda, ou os estados do Muatiânvua, domínios da soberania de Portugal 
(Lisboa: Adolpho, Modesto & Cia, 1890).  
445 Henrique Augusto Dias de Carvalho, Méthodo prático para falar a língua da Lunda (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 
1890).   
446 Carvalho, Ethnographia e história tradicional dos povos da Lunda.  
447 Henrique Augusto Dias de Carvalho, O Jagado de Cassange na Província de Angola (Lisboa: Typographia de 
Christovão Augusto Rodrigues, 1898).  
448 Henrique Augusto Dias de Carvalho, Lunda Portuguesa: Situação actual, impreterível necessidade de sua 
ocupação (Lisboa: Companhia Geral Typographica, 1895). The territories belonging to the so-called Muatânvua were 
among the last ones reached by Portuguese colonial forces at the end of the nineteenth century.  
449 Henrique Augusto Dias de Carvalho, Os climas e as produções das terras de Malange a Lunda (Lisboa: Imprensa 
Nacional, 1889); Henrique Augusto Dias de Carvalho, Meteorologia, Climatologia e Colonização (Lisboa: Tipografia 
As Colónias Portuguesas, 1892).  
450 Henrique Augusto Dias de Carvalho, África Ilustrada: Arquivo de conhecimentos uteis, Vol. 1, No. 1 (Lisboa: 
Diário de Notícias, 1892).  
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According to the oral traditions collected by Neves and Carvalho, the Lunda had been 
conquered by another large Central African state, the Luba451, a story that is represented by the 
marriage between Lweji (Ruwej), daughter of the ruler of Lunda, and the Luba hunter Chibinda 
Ilunga (Ilunga Tchibinda)452. The child born from this union eventually became the new ruler of 
the Lunda and the founder of the Mwaant yaav dynasty. One of Lweji’s brothers, Kinguri, refused 
to accept the new dynasty and became the leader of a dissident group of warriors who left Lunda 
and founded a series of states in today’s Zambia and Angola. Subsequent waves of migrations led 
by title-holders loyal to Kinguri culminated in the expansion of the Lunda commonwealth and the 
creation of a series of “Lundaized” states on its margins453.   
The legend of Kinguri and the conviction that the “Imbangala” came from the lands east 
of the Cuango River (Muatiânvua) thus became common knowledge for explorers and scholars 
from the mid-nineteenth century onwards, and was passed on to ethnographers of Angola of the 
twentieth century, such as José de Oliveira Diniz and José Redinha. Ferreira Diniz, a colonial 
official who occupied the position of Secretário dos Negócios Indígenas and Curador Geral da 
Província de Angola in the 1910s, wrote an extensive book about the “indigenous” population of 
Angola (1918), in which he dedicated a whole section to the “Bangala”. He considered the 
Mbangala to be direct descendants of the people of Lunda, along with Kioko (Quioco), Luena, 
Shinje (Xinje), Songo, Minungo, Bondo and Holo. He also used the Mbangala as a perfect example 
of a Lunda “tribe”, which he justified by showing the importance of this “tribe” and its historical 
relations with other “peoples of the west”. Ferreira Diniz saw the kinship ties between the 
Mbangala and various peoples of the kingdom of Angola as a direct consequence of their extensive 
                                                 
451 Birmingham, “The Date and Significance of the Imbangala Invasion of Angola”, 143, explains that Africanist 
scholars in the 1960s began to suspect that the Luba of Katanga were among “the most important peoples of Central 
Africa”, thus the increasing interest in studying their relation to the peoples of Lunda and their contacts to Angola.   
452 Although there is no English translation of Carvalho’s books containing the myth of Kinguri, there are different 
summaries of the myth of the conquest of Lunda by the Luba, as represented by the marriage between Lweji (Ruwej) 
and Chibinda Ilunga (Ilunga Tchibinda): Victor Turner, “A Lunda Love Story and Its Consequences: Selected Texts 
from Traditions Collected by Henrique Dias de Carvalho at the Court of Muatianvua in 1887”, Rhodes-Livingstone 
Journal, No. 19 (1955): 1-26; Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savanna, 78-97; Miller, “Kings and Kinsmen: The Imbangala 
Impact on the Mbundu of Angola”, 257-269; Miller, Kings and Kinsmen, 122-150; Thornton, “The Chronology and 
Causes of Lunda Expansion to the West”, 3; Thornton, A History of West Central Africa to 1850, 214-225.  
453 According to the traditions about Kinguri, other title holders followed him out of Lunda some time after his 
departure. These oral traditions attest that Mwa Ndonje settled north of Kasanje (among the proto-Minungo), while 
Munjumo wa Tembo moved southwest of Lunda to Songo, Bihé, and other areas in the central plateau: Miller, “The 
Imbangala and the Chronology of Early Central African History”, 558 – note 34. 
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migratory movements within Central Africa454.  For Redinha, on the other hand, the “Bangala” 
were a combination of Lunda people with “Libolos” and “Gingas”, the latter a reference to the 
Mbangala of Matamba. These Bangala left had lands beyond the Cassai River (Além-Cassai) 
following their leader Kinguri (Tchinguri or Quinguri), who was a “Lunda-Tubungo” chief. They 
settled in the interior of Angola in the seventeenth century, where they then met the Jaga of Kongo 
with whom they later travelled south and then back north. Redinha concluded that the “poly-
cultural” features of the Mbangala derived from their “poly-ethnic” condition. He added that this 
type of mixed civilization extended its roots south of the Cuanza River455.    
With the rise of African History as an independent field of study in the 1950s, there was a 
renewed interest in the oral traditions concerning the Lunda expansion. The exodus of Kinguri 
became of great importance for the study of several polities in Central Africa: it enabled historians 
to fix approximate dates for the foundation of Lunda and Kasanje and it also provided a 
chronological framework for the histories of Yaka, Katanga, Kioko, Shinje, Kazembe, and other 
peoples of the Cuango.  
In 1963, Jan Vansina wrote an article about the foundation of Kasanje, incorporating 
information from different sources and taking a hard look at the two most important versions of 
the migration of Kinguri into Angola: Neves’ history of Kasanje (1854) and Carvalho’s expedition 
to Muatiânvua (1890s)456. Vansina believed that the combination of oral traditions collected by 
Neves, Carvalho and others457 with Portuguese colonial reports and other written sources about 
the Mbangala could generate a new chronology for the rise both of Kasanje and the Lunda 
commonwealth458. His first step was to question Carvalho’s version of the exodus of Kinguri and 
the establishment of commercial relations with the Portuguese in Massangano and in Luanda. After 
                                                 
454 Diniz, Populações Indígenas de Angola, 97-119. For a similar analysis, see Beatrix Heintze, “The Extraordinary 
Journey of the Jaga through the Centuries: Critical Approaches to Precolonial Angolan Historical Sources”, History 
in Africa, Vol. 34 (2007): 70-71. 
455 José Redinha, Coleção Etnográfica (Luanda: Museu de Angola, 1955), 22-23. 
456 Jan Vansina, “The Foundation of the Kingdom of Kasanje”, The Journal of African History, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1963): 
355-374. 
457 For other versions of the oral tradition about Kinguri, see Francisco Travassos Valdez, Six Years of a Traveller’s 
Life in Western Africa, Vol. 2 (London: Hurst and Blackett, 1861); Schütt, Reisen im Südwestlichen Becken des Congo; 
Curt Von François, “Geschichtliches fiber die Bangala, Lunda und Kiobo”, Globus, LIII, No. 18 (1888): 273 et seq. 
458 Vansina, “The Foundation of the Kingdom of Kasanje”, 354. 
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serving the Portuguese governor, identified in the sources only as Dom Manuel459, Kinguri would 
have settled with his people in the interior of the kingdom of Angola (in the lands of Mbaka), but 
they did not remain there for too long. His nephew Kasanje, who succeeded him after his death, 
moved their kilombo to the lands between the rivers Lui and Cuango, founding a capital with his 
name. According to this version, the followers of Kinguri received the name “Imbangala” during 
their stay in Mbaka, before they settled in Kasanje. Vansina concluded that this version of the story 
of Kinguri did not come from any single Lunda source, but was rather a reconstruction made by 
Carvalho with information he collected from both the Lunda and the Mbangala460.  
Neves’ earlier version of the legend of Kinguri (collected among the Mbangala of Kasanje) 
is much richer in detail when compared to that of Carvalho. Neves, for instance, included the 
names of several local African rulers. His version also incorporated more personal information 
about Kinguri, including infamous stories highlighting his cruelty and how the king of Lunda 
ordered his exile. In the Mbangala tradition collected by Neves, Kinguri ended up assassinated by 
his former allies who conspired against him for fear of his cruelty. His nephew Kasanje then 
succeeded him, made contact with the Portuguese, fought alongside them, and later settled in 
Mbaka for some time. According to this tradition, Kasanje then asked the Portuguese for 
authorization to move to better lands in the banks of the Cuango River, where he founded a capital 
with his name461.      
Vansina believed that the Neves version of the exodus of Kinguri was more complete than 
Carvalho’s, and that the relationship he described between the Mbangala and the Portuguese 
seemed to be more realistic. For one, he was never convinced that Kinguri had personally made 
contact with the Portuguese and believed he had died before the Mbangala began fighting 
alongside Luso-African slavers. After analysing these and other versions of the story of Kinguri, 
Vansina concluded that his departure from Lunda and the foundation of the Lunda “empire” 
happened sometime between 1550 and 1612. He then tried to fix a date for the foundation of the 
                                                 
459 It is possible that Carvalho is referring to Governor Manuel Pereira Forjaz (1607-1611), who according to 
Cadornega, História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, Vol. 3, 222, joined forces with a local “Jaga” in the “wars of 
conquest”.  
460 Carvalho, Expedição Portuguesa a Muatiânvua, 4 Vols.; Carvalho, Ethnographia e história tradicional dos povos 
da Lunda. 
461 Neves, Memória da expedição a Cassange em 1850. 
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kingdom of Kasanje (which he placed around 1613), after a supposed large migration out of Lunda 
circa 1600462.   
Shortly thereafter, in an article on the Jaga of Kongo (1965), David Birmingham identified 
the Mbangala of Kasanje (Imbangala) as a people of Lunda origin who had invaded the Mbundu 
territories south of the kingdom of Kongo in the mid-sixteenth century463. In that same year, he 
penned a reply to Vansina’s attempt to create a chronology for the arrival of the Mbangala in 
Angola and the foundation of the kingdom of Kasanje. He proposed another set of dates for the 
initial contact between the Portuguese and the Mbangala, pushing it back from about 1610 to 1575, 
before the foundation of the coastal settlement of São Paulo de Assumpção de Luanda. Once again, 
the date for the foundation of the kingdom of Kasanje became of “considerable importance for 
dating the history of Central Africa”, including the states of Lunda and Luba464.  
As with Vansina, Birmingham made use of a combination of Lunda/Mbangala oral 
traditions and Portuguese written documents to unveil the history of the Lunda commonwealth and 
the descendants of Kinguri. He also gave special attention to Neves’ collection of traditions from 
the Mbangala of Kasanje. Birmingham concluded that the label “Imbangala” came from the name 
of their leader, Kinguri-kya-Bangala, who was dubbed the “king of Benguela” by the Portuguese. 
A combination of the traditions reported by the Jesuit Antonio Mendes (1563) and the Capuchin 
Giovanni Cavazzi (1687) made him conclude that Kinguri had died fighting the ngola of Ndongo, 
prior to the establishment of the Portuguese on the coast of Angola465.   
In the following year, Vansina published yet another article about the Jaga, the Mbangala 
and the Lunda. By then, it was clear that the Jaga and the Mbangala were not the same group of 
warriors, although both were believed to have come from lands beyond the Cuango River. The 
Jaga had invaded mbanza-Kongo in the late 1560s, while Kinguri and his people, Vansina 
sustained, contacted the Portuguese around 1610. The fact there were two major migratory 
movements out of Lunda in a period of fifty years was a remarkable process that “begs further 
                                                 
462 Vansina, “The Foundation of the Kingdom of Kasanje”, 373. 
463 Birmingham, “Speculations on the Kingdom of Kongo”, 10. 
464 Birmingham, “The Date and Significance of the Imbangala Invasion of Angola”, 143. 
465 Birmingham, “The Date and Significance of the Imbangala Invasion of Angola”, 144-146. 
109 
 
investigation”, Vansina concluded. He agreed with Birmingham that Kinguri must had died before 
1610466.  
Birmingham and Vansina engaged in a decade-long debate about the connections between 
the Mbangala of Kasanje and the Lunda commonwealth, which started with their articles published 
in the Journal of African History and continued with the publication of their respective books on 
the history of Angola, both published in 1966467. They each valued the oral traditions about Kinguri 
collected in the nineteenth century as the main references for their debate. Birmingham considered 
the arrival of the Lunda as the most important event in the history of Angola prior to 1790. He 
proposed two distinct migratory waves out of Lunda. The first one would have been a loosely 
organized migration of people from Lunda that gave rise to the Mbangala of Kasanje around the 
sixteenth century. The second wave would have been tightly controlled and organized under the 
rule of the Mwaant yaav in the eighteenth century468. For Vansina, the tradition of Kinguri’s 
exodus was important because it linked the origins of the Lunda commonwealth to the creation of 
the kingdom of Kasanje through datable Portuguese activities in Angola. Hence, it became the 
“historiographical anchor for the chronology of a huge area in west central Africa, including the 
first emergence of the core polity of the commonwealth, the Rund kingdom, as well as the date for 
the beginnings of Lunda expansion, because the Kinguri tradition conflates both processes”469. 
In the late 1960s, Joseph C. Miller entered the debate by presenting a new chronology for 
the departure of Kinguri from Lunda. According to his research, Kinguri had left the Lunda states 
in the late fifteenth century and engaged in a long journey in the interior of the continent until his 
descendants settled in the lands of Kasanje470. Although Miller gave great importance to oral 
traditions471, he did not ignore the written sources that placed the Mbangala bands south of the 
Cuanza River before the seventeenth century. These included Andrew Battell’s testimony from 
                                                 
466 Vansina, “More on the Invasions of Kongo and Angola by the Jaga and the Lunda”, 421.  
467 Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savanna; Birmingham, Trade and Conflict in Angola. 
468 Birmingham, Trade and Conflict in Angola, 147-150. See also Thornton, “The Chronology and Causes of Lunda 
Expansion to the West”, 1.  
469 Jan Vansina, “It Never Happened: Kinguri’s Exodus and Its Consequences”, History in Africa, Vol. 25, (1998): 
388. See also Vansina, “Quilombos on São Tomé, or in Search of Original Sources”, 453.  
470 Vansina, “It Never Happened”, 388 – note 4, pointed out that the early chronology for the departure of Kinguri and 
the rise of Lunda is neither included in Miller’s doctoral dissertation, nor in the latter’s book with a similar title.  
471 Vansina, “On Ravenstein’s edition of Battell’s Adventures in Angola and Loango”, 346, explains that, at the time 
both he and Miller tended to value oral traditions in detriment of written sources: “For instance, when it came to the 
origin of the Jaga [Mbangala], Lunda oral traditions took precedence over Battell - an attitude both Miller and I shared 
at the time”.  
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early seventeenth century about the presence of the Mbangala south of the Cuvo River as the 
sixteenth turned to the seventeenth century472, as well as the references to Mbangala bands on the 
central plateau (such as the Mbangala “queen” Temba-a-Ndumba) recorded by the Capuchin 
Gionvanni Cavazzi (confessor of Nzinga-a-Mbande) in the second half of the seventeenth 
century473. Since the followers of Kinguri had supposedly come from the Lunda commonwealth, 
the written references confirming their presence in territories south of the Cuanza River in the 
sixteenth century forced Miller to push back the chronology for their departure from Lunda to the 
end of the fifteenth century. Moreover, Miller believed that the followers of Kinguri, the 
Imbangala, were not Mbangala before leaving Lunda. He kept searching for the history of what 
he called “Kinguri’s band before they became Imbangala”474, and concluded they must have 
roamed the interior of the kingdom of Angola for decades, moving to areas south of the Cuanza 
and into the central plateau before meeting the Portuguese. Hence, they had become Mbangala 
somewhere along the way, but kept their memory about Kinguri and their Lunda origins.  
This new theory about the Mbangala expansion changed the dates for the exodus of Kinguri 
and, consequently, the chronology for the rise of the Lunda Commonwealth and the foundation of 
several “kingdoms” of Central Africa, such as Songo and Kioko. Miller concluded that Kinguri’s 
departure from Lunda, the Ruund heartland475, must had happened at the latest around 1490. The 
                                                 
472  There are different versions of Battell’s description of his life among the Mbangala published by Samuel Purchas. 
The first ones are published in four editions of Purchas His Pilgrimage: or Relations of the World and the Religions 
observed in all Ages and Places discovered, from the Creation unto this Present (1613, 1614, 1617 and 1626), which 
is often referred to simply as “Purchas his Pilgrimage”. Purchas published a different book in 1625, under the title 
Hakluytus Posthumus, or Purchas his Pilgrimes, contayning a History of the World in Sea Voyages and Lande 
Travells, by Englishmen and others, which is often referred to as “Purchas his Pilgrimes”. These are the main versions 
of Battell’s testimony, but there is also a 1619 edition entitled Purchas His Pilgrim Microcosmus, or the Historie of 
Man. Purchas declared that these were essentially different works both in terms of “subject” and “object”, despite 
“holding much resemblance in the name”: Hugh George Rawlinson, Narratives from Purchas his Pilgrimes 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931). For more on the two main versions, see Staller, “Rivalry and 
Reformation Politics”, 7-28. The 1617 version of Purchas his Pilgrimage was edited and republished in 1901: 
Ravenstein, The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battell of Leigh. Vansina, “On Ravenstein’s edition of Battell’s 
Adventures in Angola and Loango”, 345, criticises that all historians of the twentieth century have based their 
knowledge about Battell’s testimony on Ravenstein’s edition, never checking Purchas’ several versions. 
473 Cavazzi, Descrição histórica dos três reinos de Congo, Matamba e Angola, 2 Vols.  
474 Miller, “The Imbangala and the Chronology of Early Central African History”, 570, argued that “The dates of the 
Imbangala stay in Angola suggest tentative dates for the known history of the Kinguri’s band before they became the 
Imbangala”.  
475 According to the definition found in Jeffrey Hoover, “The Seduction of Ruwej: Reconstructing Ruund History. 
The Nuclear Lunda: Zaire, Angola, Zambia” (PhD Dissertation, Yale University, 1978), xvii, the Ruund is the “nuclear 
Lunda”. The term was used by the Lunda to define their language, which then became associated with their 
geographical position and “ethnic” associations. 
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conquest of Lunda by the Luba, represented by the marriage of Lweji, would also have happened 
around the same time476.  
While historians of Angola debated the dates for the exodus of Kinguri based on Mbangala 
traditions and Portuguese written documents, anthropologists dedicated to the study of the great 
states of Central Africa, including Lunda and Luba, pointed out problems with the chronology that 
Angolanists had established. Among them Jean-Luc Vellut, Luc de Heusch and Christopher 
Wrigley477 
Jean-Luc Vellut published a long article about the Lunda expansion (1972) based on new 
geological and documentary evidence that questioned the early chronology proposed by Miller. 
Vellut showed that the death of the Mwaant yaav Mukanza I happened in 1755, and consequently 
the Lunda expansion must have happened in late seventeenth or early eighteenth century at the 
earliest478.  In order to explain this discrepancy, Vellut built on Birmingham’s idea about two 
different waves of migrations out of Lunda and concluded that the references he saw belonged to 
the second wave, controlled by the Mwaant yaav, while Kinguri’s departure happened during an 
earlier migration. Thornton explains it further:  
“Cognizant of Miller’s conclusions that individuals recorded in genealogies might 
well represent whole generations of rulers known by a single title, rather than a 
single person, Vellut concluded that his chronological findings did not upset 
Miller’s early date for the first Lunda migration. The fact that Kinguri’s ‘sister’ in 
the tradition was also the ‘mother’ of the first mwaant yaav did not have any 
                                                 
476 This new chronology also affected the dates for the foundation of other “kingdoms”: Miller, “The Imbangala and 
the Chronology of Early Central African History”, 570-573.  
477 The debate between anthropologists such as Luc de Heusch and Christopher Wrigley and historians such as Jan 
Vansina and Joseph Miller encompasses a broader theoretical discussion about structuralism as a valid tool for the 
analysis of oral traditions concerning the peoples that occupied Central Africa before the twentieth century. Historians 
have criticized the teleological structures presented by these anthropologists in their analysis of Lunda oral traditions 
and advocated for a historical approach to the oral and written sources available. I intend to engage such debate more 
profoundly in future researches about these themes. For a criticism of structuralism as a methodology for the study of 
the history of Central Africa, see Jan Vansina, “Is elegance proof? Structuralism and Africa History”, History in 
Africa, No. 10 (1983): 307-348; Jan Vansina, “Bantu in a Crystal Ball, II”, History in Africa, Vol. 7 (1980): 293-325. 
See also Roy Willis, “Translator’s introduction”, in Luc de Heusch, The Drunken King or the Origin of the State 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, [1980] 1982), vii-xiv; Miller, Kings and Kinsmen, 9. For an introduction on 
the structural study of myths, see Claude Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology (New York: Basic Books, [1963] 
1977), 206-231.  
478 Vellut, “Notes sur le Lunda et la frontiere Luso-Africaine”, 61-166.   
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necessary chronological significance if titles with multiple incumbents and not 
single individuals were considered”479.  
 
According to Vansina (1998), Miller squared his chronology with Vellut’s conclusions by 
advancing the idea of two distinguishable migratory movements out of Lunda, an early one led by 
Kinguri himself, and a second wave in the late seventeenth century. Thus, Miller adjusted his 
chronology to the rise of the mwaant yaav, while saving the Kinguri tradition “as a genuine record 
of ancient times”480. In one of his later articles, Vansina (2007) complained that one of the most 
important sources about the Mbangala expansion, Battell’s testimony, had not been seriously  
examined by scholars engaged in the debate about Kinguri and the Mbangala (himself included) 
and that the written sources “took a backseat to the traditions he [Miller] collected from modern 
Imbangala”481.    
Vansina concluded that the tradition about Kinguri’s exodus took shape in the 1840s amidst 
the Mbangala of Kasanje and the Songo and consolidated by the beginning of the twentieth 
century482. It was a commercial strategy to unify the Mbangala to their major partners in the 
interior483. It took decades, however, for historians of Africa to realize and correct this mistake. 
                                                 
479 Thornton, “The Chronology and Causes of Lunda Expansion to the West”, 2. For Vellut’s view about perpetual 
kinship, see Vellut, “Notes sur le Lunda et la frontiere Luso-Africaine”, 65. See also Heintze, “Translocal ‘Kinship’ 
Relations in Central African Politics of the 19th Century”, 184-185. 
480 Vansina, “It Never Happened”, 389.  
481 Vansina, “On Ravenstein’s edition of Battell’s Adventures in Angola and Loango”, 346. See Miller, Kings and 
Kinsmen, passim. Thornton, “The Chronology and Causes of Lunda Expansion to the West”, 2, made a similar 
criticism to Miller’s bias towards the modern oral traditions he collected among the Imbangala in the late 1960s in 
detriment of the written sources. In a recent publication, Thornton, A History of West Central Africa to 1850, 50 – 
note 68, mentioned Vansina’s criticism about the “legendary travels of Kinguri”, while presenting his opinion on the 
rise of the Mbangala bands “in the Central Highlands, perhaps its southern fringe”.   
482 According to Vansina, “It Never Happened”, 402, “By 1920 the exodus tradition had been adopted in the whole 
area of western Lunda influence. As earlier traditions already had stressed the origin of chiefs, and hence of their 
legitimacy, in a foreign nuclear area, whether Kola (i.e. the Rund heartland in the north), Nama in the southeast, and 
probably Candembe among some Songo, another exodus story sounded familiar and was easily incorporated in most 
cases”. See also Heintze, “The Extraordinary Journey of the Jaga through the Centuries”, 77-78.  
483 Heintze, “Translocal ‘Kinship’ Relations in Central African Politics of the 19th Century”, 188-189, explains that: 
“Particularly during the nineteenth century, it was economically advantageous to establish a historical tie that would 
serve as the basis for becoming privileged trading partners, opening up trade routes or minimising conflicts by settling 
in the Lunda Commonwealth. Since these other groups too were familiar with the twin concepts of positional 
succession and perpetual kinship, they used them as convenient idioms in which to cast such relationships … Thus, a 
historical discourse emerged which put forward the notion of a common ancestral relationship of the Rund/Lunda and 




All despite decades of discussion about the validity of oral traditions and their equivalent value (or 
lack thereof) to written sources484. As Beatrix Heintze explains:  
“Since the formation of such kinship ties is a product of historical processes which 
were embedded in specific political contexts, it would be mistaken to assume that 
such ties are ‘artefacts’ of some by-gone age. Rather, in most cases they were 
political constructs which, like other constellations, were subject to change and 
could be adapted to meet the requirements of new political situations”485.  
 
The validity of the Mbangala oral traditions regarding Kinguri’s exodus from Lunda was 
first challenged by the publication of Luc de Heusch’s structuralist criticism of the Lunda traditions 
(1971). He discussed the exodus of Kinguri (Chinguri) from Lunda based on the traditions 
collected by Carvalho and analysed the classic debate between Birmingham and Vansina. De 
Heusch, a disciple and associate of Claude Lévi-Strauss, made use of structuralist concepts 
(inversion, opposition, transformation) to “discover” what he considered to be law-governed 
relations between the mythical traditions of peoples and cultures seemingly widely separated from 
each other, like the Luba and the Mbangala of Kasanje486.  
Nevertheless, de Heusch did not challenge Vansina’s chronology, based on oral traditions, 
for the departure of a historical, real warlord called Kinguri from Lunda and the rise of the 
Imbangala. Indeed, he concluded that the theory of the two waves of migrations out of Lunda was 
more plausible than Birmingham’s previous early chronology, and argued that the tradition of 
Kinguri and the rise of the mwaant yaav led to the foundation of the Bemba state in Zambia, quite 
distant from the lands of the Mbangala of Kasanje. “The Bemba epic is a mirror image of the Luba-
Lunda sacred union of the prince from above and the terrestrial princess”. Hence, the mythical 
marriage that represents the conquest of the Luba over the Lunda and the exodus of the princess’ 
brother was not an exclusivity of the Mbangala487.  
                                                 
484 While discussing the validity of oral traditions, Jan Vansina, “Oral Tradition and its Methodology”, in General 
History of Africa, Volume I. Methodology and African Prehistory, J. Ki-Zerbo, ed. (Berkeley: UNESCO / University 
of California Press, 1981), 142-165, alerted to the incorporation of fragments of oral traditions from other places into 
local history: “In practice, caravans of merchants such as the Imbangala of Angola, or no doubt those of the Dyula 
and the Hausa, may bring with them fragments of history which are incorporated into local history because they fit in 
well. Later on, links were formed between representatives of different groups at the beginning of the colonial period 
and they exchanged information concerning their traditions”. 
485 Heintze, “Translocal ‘Kinship’ Relations in Central African Politics of the 19th Century”, 186. 
486 Willis, “Translator’s introduction”, viii-ix.  
487 Heusch, The Drunken King or the Origin of the State, 228-229, 232.   
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Christopher Wrigley wrote a detailed review of de Heusch’s book (1974) in which he 
criticized the author’s acceptance of Vansina’s historical reconstruction of the rise of the Lunda 
“empire” and the thesis concerning two different waves of migration. Wrigley also criticized 
Miller’s “apparently un-questioning belief in the Lunda origin of the Imbangala”, despite praising 
his argument showing that “Kinguri” was a titular position, not a person. More importantly, 
Wrigley showed that the term “nguri” (“lion”) belonged to a Mbundu dialect (not specified) and 
not to the Lunda language488. “Thus the kinguri, the lion chief who lived in the lion hills, seems to 
be firmly pinned to the lands west of the Kwango, and the story of his migration from the east 
must come under suspicion of being a mythical fabrication”489.  
Wrigley proposed that the tradition of Kinguri’s exodus was not historical and that it was 
related to the structure of the Lunda state, and not to the foundation of outside polities. Hence, the 
Mbangala version for the exodus of Kinguri should be dismissed, along with all the chronological 
speculation based on it490. Wrigley’s position was considered extreme and was heavily criticized 
by historians491. His whole analysis was based on a debate between “exponents of literalist and 
symbolist readings of African historical narratives” about the historical existence of the personages 
of oral traditions. While historians such as Birmingham and Vansina interpreted the symbolic 
figures of Kinguri’s myth as real persons, structuralist scholars such as De Heusch and Wrigley 
tended to look for the “quasi-mathematical form hidden beneath the exotic myth narratives”492.  
Miller’s research on the Mbangala, however, had clarified that Kinguri was not a historical 
individual, as the “literalists” had supposed, but rather the name of a title. The same would be true 
for “queen” Lweji and the Luba hunter Chibinda Ilunga, the latter called Lukonkesha in the 
                                                 
488 Wrigley had indeed made important contributions by introducing the use of Portuguese archival materials to the 
anthropological (structuralist) study of Central African states, which became known as the Luso-African frontier: 
Hoover, “The Seduction of Ruwej”, 22.  
489 Wrigley, “Myths of the Savanna”, 134. More than a decade later, Vansina, “It Never Happened”, 393, agreed with 
Wrigley that the exodus of Kinguri was a nineteenth-century fabrication, according to him invented by both the 
Mbangala of Kasanje and the “Ambaquistas”, that is, the Luso-Africans from the presídio de Ambaca (Mbaka).  
490 Wrigley, “Myths of the Savanna”, 134-135. 
491 For Vansina’s reply to Wrigley, see Jan Vansina, “Comment: Traditions of Genesis”, Journal of African History, 
Vol. 15, No. 2 (1974): 317-322. See also Thornton, “The Chronology and Causes of Lunda Expansion to the West”, 
2. 
492 Willis, “Translator’s introduction”, vii-xiv. For an example about this structuralism “quasi-mathematical” approach 
to the interpretation of myths, see Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, 228-229.  
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Mbangala tradition493. Miller’s work, however, reproduced and reinforced the belief in the exodus 
of Kinguri and his role in the foundation of the Imbangala.  
In 1978, James Jeffrey Hoover defended his doctoral dissertation on the Lunda (Ruund), 
where he analysed the myth of Lweji (Ruwej) and the rise of the Mwaant yaav. Hoover accepted 
Miller’s thesis about perpetual titles, but highlighted his interpretation of the oral traditions of the 
Lunda/Mbangala as only “one plausible reconstruction” of the historical process behind the 
unification of the Lunda and the Luba494. 
Hoover used linguistic data to conclude that the tradition of Kinguri had been introduced 
into Lunda by Imbangala traders in the nineteenth century. Hence, the Mbangala influenced the 
Lunda to incorporate the legend of Kinguri, while the Ruund would influence the Mbangala to 
reject lineage-based social structures495. In his own doctoral dissertation, Miller had argued that 
the proto-Imbangala band dropped their lineage basis at the Cassai River496. Hoover built on this 
argument to suggest that the Imbangala could be imitating a “long-standing Ruund example of 
non-lineage-based social structure when the tradition says he forbade mothers to give birth; 
nothing indicates this social revolution was an innovation of the kinguri’s band”497. 
In another part of his thesis, Hoover stated that “Miller’s metaphorical interpretation of 
Ruund names as historical titles was partly necessitated by the need to get the Kinguri (Chingud) 
to Angola by the earlier dates now accepted”. There was evidence to suggest that the personages 
of the brothers of Lweji, including Kinguri, were rather recent additions to Ruund tradition and to 
those of the other peoples. “They were added as the Mbangala, Lwena, and later the Chokwe 
became significant neighbors and economic partners of the Ruund”. Hoover concluded that the 
Chibidian period, that is the rule of Chibid and Luwej, could not have happened long before 1620, 
                                                 
493 Miller explains that: “…Imbangala lineages and political structures consist of permanent, named positions, each of 
which possesses a specified status expressed in terms of kinship with all other positions in the system. Individuals 
come and go as occupants of these titles, but they do not affect the name or rank of the positions … The Imbangala 
believe that the holder of such a title actually becomes the person who founded the position many years before and 
they perform rituals to effect the individual's change in identity. The incumbent acquires personality traits attributed 
to the idealized original occupant of his position, takes the name, kinsmen, and social status of the position, and thus 
assumes his place as a living continuation of the title founder”: Miller, “Kings and Kinsmen: The Imbangala Impact 
on the Mbundu of Angola”, 22, 115-239, 262.   
494 Hoover, “The Seduction of Ruwej”, xvii, 168-172. 
495 Hoover, “The Seduction of Ruwej”, 23-27, 212-213. 
496 Miller, “Kings and Kinsmen: The Imbangala Impact on the Mbundu of Angola”, 141-150. 
497 Hoover, “The Seduction of Ruwej”, 171.  
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because of the use of the loanword “yibwobw” (soaked manioc roots). Hence, he rejected Miller’s 
earlier chronology of the Mbangala in relation to the departure of Kinguri from Lunda498.  
Hoover spotted the addition of Kinguri’s exodus to the oral traditions of both the Lunda 
and the Mbangala and was aware that these additions had the objective of establishing strong 
cultural (and kinship) ties between the Mbangala of Kasanje and the Ruund of Lunda, which would 
consequently allow the development of their trading networks. As he explained: “Entire ethnic 
groups do not develop from one heroic ancestor … The major point of the passage is to link the 
large Lunda empire in the center of the continent with the Luso-African trading kingdom of 
Kasanje which was long the major Lunda link to the world economy”499.  
Thornton reinforced Hoover’s argument by reminding that Cavazzi, who published his 
work in 1687, had never heard of the Lunda or about Kinguri’s connection with them. According 
to the Italian Capuchin, the Mbangala traced their origin to a kingdom founded by Zimbo (Njimbo), 
whose home was located on the central plateau, near the headwaters of the Cunene River500. Hence, 
it was clear that “in the face of the new evidence we must abandon the connection between early 
Imbangala history and the Lunda foundation myth”501. When Miller published Way of Death 
(1988), he was also convinced the Mbangala had not come from Lunda, but suspected their 
homeland was on the central plateau, close to the upper Cunene Valley. From there, the Mbangala 
would have made their descent into the “kingdom of Angola”502 
Beatrix Heintze has recently reaffirmed that Kinguri’s exodus was a nineteenth-century 
addition to the oral traditions of both Imbangala and Lunda. She has argued that it was meant to 
create a mythical connection between the Mbangala of Kasanje and the Mwaant yaav of the Lunda 
commonwealth. Furthermore, she attested to the incorporation of the Lunda traditions by not only 
the Mbangala of Kasanje, but also the Tchokwe (Chokwe). Heintze concluded that the presence of 
the Mbangala in the kingdom of Angola predated their settlement in Kasanje, and that Mbangala 
bands first appeared among the pastoral areas in the south and not very far from the coast503. We 
                                                 
498 Hoover, “The Seduction of Ruwej”, 214, 228.  
499 Hoover, “The Seduction of Ruwej”, 213. 
500 Cavazzi, Descrição histórica dos três reinos de Congo, Matamba e Angola, Vol. 1, book VII; Cavazzi, “Missione 
evangelica al Regno de Congo, 1668”, Book I, 7-24.  
501 Thornton, “The Chronology and Causes of Lunda Expansion to the West”, 2. 
502 Miller, Way of Death, 28-30.  
503 Heintze, “Translocal ‘Kinship’ Relations in Central African Politics of the 19th Century”, 188-189. 
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will now turn to these southern regions in search for clues about the Mbangala presence in 
Benguela.  
 
The Mbangala Migrations 
Chapter 1 showed that some historians of West Central Africa consider the territory of 
Quilengues – which included the lowlands of Mbuelo, the Chela Mountain Range, and the lower 
Cunene River basin – as the region were the Mbangala militaristic cult of the kilombo first appeared 
(Map 2). They presented evidence based on linguistic reconstructions and historical accounts that 
recorded the presence of Mbangala bands in the region since the sixteenth century504. But, after 
centuries of misunderstandings about their connections with the Jaga and other “cannibal warriors” 
of Africa, and their non-existent ancestral relationship to the Lunda commonwealth, there is much 
still to ask about the Mbangala. With the fall of Kinguri’s exodus as an explanatory model, 
historians must rethink one of the most important events of the History of West Central Africa in 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries: the rise and expansion of the Mbangala bands.  
 As mentioned previously, there is documentary and historiographical evidence for the 
dispersal of the Mbangala bands from the lowlands of Quilengues in waves of conquering 
expansions to different parts of the so-called “kingdom of Benguela”. This evidence, however, is 
scattered in various works written by missionaries, explorers, chroniclers, geographers and 
historians from the sixteenth to the twentieth century. Some Mbangala waves of migration have 
been well documented and analysed by historians. That is the case, for example, of the Mbangala 
bands who encountered the Scottish sailor Andrew Battell on the margins of the Cuvo River at the 
turning of the seventeenth century505. Others have not yet been fully analysed as part of the 
                                                 
504 Jan Vansina, How Societies are Born: Governance in West Central Africa before 1600 (Charlottesville and London: 
University of Virginia Press, 2004), 197 – note 109; Desch-Obi, Fighting for Honor, 232 – note 23. See also Heintze, 
“Translocal ‘Kinship’ Relations in Central African Politics of the 19th Century”, 189. 
505 For more on the history of the “northern” Mbangala bands (Imbangalas), see Birmingham, “The Date and 
Significance of the Imbangala Invasion of Angola”, 143-152; Birmingham, Trade and Conflict in Angola, 64-77; 
Miller, “The Imbangala and the Chronology of Early Central African History”, 549-574; Miller, “Requiem for the 
Jaga”, 121-149; Miller, Kings and Kinsmen, 176-223; Heintze, “The Extraordinary Journey of the Jaga through the 
Centuries”, 67-101; Hilton, “The Jaga Reconsidered”, 191-202; Thornton, “A Resurrection of the Jaga”, 223-227; 
Vansina, “The Foundation of the Kingdom of Kasanje”, 355-374; Vansina, “More on the Invasions of Kongo and 
Angola by the Jaga and the Lunda”, 421-429; Vansina, Kingdoms of the Savanna; Vansina, “It Never Happened”, 
387-40; Curto, “Jeribita in the relations between the colony of Angola and the Kingdom of Kasanje”, 365-366. 
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Mbangala migrations, perhaps because the evidence available for them is not as emphatic as the 
testimony of a direct witness, like Battell.  
I argue for the existence of at least three Mbangala waves of migration out of Quilengues 
during the second half of the sixteenth century and throughout the seventeenth century, as 
identified below. These Mbangala bands have been cited in the documentation and in the 
historiography of West Central Africa since the end of the sixteenth century, often identified 
simply as “jagas”. Nevertheless, because of the consolidation of the myth of Kinguri’s exodus 
from Lunda, these “southern” Mbangala bands have not been linked to the “northern” bands who 
crossed the Cuanza River at beginning of the seventeenth century and later settled in the western 
(left) banks of the Cuango River, where they became known as the Imbangala.   
In the beginning of the 1970s, for instance, Miller wrote extensively about the “southern” 
Mbangala bands, that is those south of the Cuanza River, and their overwhelming presence in the 
kingdom of Benguela (including Libolo, Hako and Kulembe506). He cited a letter written by the 
conquistador Manuel Cerveira Pereira confirming the presence of Mbangala bands in the 
immediate interior of Benguela, that is Quilengues, in the last quarter of the sixteenth century, 
around the same time as the invasion of mbanza-Kongo by the “real” Jaga507. 
Miller also mentioned that the first encounter between Mbangala warriors and the 
Portuguese could have taken place “near the mouth of the Kunene River at an unspecified date”508, 
probably an obscure reference to Humbe-Inene. However, he discarded this information as an 
addition by Giovanni Cavazzi to the oral traditions that this priest collected in Matamba.  In 
Miller’s view, the Capuchin missionary probably took the reference about the Mbangala in the 
Cunene region from stories he heard from Portuguese mariners about “misnamed Jaga” warriors 
in Benguela mixed up with legends from Eastern Africa about Zimbo509.    
                                                 
506 Miller, Kings and Kinsmen, 210-223.  
507 According to Miller, “The Imbangala and the Chronology of Early Central African History”, 564, the southern 
Mbangala bands were moving north from Benguela to Angola around the same time that the Jaga invaded the kingdom 
of Kongo. As he writes: “The next firm date also located the lmbangala quite far south, but by then apparently moving 
north near the coast. They had reached Sao Felipe de Benguela (Benguela Nova, the location of the present town of 
Benguela) by 1584 or 1585”.  
508 Miller, “The Imbangala and the Chronology of Early Central African History”, 563. 
509 Miller, “The Imbangala and the Chronology of Early Central African History”, 563 – note 55, concluded: “A lively 
set of mariners’ tales, visible in Battell’s account and other places, must have provided this detail”.  
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References for the presence of Mbangala bands close to the mouth of the Cunene River, 
however, forced Miller to consider why the followers of Kinguri would have marched so far south 
after leaving the Lunda commonwealth. In an attempt to explain this early Mbangala presence in 
the lowlands of Benguela, he argued for a supposed “circuitous southern route” taken by Kinguri’s 
bands after leaving their homeland, which had led them to the inner Cunene basin before they 
marched north510. This also forced him to propose a new chronology with an earlier date for 
Kinguri’s exodus from Lunda, as seen previously. Let us turn now to the sources. 
The first example for a wave of Mbangala migrations out of Quilengues has been well-
documented and fully analysed by chroniclers and historians since the seventeenth century (Map 
2). It concerns the marauders who marched north through the Seles, a strip of lowlands in the 
interior of Quicombo (11º20’S), between the central plateau and the sea, in the second half of the 
sixteenth century. They met the Portuguese, and Battell, on the margins of the Cuvo River, the 
largest waterway between the Cuanza and the Cunene, while trying to cross it. The Portuguese 
helped them cross the Cuvo (11ºS) in exchange for their cooperation in capturing slaves. A decade 
later, they would help the Mbangala bands cross another river, this time the mighty Cuanza511.  
Some of the northern Mbangala bands began working for Portuguese and Luso-African 
slavers in exchange for weapons, alcohol and other imported goods. Their help was essential for 
the development of the Atlantic slave trade in the seventeenth century, and proved fundamental 
for the Portuguese conquest of Ndongo. Some of these Mbangala bands settled down on the 
western (left) banks of the Cuango River and founded the kilombo of Kasanje. The Mbangala of 
Kasanje (Imbangala) became the main commercial intermediaries between the Luso-Africans of 
Angola (west) and the Lunda commonwealth (east) in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as 
discussed previously512.  
                                                 
510 Miller, “The Imbangala and the Chronology of Early Central African History”, 564, writes: “Their southward swing 
fills in an otherwise unexplained twenty-year gap in notices of their presence farther north”. However, Miller’s theory 
about a “circuitous southern route” taken by the followers of Kinguri to the mouth of the Cunene River has been 
disproved by the non-existence of Kinguri’s exodus.  
511 Purchas, Purchas His Pilgrimage, 2nd ed., 694-704; Ravenstein, The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battell of Leigh, 
19-35. See also Childs, “The Peoples of Angola in the Seventeenth Century According to Cadornega”, 272; Miller, 
“The Imbangala and the Chronology of Early Central African History”, 564-566.  
512 Miller, “The Imbangala and the Chronology of Early Central African History”, 549-574; Joseph C. Miller, “Slaves, 
Slavers and Social Change in Nineteenth Century Kasanje”, in Social Change in Angola, in Franz-Wilhelm Heimer, 
ed. (Munich: Weltforum Verlag, 1973), 09-29; Miller, Kings and Kinsmen, 176-223; Vansina, “On Ravenstein’s 
edition of Battell’s Adventures in Angola and Loango”, 321-326; Heintze, “The Extraordinary Journey of the Jaga 
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The Mbangala of Matamba preserved the memory of the second wave of migration from 
the south. Oral traditions collected in the seventeenth century attest to a second wave of Mbangala 
warriors from Quilengues, who marched up the highlands of Benguela and conquered numerous 
polities that inhabited the central plateau (Map 2). The cultural interactions between these 
Mbangala bands and the Mbundu513  communities of the central plateau resulted in the rise of new 
Mbangala rituals that shaped the cult of the kilombo.  
The Italian Capuchin Giovanni Cavazzi collected the oral traditions of the Mbangala of 
Matamba that account for the presence of their ancestors in the central plateau before they 
descended to the kingdom of Angola to settle in the province of Malanje (Baixa do Cassange) in 
the seventeenth century514. Cavazzi had access to these oral traditions from Matamba because of 
his relationship with the “Jaga queen” Nzinga-a-Mbande. The missionary, who had previously 
lived at the court of Ngola-a-Ari, the ngola of Ndongo and her greatest enemy, from 1655 to 1658, 
and visited Nzinga-a-Mbande in Matamba in 1658, remained at Nzinga’s court from 1660 to 1664, 
having participated in her funeral in December 1663515. Thornton believes that the Capuchin began 
working on his manuscript that included these oral traditions around 1660, which was completed 
by 1665 and periodically updated with marginal notes until 1668516.  
Although Nzinga-a-Mbande was originally from the kingdom of Ndongo, she became the 
“Jaga queen” of the Mbangala of Matamba when she allied to Jaga Kaza (Ngola-ka-Kaza) and 
assumed the role of tembanza, that is the first wife of the Jaga517. As tembanza, Nzinga-a-Mbande 
                                                 
through the Centuries”, 67-101; Heintze, “Translocal ‘Kinship’ Relations in Central African Politics of the 19th 
Century”, 189; Heywood, Njinga of Angola, 37-41, 
513 “Mbundu” was the generic label given to the peoples living in the interior of Benguela, especially the central 
plateau. They would be identified as “Ovimbundu” (Umbundu speakers) in the nineteenth century: Candido, An 
African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 292-293. The generic label “Mdundu” was also used in Angola to identify 
the people of the kingdom of Ndongo. Nevertheless, as Adriano Parreira, Economia e sociedade em Angola na época 
da rainha Jinga, século XVII (Lisboa: Estampa, 1990), 175, notes, the kingdom of Ndongo is not a territory reserved 
to a single “ethnicity”, hence there should be no automatic association between Ndongo and the Mdundu people either. 
514 The earliest references to the Mbangala in the central plateau are found in Cavazzi’s 1668 notes about his mission 
in Kongo entitled Missione evangelica: Cavazzi, “Missione evangelica al Regno de Congo, 1668”, Book I. The 
Missione evangelica served as basis for his book Istorica Descrizione de tre regni Congo, Matamba ed Angola, first 
published in 1687, see Cavazzi, Descrição histórica dos três reinos de Congo, Matamba e Angola, 2 Vols. 
515 Heywood, Njinga of Angola, 217-219, 235-244. 
516 Thornton, “Legitimacy and Political Power, 34; Mario Albano, “Cavazzi: conselheiro diplomático da rainha 
Nzinga”, in A Rainha Nzinga Mbandi: história, memória e mito, Inocência Mata, ed. (Lisboa: Colibri, 2012), 217-
220. See also Macedo, “Jagas, canibalismo e ‘guerra preta’”, 55-57. 
517 Miller, “Nzinga of Matamba in a New Perspective”, 209; Miller, Kings and Kinsmen, 164-165; Heintze, Angola 
nos séculos XVI e XVII, 366-367. See also Heywood, Njinga of Angola, 87-93; Pinto, “Em torno de um problema de 
identidade”, 231-232; Macedo, “Jagas, canibalismo e ‘guerra preta’”, 13-15.  
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inherited the rituals of Temba-a-Ndumba, including the preparation of the maji-a-samba, and 
became responsible for the imposition of the yijila. Temba-a-Ndumba was the daughter of Ndonji 
(one of Zimbo’s generals) and his wife Mussassa, who led the Mbangala from the lower Cunene 
basin to the highlands of the central plateau. She had been named after Zimbo’ wife, and became 
a powerful warrior after Ndonji’s death. She led the Mbangala bands, alongside with Mussassa, to 
victory over the polities of the central plateau, “scourging the neighboring kingdoms and provinces 
and cruelly slaughtering the inhabitants”518.  
Although Mussassa gave her daughter control over their kilombo, Temba-a-Ndumba, 
“because of her arrogance”, turned against her mother and made her an enemy, which I argue can 
be seen as another act of rebellion against lineage structures. Still according to Cavazzi, after 
establishing herself as the uncontested leader of the Mbangala of the central plateau, she decided 
to “renew the old laws of her father and ancestors”, by re-establishing the yijila, or “the laws of 
the jagas” as the Portuguese called them519.    
Evidently, European missionaries tended to focus their attention on the religious practices 
of the peoples they encountered in Africa. They tended to project their religious and cultural 
prejudices upon the African practices they analyzed, and regarded the events they witnessed 
through a European male-dominated perspective of the world.  The Capuchin understood the 
Mbangala rituals and social organization of the kilombo as an “evil cult”, exacerbating accounts 
about violent rites of passage, which included human sacrifice, infanticide and cannibalism520. 
Cavazzi recorded that Temba-a-Ndumba had also taught the Mbangala under her command the 
cults for the veneration of the spirits of the dead, not ancestors by kinship, but through the kilombo, 
and that there was much confusion among the Mbangala of Matamba about the origins of their 
other religious practices, not related to the kilombo521.  
A colonial historian from the seventeenth-century affirmed that the “jagas” of Benguela 
had indeed fewer rituals then those from the kingdom of Angola. The southern Mbangala, 
                                                 
518 Cavazzi, “Missione evangelica al Regno de Congo, 1668”, Book I, Chapter 1; Cavazzi, Descrição histórica dos 
três reinos de Congo, Matamba e Angola, Vol. 1, 177. See also Birmingham, “The Date and Significance of the 
Imbangala Invasion of Angola”, 145. 
519 Cavazzi, Descrição histórica dos três reinos de Congo, Matamba e Angola, Vol. 1, 177-178. See also Miller, Kings 
and Kinsmen, 162-163.  
520 Macedo, “Jagas, canibalismo e ‘guerra preta’”, 59; Thornton, Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 15.  
521 Cavazzi, Descrição histórica dos três reinos de Congo, Matamba e Angola, Vol. 1, 209. 
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according to Cadornega, were not so dedicated to the adoration of idols, like those from the north. 
They only had great adoration for the quicullos, which consisted of the bones of their ancestors. 
They made sacrifices and offers of food and drinks (Portuguese grape wine and palm wine) to the 
quicullos, and carried the funeral urns containing those bones (cofres de veneração) during their 
wars522. 
Keeping with the religious theme, Cavazzi also understood the attacks of “cannibal 
warriors” led by Zimbo against the local African communities as divine punishment for their sins. 
Zimbo was portrayed as a frightening and terrible ruler, “haughty and proud, ambitious for human 
glory and anxious to immortalize his name”. He had left his homeland in Serra Leoa with his 
followers (Muzimbos) to “kill, loot and spare no living thing, even an irrational animal”523. Cavazzi 
also believed that Zimbo was responsible for “punishing” the mani-Kongo with the invasion of his 
mbanza in the sixteenth century. Thereafter, Zimbo still marched over Eastern Ethiopia before 
retreating to the lower Cunene basin, where he would found a kilombo and restructured his army 
to initiate a new age of war524.  
Although Cavazzi stated that Temba-a-Ndumba was responsible for the yijila and the 
rituals of denial of lineage and ancestry, including the infamous maji-a-samba, in other moments 
he suggested that some of these laws and practices had been created by Zimbo himself and later 
“revived” by the “warrior queen” of the central plateau525. Cavazzi considered Zimbo the first 
Mbangala warlord (together with his wife Temba-a-Ndumba), thus Zimbo must have established 
the ‘laws of the jagas” before their new age of expansion out of the lower Cunene basin. In his 
                                                 
522 Cadornega, História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, Vol. 3, 223-224. See also Childs, “The Peoples of Angola in 
the Seventeenth Century According to Cadornega”, 276. 
523 Cavazzi, “Missione evangelica al Regno de Congo, 1668”, Book I, Chapter 1. 
524 Cavazzi, Descrição histórica dos três reinos de Congo, Matamba e Angola, Vol. 1, 124-125. See also Cadornega, 
História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, Vol. 3, 222-223.  
525 Contradiction in narratives should not be considered uncommon mistakes. As Heintze, “The Extraordinary Journey 
of the Jaga through the Centuries”, 72-73 has alerted, some written sources were based on several different oral 
traditions told at different places and times. Some of these sources also included information taken from other written 
sources, besides personal reminiscences and experiences. These interpolations are sometimes obvious, but many of 
them are hard to spot. Cavazzi’s writings are a good example of this kind of narrative amalgamation. A particular 
information or historical event could also take the opposite direction, which means the integration of historical material 
into oral traditions. 
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book, Cavazzi only begins to call the bands under Zimbo’s command “jagas” following their 
dispersal from their new kilombo on the lower Cunene basin 526. 
The information provided by Cavazzi about Zimbo as the founder of the Mbangala and the 
stories about Temba-a-Ndumba were copied and reproduced in the late nineteenth century by the 
Portuguese explorers Capello and Ivens, who had been in close contact with the southern Mbangala 
bands and attested for their ancestral presence in the lower Cunene basin527. They conjectured that 
Zimbo could also be the founder of the “empire” of Humbe-Inene (see below).  
In the 1980s, historians of Angola began pointing to the central plateau as the “homeland” 
of the Mbangala bands528. According to Miller, the Mbangala of the central plateau in the 
eighteenth century were not as centralized as the Lunda commonwealth during the same period, 
despite the fact that they shared some linguistic traits, that is they spoke a similar Umbundu 
language. These peoples of the highlands of Benguela, called Ovimbundu from the nineteenth 
century onwards, shared traditions that combined ancient “rainmaking kings, warlords rich in 
cattle, and a late-sixteenth century military cult of the Jaga”529.  
The Mbangala of the central plateau extended their power at the end of the sixteenth 
century and some of their bands “spilled down in every direction over the flanks of the plateau530. 
I suggest based on the hydrography of the central plateau that some of them followed the courses 
of the rivers down the highlands, such as Tamba and Cuanza, until they reached the lands of 
Matamba (Map 2). In the seventeenth century, the Mbangala bands of the central plateau then fell 
subject to the mighty Jaga Muzumbo-a-Kalunga, whose reputation and tradition echoed centuries 
later and hundreds of kilometres to the north of his supposed original location on the upper Cunene 
                                                 
526 Cavazzi, Descrição histórica dos três reinos de Congo, Matamba e Angola, Vol. 1, 174-180. See also Miller, Kings 
and Kinsmen, 163. 
527 Capello and Ivens, De Angola à contra-costa, Vol. 1, 213-218.  
528 Birmingham, Central Africa to 1870, 84; Joseph Miller, “The paradoxes of impoverishment in the Atlantic zone”, 
in History of Central Africa, Vol. 1, David Birmingham and Phyllis Martin, eds. (London and New York: Longman, 
1983), 139; Miller, Way of Death, 28. See also Thornton, “Legitimacy and Political Power, 31 – note 27; Thornton, 
Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 102, 116-117, 137; Thornton, “Cannibals, Witches and Slave Traders in the Atlantic 
World”, 281 – note 45.   
529 Miller, Way of Death, 28, argued that the kilombo was a joint creation from the time the followers of Kinguri met 
the Mbundu peoples of the central plateau (also called Ovimbundu). 
530 Miller, Way of Death, 28. 
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valley531. A historian of West Central Africa has recently highlighted the connections between the 
Muzumbo-a-Kalunga and Zimbo532. 
Cavazzi further suggested that there were other Mbangala migrations out of Quilengues 
when he declared he did not intend to narrate the history of all “independent captains” who left the 
kilombo founded by Zimbo at the lower Cunene basin following his death. His intension was to 
record the history of Tembo-a-Ndumba as the ancestor queen of the Mbangala of Matamba, 
because his focus was the history of Nzinga-a-Mbande533. 
A third wave of Mbangala warriors moved southwards from Quilengues and defeated the 
peoples who occupied the banks of the Cunene River (Map 2), known as kingdom of Mataman 
(Matama or Madaman). The survivors of these attacks were forced to flee across the Cunene to 
the semi-arid and desert areas of Cimbebasia (Kaokoland and Damaraland) or towards the Cuvelai 
Delta and the Ovamboland. After the destruction of Mataman and the expulsion of some of their 
subjects, these southern Mbangala bands mixed with the remaining groups in the area to found 
Humbe-Inene, or the Big-Humbe, which was also a title. Humbe-Inene was a powerful, though 
loose confederacy of African polities that became a major supplier of slaves and ivory for 
Quilengues in the eighteenth century, all the while hindering Luso-African advances into their 
territories until the second half of the nineteenth century.      
There are written references to the kingdom of Mataman since the end of the sixteenth 
century534. Lopes/Pigafetta recorded that the provinces of Cimbebasia (Cimbebas or Climbebi) 
extended from the “confines of Angola”, that is lower Cunene River, to the Bravaghul River, which 
originated on the “Mountains of the Moon”535. In the interior of the continent, the region known 
as Cimbebasia reached the mythical “first lake” of Inner Ethiopia, the mythical source of the Nile, 
                                                 
531 Miller, Way of Death, 28. 
532 Desch-Obi, Fighting for Honor, 232 – note 23. 
533 Cavazzi, Descrição histórica dos três reinos de Congo, Matamba e Angola, Vol. 1, 177.  
534 See Thomas J. Desch-Obi,“Engolo: Combat Traditions in African and African Diaspora History” (PhD Thesis, 
University of California, 2000), 21. Desch-Obi, Fighting for Honor, 20, argued that the fact the kingdom of Mataman 
attracted the attention of sixteenth and seventeenth-century Portuguese writers evidences its importance.  
535 Actually, the Kuiseb River originates in the Khomas highlands. 
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and also bordered the Magnice River (Limpopo River)536, which also supposedly sprung from the 
“first lake”537.  
In the beginning of the seventeenth century, Samuel Purchas also wrote about the existence 
of a mighty kingdom in Cimbebasia (Quimbebe) ruled by a “king” called Matama538. Both 
Lopes/Pigafetta and Purchas’ descriptions are of great importance because they refer to the 
kingdom of Mataman before its destruction at the hands of the southern Mbangala bands in the 
sixteenth century. Desch-Obi also argued that Cavazzi’s references to Zimbo as founder of a 
kilombo in the lower Cunene basin is a clear reference to the Mbangala invasion of the kingdom 
of Mataman539.  
Desch-Obi found seventeenth-century maps that place Cimbebasia east of the escarpment 
around latitude l5°S540, in this case incorporating the lands of the lower Cunene River. In the 
beginning of the eighteenth century, however, the cartographer De L’Isle located Cimbebasia and 
the kingdom of Mataman south of the Cunene River, while he identified the territory around 15ºS 
as the lands of Huila (pays d’Ohyla) and the domains of Jaga Muzumbo-a-Kalunga (see Appendix 
1.1).  
The kingdom of Mataman remained an important geographical reference centuries after its 
destruction. The eighteenth-century geographer and mathematician John Mair presented Mataman 
as one of the “subdivisions” of Guinea, that is the Atlantic portion of Africa, together with 
                                                 
536 According to Filippo Pigafetta, A Report of the Kingdom of Congo and of the surrounding countries, 158 – note 
117, the Magnice River is sometimes identified as the Zambezi River and at other times as the Limpopo River. 
Sometimes both rivers are also mistakenly called Cuama River. See also Thornton, A History of West Central Africa 
to 1850, 50. 
537 “Beyond the Kingdom of Congo we may remember, is the country of the King of Angola, and farther towards the 
Cape of Good Hope that of King Matama, and the provinces ruled over by him, called Climbebe”: Filippo Pigafetta, 
A Report of the Kingdom of Congo and of the surrounding countries, 113-114. This description by Lopes/Pigafetta 
was used by the cartographer De L’Isle to draw his “L’Afrique” (Appendix 1). 
538 Samuel Purchas, Purchas His Pilgrimage, 1st ed. (London: Printed by William Stansby for Henrie Fetherstone, 
1613); 580; Purchas, Purchas His Pilgrimage, 2nd ed., 694, mentioned the existence of the kingdom of Mataman while 
describing the coast of West Central Africa from south to north: “And with this we will begin with the most southerly 
parts, in which we first come into the kingdom of Matama (this is the king’s proper name), who being a gentile ruled 
over divers provinces, name Quimbebe [Cimbebasia]. This is a kingdom great and mighty, extending from Bravagal 
to Bagamidri”.  
539 Desch-Obi, Fighting for Honor, 232 – note 23. See also Antonio Guebe, Resistência à ocupação colonial do sul 
de Angola, região dos Va-Nyaneka Va-Nkumbi e dos Va-Ambo, 1850-1917 (Luanda: Edições de Angola, 2008), 23-
24 
540 Desch-Obi, Fighting for Honor, 20-21.  
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Benguela, Angola, Congo, Loango, Macoko, Benin, Guinea Proper and Negroland541. Its territory 
extended from Cabo Negro (16º30”S) to the Bavaghul River (24ºS)542 and bordered the Mwene-
a-Mutapa (Monomotapa)543.  
Although some eighteen and nineteenth-century authors affirmed that Cimbebasia was a 
wasteland with no towns, where the Europeans had little intercourse or commerce544, others 
asserted it was fertile lands in the interior of this unexplored “country”545. There were also skeptics 
who doubted the very existence of the kingdom of Mataman. The chronicler William Fordyce 
Mavor, for instance, dismissed most of the reports as “fictions”, while claiming to be disgusted by 
the Portuguese tales about cannibalism, infanticide and butcher shops selling human parts546.  
Others, however, reported that Mataman was not an imaginary kingdom, but located further inland 
and about 100 miles to the north from where it was usually placed in maps and travellers’ 
accounts547.  
Cimbebasia also remained an important reference, especially after the arrival of European 
missionaries in the region. The Spiritan Missionary Charles Duparquet, who directed a mission of 
the Apostolic Prefecture of Cimbebasia, included the inner Cunene basin as part of Cimbebas, as 
well as the lands of the Damara, Kwanyama, Ovambo, and those surrounding the Cubango 
                                                 
541 Mair, A Brief Survey of the Terraqueous Globe, 263. 
542 Mair, A Brief Survey of the Terraqueous Globe, 263; Universal History: From the Earliest Account of Time, 
Compiled from Original Writers, Vol. XVI (London: Richardson, Osborne, Hitch, Millar, Rivington, Crowder, Davey, 
Law, Longman & Ware, 1755), 2. 
543 Lopes/Pigafetta also made references to “jagas” fighting Amazon warriors in the lands boardering the Mwene-a-
Mutapa, which might be a reference to the presence of Mbangala bands in the kingdom of Mataman and/or in the 
Mwene-Muji: Filippo Pigafetta, A Report of the Kingdom of Congo and of the surrounding countries, 118-119, 124. 
See also Miller, “Requiem for the Jaga”, 129.  
544 William Fordyce Mavor, The History of Various Modern African Nations (London: Richard Phillips, 1808), 2; 
Mair, A Brief Survey of the Terraqueous Globe, 263. 
545 The eighteenth-century explorer Christopher Frederick Damberger, “Extracts from Damberger’s travels in the 
interior of Africa, from the Cape of Good Hope to Morocco, from the years 1781 to 1797”, The Edinburgh Magazine 
of Literary Miscellany, Vol. XVII (Edinburgh: J. Ruthven & Sons, 1801), 127, asserted there were reports of “fertile 
valleys” and “beautiful meadows” in the interior of the kingdom of Mataman. 
546 According to Mavor, The History of Various Modern African Nations, 2, “the description that have been given of 
this country are exceedingly confused, fabulous and ridiculous. In our researches after the truth, we are surfeited with 
fictions, and disgusted with stories of nations of Amazons and Cannibals, who wage perpetual war with each other, 
and in whose shambles the limbs of the captives are exposed to sale; who bury their children alive, and recruit their 
armies with the stoutest of their capitves. The Portuguese writers are the only persons that have pretended to describe 
this country; and, as no European settlements have been made in this barbarous and unpromising district, it is in vain 
to expect relations which have the smallest appearance of truth or probability”. See also Walker, Elements of 
Geography and of the Natural and Civil History, 503.  
547 Universal History, Vol. XVI, 2. 
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River548. Reports written by Finnish missionaries from the beginning of the twentieth century 
extended the territory of Cimbebasia to the upper Zambezi River549. 
Contemporary references to Cimbebasia often locate it in the western arid lands of today’s 
northern Namibia (Kaokoland and Damaraland), from the lower Cunene River (17º15’S) to the 
Bravaghul River550 (23ºS), close to the Tropic of Capricorn. Desch-Obi located the lands of 
Cimbebasia further north, defining it as the region “from the southern section of the central 
highlands to just north of the Etosha pan”551.   
Hermanegildo Capello and Roberto Ivens, who travelled the interior of Benguela in the 
1880s, had direct contact with the peoples of the lowlands (Mbuelo) as well as the inhabitants of 
the central plateau (Nano). They travelled through Quilengues using the services provided by local 
porters, guides and other African professionals. These Portuguese explorers, and self-taught 
ethnographers, developed their own thesis about the origins of the Mbangala (“jagas”) combining 
the knowledge acquired in the works of Lopes/Pigafetta, Giovanni Cavazzi and Antonio 
Nogueira552. They believed that Zimbo (Ximbo) was the first warlord of the Mbangala and that 
they had an ancestral close relation with the “tribes” of Quilengues (Ba-nhaneca and Ba-humbi, 
or the Mbangala). In their view, following the defeated in Eastern Ethiopia (kingdom of Melinde), 
Zimbo retreated to the lands in the lower Cunene basin, where he found a kilombo. From there, 
Zimbo waged war against the kingdom of Mataman, forcing their people to flee to desert areas in 
the lands of Cimbebasia and Damaraland553.  
Capello and Ivens located the kingdom of Mataman as a densely populated state between 
the Cunene River and the Chela Mountain Range and were sure that its inhabitants were indeed 
                                                 
548 Carlos Duparquet, Viagens a Cimbebásia (Luanda, Museu de Angola: 1953), 105-140. See also his map entitled 
“Carte de l’Ovampo” between pages 138-139. 
549 Matti Peltola, Suomen Iähetysseuran Afrikan työn historia. Sata vuotta suomalaista lähetystyötä 1859-1959, Vol. 
II [The History of African Work by the Finnish Missionary Society. One Hundred Years of Finnish Missionary Work, 
1859-1959, Vol. II] (Kuopio: Suomen Lähetysseura, 1958). A microfilm containing this document is deposited at the 
National Archives of Namibia, but I could not have access to it because of problems with the microfilm equipment. I 
did have access to a brief description of its contents in the reference book for the microfilms of the archive. Nowadays, 
Cimbebasia is the name of a neighborhood in the suburbs of Namibia’s capital, Windhoek. 
550 Now called Kuiseb River, close to today’s Walvis Bay, Namibia.  
551 Desch-Obi, Fighting for Honor, 20-21.  
552 Capello and Ivens, From Benguella to the Territory of Yacca, 2 Vols; Capello and Ivens, De Angola à contra-
costa, 2 vols.  
553 Capello and Ivens, De Angola à contra-costa, Vol. 1, 43, 215-217, 324-327. See also Birmingham, “Speculations 
on the Kingdom of Kongo”, 10; Thornton, A History of West Central Africa to 1850, 189. 
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Damara (Dámaras). They also recorded traditions concerning Humbe-Inene, the ruler of the great 
confederation of warrior-hunters that controlled many places in the interior of Benguela from the 
homeland in the lower Cunene basin554.  
Captain R. Avelot, in turn, conjectured that the Mbangala (Jaga) annihilated the kingdom 
of Mataman at the end of the sixteenth century, forcing its inhabitants (Cimbeba or Shi-mbeba) to 
flee to the southern lands across the lower Cunene River, where they would later become the 
Damara (Daman) and other Herero peoples555. These Mbangala founded two new “kingdoms” 
along the inner Cunene basin after the destruction of the kingdom of Mataman: Huila and 
Lunkumbi (Lu-n’kumbi), the latter ruled by Humbe-Inene556. Avelot also suggested that there was 
a unification of these two “kingdoms” by the Humbe-Inene, who began to rule over the entire 
Caculovar basin (Ka-ku-lovar), as well as Huila (Hoila or Auyla)557.  
In the second half of the nineteenth century, Father Duparquet also gained access to oral 
traditions from the Damara558 that linked their ancestors to the kingdom of Mataman, which he 
located on the north (right) bank of the lower Cunene River. The traditions recorded that the 
Damara had migrated from the north about two centuries earlier, at the time of the Mbangala 
invasions. The missionary was certain that the Damara were direct descendants of the people of 
                                                 
554 Capello and Ivens, De Angola à contra-costa, Vol. 1, 322 – note 1. 
555 The historical connection between the destruction of the “kingdom” of Mataman by waves of attacks from 
Mbangala bands of warriors and the rise of Humbe-Inene has been a matter of some academic debate. Desch-Obi, 
Fighting for Honor, 25, 234 – note 48, argued for a clear connection between the Mbangala invasions in the lower 
Cunene River basin, the destruction of Mataman and the rise of Humbe-Inene. See also Guebe, Resistência à ocupação 
colonial do sul de Angola, 23-24. Moreover, Carlos Estermann, Ethnography of Southwestern Angola: The Nyaneka-
Nkumbi Ethnic Group - Vol. II (New York/London: Africana Publishing Company, [1961] 1979), 14-30, has shown 
connections between the Mbangala (Jaga) and several of the polities that later occupied the territory of the “kingdom” 
of Mataman. He has also shown that the ruling class of Mutano, “capital” of Humbe-Inene, inherited titles that can be 
traced back to the Mbangala, such as “Humbe” and “Ngonga”. Similarly, Frieda-Nela Williams, Precolonial 
Communities of Southwestern Africa: A History of Owambo Kingdoms, 1600-1920, 2nd ed. (Windhoek, National 
Archives of Namibia, [1991] 1994), 60-67, has found traces of Mbangala interference in the migratory movements of 
Owambo peoples that occupied the territory of northern Namibia: but she relates them to the Lunda expansion and the 
supposed “exodus of Kinguri”, in accordance with the paradigm still in vogue.  
556 Mutano, “capital” of Humbe-Inene, was located on left margin of the Caculovar River, close to its intersection with 
the Cunene River. See Desch-Obi, Fighting for Honor, 25; For another reference about Mutano, see Delgado, Ao Sul 
do Cuanza, Vol. 2, 151.   
557 Avelot, “Les Grands Mouvements de Peuples en Afrique”, 81, 164-165. See also Desch-Obi, Fighting for Honor, 
24-25. 
558 According Duparquet, Viagens a Cimbebásia, 86, the nation of the Damara was divided into different “tribes”, 
each with its own ruler, but all recognized the hegemony of the main ruler Camaherero.  
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Mataman (Ma-daman), who had survived the Mbangala invasion and crossed the Cunene to 
escape, later mixing with Ovambo (Owambo) peoples559.    
The German missionary Heinrich Vedder, the first to undertake a study of the past of the 
Ovambo people, similarly saw historical ties between the Mbangala and Ovambo. In his view, the 
occupation of Ovamboland (today’s northern Namibia) was linked to the Mbangala expansion and 
their participation in the Atlantic slave trade from the beginning of the seventeenth century560. 
Historians dedicated to the history of Ovamboland, however, have refuted Vedder’s theories about 
the association between the Ovambo peoples and the Imbangala561, based on the myth of Kinguri 
and on Miller’s work about the chronology of their expansion562.  
Hence, the southern Mbangala expansion resulted in the destruction of the kingdom of 
Mataman and the rise of the Humbe-Inene as the major power in southern Quilengues, stretching 
its influence from the inner Cunene basin up to the central plateau. Capello and Ivens asserted that 
Humbi-Inene ruled over a large territory that extended from the kingdom of Bihé (Viye) to the 
lands of the Kwanyama (Cunhama), today’s northern Namibia. According to the information 
collected by the explorers, Humbe-Inene was an ally of the “king of Angola” (Ndongo) and gave 
him support against Portuguese military incursions into their territories. However, one of his allies 
from the central plateau (the “king” of Bihé) did not want to make war against the Portuguese 
conquistadores and disobeyed the orders to help Ndongo. This dispute let to a war between Humbe 
and Bihé in which the forces of Humbe-Inene were defeated and forced to retreat563. 
                                                 
559 Duparquet, Viagens a Cimbebásia, 87. See also Desch-Obi, “Engolo”, 20-21; Desch-Obi, Fighting for Honor, 234 
– note 48; Williams, Precolonial Communities of Southwestern Africa, 51-67; Marta Salokoski, “How Kings are Made 
– How Kingship Changes: A Study of Rituals and Ritual Change in Pre-Colonial and Colonial Owamboland, Namibia” 
(PhD Dissertation, University of Helsinki, 2006). 
560 Heinrich Vedder, South West Africa in Early Times (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1938), 15. Vedder based his 
work on twenty-eight manuscript volumes deposited in the Parliamentary Library of Windhoek and on oral data from 
the Ovambo peoples collected at the beginning of the twentieth century by the missionaries Erkki Laurmaa (from the 
Finnish Evangelical Lutheran Mission in northern Namibia) and Karl Sckär (who worked in the Rhenish mission in 
the Uukwanyama region). See also Williams, Precolonial Communities of Southwestern Africa, 25.  
561 According to Williams, Precolonial Communities of Southwestern Africa, 24-25, 30 – note 129, “Vedder wanted 
to present the arrival of the Owambo people as coinciding with that of the Portuguese, and also with the Imbangala 
expansion in Angola, which he believed brought the Owambo with it. However, Miller’s (1971) study on Imbabgala 
movements indicates that when they (Imbangala) arrived in southern Angola, the area was already settled by 
Ovimbundu and related people, with established kingdoms which the Imbangala conquered”.  
562 Miller, “The Imbangala and the Chronology of Early Central African History”, 549-574.  
563 Capello and Ivens, De Angola à contra-costa, Vol. 1, 214. See also Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a 
ocupação..., 326-327; Raimundo da Cunha Matos, Compêndio histórico das possessões de Portugal na África (Rio 
de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional, [c. 1835] 1963), 324; Desch-Obi, “Engolo”, 3; Desch-Obi, Fighting for Honor, 20- 21.  
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Another Portuguese explorer who roamed the interior of the kingdom of Benguela towards 
the end of the nineteenth century, Alexandre Serpa Pinto, collected some oral traditions about the 
origins of the “kingdom of Bihé” and its connection to Humbe-Inene. According to these 
traditions, Bihé was one of the sons of the soba of Humbe. A famous elephant-hunter who married 
Cahanda, the daughter of the king of Gamba (called Bomba), Bihé thus became ruler of great part 
of the central plateau. He also ruled over many “Ganguela tribes” (Ngangela) who migrated to the 
new kingdom564. In the nineteenth century, Avelot attested that the dominant class in Bihé still 
considered themselves direct descendants of the Mbangala from Humbe (Jaga du Humbé)565.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter had the objective of tracing the historical processes undergone in the territory 
of Quilengues prior to the establishment of a Portuguese settlement on the coast of Benguela at the 
beginning of the seventeenth century. In order to understand who were the main internal agents of 
change during this period, it was necessary to clarify a series of misunderstandings about the 
Mbangala bands who roamed the interior of Angola and Benguela since the sixteenth century. It 
was also necessary to deconstruct oral traditions and historiographies about the origins of the 
Mbangala, in this case the Imbangala of Kasanje, that have been legitimized as historical events 
by the weight of the authority of both elders and scholars.  
The fall of the “Exodus of Kinguri”, that is, the debunking of the oral traditions about the 
origins of the Mbangala in the Lunda commonwealth, has left a major gap in the historiography of 
West Central Africa and raised concerns about the chronology previously established for important 
polities of Central Africa. This chapter is an attempt to begin a new academic discussion about the 
rise and expansion of the Mbangala bands, which features as one of the most important historical 
events in West Central Africa in the sixteenth century and a major element for the understanding 
of historical processes from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century. The rise of the Mbangala 
bands and their martial cult of the kilombo in the sixteenth century brought social, political and 
                                                 
564 Alexandre Alberto de Serpa Pinto, How I Crossed Africa: From the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean, through Unknown 
Countries; Discovery of the Great Zambezi and Affluents (San Francisco: R.W. Bliss and Company, 1881), 90-91. 
See also Desch-Obi, Fighting for Honor, 231 – note 21. 
565 Avelot, “Les Grands Mouvements de Peuples en Afrique”, 166.  
131 
 
religious disruption to the decentralized lineage-based agropastoral communities that occupied the 
region since the fifteenth century. The turmoil and destruction created by these bands of roaming 
warriors combined with environmental challenges, such as extended droughts, created the perfect 
landscape for the development of the slave trade in Benguela in the seventeenth century. The 
different Mbangala bands that roamed the interior became both partners in slaving operations and 
an easy justification for the military actions of Luso-African slavers.  
The efficiency of the Mbangala martial culture, including its expansion through the 
incorporation of young men and their transformation into dedicated warriors who believed 
themselves “invulnerable” to physical and spiritual harm, made the Mbangala bands unstoppable 
and took them to distant parts of West Central Africa, while forcing small and big polities to adapt 
to the “revolution” they ignited. Documental and linguistic evidence point to different waves of 
Mbangala migrations moving out of Quilengues and expanding both northwards and southwards. 
In time, these bands of roaming warriors settled down and “diluted” themselves into the local 
communities they interacted with. This amalgamation with local communities they once raided 
included the acceptance of new kinship ties and the development of lineage structures.  
In the next chapter we will see how Mbangala bands and Luso-African slavers worked 
together for the development of the Atlantic slave trade from Benguela in the seventeenth century 
and turned it into one of the most important slave-exporting regions in the history of the Atlantic 





Foreign Intervention and the Rise of the Atlantic Slave Trade in Benguela 
 
The rise of Mbangala bands in the sixteenth century prepared the landscape for the 
development of the Atlantic slave trade on the coast of Benguela at the beginning of the following 
century. The fast spread of these nomadic warriors and the way they reproduced themselves, 
through the kidnapping of adolescents who soon became new warriors, led to their occupation of 
vast portions of the interior of Benguela at the beginning of the seventeenth century. I argue that 
this widespread presence of Mbangala bands in the sertões shaped the territory of Quilengues, 
populating it with refugees from communities disrupted by raids and internal wars. A combination 
of systemic violence and environmental destruction, including enduring droughts and the burning 
of fields by invading Mbangala warlords, caused the displacement of entire communities, forcing 
them to move into someone else’s domains and to accept subjugation under new local rulers. 
Groups of displaced peoples moving about and migrating into foreign territory were easy prey for 
Mbangala warlords “hunting” in the area566. By the beginning of the seventeenth century, they 
became the “ideal” victims for the Atlantic slave trade. 
In this chapter, I discuss the rise of the Atlantic slave trade on the coast of the “kingdom of 
Benguela” and the participation of both foreign and local agents in the development of that 
commerce. I argue that the intervention of Portuguese and Luso-African slavers on the coast and 
in the interior of Benguela empowered some African authorities, including Mbangala warlords, 
who chose to open trading relations with the foreigners in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
The acquisition of imported goods by these local authorities, such as textiles, alcohol and weapons, 
reshaped the political landscape of the region that Luso-Africans generically called “Quilengues”, 
                                                 
566 Luso-African slavers operating in Benguela in the beginning of the seventeenth century depended on local 
Mbangala warriors to “hunt slaves” for them. In 1617, the governor of Angola, Luis Mendes de Vasconcelos, wrote 
to El-Rei, Dom Felipe II, explaining the importance of the “jagas” for the development of the slave trade in Angola. 
He refers to the Mbangala mercenaries working for Portuguese officials and moradores as “hunting dogs” (cães de 
caça) who brought them slaves from the interior of Benguela: “Carta do governador de Angola a El-Rei”, No. 98 (28 
August 1617), in Monumenta Missionaria Africana (henceforth MMA): África Ocidental, 1611-1621, 1st series, Vol. 
6, Antonio Brásio, ed. (Lisboa: Agência Geral do Ultramar, 1955), 283. Colonial historians, such as Alfredo 
Albuquerque Felner and Ralph Delgado, also used this analogy comparing African warriors to “hunting dogs” in the 
service of Portuguese slavers. Alfredo Albuquerque Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a ocupação e início do 
estabelecimento dos Portugueses no Congo, Angola e Benguela, extraído de documentos históricos (Coimbra: 
Imprensa da Universidade, 1933), 207, called the Mbangala “a pack of dogs” (matilha). Ralph Delgado, O Reino de 
Benguela: do descobrimento à criação do governo subalterno (Lisboa: Ed. do Autor, 1945), 220, also used the 
expression “hunting dogs”, probably taken from Vasconcelos’ 1617 letter to El-Rei, as did John K. Thornton, Warfare 
in Atlantic Africa, 1500-1800 (London: UCL Press, 1999), 137.  
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and its effects were felt as far as Humbe Inene. The participation of Mbangala bands and other 
African warriors in slaving expeditions throughout the sertões enabled the expansion in the supply 
of slaves on the coast and the ascension of Benguela as a major slave exporter. Nonetheless, the 
war brought by foreign slavers did not spare their allies, not even after the acceptance of vassalage. 
Anyone could become a victim of the Atlantic slave trade.  
There are documental references attesting to contacts between Portuguese sailors and local 
African authorities of the so-called “kingdom of Benguela” before the official arrival of Manuel 
Cerveira Pereira in 1617. These traders visited the region to acquire a series of commodities offered 
by African communities, which included vegetables, beeswax, cattle, ivory, copper “bracelets” or 
manilhas, and slaves567. Although the search for copper mines in the interior of Benguela became 
the main justification used by the governor of Angola, Manuel Cerveira Pereira (1603-1606 and 
1615-1617) to explore Benguela, slaves quickly became the major reason for the Portuguese 
presence in the region568. Governor Cerveira Pereira, who was also the first governor of Benguela, 
was one of the major promoters of the slave trade and became known as the “conquistador of 
Benguela”569.  
                                                 
567 Luciano Cordeiro, Viagens, explorações e conquistas dos portuguezes: Benguela e seu Sertão, por um anonymo, 
Coleção de documentos, 1617-1622 (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1881), 5. See also Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 
20-21. 
568 There were serious doubts about the existence of copper mines in the vicinity of Benguela, the main reason raised 
by Manuel Cerveira Pereira to invest in its exploration. The bishop of Congo, Dom Frei Manuel Baptista, affirmed 
that “there is no copper in Benguela”. He had consulted with capitães-mores and sailors who lived in Benguela and 
they told him they had never heard any stories about these mines. Bishop Baptista confronted Captain Cerveira Pereira 
a few days before his departure for Benguela in a new expedition to the supposed copper mines, who replied that 
although he had never seen them, he had heard news of their existence: “Lembranças do Bispo do Congo a El-Rei” 
No. 121 (7 September 1619), MMA, 1st series, Vol. 6, 363. In 1617, the governor of Angola, Luis Mendes de 
Vasconcelos, suggested that the real reason for Captain Cerveira Pereira’s desire to explore Benguela was to capture 
slaves for the Atlantic market: “Carta do governador de Angola a El-Rei”, No. 98 (28 August 1617), in MMA, 1st 
series, Vol. 6, 283-285. In 1624, Governor Fernão de Sousa wrote to Captain Cerveira Pereira ordering him to stop 
trying to deceive the Crown with stories about mines: Ralph Delgado, História de Angola, Vol. 2 (Luanda: Banco de 
Angola, 1948), 117-118. In a report from 1781, the governor of Benguela, Antonio José Pimentel de Castro e Mesquita 
(1779-1784), informed his superiors that he did not find the alleged copper mines of Benguela. He reported that the 
“blacks” from the region did not have information about the supposed mines either, even those who used copper 
bracelets, arguing that if there was any copper in the region it would be a common article among the local populations, 
who were very fond of this type of ornament: AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 64, Doc. 35, “Ofício do governador de 
Benguela António José Pimentel de Mello e Castro”, (20 July 1781). 
569 The title of conquistador was created in the fifteenth century, with the proclamation of the Dum Diversas, a papal 
bull issued by Pope Nicholas V (1452) that authorized the king of Portugal (Dom Afonso V) to conquer infidels and 
pagans, and allowing their perpetual enslavement. This broad authorization to enslave non-Christians was only 
constrained by a decision of the Holy Office from 1686, which required a declaration of “just war” to justify any 
attacks: Estevam C. Thompson, “Fontes coloniais para uma história pré-colonial de Benguela, sécs. XVII a XIX”, 
Africana Studia, No. 25 (2015): 40. 
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There is also plenty of information about the establishment of commercial contacts 
between Portuguese slavers and Mbangala warlords, referred to as “jagas” in the documentation, 
soon after the arrival in 1617 of Governor Cerveira Pereira and his men, which contradics Mariana 
Candido’s reading of the primary documentation570. Early descriptions of the “jagas” camped 
close to São Filipe de Benguela did not differ from the established discourse that viewed the 
Mbangala as “thieves” and “cannibals”, who sustained themselves through raiding and the 
consumption of human flesh571.  They were depicted as “hunting dogs” (cães de caça) used by 
Portuguese slavers to acquire captives in the interior of Benguela572. According to one source, they 
ate most of their captives and sold the remaining ones to slave traders573.  
Some traders operating in the region of Benguela argued that the alliances with the 
Mbangala warlords were essential for the development of commerce574. They affirmed that there 
was no way to maintain their slaving business without the participation of “jagas” hunting slaves 
for them575. Others opposed this partnership and believed that soon these “jagas” would 
“consume” all natives, leaving the land uninhabited, as they had done in other areas in which they 
had entered and were allowed to remain576.     
                                                 
570 Mariana P. Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World: Benguela and its Hinterland (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 41 and 44-45, affirms that “Portuguese documents on Benguela are silent on the 
Imbangalas, suggesting that they were not an important force in the history of Benguela”. Some pages later, however, 
she cites a document attesting that Quilengues was a territory “filled with Quilombos of jagas”.  
571 “Carta do governador de Angola a El-Rei”, No. 98 (28 August 1617), MMA, 1st series, Vol. 6, 283-285. Although 
Captain Cerveira Pereira worked alongside some Mbangala warlords, he also accused them of being “cannibals” when 
it was convenient: José Rivair Macedo, “Jagas, canibalismo e ‘guerra preta’: os Mbangalas, entre o mito europeu e as 
realidades da África Central do século XVII”. História, São Paulo, Vol. 23, No. 1 January/June (2013): 64. 
572 “Carta do governador de Angola a El-Rei”, No. 98 (28 August 1617), MMA, 1st series, Vol. 6, 283.  
573 “Carta do governador de Angola a El-Rei”, No. 98 (28 August 1617), MMA, 1st series, Vol. 6, 284. Joseph C. 
Miller, “Requiem for the Jaga”, Cahiers d’études africaines, Vol. 13, No. 49 (1973): 121-149, argues that stories about 
wide-spread cannibalism among the Mbangala could be a strategy used by slave traders to justify the low number of 
slaves officially reported to the colonial administration despite the large number of captives captured during enslaving 
operations. See also Chapter 2. 
574 “Carta do governador de Angola a El-Rei”, No. 98 (28 August 1617), MMA, 1st series, Vol. 6, 283-285. See also 
Beatrix Heintze, Fontes para a história de Angola do século XVII, Vol. 1 (Stuttgart: Franz Weiner Verlag Wiesbaden 
GMBH, 1985), 7; Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a ocupação…, 207, 303. 
575 The “jagas” were also considered necessary allies in the “kingdom” of Angola, as reported by the consquistador 
Garcia Mendes Castelo Branco. He affirmed that the “jagas” were feared by the other African polities and that their 
alliance could be used to deter local authorities from rebelling against the colonial administration. He advised 
Portuguese authorities that grape wine was their most cherished commodity and that they should be provided three 
barrels of wine annually for their most important celebrations: “Relação de Garcia Mendes Castelo Branco”, No. 136 
(16 January 1620), MMA, 1st series, Vol. 6, 451.   
576 “Carta do governador de Angola a El-Rei”, No. 98 (28 August 1617), MMA, 1st series, Vol. 6, 283-285.  
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This chapter also considers the surge of the slave trade in the end of the eighteenth century, 
linking it to the increase of Portuguese military actions in Caconda and Quilengues. Disguised as 
“punitive expeditions” against “rebel sobas”, these were indeed slaving operations directed against 
vassal and independent African authorities. Hence, I argue that Quilengues was not only an area 
through which slave caravans travelled to reach coastal markets, but was also an important 
reservoir of captives itself. This argument corroborates recent historiography on the slave trade in 
West Central Africa, which has pointed to the origins of slaves from areas close to the embarkation 
points on the coast577. This new historiography has criticized Joseph C. Miller’s thesis regarding 
an ever-expanding “slaving frontier” in Angola and Benguela and the role of long-distance 
caravans in the supply of slaves to the Atlantic market578.   
This chapter also shows that the acceptance of vassalage by African authorities did not 
necessarily protect them from being attacked by military officers involved in the slave trade. 
Hence, instead of understanding these unjustified wars against vassal sobas, supposedly protected 
by their status, as an “incoherence of the legislation”579, I argue these were deliberate attacks 
promoted by military personnel unapologetically involved in the slave trade and who had little 
regard for the orders received from their superiors from Benguela, Luanda or Lisbon. More 
examples of the slavers’ disregard for colonial regulations and procedures, as well as for the 
protection supposedly granted to African vassals, will be shown in chapter 4 and 5.    
Finally, I challenge the interpretation found in some colonial sources presented in this 
chapter, and recently reaffirmed by Daniel Domingues da Silva580, that the slave trade in Benguela 
                                                 
577 José C. Curto, “Rethinking the Origin of Slaves in West Central Africa”, in Changing Horizons of African History, 
Awet T. Weldemichael, Anthony A. Lee and Edward A. Alpers, eds. (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2017), 23-47; 
Daniel Domingues da Silva, The Atlantic Slave Trade from West Central Africa, 1780-1867 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), 18-19, 73-99; Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 198-214; Roquinaldo 
A. Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World: Angola and Brazil during the Era of the Slave Trade 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 52-87. See also Daniel Domingues da Silva, “From beyond the 
Kwango: Tracing the Linguistic Origins of Slaves Leaving Angola, 1811-1848”, Almanack, No. 12 (2016): 34-43; 
Daniel Domingues da Silva, “The Kimbundo Diaspora to Brazil: Records from the Slave Ship Brilhante, 1838”, 
African Diaspora, Vol. 8 (2015): 200-219.  
578 For more on the slaving frontier thesis, see Joseph C. Miller, Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan 
Slave Trade, 1730-1830 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 140-169. David Birmingham, Trade and 
Conflict in Angola: The Mbundu and Their Neighbours Under the Influence of the Portuguese, 1483-1790 (London: 
Oxford University Press, 1966), 133-161, had previously developed the main ideas about displacement to the interior 
caused by wars and the establishment of peaceful relationships with African communities living close to the coast. 
579 Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 175-188. 
580 Silva, The Atlantic Slave Trade from West Central Africa, 96. 
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started after failed attempts to find copper. I argue rather that the exploration of the supposed 
copper mines in the interior of Benguela was but an excuse given by slave traders, such as 
governors Manuel Cerveira Pereira and Lopo Soares Lasso, to exploit the region for slaves. Hence, 
instead of having failed to find the mines581, Cerveira Pereira, in fact, succeeded in his true, and 
personal, goal of developing the Atlantic slave trade from Benguela.       
 
Benguela-a-Velha and the tale of a white mercenary among the “jagas” 
As indicated above, Portuguese contact with the Benguela region began well before the 
arrival of Captain Cerveira Pereira as the first Portuguese governor of Benguela in 1617. The 
Portuguese visited the coast of Benguela since the end of the fifteenth century. In 1483, the 
Portuguese explorer Diogo Cão sailed to the mouth of the Catumbela River and dropped anchor in 
a nearby bay, which he named Angra de Santa Maria. He also visited the site that would later be 
chosen for the first attempt of Portuguese settlement in the “kingdom of Benguela”582. By 1546, 
Portuguese and Luso-African traders regularly visited the lands around the Longa River to acquire 
copper and slaves from local inhabitants583.  
The first governor of Angola, Paulo Dias de Novais (1575-1588), also organized maritime 
expeditions to the southern coast of Benguela584. He sent Captain Garcia Mendes Castelo Branco 
to explore the littoral down to Cape Negro (Cabo Negro), who returned with news about the 
existence of valuable minerals and cattle in the hands of the local population. Governor Novais 
then ordered his nephew, Captain Antonio Lopes Peixoto, to create a presídio on the coast of 
Benguela from where trading caravans could be launched to explore the wealth of the land585. 
                                                 
581 Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 47-49.  
582 Augusto Antonio de Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola, 1784-1791”, Boletim da Sociedade de 
Geographia de Lisboa, 7ª série, (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1887), 417; Ernest G. Ravenstein, “The Voyages of 
Diogo Cão and Bartholomeu Dias, 1482-88”, The Geographical Journal, Vol. 16, No. 6, December (1900): 631. See 
also Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 37. 
583 Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a ocupação…, 324.  
584 This southern portion of Benguela would become, centuries later, the province of Moçamedes (1840): See José C. 
Curto and Arshad Desai, “The Early Demography of Moçamedes, 1839-1869: A Preliminary Analysis”, Historae, 
Vol. 10, No. 2 (2019): 11-32. 
585 Elias Alexandre da Silva Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 1 (Lisboa: Editora Ática, [1787-1792] 1937), 204-205. 
Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a ocupação…, 324; Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 21.  
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Captain Peixoto left Luanda in 1587 with seventy men and anchored close to a hill Diogo 
Cão had dubbed “A Terra de Duas Pontas”, called simply “Morro” in the sixteenth century, 
meaning “hill” or more precisely “cliff”586. The initial Portuguese settlers developed commercial 
relations with a major authority of the region, who initially saw this foreign presence on the coast 
as advantageous, and even accepted the presence of foreigners in his libatas587. The foreign traders 
declared that this local ruler, identified simply as “king of Benguela”588, reached out to them in 
order to establish trade, accepting “subjugation” to Portugal to enhance their relationship589.   
Despite initial peaceful relations, the local ruler changed his attitude towards the foreign 
presence in his lands and decided to expel the Portuguese settlers. He began by attacking a group 
of 50 soldiers fishing on the beach without their guns. They were all beheaded. African warriors 
then moved against the settlement, where they slaughtered everyone in sight. Only two soldiers 
managed to escape and return to Luanda to provide the governor of Angola with news of the 
attack590. According to one source, Captain Peixoto tried to flee on horseback, but died from 
injuries sustained during the attack before reaching safety591. 
After its destruction, this first settlement close to “Morro” became known as Benguela-a-
Velha (Old Benguela)592. It would take decades for a new attempt to create a settlement in 
Benguela, despite some expeditions sent by Governor João Furtado de Mendonça (1595-1602) to 
explore the region593. Slave traders also kept visiting Benguela and engaging in commerce with 
                                                 
586 Ravenstein, “The Voyages of Diogo Cão and Bartholomeu Dias”, 631. 
587 Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 1, 205.  
588 There is some academic debate among historians of West Central Africa about who was the supposed “king of 
Benguela”: David Birmingham, “The Date and Significance of the Imbangala Invasion of Angola”, The Journal of 
African History, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1965): 146; Jan Vansina, “More on the Invasions of Kongo and Angola by the Jaga 
and the Lunda”, The Journal of African History, Vol. 7, No. 3 (1966): 425-426; Miller, Joseph C. “The Imbangala and 
the Chronology of Early Central African History”, The Journal of African History, Vol. 13, No. 4 (1972): 560-564; 
John K. Thornton, A History of West Central Africa to 1850 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 130, 
114; Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 33, 37-38. 
589 “Carta do Padre Diogo da Costa ao Provincial de Portugal”, No. 87 (31 May 1586) in MMA, 1st series, Vol. 3, 21.  
590 The eighteenth-century historian Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 1, 206, called the attack a “carnage” (carniçaria). 
Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 23, used similar language to talk about the attack, calling it a “horrendous carnage” 
(medonha carnificina). Both historians suggested that news about the destruction of the presídio and the death of his 
nephew helped shorten the life of Governor Novais. For a brief description of the event, see also Cordeiro, Viagens, 
explorações e conquistas dos portuguezes, 7-8. 
591 This source also affirms that some people who were in the fort took refuge in a ship, taking their merchandise 
(fazendas) with them and later returning to Luanda: “História da residência dos padres da Companhia de Jesus em 
Angola, e cousas tocantes ao Reino, e Conquista”, No. 132 (1 May 1594), in MMA, 1st series, Vol. 4, 572.   
592 For the location of “Morro de Benguela Velha”, see Appendix 6. 
593 Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a ocupação…, 324.  
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local authorities, including some Mbangala warlords594. Andrew Battell, an English sailor and 
mercenary, participated in one of these inland slaving expeditions close to Benguela-a-Velha595.  
On one occasion, the slaving expedition of which Battell was part met a group of Mbangala 
warriors camped on the left (south) margin of the Cuvo River596. According to his testimony, this 
Mbangala band had not had previous contact with slavers, because their “jaga” had never seen 
white men before. The Mbangala warlord supplied captives to Battell’s expedition at rock bottom 
prices597. In return, the “Jaga” asked the Portuguese to help his band cross the Cuvo River with 
one of their boats, so they could engage in war against “Benguelas” on the other side of the river598.  
After defeating his enemy, the “Jaga” sold part of the captives to the Portuguese. For five 
straight months, the foreign slavers acquired victims from these “jagas” until one day, after 
returning from Luanda to acquire more captives, they realized that the Mbangala were gone. The 
slavers decided to follow them into the interior. On the way, they met another local warlord called 
Mofarigosat who also had never had contact with white men. The slavers ended up fighting 
alongside Mofarigosat’s forces to defeat his local enemies. After a series of successful campaigns, 
the Portuguese slavers asked for permission to leave, but Mofarigosat denied it. They then offered 
to leave Andrew Battell behind as guarantee that they would return599.  
Left behind and fearing for his life, Battell decided to flee and try to join the Mbangala 
band he had previously met. He found some of them at the ombala of soba Cashil, which Battell 
describes with certain amazement, and joined the warriors in a two-day march to their kilombo, in 
                                                 
594 Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a ocupação…, 328. Joseph C. Miller, “Angola central e sul por volta de 1840”, 
Estudos Afro-Asiáticos, No. 32, December (1997): 13, suggests that the persistence of warfare and the development 
of the slave trade in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries confirmed the utility of the Mbangala warlords and their 
bands of warriors. 
595 Ernest G. Ravenstein, The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battell of Leigh, in Angola and the Adjoining Regions. 
(London: The Hakluyt Society, 1901), 19. 
596 Battell mentioned that the “Gagas” or “Iagges” called themselves “Imbangolas”: Samuel Purchas, Purchas His 
Pilgrimage, 1st ed. (London: Printed by William Stansby for Henrie Fetherstone, 1613), 589. See also Samuel Purchas, 
Purchas His Pilgrimage, 4th ed. (London: Printed by William Stansby for Henrie Fetherstone, 1626), 772.  
597 In the early seventeenth century, according to Andrew Battell, slavers paid the equivalent to $001 real per slave 
bought from the Mbangala in Benguela-a-Velha, while in Luanda the price for a slave was about 12$000 réis. 
Although the price of slaves in the surroundings of Benguela-a-Velha was quite low, this account seems to be 
exaggerated and hyperbolic: Samuel Purchas, Hakluytus Posthumus, or Purchas His Pilgrimes: Containing the 
History of the World in Sea Voyages and Lande Travells by Englishmen and Others, vol. 6 (Glasgow: James 
MacLehose and Sons, 1905), 377; Ravenstein, The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battell of Leigh, 20. See also Felner, 
Angola: Apontamentos sobre a ocupação…, 326. 
598 Ravenstein, The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battell of Leigh, 19-20.  
599 Ravenstein, The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battell of Leigh, 22-23. 
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Calicasamba. Battell then began to roam the sertões with the Mbangala, hoping that they would 
march west, where he could see the ocean and attempt to board some ship in the vicinity. He visited 
a number of libatas and ombalas of powerful sobas, including those of Calango, Makellacolonge, 
Shillambanza and Cafuxe (Kafuxi-ka-Mbari600), describing some of these places with clear 
admiration601. 
Battell recognized some of the rivers that the Mbangala came across, including the Longa 
and the Cuanza. The Mbangala roamed the left (south) margin of the Cuanza for months and he 
fought alongside them with his musket, earning a certain reputation among African warriors and 
authorities alike. Battell earned the favors of soba Cafuxe (who he called “Casoch”) for his 
services in war, and bragged he could have anything he desired from this potentate. He also 
informed that he was protected by his fellow African warriors, being “often carried away in their 
arms, and saved my life” 602.  
Battell was the only slaver who lived among Mbangala warriors to recount his experience. 
He described Mbangala warlords and the organization of the kilombo with esteem, always praising 
them for their bravery and military abilities. He left the company of the Mbangala for the presídio 
of Massangano after some Luso-African traders approached them to buy slaves. He later joined 
the Luso-Africans as a mercenary and fought with his musket under the orders of Governor 
Cerveira Pereira in the wars of Cambambe603.  
As demonstrated above, there was a strong presence of various Mbangala warrior bands in 
the interior of Benguela as the Portuguese attempted to establish a settlement on that coast at the 
beginning of the seventeenth century. Some of these Mbangala bands worked as mercenaries for 
Portuguese and Luso-African slavers and played important roles in the development of the slave 
trade from Benguela. Thus, I argue that the Mbangala bands are essential to understand the history 
of Benguela: they appear in many Portuguese sources from the early seventeenth century as long 
as we know how to read them. Once the misunderstanding about the “jagas” is resolved (Chapter 
                                                 
600 For more about Kafuxi-ka-Mbari, see Thornton, A History of West Central Africa to 1850, 101-107 
601 Ravenstein, The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battell of Leigh, 23-27.  
602 Ravenstein, The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battell of Leigh, 27-28.  
603 Ravenstein, The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battell of Leigh, 38. 
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2), the Mbangala thus become a major force behind the history of Benguela and the southern 
Atlantic slave trade604.  
 
Manuel Cerveira Pereira and the development of the Atlantic slave trade from Benguela 
Following these first contacts, Manuel Cerveira Pereira605 arrived as the first governor of 
Benguela in mid-1617, accompanied by 150 soldiers in several ships606. Although he made a first 
stop at Benguela-a-Velha, he allegedly judged the area difficult to defend against local enemies 
and decided to sail further south. Pereira and his party anchored in a bay (Bahia da Torre or de 
Santo Antônio607) and immediately began building defensive structures, which included a wall and 
installing a number of artillery pieces.  
According to a report from the governor of Angola, Luis Mendes de Vasconcelos (1617-
1621), Captain Cerveira Pereira decided not to settle in Benguela-a-Velha, called both “Bemgala” 
and “Bemguela” in the documentation, mainly because he could not find people to enslave: the 
Mbangala bands that had previously roamed the area had destroyed all sources of captives. 
Governor Vasconcelos accused Cerveira Pereira of digressing from his main goal of finding the 
copper mines in the interior of Benguela and dedicating most of his time and resources to hunt for 
slaves with the help of an Mbangala warlord with whom he became associated608.  
                                                 
604 As previously argued, this thesis contradicts some of the most recent historiography on Benguela. See Candido, An 
African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 41. 
605 For a classic colonialist view of Manuel Cerveira Pereira’s life and military career, see Gastão Sousa Dias, Manuel 
Cerveira Pereira (Lisboa: Agência Geral das Colônias, 1940). For a recente fictional version, see Pepetela. A sul. O 
Sombreiro (Alfragide: Dom Quixote, 2011). 
606 Cordeiro, Viagens, explorações e conquistas dos portuguezes, 8. In another source, Captain Cerveira Pereira 
claimed that he arrived accompanied by only 130 soldiers, because some had fallen sick before their departure from 
Luanda. Morever, thirty-eight soldiers died in Benguela soon after their arrival: AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 1, Doc. 
87, “Representação de Manuel Cerveira Pereira”, (2 July 1618). A transcript of this document can be found in 
“Representação de Manuel Cerveira Pereira”, No. 103 (6 March 1618), MMA, 1st series, Vol. 6, 298.  
607 There is some dispute about the location of Torre Bay. Lopes de Lima did not believe it was the same of the Cattle 
Bay (bahia das Vaccas), which became the central point of embarkation in São Filipe de Benguela. Some pointed to 
Elephant Bay (bahia dos Elefantes) as the actual place chosen by Captain Cerveira Pereira to anchor in Benguela: 
“Relação da Conquista de Benguela”, in Cordeiro, Viagens, explorações e conquistas dos portuguezes, 8-9 – note 1. 
Another source mentions only bahia de Santo Antonio: “Carta do governador de Angola a El-Rei”, No. 98 (28 August 
1617), MMA, 1st series, Vol. 6, 284. See also AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 1, Doc. 87, “Representação de Manuel 
Cerveira Pereira”, (2 July 1618). 
608 “Carta do governador de Angola a El-Rei”, No. 98 (28 August 1617), MMA, 1st series, Vol. 6, 283-285.  
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Governor Vasconcelos denounced the great number of slaving operations in Benguela and 
the use of local Mbangala mercenaries to carry out “illicit” attacks against individuals considered 
free African subjects of Portugal. He promised to pacify the interior and bring order to the slave 
market, freeing those wrongfully captured. Yet, Vasconcelos further informed El-Rei609 about 
those who he considered traitors of the Crown for stealing, enslaving and murdering local 
Portuguese subjects, even “feeding” them to the “jagas”. According to this governor of Angola, 
Captain Cerveira Pereira was among the traitors who should receive capital punishment for their 
crimes610.  
The governor of Angola wrote repeatedly to his superiors in Lisbon denouncing the slaving 
operations carried out by Captain Cerveira Pereira and other slavers based in Benguela. The 
captain had been extorting local sobas and stealing goods from them, which scandalized African 
authorities and made Governor Vasconcelos request a year of tribute exemption for the sobas, so 
that they could recover from the “tyrannies” exercised against them611. Dom Frei Manuel Baptista, 
the Bishop of Congo, complained to El-Rei that Captain Cerveira Pereira had been given so much 
power that he became corrupted612 and that the captain ambitioned to begin a new conquista of his 
own by destroying the one that already existed613.    
An anonymous report (“Benguela e seu sertão”) describing Captain Cerveira Pereira’s 
arrival in Benguela brings not a few examples of the slaving expeditions and the modus operandi 
of the Portuguese slaver614. It lists five different slaving raids, called “battles” by the author, against 
different local African polities, ranging from small nomadic groups to major sobados, including 
                                                 
609 El-Rei is a reference to Filipe II of Portugal, also known as Filipe III of Spain, who reigned over both Portugal and 
Spain from 1598 to 1621. 
610 “Carta do governador de Angola a El-Rei”, No. 98 (28 August 1617), MMA, 1st series, Vol. 6, 285. 
611 “Carta do governador de Angola ao Conde de Faro”, No. 99 (9 April 1617), MMA, 1st series, Vol. 6, 286-287. 
612 Captain Cerveira Pereira was notorious for his cruelty against African enemies and even his own soldiers. A number 
of soldiers under his command tried to escape from Benguela to Luanda: Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a 
ocupação…, 334.  
613 “Lembranças do Bispo do Congo a El-Rei” No. 121 (7 September 1619), MMA, 1st series, Vol. 6, 362. The 
“kingdoms” of Angola and Benguela had been officially separated by a Royal Provision dated 14 February 1615: 
Ralph Delgado, História de Angola, Vol. 1 (Luanda: Banco de Angola, 1948), 121. 
614 Although it is not possible to confirm the authorship of this report, Luciano Cordeiro, who edited and published 
the source, believed it could have been written by Manuel Cerveira Pereira himself, or at least by someone under his 
direct influence: Cordeiro, Viagens, explorações e conquistas dos portuguezes, 5. Hence, the account also has to be 
considered as an attempt to leave a positive narrative about Captain Cerveira Pereira and his time as conquistador of 
Benguela. Nevertheless, the report brings an inside look into the Portuguese slaver’s operations in Benguela and the 
way he confronted local resistance. It also evidences the early alliance made by Captain Cerveira Pereira with local 
“jagas”, that is Mbangala warlords, for the development of the Atlantic slave trade in the region.  
142 
 
conflicts with independent Mbangala warlords who occupied portions of the interior of the “new” 
conquista of Benguela.  
According to this anonymous report, Captain Cerveira Pereira arrived with his men on the 
site of what became São Filipe de Benguela in 17 May 1617. It did not take long for the movement 
of Portuguese troops on the coast to draw the attention of the local soba, probably Peringue615, 
who sent scouts to the new settlement to learn about the intruders and their intentions in his lands. 
Captain Cerveira Pereira declared that he had come in peace and gave the soba gifts of textiles as 
proof of his friendly intentions. The soba seems to have given him authorization to remain on the 
coast, since the author of the report affirmed that the settlers occupied it peacefully and were not 
attacked after their arrival616.  
Soba Peringue engaged in further diplomatic relations with the Portuguese by sending 
some cattle to the new settlement on the coast, along with an embassy with his subjects, referred 
to as “sons” in the documentation. The African ruler, however, declined Captain Cerveira Pereira’s 
offers of vassalage, which created great tension between the parties. As the Portuguese began the 
exploration inland, the soba retreated to his kilombo and was accused of killing some slaves of the 
settlers along the way. This gave Captain Cerveira Pereira the “justification” he needed to take 
action. He composed a military detachment of ninety armed men and forty slave-warriors and 
marched against the soba617.  
The first “battle” commanded by Captain Cerveira Pereira against soba Peringue was a 
classic slave raiding operation. The soldiers travelled overnight and attacked the enemy at four in 
the morning, while they were asleep. When they noticed the invasion, the African warriors 
retreated to the hills, from where they attacked the invaders with arrows, while the remaining 
population ran into the bush. As reported by the anonymous author, a vicious skirmish followed, 
                                                 
615 There are references in another report from 1618 written by Captain Cerveira Pereira about his arrival in Benguela 
that indicates that the soba in question was Peringue: AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 1, Doc. 87, “Representação de 
Manuel Cerveira Pereira”, (2 July 1618). See also Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a ocupação…, 333; Miller, 
“Angola central e sul por volta de 1840”, 23; Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 45.  
616 Cordeiro, Viagens, explorações e conquistas dos portuguezes, 9. See also AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 1, Doc. 
87, “Representação de Manuel Cerveira Pereira”, (2 July 1618). 
617 According to Captain Cerveira Pereira, local African warriors attacked the slaves of the settlers who were cutting 
trees for wood in the bush, beheading two of them and taking another six as captives: AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 
1, Doc. 87, “Representação de Manuel Cerveira Pereira”, (2 July 1618). See also Cordeiro, Viagens, explorações e 
conquistas dos portuguezes, 9; Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a ocupação…, 333. 
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with the African warriors bravely defending their position. Since they did not know the power of 
Portuguese firearms, they advanced against the attackers: many were massacred and others 
retreated into the bush. Captain Cerveira Pereira’s forces then invaded the libata, capturing those 
who did not flee, as well as seizing cattle and other supplies. Thereafter, he ordered his men to 
burn all of the huts and carry the loot back to their settlement618.  
The second “battle” was against the “jagas”, that is a band of Mbangala warriors from the 
sertões of Benguela. The anonymous author defined them as “venturing warriors” who roamed the 
interior and behaved like thieves, “making war and destroying the land” without any local 
resistance. After three months in the region, the Portuguese noticed the existence of a kilombo 
close to their settlement. They received an embassy from its Mbangala warlord, Cangombe619. The 
“Jaga” reached out to the Portuguese forces stationed close the “Morombo” River (probably the 
Marimbombo River, a perennial river close to São Filipe de Benguela) to sell some captives. 
Captain Cerveira Pereira authorized the transaction as long as Jaga Cangombe accepted vassalage 
to Portugal. The anonymous author reported that the Cangombe accepted the conditions and made 
good trade with the Portuguese620. 
This same source briefly described the kilombo, praising the bravery of its warriors and the 
great authority of their warlord, who they obeyed with great “punctuality”. Jaga Cangombe seems 
to have developed good commercial relations with the Portuguese traders, but these did not last 
long. He was eventually accused of treason for inciting slaves to escape from the Portuguese and 
for giving shelter to more than thirty runaways. Cangombe denied the accusation, declared that he 
owed no obedience to the Portuguese, and that he could destroy them if he wanted621.  
                                                 
618 Cordeiro, Viagens, explorações e conquistas dos portuguezes, 10. See also AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 1, Doc. 
87, “Representação de Manuel Cerveira Pereira”, (2 July 1618). 
619 Although the anonymous author does not name the first Mbangala warlord who made contact with the Portuguese 
forces in Benguela, Captain Cerveira Pereira describes the same event in one of his reports to his superiors calling 
him “Cangombe”: AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 1, Doc. 87, “Representação de Manuel Cerveira Pereira”, (2 July 
1618). 
620 Cordeiro, Viagens, explorações e conquistas dos portuguezes, 10-11. See also Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre 
a ocupação…, 336. 
621 Captain Cerveira Pereira also described this conflict with the Mbangala camped closed to São Filipe de Benguela 
in another report to his superiors. He affirmed that “Jaga” Cangombe reached out for an alliance with the Portuguese 
because they had been fighting his local enemies and that he accepted the help of the “Jaga” out of necessity. Captain 
Cerveira Pereira then complained that the Mbangala warlord began to incite slaves from the Portuguese settlement to 
run away: AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 1, Doc. 87, “Representação de Manuel Cerveira Pereira”, (2 July 1618).  
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Captain Cerveira Pereira, who lost his temper with these declarations from the “Jaga”622, 
soon organized a punitive expedition with more than eighty armed men against the latter’s kilombo. 
As usual, the soldiers marched overnight, arriving around four in the morning and attacking the 
enemy forces while they were asleep. They caught their victims, once again, by surprise and forced 
them to abandon their houses and run to the hills. Many Mbangala warriors remained and fought 
bravely against the invaders, but were not able to stop the “fury” of Portuguese arms. Some 
retreated to the hills, while many others were captured by a small detachment of two soldiers on 
horseback commanded by Captain Cerveira Pereira. The Portuguese also captured and later 
beheaded the Mbangala warlord623. The invaders, as was becoming customary, looted the kilombo 
and seized great amount of supplies and more then 150 captives624. 
The third slaving expedition reported by the anonymous author was against a group of 
nomadic herders, identified as the “Moquimbas” (also “Maquimbas” or “Moximbas”). The report 
explained that these people lived off their cattle and roamed the hills of the interior. They were so 
resilient, according to the source, that they were the only ones to resist the “jagas”. The 
“Moquimbas”, refused to accept vassalage to El-Rei and left for lands further away from the 
settlement. But even then, they too soon became victims of Captain Cerveira Pereira. The report 
justified this attack also by claiming that the Portuguese settlement was in need of supplies, 
especially beef, and that the cattle of the “Moquimbas” could provide the necessary means for their 
survival625.  
Captain Cerveira Pereira’s troops spent three days seeking the nomadic group in the hills 
of the backlands of Benguela, until they found them, one morning, transferring their cattle to 
another pasture. This time, the Portuguese had the support of an Mbangala warlord, who had 
agreed to join the expedition with eighty of his men. Their soldiers attacked the “Moquimbas” on 
                                                 
622 According to Manuel Cerveira Pereira, the “Jaga” declared that the Portuguese were like “women in war” and that 
they were “only men at sea”. Captain Cerveira Pereira replied that the “Jaga” should either return his slaves or “tighten 
his bow” because he would go after him to show “if whites were men or women”: AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 1, 
Doc. 87, “Representação de Manuel Cerveira Pereira”, (2 July 1618).  
623 After defeating the “Jaga”, Captain Cerveira Pereira kept him under captivity for some time, forcing his people to 
return all runaway slaves in hopes that he would be released. The captain decided to behead “Jaga” Cangombe after 
the return of the slaves to make him an example to others. He added an anecdote that the “Jaga” called the name of 
“Jesus” (Jesu) three times before being beheaded, and thus died as a Christian: AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 1, Doc. 
87, “Representação de Manuel Cerveira Pereira”, (2 July 1618). 
624 Cordeiro, Viagens, explorações e conquistas dos portuguezes, 10-11. 
625 Cordeiro, Viagens, explorações e conquistas dos portuguezes, 11-12. See also Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre 
a ocupação…, 336-337. 
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foot and, along with Captain Cerveira Pereira and two others on horseback, forced them to leave 
their huts and cattle behind and to run for their lives. The raiders captured more than a thousand 
head of cattle, which were shared with the “jagas” who helped in the expedition, along with an old 
woman who was not able to escape626.  
The fourth raid commanded by Captain Cerveira Pereira in the interior of Benguela was 
against a major potentate in the region, probably soba Quitumbela627, located close to the mouth 
of the Coporolo River, also known as São Francisco628 (Map 3). The Portuguese considered soba 
Quitumbela a powerful enemy for his great number of dependents and the fertility of his lands629. 
His people were accused of visiting the Portuguese settlement to steal from it, including a large 
number of slaves, who were later resold to the “Moquimbas”. They were also accused of having 
“killed and eaten” an ensign or alferes who had fled from the settlement after committing a crime 
and was found hiding in the bush. Captain Cerveira Pereira sent messengers to the sobado with 
offers of vassalage, threatening the soba with destruction and enslavement in case of refusal. The 
soba refused to accept the captain’s offer, and disdaining the Portuguese forces, boasted that they 
were not strong enough to face him630.  
Captain Cerveira Pereira considered all these events a great offense and assembled a 
detachment of eighty armed men to march against soba Quitumbela. He also counted on the 
support of the “jagas” who had helped him defeat the “Moquimbas” and now worked alongside 
Portuguese forces. They marched for one and a half day until they reached the main libata of their 
new enemy. Africans scouts, however, followed the movement of the Portuguese troops and 
alerted the soba and his people, who left their houses for fortifications in the bush, taking all their 
belongings with them.  
                                                 
626 According to Captain Cerveira Pereira’s report from 1618, they seized more than one thousand head of large cattle 
and a great number of sheep: AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 1, Doc. 87, “Representação de Manuel Cerveira Pereira”, 
(2 July 1618). The number presented by the anonymous author is much higher: 3000 head of cattle: Cordeiro, Viagens, 
explorações e conquistas dos portuguezes, 11-12.  
627 Captain Cerveira Pereira briefly mentions Soba Quitumbela in his 1618 report: AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 1, 
Doc. 87, “Representação de Manuel Cerveira Pereira”, (2 July 1618). 
628 According to Lopes de Lima, the soba in question was Muene Calunga. See Cordeiro, Viagens, explorações e 
conquistas dos portuguezes, 12 – note 1.  
629 In another report from 1618, Captain Cerveira Pereira revealed that soba Peringue had fled with his people to the 
lands of a soba who occupied the territory close to the bay of São Francisco (Coporolo River): AHU, Angola, 1a 
Secção, Cx. 1, Doc. 87, “Representação de Manuel Cerveira Pereira”, (2 July 1618).  
630 Cordeiro, Viagens, explorações e conquistas dos portuguezes, 12.  
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Hence, the raiders found only empty houses when they arrived, except for a small group 
left behind to attract the invading forces into an ambush. As the African scouts ran into the bush 
and were followed by the Portuguese and their “jagas”, a great number of African warriors armed 
with arrows awaited the invaders in the bush and counter-attacked. Although the raiders almost 
panicked in face of such tremendous resistance, the anonymous author declared that they managed 
to overcome their fear and defeated the resistors with the might of their guns and the strategic use 
of a few horses. The Portuguese killed many of the Africans they found and captured 20 individuals 
to sell as slaves and 150 head of cattle. Captain Cerveira Pereira then ordered that the two main 
libatas of Quitumbela be set on fire and all crops, seeds and palm trees to be destroyed. According 
to our source, the total destruction of their land should teach Africans to obey by fear631.  
Captain Cerveira Pereira returned to Benguela with his share of the booty, but left fifty 
soldiers behind in the company of his allied “jagas” to carry out other attacks against neighboring 
libatas. The Mbangala warlord, however, did not want to remain in the service of the Portuguese, 
since he had grown “prosperous and rich” after various successful raids. He told the Portuguese 
soldiers that he was going to make war elsewhere to bring them more captives. They left for the 
sertões and the soldiers returned to São Filipe de Benguela. Captain Cerveira Pereira would see 
the warlord’s action as a treasonous act632.  
On their way back to the coast, the soldiers met a group of African herders and tried to 
seize their cattle, but the latter retreated to the rocky hills. Captain Cerveira Pereira was informed 
of their location and gathered ninety soldiers to raid the hills where the herders had taken refuge. 
The troops marched for two days and prepared the attack for the early hours of the day, while their 
victims were still asleep. However, one soldier, who accidently hit the battle drum, revealed their 
position. The herders jumped into formation to defend their community, while women and children 
ran to the higher and more protected parts of the hills, where the invaders could not reach. The 
herders fought bravely with arrows and stones, but could not resist the attack of the gunmen, who 
killed several of them. They retreated to the higher hills, leaving cattle and other supplies behind. 
                                                 
631 Cordeiro, Viagens, explorações e conquistas dos portuguezes, 12-13. 
632 Cordeiro, Viagens, explorações e conquistas dos portuguezes, 13. 
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Captain Cerveira Pereira then ordered his men to burn the huts and break all the vessels for water, 
the latter an especially harmful act, according to the anonymous author633.  
On the following day, the soldiers began their march back to São Filipe de Benguela with 
their looted cattle. They were forced to follow the low course of a dry river, surrounded by rocky 
hills. The herders followed the caravan from above and, at the opportune moment, attacked the 
Portuguese with stones and arrows, causing many injuries. Captain Cerveira Pereira positioned his 
gunners to hinder the advance of the attackers and fled with the rest of the caravan. The herders 
grabbed whatever they could and retreated, while the Portuguese took refuge in their camp634.  
The anonymous author additionally declared in his report that Captain Cerveira Pereira 
commanded many other raiding expeditions against local communities during his first years in 
Benguela, ventures that he did not have enough space to write about. He also denounced the 
existence of enemies of the captain within the Portuguese forces, who worked to destroy his 
accomplishments and had even tried to poison him. Those arguments served to justify the lack of 
information about the copper mines that the captain should have been exploring, instead of raiding 
local communities and capturing slaves635. 
Cerveira Pereira’s infamous career finally ended with his death by natural causes in April 
1626636, nine years after founding the settlement of São Filipe. Amidst stories of violence and 
destruction, Captain Cerveira Pereira built the foundations for the slave trade from Benguela while 
in command of the Conquista. 
 
Lopo Soares Lasso and the first military expeditions into Quilengues  
Following the death of Captain Manuel Cerveira Pereira, he was replaced by Captain Lopo 
Soares Lasso (Laço), another experienced slaver and military commander. Captain Lasso was 
chosen by the governor of Angola, Fernão de Sousa, to replace Captain Cerveira Pereira after 
Bento Banha Cardoso, yet another local slaver, refused the position. Captain Cardoso allegedly 
                                                 
633 Cordeiro, Viagens, explorações e conquistas dos portuguezes, 13-14. 
634 Cordeiro, Viagens, explorações e conquistas dos portuguezes, 14. 
635 Delgado, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 25, argued that the money invested in the search of copper mines in Benguela 
was not wasted: even though Captain Cerveira Pereira never reached them, it served to organize the slave trade.    
636 For more on Cerveira Pereira’s death, see Delgado, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 117-121.  
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refused the offer for lack of resources to maintain the military force necessary to defend the 
settlement in Benguela from African warriors and Dutch forces alike637. Hence, Captain Lasso 
became the new governor of Benguela (1627-1635).  
In order to give the new governor of Benguela the means to maintain the high costs of the 
venture, Governor Sousa authorized Captain Lasso to use his position to participate in the local 
slave trade638. If Captain Cerveira Pereira was known as the “consquitador” of Benguela, Captain 
Lasso became known the “avassalador dos sertões de Benguela” for the wars he waged in the 
interior (Quilengues) and the great number of African polities he defeated and turned into “vassals” 
of Portugal639. The captives acquired during these campaigns guaranteed the funds necessary for 
the maintenance of the settlement.  
Captain Lasso was an experienced slaver who had commanded several expeditions against 
the “kingdom of Ndongo”. Then a lieutenant, he was responsible for the destruction of the 
kilombos of soba Ngunza-a-Ngombe (Zenza Angumbe), soba Bangu (Bango-Bango) and soba 
Kafuxi-ka-Mbari (Cafuxe)640. He also participated voluntarily in the campaigns commanded by 
Captain Bento Banha Cardoso against Queen Nzinga-a-Mbande641, paying for his own troops and 
other expenses with his deals in the slave trade642. Before becoming governor of Benguela, he had 
also commanded an expedition against a kilombo in Kisama (Quiçama), a territory between the 
“kingdoms” of Angola and Benguela known for its “rebellious nature” and great resistance against 
                                                 
637 “Carta de Fernão de Sousa ao Governo”, No. 76 (9 July 1626), in Beatrix Heintze, Fontes para a história de Angola 
do século XVII, Vol. 2 (Stuttgart: Franz Weiner Verlag Wiesbaden GMBH, 1985), 163-165. See also Delgado, O 
Reino de Benguela, 115. 
638 Governor Sousa informed that Captain Lasso “remained trading” (ficasse aviando): “Carta de Fernão de Sousa ao 
Governo”, No. 76 (9 July 1626), in Heintze, Fontes para a história de Angola do século XVII, Vol. 2, 163-165; “Carta 
de Fernão de Sousa ao Governo”, No. 76 (1 June 1627), in Heintze, Fontes para a história de Angola do século XVII, 
Vol. 2, 180. See also Delgado, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 119-123; Heintze, Fontes para a história de Angola do 
século XVII, Vol. 1, 93. The participation of governors and capitães-mores in the slave trade remained legal until the 
1720s. Governor Antonio de Albuquerque Coelho de Carvalho (1722-1725) was the first one to be prohibited from 
getting involved with the trade and received a salary (soldo) of 15$000 cruzados instead: Correa, História de Angola, 
Vol. 1, 357; Carlos Couto, Os Capitães-Mores de Angola no Século XVIII (Luanda: Instituto de Investigação Científica 
de Angola, 1972), 80-81; Miller, Way of Death, 547. See also J. C. Feo Cardozo de Castellobranco Torres, Memórias 
contendo a biographia do vice-almirante Luiz da Mota Feo Torres: A história dos governadores e capitaens generaes 
de Angola, desde 1575 até 1825 (Paris: Fantin, 1825), 244.  
639 Mário Antonio Fernandes de Oliveira, Angolana: documentação sobre Angola (1783 -1883), Vol. 1 (Luanda: 
Centro de Investigação Científica de Angola, 1968), 258.  
640 Ravenstein, The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battell of Leigh, 163-164; Raimundo da Cunha Matos, Compêndio 
histórico das possessões de Portugal na África (Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional, [c. 1835] 1963) 264, 268.  
641 For more about Nzinga-a-Mbande, also Njinga, see Chapter 2 
642 Heintze, Fontes para a história de Angola do século XVII, Vol. 1, 93. See also “O extenso relatório do governador 
a seus filhos”, No. 30 (n/d, 1625-1630) in Heintze, Fontes para a história de Angola do século XVII, Vol. 1, 263.  
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foreign presence643 (Map 2). Lastly, he was celebrated as defender of São Filipe de Benguela, after 
driving away the Dutch ships that attacked the town in 1633644.  
The experienced commander pioneered the penetration of the sertões of Benguela and was 
the first to wage war in the lands of Quilengues, reaching the surroundings of Huila. By 1628, he 
had opened indirect trade with the deep interior, as far as Quipungo, via a commercial outpost in 
Quilengues. The inflow of imported goods into “the heartland of the Kunene peoples”, as Desch-
Obi calls it, had great impact on the polities located deep into the sertões, reaching as far as Humbe 
Inene. It helped destabilize the traditional political structure of the Cunene region, since the centre 
of this new source of wealth was in the areas between Quipungo and the outpost of Quilengues, 
far from the control of Humbe rulers in Mutano645. “As a result, the earlier political balance based 
on cattle redistribution was shaken as subordinate kings and provincial lords (ovipundi) moved to 
take advantage of the trade and acquire goods for their own redistribution of subordinates”646.      
Captain Lasso left Luanda on 24 April 1627, with seventy-two soldiers and an unknown 
number of slaves, to occupy his post of the new governor of Benguela. Governor Fernão de Sousa 
(1624-1630) had ordered him to disembark in the lands of Sumbe-a-Mbwela647 (Sumbe Ambala), 
at the mouth of the Cuvo River, close to Benguela-a-Velha. According to the governor of Angola, 
this was the most defensible site and the closest one to the supposed copper mines in the interior. 
Nevertheless, Captain Lasso did not disembark on the shores of Sumbe, but rather in the southern 
region of Quicombo. He justified his decision by stating this was a better site to anchor and still 
close to the access route to the copper mines. After disembarking, however, he did not march to 
                                                 
643 “Carta de Fernão de Sousa ao Governo” No. 36 (15 August 1624), in Heintze, Fontes para a história de Angola 
do século XVII, Vol. 2, 86. 
644 Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 1, 244-245; Torres, Memórias contendo a biographia…, 170. See also Ravenstein, 
The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battell of Leigh, 170.  
645 Mutano was the “capital” of Humbe-Inene, located on left margin of the Caculovar River, close to its intersection 
with the Cunene River. For more, see Chapter 2. 
646 Thomas J. Desch-Obi, Fighting for Honor: The History of African Martial Art Traditions in the Atlantic World 
(Columbia: The University of South Carolina Press, 2008), 47. See also Gastão Sousa Dias, Pioneiros de Angola: 
Explorações portuguesas no sul de Angola, séculos XVII e XVIII, Coleção Pelo Império, No. 42 (Lisboa: Agência 
Geral das Colônias, 1937), 7-8; Miller, Way of Death, 71-73.  
647 Sumbe-a-Mbwela was an African ruler who controlled the basin of the Cuvo River: his name was later adopted to 
designate the people who lived in the region as Sumbe: Miller, “Angola central e sul por volta de 1840”, 23.  
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the supposed mines, but instead engaged in a slaving expedition against “jagas” camped in the 
vicinity648.  
In a report from 1629, one finds a description of the first military campaign led by Captain 
Lasso against African authorities in the interior of Benguela, both “Jagas” and “Ambundos” (that 
is Mbangala and non-Mbangala). Although Captain Cerveira Pereira had previously defeated some 
“jagas” and sobas living in the vicinity of São Filipe de Benguela, he had not engaged the powerful 
warlords of the interior, in the region dubbed “Quilengues” by the Portuguese. The slave traders 
did not venture far from their libatas and into the sertões back then, allegedly not going beyond 
the sobado of Molundo649 (Map 3).  
At the time of Captain Lasso’s arrival in Benguela, the Portuguese had established mostly 
peaceful relations with some local African rulers, who after military defeat accepted their terms of 
vassalage. These included sobas Peringue, mani-Berro, Quizamba, and an unnamed soba who 
lived on the coast close to the town of São Filipe, probably Quitumbela650. Among the so-called 
“jagas”, only Kakonda was considered a vassal (feudatário) of Portugal. Other local sobas also 
kept peaceful commercial relations with the slavers on the coast, although they had not accepted 
any terms of “subjugation”. Among them, one finds sobas Cabamba and Molundo651.    
Captain Lasso disembarked in Benguela on 10 May 1627. Soon after, he received news 
that a powerful Mbangala warlord in Quilengues, Jaga Nguri (Anguri), had raided vassal sobas 
Peringue and mani-Berro and, in the process, had captured their wives, “sons” and cattle. A couple 
of weeks after his arrival, Captain Lasso thus assembled eighty armed soldiers and marched to the 
fortified hills (impuri) inhabited by Nguri. The Mbangala warlord was defeated and forced to 
                                                 
648 “Carta de Fernão de Sousa a Lopo Soares Lasso”, No. 191 (24 April 1627), in Heintze, Fontes para a história de 
Angola do século XVII, Vol. 2, 209. See also “Carta de Fernão de Sousa ao Governo”, No. 76 (1 June 1627), in 
Heintze, Fontes para a história de Angola do século XVII, Vol. 2, 180-181; Delgado, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 118, 
125. 
649 “Auto do Provedor da Fazenda de Benguela”, No. 202 (23 July 1629) in Heintze, Fontes para a história de Angola 
do século XVII, Vol. 2, 303.  
650 Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 65.  
651 “Auto do Provedor da Fazenda de Benguela”, No. 202 (23 July 1629) in Heintze, Fontes para a história de Angola 
do século XVII, Vol. 2, 302. Delgado, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 125, 404; Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 119-120. 
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accept vassalage, after losing many of his warriors. During these first campaigns in the sertões, 
Captain Lasso lost his left eyesight after being injured by two enemy arrows652.  
Following this successful campaign against Jaga Nguri, Captain Lasso kept advancing into 
the sertões, making war against other African authorities in the interior of Quilengues, among them 
Bisansongo and Quissangue. Soba Bisansongo, for instance, was surrounded in his impuri and 
killed during the battle. His quiambole653 requested a truce and was forced to accept vassalage. 
Other African rulers, such as soba Bembe (Bambe), approached the Portuguese forces after the 
defeat of Bisansongo to “accept subjugation”. As it happens, a local enemy had expelled Bembe 
from his lands. But, after becoming a vassal of Portugal, he re-acquired them654. In the end, the 
acceptance of vassalage allowed soba Bembe to return to power.  
In February 1628, Captain Lasso organized yet another expedition against African polities 
in the sertões. He marched to the lands of soba Quilumata (Culimata) with seventy-five soldiers. 
But Captain Lasso was not able to engage in any battle because Quilumata decided to flee, leaving 
more than two thousand head of cattle behind, which were seized by the invaders along with some 
slaves. In September of 1628, he marched on with the same force against soba Cabamba, in the 
lands of Luceque (Luqueco). According to one report, Cabamba was the most powerful soba of 
the interior, and the one with the most aversion to vassalage. A powerful army composed of 1500 
African warriors (both “Ambudos” and “Jagas”) accompanied the slavers, the largest military 
campaign ever assembled in Benguela, and the one that generated the greatest amount of slaves 
and cattle655. 
In November of 1628, Captain Lasso then marched to the region of Sumbe seeking the 
supposed copper mines of the interior. He found a kilombo along the way, but the people fled 
                                                 
652 “Auto do Provedor da Fazenda de Benguela”, No. 202 (23 July 1629) in Heintze, Fontes para a história de Angola 
do século XVII, Vol. 2, 302-304.  See also “O extenso relatório do governador a seus filhos”, No. 30 (n/d, 1625-1630) 
in Heintze, Fontes para a história de Angola do século XVII, Vol. 1, 295; Delgado, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 125-
126.  
653 According to Antonio de Oliveira de Cadornega, História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, 1680, vol. 1 (Lisboa: 
Agência Geral do Ultramar, [1680] 1972), 620, quiambole was the title given to “capitães-mores by Africans”.  
654 “Auto do Provedor da Fazenda de Benguela”, No. 202 (23 July 1629) in Heintze, Fontes para a história de Angola 
do século XVII, Vol. 2, 303. See also Ralph Delgado, Ao Sul do Cuanza: Ocupação e aproveitamento do antigo reino 
de Benguela, 1843-1942, Vol. 1 (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional. 1940), 229-230. 
655 The report estimated between four to five thousand head of cattle as seized by the Portuguese. There are no 
estimates for the number of captives taken, only that they were many (muitas peças): “Auto do Provedor da Fazenda 
de Benguela”, No. 202 (23 July 1629) in Heintze, Fontes para a história de Angola do século XVII, Vol. 2, 304. See 
also Delgado, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 126.  
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without engaging in battle. They had probably heard news of previous attacks promoted by the 
captain and the destruction they caused. The invaders chased the fleeing population for four days, 
but did not reach them. Nonetheless, Captain Lasso kept waging war on libatas he found along the 
way to the mines, “subjugating” as many as thirteen sobas, some of them considered quite 
powerful enemies. These campaigns led to the enslavement of around one thousand people. 
Among the sobas defeated by Captain Lasso and forced to accept vassalage, one finds: mani-
Songo, Lulembe, mani-Nhanga, Quitemo, Cabombo, Conzamba, Monadundo, mani-Catubela, 
Caungueca, Cabambe, Gumbe, Cangunda and Cahuri656.  
Captain Lasso thereafter informed the governor of Angola that a local enemy of the soba 
who reigned over the copper mines had defeated and expelled him from his lands. The defeated 
soba reached out to the governor of Benguela to sew an alliance, promising to give him the copper 
mines if he helped destroy his nemesis. Captain Lasso justified he could not march to the mines 
because he did not have enough manpower and asked his superiors for reinforcements to carry out 
this campaign657. These excuses and requests were very similar to those of Manuel Cerveira 
Pereira.  
Although Captain Lasso kept sending news about the existence of copper mines in the 
interior, his greatest “accomplishments” were successful slaving raids against local sobas and 
“jagas”658. When he finally arrived at the mines in the interior of the Cuvo River659, the governor 
of Angola complained that the captain had not sent enough information about them, but only four 
rocks with a small amount of copper660. The slave trade was to remain the most important business 
for the Portuguese in Benguela throughout the century. 
                                                 
656 “Auto do Provedor da Fazenda de Benguela”, No. 202 (23 July 1629) in Heintze, Fontes para a história de Angola 
do século XVII, Vol. 2, 304. 
657 “Carta de Fernão de Sousa ao Governo”, No. 111 (29 August 1628) in Heintze, Fontes para a história de Angola 
do século XVII, Vol. 2, 209. See also “Carta de Fernão de Sousa não enviada”, No. 107 (August 1628) in Heintze, 
Fontes para a história de Angola do século XVII, Vol. 2, 199; Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 124-125. 
658 “Carta de Fernão de Sousa ao Governo”, No. 121 (5 November 1628) in Heintze, Fontes para a história de Angola 
do século XVII, Vol. 2, 217. 
659 Captain Lasso took possession of the mines of Sumbe, close to the Cuvo River, in March of 1629: Heintze, Fontes 
para a história de Angola do século XVII, Vol. 1, 93. According to Delgado, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 126, these 
were the “real” mines of Benguela, not those Captain Cerveira Pereira spent years searching for.  
660 “Carta de Fernão de Sousa ao Governo”, No. 134 (29 March 1629) in Heintze, Fontes para a história de Angola 
do século XVII, Vol. 2, 227. See also “Carta de Fernão de Sousa a El-Rei”, No. 150 (8 January 1630) in Heintze, 
Fontes para a história de Angola do século XVII, Vol. 2, 246-247. 
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Indeed, Captain Lasso continued to organize slaving operations in the interior of Benguela 
for almost a decade. His activities only stopped when he faced one of the most powerful sobas of 
Quilengues in 1637. On this occasion, he marched against soba Ngola-a-Nzimbo (Ngola Njimbo 
or Gola Amgimbo), who initially did not want to fight and looked for a diplomatic solution to end 
hostilities. When the Portuguese expedition arrived in the lands of soba Nzimbo, they were 
approached by an embassy from the African ruler to negotiate a peace treaty. The soba stated that 
there was no need for violence and war between them. If they had come after runaway slaves who 
fled to his territory, he promised to return them all; in case the expedition was after captives for 
the Atlantic trade, he would give them enough slaves to “satisfy their greed”. Soba Ngola-a-
Nzimbo argued that it was not right to raid his people, who lived peacefully in his lands. Still, 
Captain Lasso ignored Nzimbo’s offer of peace and invaded his sobado661.    
Although Ngola-a-Nzimbo’s warriors fought bravely to defend their territory from Captain 
Lasso’s forces, the expedition broke through their defenses and invaded Nzimbo’s ombala. The 
raiders sacked and burned it down, enslaving its inhabitants. The soba retreated with some of his 
warriors and sought reinforcements from neighboring sobados. Ngola-a-Nzimbo subsequently 
assembled a mighty army with the help of other sobas and returned to his ombala to take revenge. 
He caught the raiders still distracted with the looting of his capital and slaughtered them. Captain 
Lasso died alongside his men: only one survivor returned to Benguela to tell the story of the 
attack662.    
 
The Caconda wars in Bongo in the second half of the seventeenth century 
Captain Lasso’s defeat at the hands of Ngola-a-Nzimbo’s army in 1637 did not make the 
Portuguese abandon their project to conquer the territory in the interior of Benguela and turn it 
into a major source of slaves. No major military expedition seems to have reached this area during 
the following thirty-five years. But it did not take too long for the cycle of violence to erupt yet 
again. 
                                                 
661 Cadornega, História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, vol. 1, 201-202.   
662 Cadornega, História Geral das Guerras Angolanas, vol. 1, 230.   
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In 1673, a dispute arose in Kakonda for control of the jagado between its ruler, Caala, and 
his nephew, Gandir, who had come of age and desired to become the new “Jaga”663. Caala, who 
had previously been accused of killing his sister Lamba Culembe, made an attempt against 
Gandir’s life. With the support of some neighboring sobas, Caala also arrested pumbeiros trading 
in the sertões, seizing their merchandise. News of the feat soon reached São Filipe de Benguela, 
leading local traders to request that the governor launch an expedition against Caala. Gandir also 
came to the coastal settlement to ask for Portuguese assistance to claim his place as Jaga 
Kakonda664.   
The governor of Angola, Francisco da Távora (1669-1676) did not initially give 
authorization for the slavers in Benguela to move against Caala. Only after much pressure from 
the community of merchants did the governor agree to dispatch an expedition from Luanda. 
Meanwhile, Captain Manuel Rodrigues do Couto (governor of Benguela in 1672) and other local 
slavers organized their own “punitive expedition”. They marched against Caala without 
authorization from the governor of Angola. The slavers’ main goal was to guarantee the return of 
their investments in the trade, which had been disrupted by the actions of the “jaga” 665. 
The expedition assembled by Captain Couto was composed of the most important members 
of the merchant community of Benguela666 and the allied sobas Bumba-Cazombo, Quitata-
Cambimbe, Moambo-a-ebo, Gando, Molundo, Peringue, Quizambo and Moambo-albo. Before 
departing, however, the captain suffered what seems to have been a heart attack (atacado por uma 
pontada) and died. Sergeant-major (sargento-mor) Manuel da Rocha Soares assumed command 
                                                 
663 Matos, Compêndio histórico das possessões de Portugal na África, 291, writing in the early nineteenth century, 
affirmed that many of the warlords in the interior of Benguela, such as Kakonda, considered themselves descendants 
of the “jagas” (giacas) who had conquered the country in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. They thus did not 
use the title of “Soba” but rather “Jaga”. 
664 Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 216. See also Ralph Delgado, História de Angola, Vol. 3 (Luanda: Banco de 
Angola, 1948), 355. 
665 Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 217. See also Delgado, História de Angola, Vol. 3, 355. 
666 Among them, one finds: João Brás Goes, Manuel Ferreira, Carlos de Lacerda, Manuel Fernando Roque, Francisco 
Dias Cordeiro, Pedro da Silva, Manuel Monteiro, José de Campos, Manuel Dias de Oliveira, Domingos Gonçalves, 
André Fernandes, Matias Cabral da Silva, Manuel da Rocha Soares, Manuel Monteiro Louzado, Manuel Fernandes 
Torta, Bento Pereira da Fonseca, José Ferreira Lobo, André Fernandes, Sebastião Pegado Ponte, Manuel Rosado, 
Gaspar Dias de Lima, Cruz de Antonio Borges, Pedro Veleiro Sespedes, Matias Coutinho de Mendonça, Baltazar 
Gonçalves, Domingos Antunes da Silva, Cruz de João Vaz da Cruzada, Manuel Pita Calheiros, Antonio Lopes de 
Manuel Dias de Oliveira and Frei Manuel de Santo André: Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 218. 
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and ordered the expedition to move to the land of Gila-honi, where they were to meet yet another 
detachment of black warriors (guerra preta) from Quilengues before moving to attack Caala667.  
When the expedition was ready to march against Kakonda, some sobas accused Bumba-
Cazombo and Quitata-Cambimbe of collusion with the “jagas” and of plotting to flee from the 
expedition with their porters. The plot seem to have been somewhat successful, for the expedition 
retreated to São Filipe and revenge against Kakonda was postponed. Commander Rocha Soares 
justified that it was impossible to engage in war in the sertões without porters and a good number 
of guerra preta668. While the power of African rulers in the sertões (both sobas and “jagas”) was 
undeniable, the forces of the Portuguese did not even have a fort in the interior to give them logistic 
support or to serve as a point of retreat in case of military defeat.   
In 1682, however, the Portuguese sewed an alliance that permitted them to build their first 
outpost at the base of the plateau, within the so-called “sertões of Caconda”. By then, commercial 
activity in these sertões had become a dangerous enterprise, which caused a decline in local slave 
trading. The governor of Angola, João da Silva e Sousa (1680-1684), made an agreement with the 
soba Bongo (a dependent of Jaga Kakonda669) to build a fort in his lands, at the foot of the hills of 
Quilengues670. The soba probably agreed to the governor’s proposition by considering the benefits 
of having a market with imported goods so close to his ombala. As mentioned before, imported 
commodities helped local authorities to acquire new dependents and to spread their political capital 
(Chapter 2).  
This presídio was dubbed Caconda, a name that would later be transferred to other sites. 
The region became a strategic trading centre where Luso-African caravans bought beeswax, ivory 
and especially slaves. A workforce commanded by sargento-mor Pedro da Silva built the fort along 
the margins of the Lutira River (Map 4). As pointed out by the Ralph Delgado, the foundation of 
the presídio of Caconda (1682) opened a new stage for the slave trade in Benguela671.  
                                                 
667 Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 218. 
668 Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 219-220. Caala was not attacked by Portuguese forces and remained as the ruler 
of Kakonda, while Gandu was forced to renounce his ambitions to become the new “Jaga”: Delgado, História de 
Angola, Vol. 3, 358. 
669 Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 73.  
670 Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 218; Matos, Compêndio histórico das possessões de Portugal na África, 290. 
671 Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 218. 
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This first presídio in the “sertões of Caconda” was located in the lowlands of Mbuelo, in 
the territory of Bongo, not in the highlands of Nano. Only two years after its construction, the 
relationship with soba Bongo deteriorated, and the African ruler marched against the outpost in 
his lands, with the support of Jaga Kakonda672. At the time, the presídio of Caconda was under 
the command of Captain Manuel da Rocha. He had received fifty soldiers as reinforcements to 
defend the outpost and launch “punitive” expeditions against local “rebels”. Before he could act, 
however, Bongo and Kakonda attacked the presídio673.   
They caught the Portuguese forces by surprise, attacking them with arrows and guns. After 
a day long battle, some soldiers raised a “white flag” and left their fortified camp to surrender, 
unbeknownst to Captain Rocha. When the captain realized what was transpiring, he decided to 
play along, fearing an insurrection on the part of remaining soldiers, who were distressed by the 
long battle. He thus left the camp, accompanied by the sargento-mor and a few other soldiers to 
negotiate the terms of capitulation with Jaga Kakonda674.  
Kakonda, however, did not accept their offer of surrender and killed the captain and his 
men, leaving only one alive to tell the tale. Jaga Kakonda allegedly decapitated Captain Rocha 
and sat on his head, thus adding insult to injury. He then raided the Portuguese camp, seizing 
weapons, ammunition, imported goods and religious paraphernalia. The defensive structures were 
destroyed, as was the church. The soldiers were arrested and later rendered back to São Filipe of 
Benguela, as a demonstration of “daring generosity”. After this victory, Kakonda began to incite 
other African rulers to rise against Portuguese presence in the sertões675.  
                                                 
672 Mariana Candido, “Jagas e Sobas no ‘Reino de Benguela: Vassalagem e criação de novas categorias políticas e 
sociais no contexto da expansão portuguesa na África durante os séculos XVI e XVII”, in África: histórias conectadas, 
Alexandre Ribeiro, Alexsander Gebara e Marina Berthet, eds. (Niterói: PPGH-UFF, 2014), 71; Thomas J. Desch-Obi, 
“Engolo: Combat Traditions in African and African Diaspora History” (PhD Dissertation, University of California, 
2000), 67. See also Francisco Castelbranco, História de Angola: desde o descobrimento até a implantação da 
República, 1482-1910 (Luanda, Typographia a Luzitania, 1932), 142-145. 
673 Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 1, 305; Torres, Memórias contendo a biographia…, 211-212; José Joaquim Lopes 
de Lima, Ensaios sobre a statistica das possessões portuguezas na África Occidental e Oriental; Ásia Occidental; 
China, e na Oceania, vol. 3 (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1846), 109-111; Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 212. See 
also Castelbranco, História de Angola, 143.  
674 Lima, Ensaios sobre a statistica..., Vol. 3, 109-111; Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 222. See also Castelbranco, 
História de Angola, 143. 
675 Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 222-223. 
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Pumbeiros, in particular, became easy pray for these African “rebels”, who captured 
anyone roaming their sertões and seized their merchandise676. This “insurrection” of African 
polities in the interior of Benguela represented a major loss for the Portuguese, since the region 
was then responsible for one third of the revenue of their colonial enterprise in West Central Africa. 
The disruption of commerce could cause the insolvency of “Brazilian” creditors involved in the 
slaving business and the consequent destruction of the Conquista. Accusations of “profanation” of 
religious images and garments strengthened the request for a punitive expedition against Jaga 
Kakonda677.  
The governor of Angola, Luis Lobo da Silva (1684-1688), dispatched an army to Benguela 
commanded by Captain Carlos de Lacerda. It was composed of two hundred armed soldiers and a 
great number of porters and “black warriors” armed with bows and arrows. The expedition 
attacked the libata of Kakonda and retrieved some weapons and religious images, but did not find 
the “Jaga”, who was engaged elsewhere in war against local enemies. They seized the cattle and 
destroyed the libata. In the meantime, Kakonda received news of the attack and returned to his 
libata to take revenge678.   
When Captain Lacerda saw the size of the army Jaga Kakonda had assembled against him, 
he panicked and fled back to Benguela. The retreat was considered shameful, and Captain Lacerda 
was removed from his post679. Another expedition was subsequently put under the command of 
the governor of Benguela, João Brás de Goes, who counter-attacked. In the process, Captain Goes 
raided several African rulers in the sertões of Benguela and destroyed their quipacas (fortifications 
similar to kilombos680).  
The expeditions commanded by Captain Goes against Jaga Kakonda were mostly 
successful. Kakonda fled and took refuge in the lands of several local allies, including sobas 
Xahisenda, Cangengo, Quibengo, Cacombo and Lumbimbe. Finally, he sought shelter in the lands 
of soba Ngola-a-Nzimbo, an old enemy of the Portuguese and responsible for the destruction of 
                                                 
676 Matos, Compêndio histórico das possessões de Portugal na África, 290.  
677 Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 223. 
678 Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 1, 305-306; Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 224; Castelbranco, História de 
Angola, 143-144. 
679 Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 1, 306; Torres, Memórias contendo a biographia…, 212; Delgado, O Reino de 
Benguela, 224; Matos, Compêndio histórico das possessões de Portugal na África, 291; Castelbranco, História de 
Angola, 144.  
680 For more about quipacas, see Chapter 1.  
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the expedition commanded by Captain Lasso years before. Nzimbo promised to defend Kakonda 
against the invading forces, stating that they had together beheaded a couple of Portuguese officers 
before and that he would do the same to Captain Goes, if he dared to step into his lands681.   
Captain Goes marched against Nzimbo’s ombala, defeating his warriors and recovering 
two artillery pieces stolen from the presídio. Nzimbo escaped with some of his men and took 
refuge in the impuri (fortified hills) of Bembe682. The Portuguese commander then built a new 
fortified outpost, this time in the lands of the Hanya (Hanha)683, which he also named Caconda 
(1685)684. 
Defeated, Jaga Kakonda tried to make peace with the Portuguese. In 1688, he visited 
Benguela to speak with its new governor, Captain Manuel de Nojosa, and accused the former 
governor, Captain Goes, of committing “crimes” against his people, including assassination and 
illegal enslavement. Kakonda was given safe passage to travel to Luanda and repeat his accusations 
to the chief judge (Ouvidor Geral) of Angola. Captain Goes was soon arrested for several crimes, 
which included appropriation of the captives reserved for the royal fifth (quinto)685. Sargento-mor 
Pascoal Rodrigues assumed command of the new presídio of Caconda, and also became 
responsible for the construction of a new church dedicated to Nossa Senhora da Conceição. 
Nonetheless, Jaga Kakonda was also arrested and sent to the fortress of Penedo, in Luanda, where 
he later died686.  Kakonda’s defeat in 1685 and subsequent humiliation gave fresh impetus to 




                                                 
681 Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 225-226; Matos, Compêndio histórico das possessões de Portugal na África, 291; 
Castelbranco, História de Angola, 145. 
682 Desch-Obi, “Engolo”, 67. 
683 Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 228, called it “Quitandas da Hanha”. See also Delgado, Ao Sul do Cuanza, Vol. 
1, 232. 
684 Delgado, Ao Sul do Cuanza, Vol. 1, 112, 232, 273-274; See also Castelbranco, História de Angola, 143-144. 
685 The royal fifth was a tax that reserved for the monarch of Portugal one-fifth (20%) of all precious metals and other 
commodities, including slaves, acquired by his subjects as booty of war, found as treasure or extracted by mining. 
686 Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 226-227; Matos, Compêndio histórico das possessões de Portugal na África, 291-
292; Castelbranco, História de Angola, 145. 
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The Caconda wars in Hanya in the beginning of the eighteenth century  
While the defeat of Jaga Kakonda was a significant achievement from the perspective of 
Portugal’s military ambitions in the region, the beginning of the next century saw continuing 
resistance to Portuguese and Luso-African presence inland in the form of the Caconda wars.  
About a decade after the death of  Jaga Kakonda under Portuguese custody in the dungeons 
of Penedo, his descendant Hiamba-Kakonda (Hiamba Caconda687) and his sister Nana-a-Mbundu 
(Nana Ambundo688) sought to re-acquire their rights over the lands of Hanya, where the Portuguese 
had rebuilt the presídio of Caconda. They gathered an army with the support of local allies and 
marched against Caconda in 1698. The governor of Angola, Luís Cesar de Menezes (1697-1701), 
subsequently dispatched troops from Luanda commanded by Captain Gaspar Rebelo da Costa to 
defeat the “rebels”, but the expedition did not manage to capture them689. 
Captain Rebelo da Costa offered Hiamba-Kakonda and Nana-a-Mbundu “mild” terms of 
vassalage, but they declined. The captain was forced, therefore, to return to Luanda without the 
completion of his mission. The governor of Angola then decided to replace him with a Luso-
African captain born in Benguela, Antonio de Faria. Captain Faria organized his own expedition 
with the help of local slavers and vassal sobas and marched against the enemies, but found the 
libatas of Hiamba-Kakonda empty upon arrival. The African ruler had moved to the fortified hill 
of soba Xalungando. The Portuguese forces attacked Xalungando’s impuri, forcing the Africans 
to escape through cracks and tunnels that the Portuguese did not dare to enter. The invaders seized 
a great amount of cattle and slaves, enough to make them return to the coast “rich and merry”, 
according to one source690. 
Governor Menezes was succeeded by Bernardino de Távora de Sousa Tavares (1701-
1702), who attempted to put an end to the conflict by offering Jaga Hiamba-Kakonda a pardon for 
his “crimes”. The African ruler, once again, turned down the offer and kept up his attacks on 
                                                 
687 According to Delgado, Hiamba-Kakonda was in fact Huambo (Wambu), one of the rulers of the central plateau: 
Delgado, Ao Sul do Cuanza, Vol. 1, 309.  
688 Delgado, Ao Sul do Cuanza, Vol. 1, 232, presented Hiamba-Kaconda and his sister as heirs of soba Bongo. Candido, 
An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 249, however, disputes the information that they were siblings, but 
rather “allies in preventing the advance of the Portuguese inland”.    
689 Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 229; Matos, Compêndio histórico das possessões de Portugal na África, 294-295.  
690 Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 1, 328-329; Torres, Memórias contendo a biographia…, 227; Delgado, O Reino 
de Benguela, 229-230.  
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pumbeiros attempting to trade in the lands he considered his domain. The “Jaga” also incited his 
counterparts to attack local allies of the Portuguese. Soba Catira, for instance, “spirited by the 
actions” of Hiamba-Kakonda, attacked the vassal soba Xa-Dingri (who lived close to the presídio 
of Caconda) and seized all his cattle. The vassal soba requested help from Captain Antonio de 
Faria, who sent emissaries to Catira to question him about the attack691.  
Soba Catira replied to the governor that he should worry about the “whites” under his 
command and not about the “blacks”. Soba Xa-Dingri, in turn, threatened the governor that he 
would look for another “lord” (senhor) to help him, if he did not receive the requested military aid. 
Captain Faria therefore prepared an expedition against Catira composed of seventy soldiers plus 
guerra preta. He also sent a last threat to the “rebel” soba, demanding that he present himself at 
the presídio for questioning, to which Catira responded by sending two detachments of warriors 
to attack Caconda692.       
Despite great endeavours on the part of Catira’s warriors, the Portuguese managed to repel 
the attack and pursued the fleeing African warriors. Jaga Hiamba-Kakonda intervened on Catira’s 
behalf and a great battle followed, resulting in the death of a large number of Catira’s warriors, the 
burning of his libatas, the imprisonment of his people, and the acquisition of cattle. Catira escaped 
and waited for the Portuguese expedition to retreat to the coast before returning to his lands. 
Hiamba-Kakonda also suffered major losses. He eventually presented himself at the presídio, 
along with other local “rebel” potentates, and negotiated the terms of his surrender. Captain Faria 
pardoned all of the “rebels” following their acceptance of vassalage, rewarding them with titles 
over the lands within the jurisdiction of the presídio of Caconda693.  
Mariana P. Candido has presented a different version of the fate of Hiamba-Kakonda and 
Nana-a-Mbundu. According to her, Captain Antonio de Faria’s expedition would have defeated 
Nana-a-Mbundu’s forces at some point, after which she accepted vassalage, while Hiamba-
Kakonda managed to resist Portuguese attacks and remained an independent “Jaga”. Both African 
rulers were offered asylum by another local powerful potentate, soba Kanguengo, and decided to 
move their kilombos to the lands of Ivangando, away from Portuguese influence in Caconda. Once 
                                                 
691 Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 230-231. 
692 Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 231-232. 
693 Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 233. See also Torres, Memórias contendo a biographia…, 227; Matos, Compêndio 
histórico das possessões de Portugal na África, 294-295. 
161 
 
settled in Ivangando, Hiamba-Kakonda and Kanguengo united forces and raided some neighboring 
sobados of African vassals of Portugal, provoking another attack by Portuguese forces. After being 
defeated, Hiamba-Kakonda managed to avoid “punishment” for his “rebellious” actions by 
presenting himself at the presídio of Caconda and excepting the terms of vassalage. The Luso-
African raiders, however, did not spare soba Kanguengo: they invaded Ivangando and captured 
more than fifty of his subjects, as well as a thousand head of cattle694.      
Whatever the story about the defeat of Hiamba-Kakonda and Nana-a-Mbundu, the fact is 
that it inhibited their aspirations of recovering control over the territory of Hanya, which 
consequently guaranteed the maintenance of the presídio of Caconda for more then eighty years 
as the most important commercial outpost in the interior, at the very foot of the central plateau 
(Map 4). The governor of Angola, Francisco Inocêncio de Sousa Coutinho (1764-1772), again 
transferred the presídio of Caconda to the highlands of Nano in 1768-1769, as part of his project 
to enhance Portuguese influence and control over the trading routes in the interior of Benguela. 
After the move, the old presídio of Caconda was renamed Caconda-a-Velha and the lands of 
Hanya, on the border of the territory that Luso-Africans generically called “Quilengues”695. This 
marked the establishment of an entrenched Portuguese presence within Quilengues.  
 
The battle for Quilengues in the first half of the eighteenth century 
The entrenchment of Portuguese presence in the presídio of Caconda opened up for them 
an important access route to slave trading in the interior of Benguela. For eight decades, the old 
presídio of Caconda in the lowlands of northern Quilengues, that is Caconda-a-Velha, featured as 
the main centre of the slave trade in the interior of the “kingdom” of Benguela. From its foundation 
in the 1680s until its transfer to the central plateau at the end of the 1760s, Luso-African slavers 
engaged in innumerable wars against local rulers and enslaved a great number of their subjects696.  
                                                 
694 Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 250. 
695 See the location of Caconda-a-Velha as part of Quilengues in Map 3. See also Francisco Cândido Cordeiro Pinheiro 
Furtado, “Carta geographica da costa occidental da África” (1790), in Torres, Memórias contendo a biographia…, 
unpaginated. 
696 There are no estimates for the number of slaves exported from Benguela in the seventeenth century because of the 
lack of documents: Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 152. Nonetheless, Miller, “Angola 
central e sul por volta de 1840”, 20, proposed 2,000 to 3,000 slaves exported per year as early as the second half of 
the seventeenth century. He also estimated that total exports for the entire coast from Luanda to Cape Negro ranged 
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Environmental distress also caused a surge in internal conflicts among African potentates 
struggling to survive. Long periods of droughts between the 1680s and the 1720s triggered the 
migration of many communities living in the lowlands of Quilengues and on the central plateau. 
These refugees became favored victims for the slave trade in the sertões of Quilengues (Mbuelo) 
and Caconda (Nano), reaching as far as the Upper Cunene region697.    
In the first two decades of the eighteenth century, the Portuguese engaged in a series of 
slaving expeditions disguised as official military campaigns against local rulers of Quilengues. 
The slavers used the presídio of Caconda-a-Velha as their headquarters in the sertões, from where 
they dispatched their pumbeiros and launched expeditions. This made Caconda-a-Velha the most 
important target for African resistance against Portuguese slavers698. At the turn of the century, the 
high activity of the slavers in the sertões of Quilengues had generated much animosity on the part 
of local African polities and caused a series of “rebellions”; Ralph Delgado called these conflicts 
the “memorable battle for Quilengues”699 
The excesses committed by the slaving operations of the 1710s triggered the ruler of 
Quitata, soba Gando-ia-Quitata, to incite attacks against pumbeiros roaming the sertões, which 
prompted a reaction from the capitão-mor of Caconda, Captain Luiz Ferreira. Upon receiving 
reinforcements from Luanda, Luso-African soldiers marched against Gando-ia-Quitata, destroying 
his libata and capturing great numbers of slaves and cattle. The soba retreated to the Upper Cunene 
region, taking refuge in the lands of soba Canhacuto. The Luso-African forces chased and attacked 
both sobas. After the destruction of his libata, Cachacuto and his first wife were captured by the 
Luso-Africans, as well as a large number of slaves700.  
                                                 
from 12,000 to15,000 slaves per year in the first half of the seventeenth century. For more on slave exports from 
Benguela in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see José C. Curto, “The Legal Portuguese Slave Trade from 
Benguela, Angola, 1730-1828: A Quantitative Re-Appraisal,” África, 16-17, no. 1 (1993/1994): 101-116; José C. 
Curto, “Another Look at the Slave Trade from Benguela: What We Know and What We Do Not Know”, Portuguese 
Studies Review, Vol. 23, No. 2 (2015): 9-26.  
697 Miller, Way of Death, 150; Desch-Obi, “Engolo”, 68-69. See also Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic 
World, 255.  
698 Delgado, Ao Sul do Cuanza, Vol. 1, 232.  
699 Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 256.  
700 Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 1, 338-339; Torres, Memórias contendo a biographia…, 233-234; Delgado, O 
Reino de Benguela, 252-253. See also Matos, Compêndio histórico das possessões de Portugal na África, 296; 
Delgado, Ao Sul do Cuanza, Vol. 1, 232.  
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The major event in the “battle for Quilengues” happened during the government of 
Henrique de Figueiredo e Alarcão (1717-1722), when Jaga Quiambola (Quiambela), heir of 
Gando, was chosen to lead the resistance against Portuguese slaving operations in the interior. 
Quiambola had the support of several local rulers, such as Lungariaebo (Zunga-ria-hebo), 
Quiendangondo, Mucuinabas and Janjala (Ianjara)701. In 1718, they laid siege to Caconda-a-Velha 
and allegedly intended to invade São Filipe de Benguela as well702.  
The main reason behind the “rebellion” was the slaving operations commanded by the 
capitão-mor of Caconda, José da Nóbrega de Vasconcelos, and his sargento-mor Antonio Vieira 
Guimarães. Captain Nóbrega de Vasconcelos would later be arrested by colonial authorities for 
waging unauthorized war against sobados in the sertões and sent to Limoeiro prison in Lisbon, 
where he remained until 1725703.   
Under siege and running out of supplies, Captain Nóbrega de Vasconcelos managed to 
send a small number of experienced soldiers, led by Captain João Pilarte da Silva, to raid the 
neighboring region of Mahungo. They sneaked out of their fortified camp and attacked the ombala 
of soba Lungariaebo by surprise, swiftly beheaded him, arresting his wife and seizing the 
necessary supplies for the maintenance of Caconda-a-Velha until the arrival of reinforcements. At 
the same time, Captain Nóbrega de Vasconcelos requested help from the Governor of Benguela, 
Manuel Simões (1717-1721), who forwarded the request to Luanda704.   
The governor of Angola dispatched reinforcements, weapons and a small cavalry 
detachment with six horses to Benguela. The governor of Benguela personally commanded the 
reinforcements to Caconda in June 1722, which included five soldiers armed with muskets and 
more than 800 guerra preta armed with bows and arrows. He divided his troops into two units and 
managed to trick Jaga Quiambola into engaging one of them, while the other remained hidden in 
the bush and attacked the enemy from behind. After a full day of battle, the Luso-African forces 
                                                 
701 According to Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 1, 348, all the sobas and “jagas” of Caconda gathered around 
Quiambola against the Portuguese presence in the sertões. See also Torres, Memórias contendo a biographia…, 240-
241. 
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703 Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 256-260. 
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killed four sobas, along with thirty-seven of Quibangola’s most valuable warriors. They also 
fatally wounded soba Giraul (Giraúlo) and captured his wife. Quimabola, however, managed to 
escape and retreated deep into the sertões705.  
After the retreat of Quiambola, the governor of Benguela sent his men after the sobas who 
had helped the “jagas”. He also chased Quiambola and destroyed part of his remaining forces, but 
Quiambola fled to the hills of Bembe. They attacked him once more, with the “Jaga” escaping 
again, this time to the region of Catumbela. After another attack, Quiambola decided to surrender, 
since he had lost most of his warriors. Jaga Quiambola accepted the terms of capitulation and 
vassalage and had his life spared by the governor of Benguela. The slavers from São Filipe de 
Benguela celebrated their victory over the African rulers of Quilengues for three nights, in which 
they lit up the town with lamps and fired shots of artillery706.     
 
The transfer of Caconda to the central plateau and foundation of Salvaterra dos Magos 
 The Luso-African victory over Jaga Quiambola and his allies allowed the colonizers to 
further entrench their presence in the interior of Benguela, while at the same time exacerbating the 
negative effects of increased slave trading. At the end of the 1760s, the Governor of Angola, 
Francisco Inocêncio de Sousa Coutinho (1764-1772), attempted to reinforce the Portuguese 
presence in the interior of Benguela in order to establish better control over the slave trade and its 
agents roaming the sertões, among them many deserters and deported criminals. He also 
envisioned the development of other sources of revenue, including mineral exploration and the 
advancement of agriculture707.  
In a report dated 23 September 1768, the governor of Angola complained that the slaving 
operations in the interior were out of control and that settlers were involved in constant wars that 
                                                 
705 Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 1, 349-350, 354-355; Torres, Memórias contendo a biographia…, 242-245; 
Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 256-259. 
706 Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 1, 356; Torres, Memórias contendo a biographia…, 245; Matos, Compêndio 
histórico das possessões de Portugal na África, 296-297; Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 256-260. See also Delgado, 
Ao Sul do Cuanza, Vol. 1, 233.  
707 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 52, Doc. 45, “Bando que ordena as feiras nos sertões de Benguela e Caconda”, (23 
Setember 1768). A transcipt of this source can be found in “Bando sobre as feiras que devem haver nos Certões de 
Benguela e Caconda” (23 September 1768), in Arquivos de Angola, 1790-1797, 1ª Série, No. 6 (Luanda: Arquivo 
Nacional, 1933), unpaginated.  
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destroyed all opportunities of development. He blamed the existence of small groups of “whites” 
scattered throughout the sertões for the chaos in the region, pointing to the fact that they did not 
live in society, were absent from church, and some did not even teach Portuguese to their children 
anymore: “Individuals wandered dispersed, without religion, without justice, without society and 
without order”, lost to the “vices of the land”. Besides, these settlers acted “tyrannically” towards 
local African rulers and created constant conflicts with them708.    
Sousa Coutinho determined that these settlers should be gathered in permanent markets in 
the interior, built around settlements with a regent, a judge and a church.  Beyond regulating trade, 
these settlements should also control the movement of criminals, deserters and other “vagabonds” 
who roamed the sertões without any governance on the part of the “colonial” administration709. 
The governor of Benguela, Francisco Xavier de Sousa Furtado (1777), was chosen to oversee the 
construction of these colonial settlements. He was to select regents from among the most important 
merchants of Benguela for new settlements in Quilengues (Salvaterra dos Magos), Huila (Alba-
Nova), Quipeio (Passo de Sousa), Bihé (Amarante), Quitata (Vila-Viçosa), Tinde (Novo-Belém), 
Galangue Grande (Linhares), Ivangando (Borba), Bailundo (Nova-Golegã), Fendi (Contins), 
Luceque (Sarzedas) and Ngunza (Novo Redondo). The new regents were supposed to impose the 
new regulations and arrest those who did not comply710.    
                                                 
708 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 52, Doc. 45, “Bando que ordena as feiras nos sertões de Benguela e Caconda”, (23 
Setember 1768). See also, “Carta de D. Francisco Inocêncio de Sousa Coutinho para Francisco Xavier de Mendonça 
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709  “Instrução por que se há de governar o capitão-mor de Caconda João Baptista da Silva, e do qual não se apartará 
hum só ponto” (15 December 1769), in Arquivos de Angola, unpaginated; Extracts of this document can also be found 
in “Instrução por que se há de governar o capitão-mor de Caconda João Baptista da Silva, e do qual não se apartará 
hum só ponto”, No. 6, in Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a colonização…, Vol. 1, 173-175. See also “Carta de 
D. Francisco Inocêncio de Sousa Coutinho para Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado”, No. 4 (18 October 1769), 
in Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a colonização…, Vol. 1, 163-169. 
710 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 52, Doc. 45, “Bando que ordena as feiras nos sertões de Benguela e Caconda”, (23 
September 1768); “Instrução por que se há de governar o capitão-mor de Caconda João Baptista da Silva, e do qual 
não se apartará hum só ponto” (15 December 1769), in Arquivos de Angola, unpaginated; “Carta de D. Francisco 
Inocêncio de Sousa Coutinho para Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado”, No. 4 (18 October 1769), in Felner, 
Angola: Apontamentos sobre a colonização…, Vol. 1, 163-169.  See also Ralph Delgado, O governo de Sousa 




The governor of Angola also ordered the transfer of the presídio of Caconda, which at the 
time had only one settler, to the highlands of Nano711. He chose the land of Catala, considered a 
healthy and rich territory, as the site for the new presídio of Caconda (Map 4), which became also 
known as Caconda-a-Nova712. The presídio of Caconda-a-Velha was abandoned by the Portuguese 
because Sousa Coutinho concluded that its maintenance costs were too high. He also argued that 
the presence of deserters and outlaws involved in illegal trading in the area was an endemic 
problem that could only be solved by the establishment of a “white” settlement in the lands of 
Hanya, with the presence of a judge713.  
Caconda-a-Velha did not completely lose its importance after being abandoned. Indeed, it 
remained a haven for smugglers and deserters until at least the beginning of the nineteenth century. 
In a letter from 1810, the capitão-mor of Caconda, Alexandre José Coelho de Sousa e Menezes, 
denounced that the captain in charge of the territory of Hanya, that is Caconda-a-Velha, Paschoal 
da Silva, gave shelter to deserters from Caconda and Benguela. Its capitão-mor, Captain Paschoal 
da Silva, was a “brat” (moleque) who did not respect his orders714, evidencing the virtual 
independence of these slavers from “colonial control”.  
The transfer of the presídio of Caconda to Catala turned Salvaterra dos Magos, the 
administrative centre of Quilengues, into the main centre of Portuguese influence in the lowlands 
of Mbuelo, at the foot of the central plateau. Caravans descending from Caconda and other parts 
of Nano, as well as those coming from the southern regions of Quipungo, Huila and Humbe, 
stopped at the settlement on their way to Benguela. Although the presence of “white” traders in 
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the region dated from the previous century, Salvaterra dos Magos was the first official Luso-
African settlement in Quilengues715.  
Despite its importance, the settlement of Salvaterra dos Magos was weakly protected, 
having only four soldiers stationed for its defence in 1769. In case of conflict with local potentates, 
Salvaterra dos Magos relied on its inhabitants (moradores) for protection and depended on periodic 
military reinforcements from São Filipe de Benguela and Caconda-a-Nova716.  
 
Ngunza-Kabolo and the Portuguese attempts to control the coast of Novo Redondo 
Beyond establishing Salvaterra dos Magos in 1769, the coming of Sousa Coutinho to the 
governorship of Angola led to a more general reorganization of the Portuguese presence in the 
interior of Benguela and on the coast. As seen previously, the governor ordered the creation of a 
number of “white” settlements throughout Benguela in 1769. One of these new settlements, Novo 
Redondo, was built on the coast close to the mouth of the Ngunza River, in the lands of soba 
Ngunza-Kabolo717 (Map 3).  
The governor of Angola was aware of the presence of English and French smugglers, who 
also regularly visited the ports of Loango and Cabinda, on the coast south of the Cuanza River and 
feared they would stretch their presence down to Cape Negro. The latter was a well-known point 
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716 Delgado, Ao Sul do Cuanza, Vol. 1, 282-283. 
717 Novo Redondo was located 15 kilometers north of Quicombo and 60 kilometers south of Benguela-a-Velha: 
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of “unauthorized trade”718 in slaves and other local merchandise, such as ivory719. With the 
construction of Novo Redondo, the governor of Angola intended to control surrounding alternative 
points for the embarkation of slaves, such as Benguela-a-Velha (Sumbe-Mbwela), Quicombo, 
Egito, Lobito, and Catumbela720.  
Slave caravans coming from the interior, including the central plateau, regularly visited all 
of these alternative embarkation points to trade slaves with English and French smugglers. 
Portuguese attempts to enhance control over this coast with the construction of the presídio of 
Novo Redondo led to increasing “rebellions” on the central plateau. Pumbeiros trading in Nano 
were constantly attacked, many of them by the soba of Mbailundo, who had strengthened his 
                                                 
718 I have decided to adopt the term “unauthorized trade” instead of “illegal trade” due to concerns about the ahistorical 
character and colonialist bias of the latter. The idea of an “illegal” slave trade in Angola in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century presumes the existence of an effective colonial system of law to which all agents of the trade would 
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pluralism, one in which different legal rules governed the same geographical space. Moreover, despite attempts by the 
colonial administration to regulate the slave trade in areas under its direct influence, most “legal” decisions concerning 
the slave trade and the enslavement of individuals were taken by persons in positions of authority, independently from 
their relation to the colonial administration, while African customary law did not depend on colonial legislation. 
Hence, references to a “legal slave trade”, or as Chapter 4 discusses, the “illegality” of the enslavement of African 
vassals and their people are misnomers. Unavoidably, these concepts entail a colonialist perspective over the otherwise 
plural legalist landscape of the interior of Benguela, especially when applied only to the Portuguese. The use of 
“unauthorized trade” could also have colonialist implications, since Portuguese and Luso-Africans slavers in positions 
of authority were the ones to grant the “authorization” in question. Nevertheless, its use is preferable to “illegal trade”, 
because the latter assumes the existence of a coherent legal system that regulated the slave trade in West Central Africa 
before the nineteenth century. As Frank Luce, “Rural Workers and Labor Justice; the Estatuto do Trabalhador Rural 
in Brazil’s cacao region, 1963-1973” (PhD Dissertation, York University, 2009), 16-17, 20 explains, the notion of 
legal pluralism implies that there may be multiple juridical fields in one geopolitical region, while the overlapping of 
legal orders that regulate the same legal field is defined as “interlegality”. For a definition of “juridical field”, see 
Pierre Bourdieu, “The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field”, Hastings Law Journal, No. 38 (1986-
1987): 805-853.        
719 “Ofício do governador para Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado sobre o estabelecimento das novas povoações 
do Sertão de Benguela chamadas Novo Redondo, etc.” (12 January 1769) in Arquivos de Angola, unpaginated; “Carta 
para José Viera d’Araujo, capitão-mor de Benguela”, No. 7 (28 April 1770) in Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a 
colonização…, Vol. 1, 175-176; “Informações prestadas por D. Francisco Inocêncio de Sousa Coutinho sobre o 
governo de Angola ao seu sucessor D. Antonio de Lancastre”, No. 10 (26 November 1772) in Felner, Angola: 
Apontamentos sobre a colonização…, Vol. 1, 201; “Carta de Antonio José Pimentel e Castro, de 27 de janeiro de 1783 
para Martinho de Melo e Castro”, No. 12 (27 January 1783), in Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a colonização…, 
Vol. 1, 211. See also Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 36; Torres, Memórias contendo a biographia…, 264. 
720 “Ofício do governador para Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado sobre o estabelecimento das novas povoações 
do Sertão de Benguela chamadas Novo Redondo, etc.” (12 January 1769) in Arquivos de Angola, unpaginated. See 
also Delgado, Ao Sul do Cuanza, Vol. 2 (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional. 1940), 463-471. 
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power and local influence by acquiring imported goods from French and English smugglers on the 
coast between Sumbe-Mbwela and Catumbela 721.    
Besides being close to the Cuvo River (Sumbe-Mbwela), where the Portuguese had 
attempted to create a settlement years before, the area through which flowed the Ngunza River 
was also rich in slaves and ivory. In 1768, the governor of Angola ordered a small expedition to 
establish a permanent market in the lands of Ngunza-Kabolo with the objective of opening 
peaceful commercial relations with this ruler, but local warriors attacked the settlers soon after 
their arrival. The settlement was destroyed and the settlers who did not flee were captured and 
taken as captives into the sertões722. 
 At the beginning of 1769, the governor of Angola dispatched a company of one hundred 
soldiers and two pieces of artillery, commanded by captains Joaquim Monteiro de Morais and 
Antonio José da Costa, to occupy the mouth of the Ngunza River and build the presídio of Novo 
Redondo.  They secured the outpost, built a small fortified camp surrounded by adobe walls and 
began developing diplomatic and commercial relations with local authorities723. The presence of 
Portuguese traders on the coast of Ngunza sponsored immediate changes in the political landscape 
of the region. Soba Ngunza-Kabolo, a tributary of the soba of Seles, decided to break ties with his 
former overlord, declaring that he was now a subject of the Portuguese. He stopped paying tribute 
to Seles, who tried to punish this offence and re-establish control over his tributary by marching 
against the new presídio. The capitão-mor of Novo Redondo, Francisco Nunes, vowed to protect 
Ngunza and confronted Seles in battle for his “rebelliousness”, but he and his men were captured 
and slaughtered by the enemy724.     
                                                 
721 Miller, “Angola central e sul por volta de 1840”,  63, argues that the Mbailundo wars of 1773 and 1775 were a 
direct reaction to increasing attempts by Portuguese forces to control the coast between Sumbe-Mbwela and 
Quicombo. 
722 “Ofício do governador para Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado sobre o estabelecimento das novas povoações 
do Sertão de Benguela chamadas Novo Redondo, etc.” (12 January 1769), in Arquivos de Angola, unpaginated. 
723 For more about the foundation of Novo Redondo, see Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 37; Torres, Memórias 
contendo a biographia…, 264; Catálogo dos governadores do Reino de Angola, in Coleção de notícias para a história 
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História de Angola, 169-170. 
724 Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 46-47, 67; Torres, Memórias contendo a biographia…, 267-268; Delgado, Ao 
Sul do Cuanza, Vol. 1, 473. 
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The victory of Soba Seles over the Portuguese stationed in Novo Redondo incited other 
local African rulers to resist the foreign presence. Hence, “rebellions” spread to the interior and 
uphill to Nano. Powerful sobas, such as Mbailundo, increased their attacks on pumbeiros buying 
slaves in the sertões, which eventually triggered a reaction from Luanda. The new governor of 
Angola, Antonio de Lancastre (1772-1779), launched a series of “punitive” expeditions against 
“rebel” sobas, led by captains Albano de Caldas Araújo and Antonio José da Costa, the latter being 
the same who commanded the occupation of Novo Redondo725.  
This campaign against the “rebels” of Novo Redondo became a massive three-year war in 
the interior of Ngunza that later reached the highlands of Nano. The war lasted from 1773 to 1775 
involving several sobados, and generating great amounts of slaves for the Atlantic trade. Captain 
Costa spent over a year raiding local libatas and destroying enemy quipacas, enriching himself 
with the people captured as spoils of war. When he finally reached Nano, however, he concluded 
a treaty with the soba of Mbailundo and retreated to the coast. Rumors had it that he had negotiated 
peace with Mbailundo in exchange for slaves for his personal gain. Loaded with slaves from the 
sertões, Captain Costa returned to Luanda in December of 1775, where he was received with 
animosity by the governor of Angola. Despite accusations of bribes and illicit trading, he remained 
in command of slaving operations, disguised as military “punitive” expeditions, in the interior of 
Benguela for a few subsequent decades726.  
Indeed, between 1774 and 1796, Captain Costa became one of Benguela’s most important 
slave suppliers, after which he left the continent with his wife for Rio de Janeiro727. During this 
period, he featured as one of the most active and respectable members of the community of slave 
traders in São Filipe de Benguela728. He also had associates in Novo Redondo, a settlement he 
helped to build and protect. He further rose to the position of royal treasurer (Tesoureiro) of 
                                                 
725 Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 48; Matos, Compêndio histórico das possessões de Portugal na África, 302; 
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Benguela in the 1790s. As we will see below, Captain Costa played a vital role in the exploration 
of Quilengues and in the supply of a large number of captives during the late eighteenth century 
surge in slaves exported from Benguela.   
The war of Mbailundo ended with the arrest of the soba, not by Captain Costa and his 
forces, but by a slaver who betrayed the African ruler, allegedly getting the soba drunk and seizing 
him after he passed out729.  In the end, the Portuguese had defeated many powerful African rulers, 
such as Quingolo, Cambundo-dara, Clara-Camnuanda, Cammumá, Canjungo, Cassenze, Muco, 
Muganguela, Sambo, Galangue and Matenda-Azamba, among others. The soba of Mbailundo was 
taken to the dungeons of Penedo, in Luanda, along with his heir Guingando, from where they never 
left. Meanwhile, the Portuguese placed a vassal soba, Capingana, in charge of the conquered 
lands730. 
 
The 1785’ expedition to Cape Negro and the raiding of Quilengues 
In addition to his successful campaign to expand Portuguese influence in the interior of 
Benguela, Governor Sousa Coutinho also launched military campaigns to bring the coastal 
territory south of the Cuanza River under Portuguese control. The contraband trade in slaves along 
this littoral zone was an important issue in Luanda since the beginning of the seventeenth century, 
even before the 1617 arrival of the Portuguese in São Filipe. During the second half of the 
eighteenth century, it became a major problem for Portuguese colonial aspirations to control the 
coast of Benguela. As discussed previously, there was a special concern with the presence of 
foreign traders on the southernmost region of Cape Negro, a point of embarkation for contraband 
slaves. In 1769, Governor Sousa Coutinho consulted with some of the most important sertanejos 
in Benguela about the possibility of occupying Cape Negro, but never managed to fulfill his plans 
to build a presídio in that region731.  
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Nonetheless, at the beginning of 1770, the governor of Angola dispatched an expedition 
commanded by Captain João Pilarte da Silva to the lands of the Mocorocas (Macarocas), a semi-
nomadic group that lived close to the Coroca River, in Cape Negro (see Appendix 3.1). Captain 
Pilarte da Silva left São Filipe de Benguela for the lands of soba Canina, a local ally of the 
Portuguese, where he acquired guerra preta, porters and guides for the expedition. He moved 
south through the territory of Njau, then a tributary of Canina, who attempted to hinder their 
passage and for that reason was punished by his overlord. Canina defeated Njau and seized his 
cattle, but the soba managed to escape732.   
After days of marching through uninhabited dry lands, during which several members of 
the expedition died, Captain Pilarte da Silva arrived on the coast of Cape Negro. The arrival of his 
caravan drew attention from local warriors armed with bows and arrows, identified as having a 
“clicking language”, who attacked them. After the battle, the Portuguese expedition captured a 
couple of women who gave them some information about the region, but they soon died of 
smallpox (bexiga), a disease that also victimized other members of the caravan733.   
The governor of Angola concluded from the expedition led by Captain Pilarte da Silva that 
there was an urgency in occupying the lands around the Coroca River734, bringing war to the local 
authorities that attacked the Portuguese and building a fort to guarantee their safety and the control 
of the southern trading routes to the interior. Nonetheless, a presídio in Cape Negro would be 
difficult to maintain, since any contact by land would have to face local resistance, such as that of 
the soba of Njau, while navigation by sea to the region was complicated due to the strength of the 
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de Caconda”, No. 8 (9 December 1770), in Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a colonização…, Vol. 1, 178. For 
more about Captain Pilarte da Silva’s expedition, see Dias, Pioneiros de Angola, 17-22. 
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maritime currents running northwards. The Portuguese wind-powered ships took as much time to 
sail from Luanda to Benguela as they did if leaving from the coast of Brazil735.  
Due to all of these difficulties, the project of occupying Cape Negro was abandoned for 
more than a decade. In 1783, the governor of Benguela, Antonio José Pimentel de Castro e 
Mesquita (1779-1784), again proposed the subjugation of local potentates in Cape Negro and the 
construction of a presídio in the region to inhibit contraband trade736. Finally, the new governor of 
Angola, José Almeida e Vasconcelos de Soveral e Carvalho (1784-1790), the Baron of 
Moçamedes, promoted a detailed exploration of the southern coast down to Cape Negro, as well 
as the lands in the interior of Quilengues.  
Soon after his arrival in Luanda, the Baron of Moçamedes ordered the new Governor of 
Benguela, Pedro José Correia Quevedo Homem e Magalhães (1784-1788), to produce reports on 
the possibility of occupying and exploring the southern coast and its backlands. Homem e 
Magalhães’ report from 1785 highlighted problems similar to those found by the 1770 expedition 
of Captain Pilarte da Silva and the impossibility to establish a permanent market in Cape Negro. 
He argued that, in case of attack, reinforcements from São Filipe de Benguela could not reach the 
presídio in Cape Negro by land, because of local resistance, or by sea, because of the maritime 
currents, unless they came from Brazil. The governor of Benguela believed that in order to occupy 
Cape Negro, the Portuguese would have to build another supporting presídio at the mouth of the 
                                                 
735 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 70, Doc. 5, fls. 1-5, “Relatório de João Pilarte da Silva sobre a expedição ao Cabo 
Negro em 1770”; “Cópia de huma rellação que deu João Pilarte da Silva, hoje falecido, ao capitão-mor José Vieria de 
Araujo da viagem que fez ao Cabo Negro por terras no anno de 1770 em companhia de José dos Santos, hoje capitão 
de Caconda”, No. 8 (9 December 1770), in Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a colonização…, Vol. 1, 182. In a 
letter to his superiors from 1785, the Baron of Moçamedes explained that the exploration of the southern coast to from 
São Filipe de Benguela to Cape Negro depended on the use of small galleys equipped with lateen sails and oars, in 
order to overcome the strength of the Benguela current: “Carta para o Sr. Martinho de Mello e Castro, secretário da 
repartição ultramarina” (28 November 1785), in Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola”, 420; “Carta para 
o Sr. Martinho de Mello e Castro, secretário da repartição ultramarina” (18 January 1786), in Oliveira, “Primeiras 
explorações no sul de Angola”, 425. The commander of the frigate “Loanda” (sent to Angra dos Negros) Captain 
Antonio José Valente and the Pilot Manuel Caetano Firme confirmed the difficulties of sailing against the Benguela 
current after in one of their reports. The journey from São Filipe de Benguela to Cape Negro lasted 25 days: “Copia 
de doze documentos que acompanharam o officio com data de 18 de Janeiro de 1786 sobre a exploração de cabo 
Negro, dirigido ao Ilmo. e Exmo. Sr. Martinho de Mello e Castro, Secretário de Estado da repartição ultramarina, pelo 
governador de Angola, o barão de Mossamedes”, in Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola”, 426-428. 
736 “Carta de Antonio José Pimentel e Castro, de 27 de janeiro de 1783 para Martinho de Melo e Castro”, No. 12 (27 
January 1783), in Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a colonização…, Vol. 1, 211. 
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Cunene River, from where they could also have access to local commodities (beewax, ivory, cattle 
and slaves) offered by the Nkhumbi peoples (“Mohumbes”, as he called) from the interior737.  
Ignoring the advice of the governor of Benguela and other merchants who had visited Cape 
Negro738, the Baron of Moçamedes decided to organize a series of expeditions to explore the 
region, both by sea and land, and thereby determine the best place for the creation of a settlement. 
The first was a maritime expedition commanded by Captain Luis Candido Pinheiro Furtado739 and 
Captain Antonio José Valente740 that was to explore and map the coast between São Filipe de 
Benguela and Cape Negro. A second expedition, commanded by Captain Gregório José Mendes741, 
was to explore and map the same coast by land. A third expedition, commanded by the infamous 
slaver Antonio José da Costa742, was to explore the Cunene Basin and punish some “rebels” from 
Quilengues. The naturalist Joaquim José da Silva743 accompanied Captain Costa’s expedition to 
map and study the “Natural History” and the peoples of the interior of Benguela744.  
The second expedition, led by Captain Mendes, was not in the original plans of the Baron 
of Moçamedes, but was organized by Captain Pinheiro Furtado after their arrival in Benguela745. 
He had asked the governor of Benguela to hold a meeting with the members of the community of 
slave traders of São Filipe to get information about the lands that they were about to explore. Most 
                                                 
737 “Carta do governador de Benguela Pedro José Correa de Quevedo Magalhães a Martinho de Mello e Castro, de 24 
de fevereiro de 1785”, No. 14 (24 February 1785) in Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a colonização…, Vol. 1, 
213-215; AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 70, Doc. 12, “Relatório do governador de Benguela Pedro José de Quevedo 
Homem de Magalhães”, (4 May 1785). A transcript of this source can be found in “Carta do governador de Benguela 
Pedro José Correa de Quevedo Magalhães a Martinho de Mello e Castro, de 4 de maio de 1785”, No. 14 (4 May 1785) 
in Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a colonização…, Vol. 1, 216-220.  
738 According to Dias, Pioneiros de Angola, 26, the Baron of Moçamedes was convinced that Governor Quevedo was 
incompetent to carry out the mission to occupy Cape Negro. According to Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 129, 
the Baron’s decision to include other military commanders in the exploration of the lands in southern Benguela created 
tension with Governor Quevedo who, according to Correa, began to sabotage the expeditions. 
739 Lieutenant Colonel of the Corps of Engineers (Tenente-coronel de engenheiros) 
740 Lieutenant Captain (Capitão-tenente) 
741 Sergeant Major of Ordinances (Sargento-mor de ordenanças) 
742 Captain of the Grenadiers Guard (Capitão de granadeiros) 
743 Secretary of Government (Secretário do governo) 
744 “Relatório de Antonio José Valente, de 3 de fevereiro de 1791, em que descreve a organização da expedição em 
que foi à Angra do Negro”, No. 10 (3 February 1791) in Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a colonização…, Vol. 
1, 229-232. See also Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 129; Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola”, 
419.  
745 Captain Mendes made a great impression upon the tenente-coronel of the expedition, who described him as a 
“Prussian king” for the way he dressed and behaved: Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 137.  
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advised against the sea expedition, saying they had lost several ships in Cape Negro sent to acquire 
“cattle” in the region, making no reference to contraband trade746.   
Nonetheless, Captain Mendes, one of the sertanejos invited to the meeting, supported the 
idea of opening trade with the deep sertões of southern Quilengues and Cape Negro. He 
volunteered to help the exploration by land, marching with his own caravan to map the terrain, 
including the coast visited by the maritime expedition. This would also free Captain Costa to 
explore the Lower Cunene Basin and discover its mouth, as well as command “punitive” 
expeditions against “rebels” in the sertões of Quilengues747.  
Captain Pinheiro Furtado was the first to leave on his mission to explore the coast down to 
Cape Negro, with a stop planned in Angra dos Negros (a cove in the current capital of the province 
of Namibe). While he and Captain Valente explored the southern coast in great detail, another 
ship, the frigate (fragatinha) Loanda, sailed directly to Angra dos Negros, taking Captain José de 
Sousa de Sepulveda748 on board, where it was to wait for the arrival of the remaining ships749.  
Once in Angra dos Negros, Captain Sepulveda began exploring the region, seeking local 
communities to raid. He seized cattle from local nomadic herders and burned huts he found in the 
vicinity. On one occasion, he was approached by one of these groups of herders, later identified as 
the Mucuanhangues, who wanted to trade sheep and milk for iron, knives and textiles. According 
to the account detailing this encounter, the herders attacked the Luso-African traders in a moment 
of distraction and killed them in revenge for the destruction of their huts and the theft of their 
cattle750. Captain Mendes and his forces, as we will see below, later castigated the Mucuanhangues 
for this attack.  
                                                 
746 “Carta para o Sr. Martinho de Mello e Castro, secretário da repartição ultramarina” (18 January 1786) in Oliveira, 
“Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola”, 424-425; “Relatório de Antonio José Valente, de 3 de fevereiro de 1791, 
em que descreve a organização da expedição em que foi à Angra do Negro”, No. 10 (3 February 1791) in Felner, 
Angola: Apontamentos sobre a colonização…, Vol. 1, 230.  
747 “Copia de doze documentos que acompanharam o officio com data de 18 de Janeiro de 1786 sobre a exploração 
de cabo Negro, dirigido ao Ilmo. e Exmo. Sr. Martinho de Mello e Castro, Secretário de Estado da repartição 
ultramarina, pelo governador de Angola, o barão de Mossamedes”, in Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações no sul de 
Angola”, 425.  
748 Lieutenant of Artillery (Tenente d’artilharia) 
749 Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola”, 429-430; Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 131. 
750 “Copia de doze documentos que acompanharam o officio com data de 18 de Janeiro de 1786 sobre a exploração 
de cabo Negro, dirigido ao Ilmo. e Exmo. Sr. Martinho de Mello e Castro, Secretário de Estado da repartição 
ultramarina, pelo governador de Angola, o barão de Mossamedes”, in Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações no sul de 
Angola”, 428-429. See also Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 131-132.  
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After anchoring in Angra dos Negros751 and learning about the assassination of Captain 
Sepulveda, Captain Pinheiro Furtado sent the frigate Loanda back to São Filipe and continued the 
exploration of the southern coast down to the mouth of the Coroca River, in Cape Negro752 (Map 
3). The itinerary of the maritime expedition and the geographic information collected enhanced 
Portuguese knowledge about the southern coast of Benguela and produced one of the most 
important Portuguese maps of West Central Africa at the end of the eighteenth century753 (See 
Appendix 3). 
Captain Pinheiro Furtado concluded in his report that the creation of a settlement in Angra 
dos Negros demanded the opening of communication through land, since navigation against the 
current was difficult and dangerous for large “round” ships, that is vessels with deep draughts. The 
cove was only 60 leagues away from São Filipe de Benguela, and although the coast proved to be 
very dry and with few sources of potable water for caravans, the backlands were more hospitable 
and potential commercial routes passed by several local communities that could be incited to 
participate in trade, as Captain Mendes’ expedition would confirm754.    
Upon returning to São Filipe de Benguela from his maritime expedition to Cape Negro, 
Captain Pinheiro Furtado learned that the caravan commanded by Captain Mendes had not yet left 
town, allegedly because of a lack of support from the governor of Benguela, who refused to supply 
him with soldiers and gunpowder755. Following some pressure from Portuguese officers, the 
                                                 
751 Captain Pinheiro Furtado renamed Angra dos Negros as Moçamedes. The region had been visited by Portuguese 
traders for a long time, as evidenced by the names inscribed on a rock found at the bay. See “Copia de doze documentos 
que acompanharam o officio com data de 18 de Janeiro de 1786 sobre a exploração de cabo Negro, dirigido ao Ilmo. 
e Exmo. Sr. Martinho de Mello e Castro, Secretário de Estado da repartição ultramarina, pelo governador de Angola, 
o barão de Mossamedes”, in Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola”, 429. For a transcript of the 
inscriptions found on the rock at Angra dos Negros, see Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola”, 433-434. 
752 “Relatório de Antonio José Valente, de 3 de fevereiro de 1791, em que descreve a organização da expedição em 
que foi à Angra do Negro”, No. 10 (3 February 1791) in Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a colonização…, Vol. 
1, 229-232. See also Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola”, 420.  
753 “Carta para o Sr. Martinho de Mello e Castro, secretário da repartição ultramarina” (18 Jan 1786), in Oliveira, 
“Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola”, 421-422.  
754 The coast of Angra dos Negros was dry and cold, with chilling ocean winds, which forced most of the local 
population to live further inland, in higher and greener terrains: “Copia de doze documentos que acompanharam o 
officio com data de 18 de Janeiro de 1786 sobre a exploração de cabo Negro, dirigido ao Ilmo. e Exmo. Sr. Martinho 
de Mello e Castro, Secretário de Estado da repartição ultramarina, pelo governador de Angola, o barão de 
Mossamedes”, in Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola”, 429-430. See also “Relatório de Antonio José 
Valente, de 3 de fevereiro de 1791, em que descreve a organização da expedição em que foi à Angra do Negro”, No. 
10 (3 February 1791) in Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a colonização…, Vol. 1, 229-232.  
755 “Copia de doze documentos que acompanharam o officio com data de 18 de Janeiro de 1786 sobre a exploração 
de cabo Negro, dirigido ao Ilmo. e Exmo. Sr. Martinho de Mello e Castro, Secretário de Estado da repartição 
ultramarina, pelo governador de Angola, o barão de Mossamedes”, in Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações no sul de 
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governor conceded and Captain Mendes left São Filipe de Benguela with a large caravan composed 
of more than one thousand people, most of whom were his dependents and slaves756.    
Captain Mendes had personal interests in exploring the coast to the south of Benguela, as 
well as its backlands. One of the most successful slavers of Benguela in the 1780s, his slaving 
business was described as “resplendent” and he profited greatly from his investments in what 
turned out to be a major slaving expedition. This explains his disposition to pay for most of the 
costs for the soldiers under his command757. Captain Mendes was experienced in leading caravans 
into the sertões of Benguela, had an unparalleled knowledge of the interior, and was somewhat 
versed in some local languages758.   
After leaving São Filipe de Benguela, Captain Mendes’ caravan crossed the lands of 
Quipupa and the Coporolo River. He passed through the five major polities that inhabited the 
Coporolo basin, which included Quizamba, Kalunga, Mama, Capembe, and Chela759. From there, 
he travelled south, staying parallel to the coast. He passed by Angra de Santa Maria, the beach of 
Equimina (São João de Quimina), and series of dry rivers. Along the way, Captain Mendes fought 
                                                 
Angola”, 431-435; “Relatório de Antonio José Valente, de 3 de fevereiro de 1791, em que descreve a organização da 
expedição em que foi à Angra do Negro”, No. 10 (3 February 1791), in Alfredo Albuquerque Felner,  Angola: 
Apontamentos sobre a colonização dos planaltos e litoral do sul de Angola, Vol. 1 (Lisboa: Agência Geral das 
Colônias, 1940), 229-232.  
756 “Carta para o Sr. Martinho de Mello e Castro, secretário da repartição ultramarina” (18 January 1786), in Oliveira, 
“Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola”,421-422; “Copia de doze documentos que acompanharam o officio com 
data de 18 de Janeiro de 1786 sobre a exploração de cabo Negro, dirigido ao Ilmo. e Exmo. Sr. Martinho de Mello e 
Castro, Secretário de Estado da repartição ultramarina, pelo governador de Angola, o barão de Mossamedes”, Oliveira, 
“Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola”, 426; “Descripção itinerária da derrota que por ordem dos srs. da junta de 
comissão estabelecida na cidade de S. Filippe de Benguela, pelo Ilmo. e Exmo. Sr. barão de Mossamedes, governador 
e capitão general do reino de Angola e suas conquistas, fez o sargento-mor Gregório José Mendes, da mesma cidade 
até o porto de Mossamedes, na angra do Negro, em 15º de latitute sul, com o exame dos sertões compreendidos entre 
estes portos, apresentada à mesma junta em 1 de janeiro de 1786” (1 January 1786) in Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações 
no sul de Angola”, 437. 
757 Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 130-131, 138-139.  
758 “Carta para o Sr. Martinho de Mello e Castro, secretário da repartição ultramarina” (18 January 1786), Oliveira, 
“Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola”, 422. For a fictional description of Captain Mendes’ expedition, see Jorge 
Arrimar, O Planalto dos Pássaros (Porto: Campo das Letras, 2002), 67-103. 
759 There were no “series of forts” built along the Coporolo River, contrary to what is maintained by Silva, The Atlantic 
Slave Trade from West Central Africa, 96. 
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some local communities who resisted his presence760, and managed to impose vassalage on some 
of them. He also used the service of individuals he captured during the march as local guides761. 
Captain Mendes’ caravan was so large that the provisions they carried from São Filipe de 
Benguela were not enough to sustain its personnel for much time. The caravan consumed 10 cows 
and 30 sheep a day, as well as a great quantity of water762. Hence, the original supplies lasted only 
for 15 days, after which the slaver began organizing raids to acquire the necessary means for the 
survival of his expedition. On the first such occasion, he sent one hundred and twenty soldiers 
supported by seven hundred black warriors to seize the cattle of nearby communities. They 
acquired 500 head of bovine cattle and more than 2,000 sheep, which sustained the expedition 
until its arrival in Angra dos Negros763.  
Once in Angra dos Negros, the intruders explored the area around a river that Captain 
Mendes dubbed “River of Deaths” (Rio das Mortes), but the inhabitants of the region fled as they 
saw the huge caravan approaching. The expedition arrested an elder who did not manage to escape 
and found clothes and other objects that were believed to belong to Captain Sepulveda and his 
men. The caravan used the captured elder as guide and followed the course of the river to the 
interior, reaching as far as the lands of Cuvale (Cubale), within the greater territory of Humbe-
                                                 
760 Captain Mendes’ description of the peoples of Quilengues serves as evidence of their cultural and ethnolinguistic 
heterogeneity, as well as a sign of constant migratory movements of nomadic herders from semi-desert areas through 
territories controlled by other African authorities. For instance, he met individuals who spoke a guttural language 
unknown to all members of his caravan, although they lived under the protection of vassal sobas, such as Kalunga 
(Muene Calunga): “Descripção itinerária da derrota que por ordem dos srs. da junta de comissão estabelecida na cidade 
de S. Filippe de Benguela, pelo Ilmo. e Exmo. Sr. barão de Mossamedes, governador e capitão general do reino de 
Angola e suas conquistas, fez o sargento-mor Gregório José Mendes, da mesma cidade até o porto de Mossamedes, 
na angra do Negro, em 15º de latitute sul, com o exame dos sertões compreendidos entre estes portos, apresentada à 
mesma junta em 1 de janeiro de 1786” (1 January 1786), Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola”, 438.  
761 “Descripção itinerária da derrota que por ordem dos srs. da junta de comissão estabelecida na cidade de S. Filippe 
de Benguela, pelo Ilmo. e Exmo. Sr. barão de Mossamedes, governador e capitão general do reino de Angola e suas 
conquistas, fez o sargento-mor Gregório José Mendes, da mesma cidade até o porto de Mossamedes, na angra do 
Negro, em 15º de latitute sul, com o exame dos sertões compreendidos entre estes portos, apresentada à mesma junta 
em 1 de janeiro de 1786” (1 January 1786) in Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola”, 438-442. 
762 According to Captain Valente, Captain Mendes’ male slaves and black soldiers could survive the hardships of the 
expedition because they were used to drink muddy water (agoa emlodada): “Relatório de Antonio José Valente, de 3 
de fevereiro de 1791, em que descreve a organização da expedição em que foi à Angra do Negro”, No. 10 (3 February 
1791), in Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a colonização…, Vol. 1, 230. 
763 “Descripção itinerária da derrota que por ordem dos srs. da junta de comissão estabelecida na cidade de S. Filippe 
de Benguela, pelo Ilmo. e Exmo. Sr. barão de Mossamedes, governador e capitão general do reino de Angola e suas 
conquistas, fez o sargento-mor Gregório José Mendes, da mesma cidade até o porto de Mossamedes, na angra do 
Negro, em 15º de latitute sul, com o exame dos sertões compreendidos entre estes portos, apresentada à mesma junta 
em 1 de janeiro de 1786” (1 January 1786) in Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola”, 439.  
179 
 
Inene, where they found groups of herders and a great quantity of sheep. Along the way, the slavers 
raided other local communities for supplies and people to serve them as guides764.  
From the lands of Cubale the caravan moved to Bumbo, a fertile territory in the interior 
where the Portuguese also envisaged the creation of a permanent market to trade with local 
communities. According to informants captured during the march, the peoples of this region had 
never established direct commercial relations with any Europeans. Captain Mendes freed the 
captured guides after there was no use for them, dressing them in textiles in the hope of inciting 
interest for imported goods among local communities765.  
Following a few days in the lands of Bumbo, local inhabitants began to approach the 
caravan to establish peaceful relations, which Captain Mendes understood as an act of subjugation. 
Although local warriors soon attacked the expedition with arrows, the captain was able to negotiate 
a truce. The caravan was subsequently visited by five ambassadors from Bumbo, including three 
macotas, a quissongo and a “son” of the soba. Days later, the soba himself visited the Portuguese 
camp and agreed to accept the terms of vassalage offered by Captain Mendes766.  
Upon accepting vassalage, the soba of Bumbo promised to capture soba Muchuro, 
responsible for the attack against Captain Sepulveda and his men, and mediate a truce with his 
local allies who remained opposed to foreign presence in their lands and who had frequently 
attacked the caravan during the night. The soba further guided the expedition to “places of interest” 
further into the sertões. Captain Mendes suggested in his report that the soba of Bumbo 
manipulated the expedition to fight his local enemies, guiding them through their lands to reach 
                                                 
764 “Descripção itinerária da derrota que por ordem dos srs. da junta de comissão estabelecida na cidade de S. Filippe 
de Benguela, pelo Ilmo. e Exmo. Sr. barão de Mossamedes, governador e capitão general do reino de Angola e suas 
conquistas, fez o sargento-mor Gregório José Mendes, da mesma cidade até o porto de Mossamedes, na angra do 
Negro, em 15º de latitute sul, com o exame dos sertões compreendidos entre estes portos, apresentada à mesma junta 
em 1 de janeiro de 1786” (1 January 1786) in Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola”, 442-443. 
765 “Descripção itinerária da derrota que por ordem dos srs. da junta de comissão estabelecida na cidade de S. Filippe 
de Benguela, pelo Ilmo. e Exmo. Sr. barão de Mossamedes, governador e capitão general do reino de Angola e suas 
conquistas, fez o sargento-mor Gregório José Mendes, da mesma cidade até o porto de Mossamedes, na angra do 
Negro, em 15º de latitute sul, com o exame dos sertões compreendidos entre estes portos, apresentada à mesma junta 
em 1 de janeiro de 1786” (1 January 1786) in Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola”, 444-445.  
766 “Descripção itinerária da derrota que por ordem dos srs. da junta de comissão estabelecida na cidade de S. Filippe 
de Benguela, pelo Ilmo. e Exmo. Sr. barão de Mossamedes, governador e capitão general do reino de Angola e suas 
conquistas, fez o sargento-mor Gregório José Mendes, da mesma cidade até o porto de Mossamedes, na angra do 
Negro, em 15º de latitute sul, com o exame dos sertões compreendidos entre estes portos, apresentada à mesma junta 
em 1 de janeiro de 1786” (1 January 1786) in Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola”, 445-446.  
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any supposed destination. Indeed, the expedition was a major threat to Bumbo’s enemies, who had 
never engaged a conflict against firearms767.  
The commander of the expedition also reported on the effects of wars and slaving raids in 
Quilengues. Places such as the lands of the Bimxiabas were uninhabited due to local conflicts, 
with the population having been either captured or forced to migrate to other regions. Captain 
Mendes also informed that the ruler of the Mucuandos or Muquandos, Naquageli, had recently 
died and that his “sons” had been forced to migrate to Quilengues due to a civil war that followed 
his death768.  
Captain Mendes pondered that most of the local African communities of Quilengues that 
he had crossed paths with were too “rebellious” because of the destructive actions of outsiders who 
had previously visited them only to raid their villages and seize their cattle769. The irony of this 
realistic commentary seems to have been lost on the captain. In fact, his own slaving operations in 
the sertões helped displace many communities who were forced to flee their land, leaving their 
crops and cattle behind. Not surprisingly, he was accused of betraying African allies, first 
summoning them to participate in slaving operations and then attacking them after they were 
dismissed from the “royal service”770. Captain Joaquim Monteiro Moraes, who accompanied the 
expedition and kept a diary of their itinerary, recorded many of his treacherous actions771.  
Although the expeditions commanded by Captain Pinheiro Furtado and Captain Mendes 
were considered successful and satisfactory for the “royal service”, the third expedition 
                                                 
767 “Descripção itinerária da derrota que por ordem dos srs. da junta de comissão estabelecida na cidade de S. Filippe 
de Benguela, pelo Ilmo. e Exmo. Sr. barão de Mossamedes, governador e capitão general do reino de Angola e suas 
conquistas, fez o sargento-mor Gregório José Mendes, da mesma cidade até o porto de Mossamedes, na angra do 
Negro, em 15º de latitute sul, com o exame dos sertões compreendidos entre estes portos, apresentada à mesma junta 
em 1 de janeiro de 1786” (1 January 1786) in Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola”, 437-449; See also 
Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 133. 
768 “Descripção itinerária da derrota que por ordem dos srs. da junta de comissão estabelecida na cidade de S. Filippe 
de Benguela, pelo Ilmo. e Exmo. Sr. barão de Mossamedes, governador e capitão general do reino de Angola e suas 
conquistas, fez o sargento-mor Gregório José Mendes, da mesma cidade até o porto de Mossamedes, na angra do 
Negro, em 15º de latitute sul, com o exame dos sertões compreendidos entre estes portos, apresentada à mesma junta 
em 1 de janeiro de 1786” (1 January 1786) in Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola”, 447.  
769 “Descripção itinerária da derrota que por ordem dos srs. da junta de comissão estabelecida na cidade de S. Filippe 
de Benguela, pelo Ilmo. e Exmo. Sr. barão de Mossamedes, governador e capitão general do reino de Angola e suas 
conquistas, fez o sargento-mor Gregório José Mendes, da mesma cidade até o porto de Mossamedes, na angra do 
Negro, em 15º de latitute sul, com o exame dos sertões compreendidos entre estes portos, apresentada à mesma junta 
em 1 de janeiro de 1786” (1 January 1786) in Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola”, 448.  
770 Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 138-139. 
771 Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 139. 
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commanded by Captain Costa was considered a failure by his superiors, due to prioritizing his 
personal slaving interests over the official mission772. Dom Martinho de Melo e Castro773 argued 
that Captain Costa was one of the biggest thieves in the sertões of Angola and denounced him of 
practicing “illegal attacks” against the African potentates of Quilengues774. 
Despite the accusations, Captain Costa managed to escape punishment due to his close 
relationship with government officials in Luanda, including the governor of Angola, the Baron of 
Moçamedes, and the Secretary of the colonial government, João Ribeiro de Sousa. Costa’s 
daughter lived for some time in the house of the baron and later married Secretary Sousa. 
According to Melo e Castro, Captain Costa’s father-in-law was Eusebio de Lemos Catela775, a 
professor of Medicine who included the captain’s two sons and his daughter in his will as heirs. 
Costa’s sons abdicated their rights in the name of their sister, which gave her the means for a good 
dowry that allowed her to marry Ribeiro de Sousa, formerly an Ensign (alferes) from Trás-os-
Montes, Portugal776.  
Sousa arrived in Angola in the company of the Baron of Moçamedes to work as his 
Secretary, despite the fact the naturalist Joaquim José da Silva already occupied this position. 
Secretary Sousa soon became an investor in the business of slaving in the interior of Benguela, in 
association with Antonio Martiniano, a sertanejo with whom he acquired a slave ship. In São Filipe 
de Benguela, Sousa also established a commercial partnership with a slaver named Jacinto José de 
Brito Romano, and with Captain Manuel Antonio Mourão. Sousa convinced the governor of 
Benguela that the latter should occupy the position of commander of the town’s Company of 
Artillery. Despite being the head for the military detachment responsible for the protection of the 
town, Captain Mourão regularly travelled to Novo Redondo to trade in slaves, ignoring his military 
                                                 
772 “Extracto de um officio de Martinho de Melo e Castro ao capitão general de Angola, Manuel de Almeida e 
Vasconcellos, datado de agosto de 1791”, in Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola”, 451-453; “Para 
Manuel de Almeida e Vasconcelos, governador e capitam general do Reino de Angola” in Oliveira, Angolana, Vol. 
1, 46. 
773 Martinho de Melo e Castro was the Portuguese Secretary of State of the Navy and Oversea Possessions (Secretário 
de Estado da Marinha e do Ultramar) from 1770 to 1795. 
774 “Para Manuel de Almeida e Vasconcelos, governador e capitam general do Reino de Angola” in Oliveira, 
Angolana, Vol. 1, 44. See also Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 133. 
775 There is a reference about a certain Doctor Eusébio Catela de Lemos as chief physician (físico-mor) of Angola in 
1754: Annaes da Socidedade Literaria Portuense (Porto: Imprensa de Alvares Ribeiro, 1837), 10 
776 “Para Manuel de Almeida e Vasconcelos, governador e capitam general do Reino de Angola” in Oliveira, 
Angolana, Vol. 1, 44.  
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duties and dedicating his time to business with his associates, which included trading with French 
smugglers on the coast of Benguela777.  
The main business partner of Secretary Sousa, however, was his father-in-law, Captain 
Costa. The Secretary of government convinced the Baron of Moçamedes to name Captain Costa 
commander of the overland trek to Cape Negro that was to move parallel to Captain Pinheiro 
Furtado’s maritime expedition. He also managed to get rid of his direct adversary in former 
Secretary Joaquim José da Silva, who was enlisted as naturalist of the land expedition commanded 
by his father-in-law. Moreover, with the inclusion of Captain Mendes in the exploration of the 
coast by land, Captain Costa’s original orders were altered778 so that he could launch slaving 
operations in Quilengues disguised as “punitive” expeditions against “rebel” sobas779. 
The expedition led by Captain Costa to Quilengues attracted the attention of the peoples in 
the interior of Benguela and excited the ambitions of traders in Benguela who awaited for news 
about new areas to exploit780. Captain Costa marched to the interior with one hundred soldiers in 
order to assemble a unit of black warriors (guerra preta) to help the expedition against the “rebel” 
sobas of Quilengues. He summoned vassal sobas to provide warriors and porters for the “royal 
service”, as well as supplies for the maintenance of his troops. These were both obligations 
predicated on the terms of vassalage that could not be denied by African vassal authorities. 
However, Captain Costa began accepting bribes (in the form of captives, ivory and beeswax) to 
free these vassals from their obligations, similar to what he had done in Nano during the wars 
against the soba of Mbailundo781. 
                                                 
777 “Para Manuel de Almeida e Vasconcelos, governador e capitam general do Reino de Angola” in Oliveira, 
Angolana, Vol. 1, 44-46. 
778 The second mission of Captain Costa in the southern backlands of Benguela consisted of exploring the Cunene 
basin and the trajectory of that major river. To carry out this venture successfully, he was given one hundred armed 
soldiers, something that according to Melo e Castro was again made possible through the intervention of his son-in-
law: “Para Manuel de Almeida e Vasconcelos, governador e capitam general do Reino de Angola” in Oliveira, 
Angolana, Vol. 1, 46. See also Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 136. 
779 “Para Manuel de Almeida e Vasconcelos, governador e capitam general do Reino de Angola” in Oliveira, 
Angolana, Vol. 1, 46-47. 
780 Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 133. 
781 “Para Manuel de Almeida e Vasconcelos, governador e capitam general do Reino de Angola” in Oliveira, 
Angolana, Vol. 1, 46-47; “Extracto de um officio de Martinho de Melo e Castro ao capitão general de Angola, Manuel 
de Almeida e Vasconcellos, datado de agosto de 1791”, in Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola”, 451. 
In one case, Captain Costa authorized the return of the soba of Quipuças (Dom Paulo in the documentation) to his 
lands in exchange of slaves for his personal gain: Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 134-135. 
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In cases where vassal sobas refused to provide warriors or pay the bribes, Captain Costa 
accused them of “rebelliousness” and enslaved their people, profiting from their sale in the market 
of São Filipe de Benguela782. Hence, instead of marching against the “rebel” sobas and “jagas” of 
Quilengues, the captain camped out in the lands of African vassals to extort them, pushing many 
to rebel against him783.    
According to accusations made against Captain Costa, he repeated his modus operandi 
after exhausting the resources of any vassal soba, moving to the lands of another vassal and 
restarting the process of exploitation. In the meantime, “rebel” African rulers kept up their attacks 
on pumbeiros crossing Quilengues with no reaction from the expedition. In Dom Melo e Castro’s 
opinion, the realization that Captain Costa only wanted to enrich himself at the expense of local 
vassals created new “rebels” amongst the African authorities of Quilengues, who saw their acts of 
“rebellion” as the only way to protect themselves from such exploitation784.  
Some vassal sobas sent complaints to the governor of Angola about the actions of Captain 
Costa in Quilengues, as did some members of the community of slave traders from São Filipe de 
Benguela, who were losing their business because of the inaction of the commander against those 
robbing their pumbeiros. Even officers under Captain Costa’s command wrote to Luanda 
complaining about their superior785. However, Secretary Sousa, his son-in-law, intercepted the 
complaints, allegedly hiding them from the governor or arguing against the accusations, if they 
came to light786.  
                                                 
782 Among the most outrageous attacks undertaken by Captain Costa against the peoples of Quilengues was his betrayal 
of the soba of Quiaca, whom the captain had approached offering vassalage and protection by Portuguese forces 
against his local enemies. Quiaca accepted the terms of vassalage and offered his warriors for “royal service”. Captain 
Costa, however, dismissed the vassal soba to return to their lands, only to attack the African ruler and his people by 
surprise when they were leaving. He attacked the vassals from behind and in the first hours in the morning, seizing all 
his belongings and enslaving his people: Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 134-135. 
783 “Para Manuel de Almeida e Vasconcelos, governador e capitam general do Reino de Angola” in Oliveira, 
Angolana, Vol. 1, 46-47; “Extracto de um officio de Martinho de Melo e Castro ao capitão general de Angola, Manuel 
de Almeida e Vasconcellos, datado de agosto de 1791”, in Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola”, 451.  
784 “Para Manuel de Almeida e Vasconcelos, governador e capitam general do Reino de Angola” in Oliveira, 
Angolana, Vol. 1, 47; “Extracto de um officio de Martinho de Melo e Castro ao capitão general de Angola, Manuel 
de Almeida e Vasconcellos, datado de agosto de 1791”, in Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola”, 452.  
785  “Para Manuel de Almeida e Vasconcelos, governador e capitam general do Reino de Angola” in Oliveira, 
Angolana, Vol. 1, 48-49. See also Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 133; Oliveira, “Primeiras explorações no sul de 
Angola”, 419-420. 
786 “Para Manuel de Almeida e Vasconcelos, governador e capitam general do Reino de Angola” in Oliveira, 
Angolana, Vol. 1, 47-48. See also, Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 136. 
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Captain Costa spent more than two years in Quilengues enslaving people for the Atlantic 
trade. After the Baron of Moçamedes summoned him back, he arrived in São Filipe de Benguela 
loaded with slaves, ivory and beeswax. Since he could not find a ship that was big enough to load 
all of his spoils of war, the commander sold part of them in the local market and embarked with 
whatever he could transport for Luanda, leaving behind the soldiers under his command. The latter 
only returned to the capital of Angola after Captain Valente visited São Filipe de Benguela, on his 
way back from Pernambuco, and transported them back to Luanda787.   
Rather than being punished for his participation in the “illegal” enslavement of African 
vassals and for having returned to Luanda with the spoils of “unjust” wars and without the soldiers 
under his command, Captain Costa was instead rewarded by the governor of Angola. The Baron 
of Moçamedes promoted him to sargento-mor and commander of the prison of Penedo, giving 
Captain Costa control over soldiers that he continued using to organize new slaving operations788.   
 
The surge of the slave trade in Benguela: the 1790s 
With the entrenchment and expansion of Portugal’s presence in the interior of Benguela 
during the second half of the eighteenth century, its slave trade on that coast increased 
dramatically. During the 1790s, slave embarkations at Benguela experienced a surge and turned 
the small town into the second largest supplier of captives in the history of the southern Atlantic 
slave trade. In fact, for a few years during the last decade of the eighteenth century, the number of 
slaves exported from Benguela surpassed even those of Luanda.  
During the 1760s and 1770s, the official slave trade from São Filipe de Benguela involved 
an annual average of 5200 captives789. Of course, this figure does not take into account the 
contraband trade in uncontrolled points of embarkation, such as Equimina and Cape Negro (Map 
                                                 
787 “Para Manuel de Almeida e Vasconcelos, governador e capitam general do Reino de Angola” in Oliveira, 
Angolana, Vol. 1, 48. See also Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 2, 136. 
788 “Para Manuel de Almeida e Vasconcelos, governador e capitam general do Reino de Angola” in Oliveira, 
Angolana, Vol. 1, 48-49. As Commander of the Penedo prison, Captain Costa continued organizing slaving operations 
disguised as “punitive” expeditions, as was the case of the attack against Mossul in 1788: Correa, História de Angola, 
Vol. 2, 140-142. 
789 Rosa Cruz e Silva, “The Saga of Kakonda and Kilengues. Relations between Benguela and its Interior, 1791-1796”, 
in José C. Curto and Paul E. Lovejoy eds., Enslaving Connections: Changing Cultures of Africa and Brazil during the 
Era of Slavery (New York: Humanity Books, 2004), 255. 
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3). The French, for instance, had greatly increased their participation in the Atlantic slave trade 
following the end of the Seven Years’ War (1763) and featured as important associates of several 
members of the community of slave traders based in Benguela. Although there is no data to create 
a precise assessment of the French contraband, Joseph C. Miller estimated that 3000 to 5000 slaves 
were involved annually, in Benguela alone, during the 1790s surge790. 
French contrabandists traded imported textiles, alcohol and especially guns for African 
slaves and ivory. As Miller explains: “South of Luanda, the inability of Portuguese traders to 
supply firearms left an unmet demand that encouraged French to ‘smuggle’, as frustrated Luanda 
governors perceived the situation, along a part of the coast where they did not have to confront 
British superiority in the weapons trade.”791 The French used alternative places of embarkation 
immediately south of São Filipe de Benguela, such as Angra de Santa Maria and Equimina, to 
trade with caravans moving through alternative routes from Quilengues792.  
In the 1780s, the governors of Benguela, Pedro José de Quevedo Homem de Magalhães 
(1784-1788) and Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcelos (July to September 1788), denounced the 
significant French presence on the coast of Benguela793. The contrabandists could even be found 
walking along the streets of São Filipe de Benguela. In 1790, the Baron Moçamedes highlighted 
that their presence in São Filipe de Benguela had become so scandalous that they could be seen 
trading in the open. When confronted, French smugglers showed no fear of punishment. One of 
them, according to the baron, stated he would leave town only when he was done with his 
business794.  
In a 1790 report sent to Luanda, local officials in Benguela informed the arrival of a French 
ship from Bordeaux, the Lampossante, captained by Pedro Paulim, which remained anchored for 
eight days in the bay facing Benguela, contradicting official orders that limited the presence of 
foreign ships to a maximum of three days. When confronted by Ensign Manuel José de Oliveira, 
Captain Paulim replied that he knew he could only stay three days, but he would stay the time he 
                                                 
790 Miller, Way of Death, 227; 603. 
791 Miller, Way of Death, 78. 
792 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 70, Doc. 12, “Relatório do governador de Benguela Pedro José de Quevedo Homem 
de Magalhães”, (4 May 1785). 
793 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 70, Doc. 5, fls. 6-7v., “Relatório do governador de Benguela Pedro José de Quevedo 
Homem de Magalhães”, (24 February 1785). 




considered necessary to finish his business. The ensign kept an eye on the Lampossante and one 
night caught the French captain in a small boat filled with contraband. After a new confrontation, 
Captain Paulim revealed that he was going to buy slaves from skipper-major (patrão-mor) of São 
Filipe and ordered his men to take up arms against the colonial patrol795.  
The French presence in West Central Africa was not a novelty. They had a strong 
participation in the slave trade in Loango and Cabinda for decades. There, even Luso-African 
traders and officials spoke good French796. The Portuguese accused the French navy of protecting 
French contrabandists on the coast north of the kingdom of Kongo. A fortified camp built in 1783 
in Cabinda was destroyed in the following year by a French naval force. This attack precipitated a 
discussion between the parts that resulted in a formal convention between Portugal and France in 
1786, in which the French agreed not to acquire slaves south of the Zaire River797.  
Despite the convention of 1786, French smugglers kept sailing along the entire coast of the 
“kingdoms” of Angola and Benguela, as far as the Cunene River798. The fight against contraband, 
the Baron of Moçamedes concluded, should be carried out on land, not at sea. It would be much 
easier to target contrabandists and their associates while they were trading on land than trying to 
patrol and seize French ships799. Nevertheless, in 1792 the colonial administration in Luanda still 
sent the old frigate Loanda to patrol the coast of Benguela800. 
Officials in Luanda pressured the governor of Benguela to take measures against 
contraband in the region, complaining that nobody was ever found guilty of collaborating with 
French traders. It was obvious that there could be no contraband without the participation of the 
moradores of Benguela. The open presence of French smugglers in this town suggested that the 
contrabandists had ties to important members of the administration and the military. Such was the 
case of Antonio da Silva Lisboa, the local judge who the governor of Benguela, Francisco Paim 
                                                 
795 Delgado, Ralph. A Famosa e Histórica Benguela: Catálogo de governadores, 1779 a 1940 (Lisboa: Edições 
Cosmos, 1940), 19. 
796 Miller, Way of Death, 37. 
797 José Maria de Lacerda, “Observações sobre a viagem da costa d’Angola a costa de Moçambique, 1797”, in Annaes 
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798  “Carta de Antonio José Pimentel e Castro, de 27 de janeiro de 1783, para Marinho de Melo e Castro”, Documento 
No. 12, in Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a colonização…, Vol. 1, 211. 
799 AHU, Angola, Códice 1628, Livro 2, 1791-1792, fls. 98v-102, “Carta para o governador de Benguela Francisco 
Paim Câmara e Ornellas”, (14 November 1791). 
800 AHU, Angola, Códice 1628, Livro 2, 1791-1792, fls. 168-169, “Carta para o governador de Benguela Francisco 
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Câmara e Ornelas (1791-1796), smeared for being a “pardo born in Africa” who protected 
contrabandists801.  
Governor Câmara e Ornelas was a military officer who became governor of Benguela after 
the tumultuous and short administration of José Maria Doutel Machado e Vasconcelos (July 1788 
to June 1789)802. Doutel e Vasconcelos was removed from the position of governor after he clashed 
with Benguela’s community of slave traders, who accused him of tyranny and corruption. The 
major businessmen (negociantes) of Benguela complained to Luanda that the governor was using 
their sertanejos as personal servants, forcing them to carry his merchandise (banzos) to buy slaves 
in the sertões803.  
The then governor of Angola ordered an inquiry (devassa) into the matter, which found the 
governor of Benguela guilty of all charges804. Doutel e Vasconcelos was subsequently arrested and 
condemned to serve his sentence in the Limoeiro prison, in Lisbon. On his way to Portugal, 
however, he was suddenly “freed by death”805. After Doutel e Vasconcelos’ arrest, Captain 
Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcelos assumed power, once again, as interim governor of Benguela 
(June 1789 to May 1791), until the governorship was assumed by Câmara e Ornelas. This episode 
demonstrated the increased power and influence of the community of slave traders based in São 
Filipe de Benguela at the end of the eighteenth century.  
The new governor of Benguela made the fight against contraband a priority, which put him 
in direct conflict with some of the main traders in Benguela. The judge of Benguela who was 
previously accused of protecting contrabandists, Antonio da Silva Lisboa, became the spokesman 
of the members of the community of slave traders in a series of denunciations against Governor 
Câmara e Ornelas, similar to the campaign they had carried out against his predecessor. The judge 
                                                 
801 Delgado, A Famosa e Histórica Benguela, 20-24. 
802 The government of Francisco Paim de Câmara e Ornelas was marked by the organization of the archives of 
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803 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 74, Doc. 49, “Devassa do Governador de Benguela José Maria Doutel d’Almeida e 
Vasconcelos”, (1790). 
804 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 74, Doc. 49, “Devassa do Governador de Benguela José Maria Doutel d’Almeida e 
Vasconcelos”, (1790). 
805 Delgado, A Famosa e Histórica Benguela, 17-18; Delgado, O Reino de Benguela, 361. 
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denounced that the governor worked against the merchant community of Benguela by using the 
powers invested in him only for personal gain. They accused him, among other things, of forcing 
sertanejos to sell him slaves for a third of their market value. He also, it was alleged, demanded 
that sertanejos and pumbeiros transport his merchandise (banzos) in exchange for authorization to 
enter the sertões. The community of slave traders of Benguela reminded the governor of Angola 
that the former governor of Benguela, José Maria Doutel Machado e Vasconcelos, had been 
arrested for following similar accusations806.  
The quarrels between the governor and the judge of Benguela upset the governor of 
Angola, who demanded that colonial officials refrain from personal disputes. “In such an 
enlightened century”, he complained, “…it is time to forget the old rivalries between civilians and 
military personnel”807. The governor of Benguela struck back: first by using his influence to 
remove the judge from his position; and secondly by having him replaced by Jerônimo Caetano de 
Araújo e Beça. Then, the governor of Benguela ordered the new judge to launch an inquiry 
(devassa) into the state of contraband in Benguela. The investigation revealed that a great part of 
the contraband trade happened in the houses of the moradores of São Filipe, including some who 
had already been caught with “illegal”, imported merchandise808.  
The investigations implicated some of the most important negociantes in Benguela 
(Joaquim José de Andrade e Silva, José Maria Arsênio de Lacerda, Sebastião Gil Vaz Lobo, and 
the infamous Captain Antonio José da Costa) as members of the contraband network. They were 
also accused of trading goods without the official royal stamp, which was “illegal” under 
Portuguese “colonial law”. All of them were arrested and later released on bail. The sertanejos 
João Coelho and Nazário Marques da Silva, who were actually caught with French contraband, 
remained under arrest and the merchandise found in their possession was seized by the colonial 
administration809.  
                                                 
806 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 76, Doc. 67, “Denúncia contra Francisco Paim da Câmara Ornelas por Antonio da 
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808 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 79, Doc. 62, “Devassa de contrabando em Benguela”, (5 December 1793). 
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The colonial administration had managed, at least temporarily, to dismantle the main 
contraband connections in Benguela responsible for deviating considerable amounts of slaves from 
the local market. In fact, the investigations had shown the involvement of some of the major traders 
in Benguela with the unauthorized trade. The impact of the dismantling of local contraband trading 
was immediate, leading to an increase in the numbers of slave exports from São Filipe de Benguela, 
as reported by the new judge in December 1793. In his opinion, the rise in slave and ivory exports 
during 1793 was, in comparison to 1791, the result of the administration’s fight against 
contraband810.  
Although the dismantling of the contraband network of São Filipe de Benguela in the early 
1790s might have aided the increase in the numbers of the slave trade, there are other factors that 
also help explain this surge. The Angolan historian Rosa Cruz e Silva has pointed to a direct 
relation between the sudden increase in the numbers of slaves exported in the first half of the 1790s 
and the intensification of “punitive” military operations carried out in Caconda and Quilengues 
during the same period. She argues that the colonial administration premeditated and designed 
conflicts with African authorities to “produce” slaves for the Atlantic slave trade. “This policy of 
intervention in the backlands furthered the production of merchandise for the slave market and 
violated the terms of several agreements signed with the indigenous peoples”811.  
Rosa Cruz e Silva focused on the connections between the Atlantic slave trade and military 
punitive operations in the interior of Benguela between 1791 and 1796, the same years that Captain 
Câmara e Ornelas governed the captaincy. During this period, the number of slaves legally 
exported from Benguela rose from 6,329 adults and 10 infants in 1791 to 10,170 adults and 17 
infants in 1795, reaching a peak in 1793 with the embarkation of 11,172 slaves and 8 infants. Prior 
to 1791, the number of slaves legally exported from Benguela had never reached more than 7,200 
slaves812. Hence, the military operations in Quilengues and Caconda authorized by Governor 
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Câmara e Ornelas were another significant factor in the surge of captives exported during the first 
half of the 1790s813.  
In the process, Governor Câmara e Ornelas swiftly made enemies on two different fronts: 
In the backlands, the increase in “punitive” expeditions agitated the people and promoted the rise 
of new warlords. The latter, in turn, took revenge on the sertanejos and pumbeiros roaming the 
interior and threatened “white” settlements, such as Salvaterra dos Magos. On the coast, French 
contrabandists became an increasing threat since the governor began his persecution against their 
associates and chased them out of town. Hence, the governor wanted to increase the military 
presence around Benguela in order to protect the town from its new enemies.  
Governor Câmara e Ornelas’ plans to reinforce the defenses of São Filipe de Benguela 
included the construction of a new fortified structure in the Catumbela region. Yet, due to 
limitations in resources, he was only able to establish three small military outposts (redutos) on 
the outskirts of town, in Marimbombo, Sombreiro and Bimbas. These redutos were meant to 
protect Benguela from both external and internal threats814. They effectively proved useful when, 
upon French pirates threatening to invade São Filipe de Benguela, probably in retaliation for 
Governor Câmara e Ornelas’ interfering in the contraband networks, the governor was forced flee 
to one of the redutos815. 
The governor of Benguela also increased the military presence in the interior colonial 
settlements. Reinforcing this military presence meant strengthening the slave trade, since military 
officers in the interior were usually deeply involved in trading. The “colonial” administration 
relied on the most successful of these slave traders to run the “provinces” as capitães-mores (in 
the case of presídios) and regentes (in the case of districtos). This was the case of Joaquim Vieira 
de Andrade, a notorious slaver who served several times as regent of Quilengues.  
 
                                                 
813 Daniel Domingues da Silva, “The Transatlantic Slave Trade from Angola: A Port-by-Port Estimate of Slaves 
Embarked, 1701-1867,” International Journal of African Historical Studies, 46, n. 1 (2013): 121-122, Appendix A, 
shows another surge in slave exports from Benguela between the years of 1836-1845.  
814 For more on redutos in the interior of Benguela, see Delgado, Ao Sul do Cuanza, Vol. 1, 102-108. 
815The governor ordered the retreat of the urban population to the reduto of Bimbas, along with the safe of the Royal 
Treasury (Cofre da Real Fazenda). See Delgado, A Famosa e Histórica Benguela, 20-24. 
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Slavers in positions of authority 
Joaquim Vieira de Andrade was part of a Luso-African family of slave traders based in 
Quilengues. His brother, João Vieira de Andrade, was listed in 1798 as the single most important 
owner of cattle among the moradores of Salvaterra dos Magos816. They had at least another brother 
actively involved in the slave trade, Elias Vieira de Andrade, who appears in some colonial 
documents leading caravans between Benguela and Quilengues817. 
The Andrade brothers were identified as “white men”, but their birthplace is not certain. 
Joaquim Vieira de Andrade was the only one serving in the military, although all of them 
eventually worked for the “royal service”, especially moving slaves and cattle belonging to the 
royal treasure or delivering official letters. Both Joaquim and João occupied the position of Regent 
of Quilengues several times during the last decade of the eighteenth century and the first decade 
of the nineteenth century818. This made the Andrade brothers some of the most important and 
powerful slavers in Quilengues for almost two decades.  
The first time Joaquim Vieira de Andrade occupied the position of Regent of Quilengues 
was in 1789 and the last was in 1808819. During this period, his family slaving enterprise moved 
thousands of people captured in Quilengues to São Filipe de Benguela. He became notorious for 
the violent and disrespectful way he treated sobas under his jurisdiction. Although most of his 
actions, including violence, did not differ much from others who came before or after him, Joaquim 
Vieira de Andrade marked a new moment in the relationship between the sobado of Socoval and 
the Portuguese “colonial” administration. It was the end of somewhat peaceful and respectful 
relations and the beginning of an aggressive advance by Luso-African slavers over the lands and 
people of Socoval, as we will see in the next chapter.  
During the 1790s, Quilengues also became increasingly important as a gateway to the 
southern sobados on the Huila/Humpata plateau, as the colonial administration sought to spread 
                                                 
816 AIHGB, DL 32, 2. 37 (Doc. 146), fls. 37-48v – “Relação dos moradores e sobas do Distrito de Quilengues” (18 
February 1798). 
817 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 101v, “Ofício dirigido ao regente de Quilengues Francisco Infante de Sequeira Correa da 
Silva”, (8 January 1802). 
818 In fact, there were cases in which one of the brothers nominated the other for a position in the colonial 
administration, see AHU, Angola, Códice 1629, Livro 3, 1792-1793, 112-112v, “Carta para o capitão mor de 
Quilengues Joaquim Vieira de Andrade”, (14 January 1793). 
819 Delgado, Ao Sul do Cuanza, Vol. 1, 306-307 
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its commercial and political sphere of influence further south. In 1791, for instance, the governor 
of Benguela struggled to find some “strong and competent candidate” to occupy the Regency of 
Quipungo820. It also became increasingly important to control the access of sertanejos and 
pumbeiros from Benguela to the northern routes of the central plateau, because from there they 
were crossing into and trading within the “kingdom of Angola”, that is, areas along the Cuanza 
River under the direct influence of Portuguese traders operating from Luanda821. 
When he was chosen for the Regency of Quilengues in 1791, Captain Andrade received 
specific instructions from the governor of Angola, Manuel de Almeida Vasconcelos (1790-1797), 
to reprimand any kind of violence against African authorities. The governor warned him also not 
to exceed his orders when collecting tribute from vassal sobas and to moderate the use of force to 
make them comply822. Despite these recommendations, Captain Andrade had many opportunities 
to exceed all limits of violence while “punishing” the “rebel” sobas in Quilengues. He attacked 
the sobas of Quiaca, Ganda and Bongo, who had engaged in hostile actions against the vassal soba 
of Lumbimbe, for which he was congratulated. As a reward, the governor of Angola ordered the 
governor of Benguela to send more soldiers and a piece of artillery to Quilengues, which should 
help to maintain “peace” in the sertões.823  
In 1792, officials in Luanda recognized Quilengues as the “most agitated province” of 
Benguela and its moradores as the favorite targets of African rulers and warlords seeking revenge. 
The governor of Angola praised the intelligence of Captain Andrade in the use of the artillery 
pieces he had sent him to fight the “rebels” and “protect” the settlement. 824 Besides the tactical 
reinforcements in Salvaterra dos Magos, the Regent of Quilengues had created a military outpost 
(reduto) in Cazua, manned by 50 soldiers. This military detachment was meant to help protect the 
peoples around it from hostile actions by “rebel” sobas and macotas825.  Yet, the governor of 
                                                 
820 AHU, Angola, Códice 1628, Livro 2, 1791-1792, fls. 19v-20, “Carta para o capitão mor de Quilengues Joaquim 
Vieira de Andrade”, (22 August 1791). 
821 AHU, Angola, Códice 1628, Livro 2, 1791-1792, fls. 13v-16v., “Carta para o governador de Benguela Francisco 
Paim Câmara e Ornellas”, (18 August 1791). 
822 AHU, Angola, Códice 1628, Livro 2, 1791-1792, fls. 19-19v., “Carta para o capitão mor de Quilengues Joaquim 
Vieira de Andrade”, (16 August 1791). 
823 AHU, Angola, Códice 1628, Livro 2, 1791-1792, fls. 19v-20, “Carta para o capitão mor de Quilengues Joaquim 
Vieira de Andrade”, (22 August 1791). 
824 AHU, Angola, Códice 1628, Livro 2, 1791-1792, fls. 168-169, “Carta para o governador de Benguela Francisco 
Paim Câmara e Ornellas”, (11 March1792). 
825 AHU, Angola, Códice 1628, Livro 2, 1791-1792, fls. 221v, “Carta para o capitão e cabo de Quilengues Hipólito 
António da Fonseca”, (15 June 1792); AHU, Angola, Códice 1629, Livro 3, 1792-1793, fl.118, “Carta para o capitão 
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Benguela still had to dispatch a second military commander to the district of Quilengues, Corporal 
Hipólito Antonio da Fonseca, to help fight any deserters who were involved in the contraband of 
slaves and provisions in Quilengues826. 
The fight against contraband promoted by the governor of Benguela, Francisco Paim da 
Câmara e Ornelas, and the expansion of military expeditions carried out by the regent of 
Quilengues, Joaquim Vieira de Andrade, were the driving forces behind the increasing number of 
slaves that reached the market of São Filipe de Benguela and boosted exports in the 1790s. Both 
the governor and the regent were members of complex networks of traders that connected the 
interior of Benguela to the Atlantic world. The main difference was that the governor of Benguela 
was an outsider trying to enrich himself as quickly as possible before leaving the country for good, 
while Captain Andrade was part of well-established social and commercial networks in Benguela. 
This would eventually put them at odds with each other.  
The governor and the regent also had different “methods” of acquiring captives. The 
governor attacked the contraband networks and channeled the slaves that were being smuggled by 
the French back to Benguela, where he had the power to control prices, quotas and the embarkation 
of the captives. The regent of Quilengues, on the other hand, squeezed local African rulers, taking 
violent measures to make them comply with his orders and often overreached his jurisdiction. 
Captain Andrade’s goal was to provoke African rulers and make them “rebel”, so as to give him a 
pretext to “punish” and enslave them. Thus, at the turn of the nineteenth century, the slave trade 
continued to dominate the Portuguese colonial project throughout the entire region in the backlands 




                                                 
e cabo de Quilengues Hipólito António Fonseca” (26 Jan 1793); AHU, Angola, Códice 1630, Livro 4, 1793-1794, fl. 
53v, “Carta para o comandante do reduto de Cazua, em Quilengues” (December 1793). 
826 Some moradores in Quilengues exploited the food market in Benguela by buying all of the local provisions 
available, such as beans, corn and manioc, and reselling them at a much higher price in the urban coastal centre. The 
Portuguese colonial administration began to considered this procedure illegal and reinforced military patrols in the 
interior to hinder such practice: AHU, Angola, Códice 1628, Livro 2, 1791-1792, fls. 39-39v., “Carta para o capitão 




The rise of São Filipe de Benguela as one of the main slaving towns of the Atlantic in the 
eighteenth century hinged on internal political, social and environmental transformations, as well 
as the military actions of Portuguese slavers in the previous century. As this chapter has shown, 
the association of foreign slavers with Mbangala warlords and other local authorities allowed the 
development of the trade through constant wars and the displacement of people living in regions 
such as Quilengues. As mentioned previously, there is sufficient documentary evidence to affirm 
there was an important participation of Mbangala bands “hunting” slaves in the so-called 
“kingdom of Benguela” during the centuries of conquest, which contradicts the argument made 
recently by a historian of Benguela827.  
On the other hand, this chapter has also shown that Quilengues remained a major supplier 
of slaves for the Atlantic trade throughout the eighteenth century, due to the penetration of Luso-
African traders far into the interior of Benguela and the development of long-distance trade. This 
further corroborates recent historiography on the Atlantic slave trade from the West Central 
African coast828 and its criticism of Miller’s classic thesis about the expansion of the “slaving 
frontier” deep into the interior of Central Africa829. Nevertheless, this does not completely reject 
the process of interiorization of the slave trade as proposed by Miller, and Birmingham before him, 
but rather shows the persistence of violent slaving operations, including raids against peoples 
living under Portuguese influence, many of whom subjected to the authority of African vassals.  
The accounts of raids and slaving operations in Quilengues presented here evidences the 
continuation of hostilities against African rulers, even after they accepted vassalage. Hence, one 
should not be surprised by accusations against Portuguese officials, and slavers, of use of their 
power to advance personal interests or by references of attacks against Africans supposedly 
protected by their status as “vassals”830. It was not a matter of “incoherence of the legislation”831, 
as Candido has suggested, but a deliberate strategy to generate profit and enhance the Atlantic 
                                                 
827 Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 41.  
828 Curto, “Rethinking the Origin of Slaves in West Central Africa”, 23-47; Silva, The Atlantic Slave Trade from West 
Central Africa, 18-19, 73-99; Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 198-214; Ferreira, Cross-
Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World, 52-87. 
829 Miller, Way of Death, 140-169. 
830 Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 175-188. 
831 Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 204.  
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slave trade. Vassalage, as we will see in the next chapter, was a tricky concept that could have 
several meanings in the context of the expansion of Portuguese presence in Benguela.  
The surge in the Atlantic slave trade at the end of the eighteenth century was analysed here 
as having two main causes. First, the fight against contraband and the channeling of slaves 
previously smuggled by English, French and Portuguese traders allowed the rise in the numbers 
of the commerce, as argued by Judge Araújo e Beça in 1793. Second, and at the same time, the 
increase in slaving operations in Quilengues and Caconda, disguised as “punitive” expeditions 
against “rebel” sobas, produced great numbers of captives, thus raising the position of São Filipe 
de Benguela into one of the major slaving towns in the Atlantic, as highlighted by Rosa Cruz e 
Silva in 1999832.  
Finally, the chapter also shows that, contrary to what Daniel Domingues da Silva has 
recently argued, the slave trade in Benguela did not start “after Portuguese attempts to find copper 
mines in the interior of Benguela had failed”833. Rather, the exploration of these supposed mines 
was an excuse for the real goal of the pioneers of the slave trade in the region, namely Captain 
Manuel Cerveira Pereira and Captain Lopo Soares Lasso. Thus, contrary to what some have 
suggested834, I argue that Captain Cerveira Pereira did not fail in his attempts to find the copper 
mines in the interior of Benguela, but succeeded in his true and personal mission of developing 
the Atlantic slave trade from that coast.  
  
                                                 
832 Silva, “The Saga of Kakonda and Kilengues”, 249-263; See also Rosa Cruz e Silva, “Benguela e Brasil no final 
do século XVIII: relações comerciais e políticas”, in Angola e Brasil nas rotas do Atlântico Sul, Selma Pantoja and 
José Flávio Saraiva, eds. (Rio de Janeiro: Bertrand Brasil, 1999), 127-142. 
833 Silva, The Atlantic Slave Trade from West Central Africa, 96. 




Conquest, vassalage and African political power 
 
The colonial occupation of Angola was a Portuguese project that took centuries to 
materialize. The historical process that historians often call “the conquest of Angola” stretched 
from the foundation of Luanda in 1575 to the downfall of the kingdom of Ndongo in 1671, the 
year of the defeat of Ngola-a-Ari at his kilombo in Pungo-a-Ndongo835. Nonetheless, the defeat of 
the ngola of Ndongo did not result in the consolidation of Portuguese colonial power. It would 
take more than 200 years for the effective occupation of the colony to materialize, followed by the 
dismantling of the supremacy of African rulers.    
In the case of Benguela and its interior, I argue that the region remained a “conquest” until 
the “wars of pacification” of the early twentieth century836, in spite of the narrative of “colonial 
control” found in Portuguese historiography and cartography from the seventeenth to the 
nineteenth century (Chapter 1). Despite colonialist terminology in seventeenth and eighteenth-
century sources concerning the “colony of Angola”, reproduced and reinforced by colonialist 
historians of the nineteenth century, the reality on the ground was that of a territory under constant 
dispute837.  
Until the consolidation of this Portuguese colonial project, African authorities maintained 
their sovereignty, even when subjected as vassals. Therefore, although documents from the 
seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries produced by Portuguese scientists and colonial officials 
were clearly “colonialist” in the way they portrayed the so-called “Captaincy of Benguela”, 
African polities within places like Quilengues were not part of this “colony”. In other words, 
Portuguese “colonial” sources detailing their presence in the interior of Benguela did not relate to 
                                                 
835 This periodization became a paradigm in the historiography of Angola in English with David Birmingham’s work 
in the 1960s. There are other dates accepted for the “conquest of Angola”, such as its “liberation” from the Dutch 
invasion (1648) or the subjugation of Matamba (1683).  
836 The Angolan “wars of pacification” are formally understood as the colonial conflicts that took place between the 
Conference of Berlin (1884-1885) and the end of the First World War (1918)   
837 I have argued elsewhere that although the colonization of Angola was a project of the Portuguese Crown since the 
sixteenth century, it was only consolidated after the proclamation of the Portuguese Republic in the twentieth century. 
The creation of colonial institutions (such as the Serviço dos Negócios Indígenas, 1913) and the promulgation of 
colonial laws (Lei Orgânica da Administração Civil das Províncias Ultramarinas, 1917) dedicated to the usurpation 
of power from African authorities marked the beginning of the effective colonization of Angola: Estevam C. 
Thompson, “Fontes coloniais para uma história pré-colonial de Benguela, sécs. XVII a XIX”, Africana Studia, No. 25 
(2015): 42-45.  
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effective “Portuguese colonial territories”, since these territories remained largely under the 
control of local African rulers838.  
Moreover, the consolidation of Portuguese and Luso-African influence and power over 
African rulers in the interior of Benguela through the signing of treaties of vassalage did not mean 
the complete subordination of African authorities to colonial power, nor the dismissal of the 
autonomy and authority of these rulers within their territories. As we will see below, the acceptance 
of vassalage could, paradoxically, mean the independence of vassal African polities from other 
local rulers and their protection against local enemies. Hence, this chapter points to traces of 
African resistance where colonialist historians tend to see subjugation.  
Therefore, I argue that the acceptance of vassalage could be advantageous to some African 
rulers who required protection against local enemies and desired access to imported goods that 
could help spread their political capital and influence, as seen in the previous chapter. Besides, the 
confirmation of their sovereignty by Portuguese forces played an important role in maintaining 
power in relation to other African authorities.  
If the opening of trade routes and diplomatic relations with Portuguese and Luso-African 
itinerant traders could bring advantages to African rulers in the interior of Benguela, it could also 
create dangerous situations. Slavers operating in the region did not respect the independence and 
the authority of African rulers or the orders of their superiors to avoid conflicts. This chapter 
discusses the “legality” behind the military expeditions organized by the regents of Quilengues at 
the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries. It also discusses the supposed 
“legal” protection given to the freeborn subjects of Portuguese vassals in the interior of Benguela. 
Finally, it focuses on a series on inquiries about the conflicts between slave traders in control of 
the administration of Quilengues and the soba of Socoval. According to the documentation at hand, 
the Portuguese considered the soba of Socoval their most important and loyal African ally in 
Quilengues until the last decade of the eighteenth century, when the relationship changed 
drastically and he was henceforth accused of being a “rebel”. Recurrent attacks and raids organized 
by the regent of Quilengues, and disguised as “punitive expeditions”, against the soba of Socoval 
                                                 
838 This argument is developed in Thompson, “Fontes coloniais para uma história pré-colonial de Benguela”, 33-69. 
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led to the apprehension of much cattle and the enslavement of freeborn individuals who were later 
sold as slaves to Brazil.   
The recurrent attacks and raids against the soba of Socoval and his people evidence that 
many of those individuals exported as slaves during the peak of the slave trade in Benguela at the 
end of the eighteenth century came from areas relatively close to the coast. The wars against 
Socoval show that the expansion of the “slaving frontier” deep into the interior did not necessarily 
mean the development of peaceful commercial relations with vassals and other African authorities, 
as argued by some Angolanists839. I have already raised these points in Chapter 3 and they will be 
reinforced in this chapter. I will conclude by arguing for the existence of multiple “waves” of 
enslavement within the boundaries of the “slaving frontier” during its expansion into West Central 
Africa, and for the presence of a great number of people from Quilengues among the enslaved 
exported to Brazil during the surge of the Atlantic slave trade in the last decade of the eighteenth 
century.   
 
Problematizing the idea of a colony 
As discussed in the Introduction of this dissertation, the Portuguese developed different 
forms of occupation in the African territories they “visited”, depending on the political and 
commercial characteristics of each one of these places. Hence, they built “trading posts” (feitorias) 
in Cacheu and Bissau in West Africa, aimed exclusively at trading with local authorities, without 
much investment in inland military penetration. In the uninhabited islands of Cape Verde, on the 
other hand, they built a “colony” where nobles (fidalgos) moved to with their families and serfs 
with the intension of reproducing Portuguese society in the Atlantic, as they had done previously 
in Madeira and in the Azores. In West Central Africa, they engaged in a long-term “conquest”, 
with massive military investments, aimed at subjugating local rulers and occupying their lands840.  
                                                 
839 As I have previously argued, although Joseph C. Miller developed the “slaving frontier thesis”, David Birmingham 
had previously developed the main ideas on displacement resulting from wars in the interior and the establishment of 
peaceful relationships with African communities living close to the coast: David Birmingham, Trade and Conflict in 
Angola: The Mbundu and Their Neighbours Under the Influence of the Portuguese, 1483-1790 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1966), 133-161; Joseph C. Miller, Way of Death: Merchant Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade, 
1730-1830 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 140-169.  See also Chapter 3 above. 
840 José Joaquim Lopes de Lima, Ensaios sobre a statistica das possessões portuguezas na África Occidental e 
Oriental; Ásia Occidental; China, e na Oceania, Vol. 3 (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1846), 93. 
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By questioning the idea of Angola, including Benguela and its interior, as a colony before 
the twentieth century, my intention is not to relativize the Portuguese early presence amongst and 
exploitation of the peoples of West Central Africa, but rather to problematize the long historical 
process of colonization of these territories. Although the Portuguese colonial project formally 
existed, its completion depended on the definitive subjugation of African authorities in the interior 
and the effective occupation of their territories. Hence, my intention is to contextualize the slow 
progression of conquest and the usurpation of the sovereignty of African rulers, as well as to 
highlight local resistance to this colonial project. 
In the case of Angola, following the defeat of Ngola-a-Ari in the seventeenth century, the 
Portuguese did not gain authority over the territory of Ndongo, but rather earned the chance to 
support the rise of a ruler favorable to their cause as the new ngola841. Until the end of the 
nineteenth century, the “Angolan” territory under direct Portuguese influence represented only a 
narrow slab of territory between the left (south) margin of the Dande River and the right (north) 
margin of the Cuanza River842 (Map 3). In the case of Benguela and its backlands, this direct 
influence was restricted to a narrow strip of land connecting São Filipe on the coast to Caconda in 
the interior, through a small corridor in northern Quilengues through Salvaterra dos Magos843. As 
with Angola to the north, Luso-Africans in Benguela relied on African allies inland to access the 
sertões, as well as to help reprehend those who resisted their presence in the backlands.  
So, when did the “conquest” become a “colony”?   
                                                 
841 David Birmingham, The Portuguese Conquest of Angola (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 1, coined the 
expression “puppet-ngola” to refer to Ndongo rulers placed in power with the support of the Portuguese and who, for 
that reason, favored their presence in Angola. This concept can be transplanted to Benguela, where the Portuguese 
also sought to place “puppet-sobas” in power.  
842 “Carta de João Correia de Sousa ao Marquês de Frecilha”, No. 7 (3 June 1622), in Monumenta Missionaria 
Africana (henceforth MMA): África Ocidental, 1622-1630, 1st series, Vol. 7, Antonio Brásio, ed. (Lisboa: Agência 
Geral do Ultramar, 1956), 17-24. The exception is Muxima, on the south side of the Cuanza River. See Map 3. See 
also José C. Curto, “Notas sobre alguns documentos inexplorados para a história de Angola: Os róis dos confessados 
de 1704”, Revista Relegens Thréskeia, Vol. 9, No 2 (2020): 254-269, in press.  
843 Although Quilengues was a territory located close to the coast and theoretically under Portuguese/Luso-African 
direct influence, Governor Botelho de Vasconcelos was aware that there was much unknown about it. He blamed it 
on the lack of communication with most of the regions he considered part of Quilengues, which included Huila, 
Humbe and Cape Negro, and argued that only the spread of sertanejos throughout the interior could solve this problem: 
Alexandre José Botelho de Vasconcelos, “Descripção da Capitania de Benguella, suas Províncias, Povos, Rios mais 
caudelosos, Minas de Ferro, e Enxofre, e outras particularidades que tem, mais consideráveis, por Alexandre José 
Botelho de Vasconcellos, 5º governador, em Benguella 1º d’Agosto em 1799”, Annaes Marítimos e Coloniaes, 4ª. 
Série, Parte Não Oficial (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1844), 148.  
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Obviously, colonialist historians tend to argue for the existence of a Portuguese colony in 
Angola before the nineteenth century844, but reality on the ground contradicts this narrative. Most 
of the lands claimed as colonial territory were, in fact, unknown to them845, but for a small number 
of sertanejos and pumbeiros who dared enter the sertões. Despite the recurrent narrative of 
“colonial control”, a careful assessment of the documentation shows a different reality.   
As I have argued previously, I consider the Captaincy of Benguela846 to be a “Conquista” 
until the beginning of the twentieth century847, despite continuous attempt by colonial officials and 
                                                 
844 Among nineteenth and twentieth century colonial writers who consider Angola a colony before the nineteenth 
century, one finds: J. C. Feo Cardozo de Castellobranco Torres, Memórias contendo a biographia do vice-almirante 
Luiz da Mota Feo Torres: A história dos governadores e capitaens generaes de Angola, desde 1575 até 1825 (Paris: 
Fantin, 1825);  Antonio Joaquim Guimarães Jr., Memória sobre a exploração da costa ao sul de Benguella, na África 
Occidental, e fundação do primeiro estabelecimento commercial na Bahia de Mossamedes (Lisboa, Typographia de 
L.C.A., 1842);  Joaquim Antonio de Carvalho e Menezes, Demonstração geográphica e política do território 
portuguez da Guiné Inferior, que abrange o reino de Angola, Benguella e suas dependências (Lisboa: Typographia 
Classica de F.A. de Almeida, 1848); Augusto Saldanha, Quarenta e cinco dias em Angola: apontamentos de viagem 
(Porto: Typographia de Sebastião José Pereira, 1862); Joachim John Monteiro, Angola and the River Congo, 2 Vols. 
(London: MacMillan and Co., 1875); João de Andrade Corvo, Estudo sobre as províncias ultramarinas, Vol. 1 
(Lisboa: Academia Real de Ciências, 1883); José Falcão, A Questão do Zaire (Coimbra: J. Diogo Pires, 1883); 
Augusto Bastos, “Traços gerais sobre a Ethnographia do Districto de Benguella”, Boletim da Sociedade de 
Geographia de Lisboa, série 26, (1908): 5-15, 44-56, 81-99, 135-140, 154-176, 197-207; Francisco Castelbranco, 
História de Angola: desde o descobrimento até a implantação da República, 1482-1910 (Luanda, Typographia a 
Luzitania, 1932); Alfredo Albuquerque Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a ocupação e início do estabelecimento 
dos Portugueses no Congo, Angola e Benguela, extraído de documentos históricos (Coimbra: Imprensa da 
Universidade, 1933); Ralph Delgado, História de Angola, 3 Vols. (Luanda: Banco de Angola, 1948); Raimundo da 
Cunha Matos, Compêndio histórico das possessões de Portugal na África (Rio de Janeiro: Arquivo Nacional, [c. 1835] 
1963); Carlos Couto, Os Capitães-Mores de Angola no Século XVIII (Luanda: Instituto de Investigação Científica de 
Angola, 1972).  
845 In the general introduction to his six-volume collection about the Portuguese oversea possessions, Lima, Ensaios 
sobre a statistica..., II, registered the Portuguese lack of knowledge about the interior of Angola and Benguela. He 
argued that it was better to “confess what one does not know” than “to conjecture what one does not know, and make 
the conjecture pass as verified knowledge”. Isabel Castro Henriques, Percursos da Modernidade em Angola. 
Dinâmicas Comerciais e Transformações Sociais no Século XIX (Lisbon: Instituto de Investigação Científica e 
Tropical, 1997), 250, points out that although Lopes de Lima gathered geographical information about the lands under 
Portuguese control, he did not take interest in independent lands, that is unknown territories. 
846 As defined in Chapter 1, the “Captaincy of Benguela”, often cited in eighteenth-century documents and cartography 
as the “Kingdom of Benguela”, was divided into seven “provinces”: Benguela, Quilengues, Caconda, Huambo, 
Bailundo, Bihé and Galangue. These provinces were founded in 1769 by Governor Sousa Coutinho in an attempt to 
increase Portuguese control over itinerant traders and deserters who roamed the interior of Benguela. By establishing 
“white” settlements inland, this governor hoped to contain their mobility and actions, which often conflicted with 
Portuguese plans of colonization. Although the Portuguese colonial administration in São Filipe de Benguela 
considered all of these “provinces” within its jurisdiction, most were actually under the direct control of local African 
rulers. Some, such as the southern portion of Quilengues, would not be reached by pumbeiros or black itinerant traders 
until the nineteenth century. 
847 This is an argument shared by other historians of Angola. Douglas Wheeler argued that the Portuguese colonial 
structure in Angola was only in fully operational in the 1930s, with the promulgation of the Acto Colonial (1930) and 
of the Carta Orgânica do Império Colonial Português e Reforma Administrativa Ultramarina (1933): Douglas 
Wheeler and René Pelissier, Angola (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971), 130. According to Henriques, Percursos 
da Modernidade em Angola, 45, the proclamation of Salazar’s dictatorship in 1926 permitted a swift reform of colonial 
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historians to portray it as a “colony” 848. By problematizing the classification of Benguela and its 
interior as a colony, I seek to give nuance to the slow process of subjugation of African vassals, 
who became subaltern rulers but did not lose authority over their lands and peoples. As could be 
expected, my argument is not shared by all Angolanist historians. 
According to Jan Vansina, the colonial conquest is “the date when administrative control 
began to be exercised by tax collection, by the nomination of local authorities, and often by the 
conducting of a census”. He added that “in most cases, the colonial period started with a genuine 
conquest followed by military occupation”849. As this chapter shows, however, military victories 
over and taxation of local authorities were not sufficient to guarantee “a genuine conquest”, as 
Vansina argued, and the occupation of the interior of Benguela, nor the creation of a colony.  
Mariana P. Candido has recently argued that “the indigenous population of Benguela and 
its hinterland was under colonial subjugation well before the end of the nineteenth century”. She 
later concluded that “Benguela in the seventeenth century was already a colony, with a bureaucracy 
in place and authorities and policies emphasized in territorial occupation and exploration”. Hence, 
she considers Benguela and its backlands a Portuguese colony from the “first attempts to impose 
territorial control, extract taxes and set up a colonial bureaucracy”850. 
Candido has also affirmed that the inhabitants of Benguela, including “settlers, officials 
and the indigenous population”, were part of an “‘imagined community’ of the Portuguese empire, 
where Christian values prevailed over local customs and religious systems”851. This interpretation, 
however, does not resonate with the constant complains from officials about the settlers’ tendency 
to distance themselves from Portuguese values, including the use of the Portuguese language and 
the Christian faith852.   
                                                 
policies. The dictatorship did not reject any colonial procedures established by the first Republic, but attempted to 
make them more effective.  
848 As argued in Henriques, Percursos da Modernidade em Angola, 18, 29, the process of production of knowledge 
about Africa remained profoundly dependent of the colonial ideology and the colonial wars until 1974, when the 
dictatorship ended.  
849 Jan Vansina, Paths in the Rainforest: Toward a History of Political Tradition in Equatorial Africa (Madison: 
University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), 21-22. 
850 Mariana P. Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World: Benguela and its Hinterland (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013), 6, 87, 313. 
851 Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 43. 
852 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 52, Doc. 45, “Bando que ordena as feiras nos sertões de Benguela e Caconda”, (23 
September 1768); “Carta de D. Francisco Inocêncio de Sousa Coutinho para Francisco Xavier de Mendonça Furtado”, 
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Soon after his arrival in Luanda, the governor of Angola, Antonio Álvares da Cunha (1753-
1758), complained to his superiors in Lisbon that settlers had forgotten “the religion, the language 
and the customs of our nation” and that they followed the “gentile laws” and only spoke 
Kimbundu853. The widespread use of Kimbundu and the acceptance of African customs and 
religious practices among the “white” population of Luanda remained a concern for Portuguese 
officials throughout the eighteenth century and beyond.  
In the following decade, Governor Sousa Coutinho denounced that even “white” noble 
families in Luanda did not teach Portuguese to their children. The latter grew up without the 
knowledge contained in “good books”, deprived of religious teachings, and knowing only the 
language of the “Ambundos” (Kimbundu)854. Sousa Coutinho believed that Portugal’s “civilizing 
mission” in Angola depended on the spread of the Portuguese language. In 1765, this governor 
issued a decree demanding that parents teach Portuguese to their children and speak it as the 
language of communication at home, including with their slaves855. 
Colonial historian Carlos Couto stated that the “white” settlers of Luanda spoke Portuguese 
as if they were foreigners (hóspedes) and Kimbundo as good as Africans. Even worse, in his 
opinion, “white” girls were raised by African women without ordinary domestic skills (prendas) 
and departed from the Christian faith, not being able to either understand or speak Portuguese856. 
The participation of “whites” in African religious rituals, identified as “witchcraft” in the sources, 
was also widespread in Angola, to the point that it triggered investigations from the Holy 
Inquisition857.  
                                                 
No. 3 (24 November 1768), in Alfredo Albuquerque Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a colonização dos planaltos 
e litoral do sul de Angola, Vol. 1 (Lisboa: Agência Geral das Colônias, 1940), 160-162.  
853 Couto, Os Capitães-Mores de Angola no Século XVIII, 65-66 – note 97.  
854 Couto, Os Capitães-Mores de Angola no Século XVIII, 65-66 – note 97. See also Jan Vansina, “Portuguese vs. 
Kimbundu: Language Use in the Colony of Angola, 1575-c.1845”, Bulletin des Seances Académie Royale des Sciences 
d’Outre-Mer. Mededelingen der Zittingen; Koninklijke Academie voor Overzeese Wetenchappen, Vol. 47 (2001): 268.  
855 Liliana Inverno, “A transição de Angola para o português: uma história sociolinguística”, in Luis Reis Torgal; 
Fernando Tavares Pimenta; Julião Soares de Sousa, eds. Comunidades Imaginadas: nação e nacionalismos em África 
(Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra, 2008), 122.  
856 Couto, Os Capitães-Mores de Angola no Século XVIII, 66. 
857 For more on the Inquisition in Angola, see José da Silva Horta, “A Inquisição em Angola e Congo: o inquérito de 
1596-98 e o papel mediador das justiças locais”, Arqueologia do Estado: primeiras jornadas sobre formas de 
organização e exercício de poderes na Europa do Sul, séculos XIII-XVIII, Vol. 1 (Lisboa: História e Crítica, 1988), 
387-415; Francisco Bethencourt and Philip Havik, “A África e a Inquisição portuguesa: novas perspectivas”, Revista 
Lusófona de Ciência das Religiões, No. 5/6, Ano III (2004): 21-27; Selma Pantoja, “Inquisição, degredo e mestiçagem 
em Angola no século XVIII”, Revista Lusófona de Ciência das Religiões, No. 5/6, Ano III (2004): 117-136; Daniela 
Buono Calainho, “Africanos penitenciados pela Inquisição portuguesa”, Revista Lusófona de Ciência das Religiões, 
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Hence, although the Portuguese attempted to enforce the use of the Portuguese language 
and of Christian beliefs, Kimbundu remained the most important language in their “colonial 
capital” and its interior until the twentieth century858. The belief that the Portuguese language was 
dominant among their supposed “African subjects” reflects a myth of an early, long and enduring 
presence of the Portuguese in Africa859. Historical data, however, indicates that the Portuguese 
language became generalized among the population of Angola only after its independence in 
1975860.  
The same was true for the town of São Filipe and the backlands of Benguela. Although 
Umbundu, referred to simply as the “Bunda language” in eighteenth century sources, was used in 
parts of the coast and the central plateau, the peoples of the sertões (Quilengues, Seles, Huila, 
Humbe, Cape Negro, etc.) effectively spoke different languages. Those living within Quilengues, 
as well as those in Dombe (Ndombe), were also able to speak Umbundu861. Moreover, there 
developed local creole languages, such as olumbali, in settlements like Moçamedes following 
1840. Hence, as was the case further north in Angola, the use of local African languages862 was 
customary in Benguela and its backlands until the twentieth century863. 
Therefore, I contend that the Portuguese “imagined community” in Benguela and its 
interior existed only “in the minds of the bureaucrats in Lisbon”, as suggested by Candido 
herself864. I tend to agree with Selma Pantoja’s conclusion that the “white” population in places 
such as Luanda and São Filipe de Benguela did not maintain and reproduce much of the Portuguese 
culture, but rather “Africanized” themselves865. And in the interior of these coastal urban centres, 
the situation was even more acute. 
                                                 
Ano III, No. 5/6 (2004): 47-63; Kalle Kananoja, “Healers, Idolaters and Good Christians: A Case Study of Creolization 
and Popular Religion in Mid-Eighteenth Century Angola”, International Journal of African Historical Studies, Vol. 
43, No. 3 (2010): 443-465. See also James H. Sweet, Recreating Africa: Culture, Kinship and Religion in the African-
Portuguese World, 1441-1770 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 42-54. 
858 Vansina, “Portuguese vs. Kimbundu”, 270. See also Inverno, “A transição de Angola para o português”, 121.  
859 René Pélissier, História das campanhas de Angola: resistência e revoltas, 1845-1941 (Lisboa: Ed. Estampa, [1986] 
2001), 18. See also Henriques, Percursos da Modernidade em Angola, 38-39. 
860 Inverno, “A transição de Angola para o português”, 117-118.  
861 Bastos, “Traços gerais sobre a Ethnographia do Districto de Benguella”, 6-7. 
862 According to Bastos, “Traços gerais sobre a Ethnographia do Districto de Benguella”, 8-9, those who could speak 
the “dialect of Angola” (Kimbundu) did not know the language spoken in Benguela (Umbundu).  
863 Inverno, “A transição de Angola para o português”, 122-123.  
864 Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 43. 
865 Pantoja, “Inquisição, degredo e mestiçagem em Angola no século XVIII”, 131.  
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Alliances with a shadow of dominance: the treaties of vassalage 
The Portuguese had a very clear project to conquer and colonize Angola upon arriving in 
Luanda during the last quarter of the sixteenth century. As Delgado admitted, they disembarked 
with the objective of imposing dominance over local African polities by forcing them to accept 
vassalage866. Why, however, did it take them centuries for the realization of this colonial project? 
A combination of African resistance and Portuguese logistic/material limitations explains the long 
historical process necessary for the emergence of the colony.  
According to the Portuguese colonialist narrative, the “kingdoms” of Angola and Benguela 
belonged to Portugal as “rights of conquest”. The Portuguese attempted to consolidate these rights 
through vassalage treaties imposed upon African authorities, usually after a military victory. For 
many African authorities, as we have seen in Chapter 3, accepting the terms of vassalage was an 
offer they could not refuse867. These African rulers not only had their lives spared, earning the 
chance to fight another day, but were also granted “legal” title to their lands868. This happened 
because the Portuguese could not control conquered territories for long: the logistic difficulties 
were just too great to overcome.  
The lack of personnel and the difficulties of transport and communication with coastal 
settlements proved to be major problems for the Portuguese colonial project in the interior of 
Benguela. This led them to sew alliances with local authorities who could help acquire men to 
fight and to transport their gear; both obligations for those who accepted vassalage869. Interpreters 
and guides, essential for expeditions inland, were also enlisted from local rulers. As we will see in 
                                                 
866 Ralph Delgado, História de Angola, Vol. 1 (Luanda: Banco de Angola, 1948), 10. 
867 Elias Alexandre da Silva Correa, História de Angola, Vol. 1 (Lisboa: Editora Ática, [1787-1792] 1937), 200, 
labelled the acceptance of vassalage by defeated African rulers a “sacred absolution”.   
868 By invoking the statute of “vassals”, sobas maintained their political autonomy and sovereignty even in relation to 
new “colonial” ambitions: Catarina Madeira Santos, “Escrever o poder: os autos de vassalagem e a vulgarização da 
escrita entre as elites africanas Ndembu”, Revista de História, Vol. 155, No. 2 (2006): 93.  
869 The supply of soldiers and porters for the “royal service” was a vassal obligation. Itinerant traders who required 
porters for their caravans, however, had to pay sobas for this service. Slavers working for the Portuguese “colonial” 
administration, especially capitães-mores, used their position of authority to avoid paying for local porters in their 
private business dealings, although the practice was prohibited and sometimes denounced by the governors: BNL, 
Códice 8744, fls. 69-73, “Portaria sobre o pagamento dos negros” (7 December 1770); BNL, Códice 8744, fls. 44v-
45- “Carta circular para todos os capitães mores dos presídios e distritos” (3 October 1770). African vassals in the 
interior of Angola, however, often refused to provide soldiers for the “royal service”, and there was little the 
Portuguese could do to avoid such disobedience: John K. Thornton, Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 1500-1800 (London: 
UCL Press, 1999), 119. See also Chapter 3 above. 
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the following chapter, the refusal on the part of the African authorities to comply with these terms 
could bring any Portuguese “colonial” project to a halt.  
The treaties of vassalage in Angola and Benguela resembled those in medieval Portugal, 
notwithstanding the adaptations that they underwent in the African context870. It preserved, for 
one, the relation of mutual respect found in the European case. Hence, despite constituting an act 
of submission, vassalage should not mean the complete annihilation of one’s authority and 
autonomy871. At least in theory, a vassal should have his authority respected even when he became 
a prisoner of war872. Obviously, such supposed formal protection did not always materialize, as 
many African vassals continued to be raided by military expeditions led by Portuguese and Luso-
African slavers, even when complying with terms of the treaties. Nevertheless, at least formally, 
the Portuguese crown demanded that its “colonial” officials treat African vassals as free and 
sovereign polities and respect their customs and laws873.  
The relation of dependency established between a lord and a vassal, according to European 
medieval standards, should not be based on coercion either874. The vassal should accept it in good 
will, which in the African context often became a contradiction since the majority of vassals had 
previously been defeated in war. This led to the development of markers to identify different forms 
of vassalage. The Portuguese thus labeled Africans “volunteer vassals” or “conquered vassals” to 
help distinguish the sobas who behaved willingly as subjects of Portugal from those who had only 
                                                 
870 Santos, “Escrever o poder”, 127, argues that the terms of the vassalage treaties in Angola maintained the same 
basic format and presented great regularity throughout the centuries.    
871 According to Beatrix Heintze, “The Angolan Vassal Tributes of the seventeenth century”, Revista de História 
Economica e Social, No. 6 (1980): 57-58, “… Portuguese rule controlled external relations of chiefdoms and 
interfered, sometimes incisively though never directly, in their military and commercial autonomy and more directly 
in their religious self-determination. Territorial boundaries, however, remained untouched and likewise internal 
autonomy was de jure and, in the 17th century, mostly de facto”.  
872 Even as prisoners of war, African rulers banished to Brazil in the early seventeenth century paradoxically 
maintained their status as “free men”, as informed by the governor of Angola, João Correa de Sousa, to the general 
governor of Brazil, Diogo de Mendonça Furtado: “Carta Régia ao governador do Brasil”, No. 21 (12 December 
1622) in MMA, 1st series, Vol. 7, 66.  
873 Beatrix Heintze, Angola nos séculos XVI e XVII (Viseu: Kilombelombe, 2007), 397-426; Miller, Way of Death, 
265; Couto, Os Capitães-Mores de Angola no Século XVIII, 252-254. 
874 After the dissolution of Angola as a private captaincy (1607), the Portuguese crown decided to manage the 
conquered territories through an appointed governor. It also ordered the abolition of the “amo” institution and the 
cancellation of any grants of African rulers to Portuguese representatives. The “amo” institution, created at the time 
of Paulo Dias de Novais, meant that African potentates and their lands were transferred as hereditary possession in 
sesmarias. After 1607, African vassals were placed under the control of the crown and were to be ruled by “mild and 
gentle means and without force” so as not to disrupt the slave trade. The vassal tribute, largely rendered in slaves, was 
transferred to the royal treasury: Heintze, “The Angolan Vassal Tributes of the seventeenth century”, 58-60.  
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accepted vassalage to escape a tragic end, and who often “rebelled” after the departure of the 
Portuguese forces from their lands875.  
Besides the vassalage treaties876, the Portuguese established “peace” or “friendship” 
treaties with strong African rulers who they did not have the means to conquer. This was the case 
with the soba of Socoval, as we will see below. These “peace treaties” were rare and, in theory, 
could only be signed with explicit authorization of the Portuguese crown. They were thus different 
from vassalage, which could be granted by any Portuguese official and, in some cases, even mere 
traders (Chapter 3)877.    
Finally, it is important to consider that the treaties of vassalage were not instruments of 
domination completely unknown to Africans, since analogous political treaties composed the 
repertoire of diplomatic relations in West Central Africa long before the arrival of Europeans. The 
hierarchy imposed by the Portuguese vassalage treaties indeed added to the African forms of 
hierarchy878. The payment of tribute, for instance, was a common demand of powerful African 
rulers who subjugated others879.  
It was not difficult for the Portuguese to adapt their medieval vassalage treaties to African 
forms of subjugation and dominance. Indeed, the repetitive use of the culture of vassalage in Africa 
validated and revitalized it as a “colonial tool”880. Over time, the Portuguese adapted the original 
meanings and procedures of vassalage to the African context, as was the case of the medieval ritual 
                                                 
875 There was also the generic use of the term “vassal” in the Angola and Benguela in reference to all African rulers 
defeated in battle: Heintze, Angola nos séculos XVI e XVII, 388.  
876 For more on treaties of vassalage in Angola, see Heintze, “The Angolan Vassal Tributes of the seventeenth 
century”, 57-78; Beatrix Heintze, “Luso-African Feudalism in Angola? The Vassal Treaties of the 16th to the 18th 
Century”, Separata da Revista Portuguesa de História, No. 18 (1980): 111–131; Heintze, Angola nos séculos XVI e 
XVII, 81-95.  
877 Vassalage, indeed, ranked the lowest in the hierarchy of Portuguese diplomatic treaties: Heintze, Angola nos 
séculos XVI e XVII, 398-399.  
878 Santos, “Escrever o poder”, 93. 
879 Besides paying tribute, the other obligations of an African vassal soba in the eighteenth century included the supply 
of labor and soldiers for the “royal service”, opening trading routes and authorizing the transit of slave traders within 
their lands, accepting the presence of officials, clerics and military personnel, prohibiting the protection of criminals 
and runaway slaves, and maintaining peaceful relation with other vassals: Catarina Madeira Santos, “Um governo 
‘polido’ para Angola: reconfigurar dispositivos de domínio, 1750- c.1800” (Phd Dissertation, Universidade Nova de 
Lisboa, 2005), 127. See also Santos, “Escrever o poder”, 81-95.  
880 Santos, “Escrever o poder”, 93.  
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of “investiture” which was combined with traditional “Mbundu”881 rituals of submission to give 
origin to “undamento”882.  
Undamento was an amalgamation of African and Portuguese political rituals. On the 
African side, it was inspired by the kuunda (Kimbundu), a traditional ceremony of recognition of 
submission of an African ruler to another. On the Portuguese side, undamento was inspired by the 
formulary of homages (Formulário das Homenagens) issued by King Dom João II during the 
assembly of the estates of the Portuguese realm in Évora (Cortes de Évora) in 1481883. The 
Portuguese also included the signature of documents as part of the undamento, while Africans 
reproduced their own rituals of subjugation by clapping their hands and bowing before their new 
overlord or his representative884.   
Near the end of the eighteenth century, the governor of Angola, Dom Miguel Antonio de 
Melo, explained to his superiors in Lisbon that the ritual of undamento was an act of subjugation 
of African rulers before the Portuguese crown through a pact that connected them to their lands 
and their subjects. According to this governor, the undamento guaranteed the efficacy of the 
treaties of vassalage, which he defined as “alliances with a shadow of dominance”885.   
A treaty of vassalage was not concluded without the undamento, and neglecting it could 
lead to the refusal of new vassals to abide by their obligations. They were independent but 
inseparable rituals886. The undamento was essential for the confirmation of the power of a vassal 
                                                 
881 The term “Mbundu” is used here in a broad sense, as in the documentation at hand, to identify the peoples in the 
interior of Angola and Benguela, who combined speakers of Kimbundu, Umbundu and other local languages.  
882 Luso-Africans in Angola forged a new Portuguese verb: undar. For a brief explanation of the ritual according to 
governor of Angola, Fernão de Sousa (1624-1630), see Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a ocupação..., 472.  
883 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 80,  “Carta do governador de Angola Dom Miguel António de Melo sobre 
as injustiças praticadas contra o Soba de Socoval”, (30 April 1798); Arquivos de Angola, 1790-1797, 1ª Série, No. 6. 
(Luanda: Arquivo Nacional, 1933), Doc. IX. See also Santos, “Um governo ‘polido’ para Angola”, 127; Santos, 
“Escrever o poder”, 81-95. 
884 Over time, some other practices and demands were added to the rituals of vassalage and undamento. For instance, 
the baptism of sobas and their conversion to Christianity, which initially featured as a ritual of celebration of the 
investiture of a vassal as sovereign of his lands, became mandatory by mid-seventeenth century. Similarly, the supply 
of labor for the construction of public buildings as part of the “royal service” was not an initial demand, but became 
a specific term of the vassalage treaties in the eighteenth century. See Santos, “Um governo ‘polido’ para Angola”, 
127 – note 316; Santos, “Escrever o poder”, 81-95.  
885 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 80, “Carta do governador de Angola Dom Miguel António de Melo sobre 
as injustiças praticadas contra o Soba de Socoval”, (30 April 1798); Arquivos de Angola, 1790-1797, 1ª Série, No. 6. 
(Luanda: Arquivo Nacional, 1933), Doc. IX 
886 Heintze, Angola nos séculos XVI e XVII, 541.  
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not only to the Portuguese, but also to other African authorities887. As Vansina noted, this 
Portuguese recognition of their vassals’ sovereignty legitimized the latter’s power. Hence, 
paradoxically, the acceptance of vassalage made African rulers autonomous in relation to other 
African political authorities888.    
Colonialist historians, mainly concerned with questions relating to Portuguese penetration 
in the “kingdoms” of Angola and Benguela and the consolidation of “colonial power”, tend to see 
a vassalage treaty as a sheer act of subjugation of African authorities, disregarding the different 
aspects of resistance that it entails. This usually occurs because they envision this historical process 
as a dispute between two sides: Portuguese colonizers conquering and imposing themselves onto 
subjugated African authorities. However, the African political landscape was very complex, 
especially in Benguela, a region populated by numerous African independent and autonomous 
polities, built around lineages and through kinship structures, that established temporary alliances 
and dependencies with one another, as we will see in the following chapter. Disputes between rival 
polities were very intense, including the ritualistic practice of cattle raids889, which drove some 
African rulers to opt for establishing alliances with outsiders against their local enemies890.  
Hence, African rulers could choose to accept vassalage in exchange for military protection 
against strong local enemies. The same was true in the case of new rulers who needed confirmation 
of their authority among neighboring polities or those with ambitions to rule. Moreover, the 
Portuguese served as mediators in conflicts between African vassals, which avoided wars and 
disruption along slave trade routes891. As we saw in Chapter 3, some African rulers in the interior 
                                                 
887 Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a ocupação..., 472.  
888 Jan Vansina, “Ambaca Society and the Slave Trade, c. 1760-1845”, The Journal of African History, Vol. 46, No. 
1 (2005): 8. See also Santos, “Escrever o poder”, 93. 
889 For more on ritualistic cattle raids, see Marta Salokoski, “Symbolic Power of Kings in Pre-Colonial Ovambo 
Societies” (Licensiate  Thesis in Sociology / Social Anthropology, University of Helsinki, 1992); Marta Salokoski, 
“How Kings are Made – How Kingship Changes: A Study of Rituals and Ritual Change in Pre-Colonial and Colonial 
Owamboland, Namibia” (PhD Thesis, University of Helsinki, 2006), 117-131. See also Thomas J. Desch-Obi, 
Fighting for Honor: The History of African Martial Art Traditions in the Atlantic World (Columbia: The University 
of South Carolina Press, 2008), 16-25; Joseph C. Miller, “Angola central e sul por volta de 1840”, Estudos Afro-
Asiáticos, No. 32, December (1997): 20. 
890 A similar argument can be found in the work of the colonial historian Carlos Couto, although his intention was not 
to show traces of “resistance” in the acceptance of vassalage by African authorities, but rather to argue that they were 
better off as protected vassals than as independent polities: Couto, Os Capitães-Mores de Angola no Século XVIII, 
254-255 
891 In March 1800, for example, the governor of Benguela ordered the regent of Quilengues to intervene in the conflicts 
between vassal sobas Aicolla, Pomba-Aculo and Quipia. The Andrade brothers had developed good relations with 
soba Quipia since mid-1790, because of the episode involving sobeta Cacombo seen above. According to the 
209 
 
of Benguela tried their best to manipulate Portuguese forces against their enemies. This and the 
following chapter will provide other examples of Africans co-opting Portuguese military forces 
against local enemies, as well as the use of their “legal” status as vassals to complain about “illegal 
attacks” against them and their subjects.   
 
“Legal” protection and procedures of enslavement  
Although there were some advantages for African rulers to establish regular commercial 
relations with the pumbeiro and sertanejo led caravans crossing their lands, these relationships 
were not without risks. The same open roads that brought caravans with imported goods, facilitated 
the penetration of slaving expeditions and raids. As José C. Curto pointed out, “the gains from 
enslaving others tempted many people in West Central Africa down this perilous road, with not a 
few eventually experiencing the twisted irony of being enslaved themselves”892.  
The opening of regular commerce with slave traders also brought transformations to the 
institution of slavery and the forms of enslavement893. Curto has argued that “to produce the 
millions of captives necessary to support rising volumes of slaves exported, African captors 
expanded existing or developed new mechanisms to turn free individuals into slaves”894. These 
included the expansion of warfare, an increase in slaving raids, a rise in kidnapping, the contortion 
of court procedures to enslave people, sometimes for trivial “crimes”, the intensification of tribute 
exactions and the upsurge in sales of kin. Not even large polities with long-standing commercial 
relations with the Portuguese were spared from raids organized by greedy capitães-mores895.  
                                                 
governor, soba Aicolla was fomenting hostilities towards Quipia because he had accepted another soba called Pomba 
Aculo in his lands as a less powerful political ruler (menos poderoso). Since they were all vassals of Portugal, the 
“colonial” administration could not admit such conflicts. Captain Andrade reached out to soba Aicolla and convinced 
him to refrain from aggression against soba Quipia, threatening that he would be considered a “rebel” otherwise. 
ANA, Códice 443, fl. 43, “Ofício dirigido ao morador de Quilengues João Vieira de Andrade”, (7 March 1800). See 
also Fontes e Estudos: Revista do Arquivo Nacional de Angola, Nos. 6-7 (Angola: Ministério da Cultura: 2011), 23.  
892 José C. Curto, “Struggling against Enslavement: The Case of José Manuel in Benguela, 1816-20,” Canadian 
Journal of African Studies, 39, n. 1 (2005): 96-122. See also José C. Curto, “Experiences of Enslavement in West 
Central Africa”, Histoire Sociale/ Social History, No. 41 (2008): 381-415. 
893 I borrow this idea of “transformations in slavery” from Paul E. Lovejoy, Transformations in Slavery: a History of 
Slavery in Africa, 3rd. Ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).   
894 Curto, “Struggling against Enslavement”, 97. 
895 Curto, “Struggling against Enslavement”, 96-122. 
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At the same time, the increasing amount of imported goods circulating in the sertões of 
West Central Africa inflated the dependency of African potentates involved in trading, since it 
reoriented all productive activities towards the Atlantic slave trade896. Moreover, the consumption 
of luxury goods acquired on credit drew many African rulers into debt, allowing their creditors to 
justify raids against them or the kidnapping of their subjects897. Itinerant traders developed 
different strategies to maintain a constant flow of merchandise into the sertões and to increase 
African debt toward them. In fact, although some African rulers willingly indebted themselves, 
others were effectively forced into incurring debts898.  
Historians of Angola have recently raised questions about the social implications of the 
presence of slaving caravans in the sertões and the dangers associated with the opening of 
commercial relations with Luso-African itinerant traders. They have also demonstrated interest in 
analysing how the increase in the Atlantic demand for captives helped corrupt African customary 
legal procedures in favor of the slave trade. At the core of this analysis, one finds a discussion 
about the “legality” of enslaving African vassals and their peoples899, including the corruption of 
the “system of reversible dependency”, also known as “pawnship”900.   
                                                 
896 Miller, Way of Death, 70.  
897 As Roquinaldo Ferreira A. Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World: Angola and Brazil during the Era of 
the Slave Trade (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 68, argues “…there is little doubt that debt incurred 
by Africans in the sertões largely drove the vicious cycle of debt-induced enslavement”. 
898 Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a ocupação..., 471-472, listed a series of strategies used by sertanejos and 
pumbeiros to force sobas to take on debt. One of them, imfuca¸ consisted of giving merchandise on credit to sobas, 
suggesting they did not have to pay for them, or that they could be paid much later, and then attacking sobas to 
recuperate the “loans”. Traders were not averse to enslaving the “wives and sons” of indebted sobas and sell them in 
the coastal markets. 
899 Curto, “Experiences of Enslavement in West Central Africa”, 381-415; José C. Curto, “Un butin illégitime: razzias 
d’esclaves et relations luso-africaines dans la région des flueves Kwanza et Kwango en 1805”, in Déraison esclavage 
et droit: Les fondements idéologiques et juridiques de la traite négrière et de l’esclavage, Isabel Castro Henriques and 
Louis Sala-Molins, eds. (Paris: Éditions UNESCO, 2002), 315-327; José C. Curto, “A restituição de 10.000 súbditos 
Ndongo ‘roubados’ na Angola de meados do século XVII: Uma análise preliminar,” in Isabel C. Henriques, ed., 
Escravatura e Transformações Culturais: África-Brasil-Caraíbas (Lisbon: Vulgata, 2002), 185-208; José C. Curto, 
“The Story of Nbena, 1817-1820: Unlawful Enslavement and the Concept of 'Original Freedom' in Angola,” in Paul 
E. Lovejoy and David V. Trotman, eds., Trans-Atlantic Dimensions of Ethnicity in the African Diaspora (London: 
Continuum, 2003), 43-64; Curto, “Struggling against Enslavement”, 96-122; Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange in 
the Atlantic World, 52-87; Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 191-236; Daniel Domingues. 
Silva, The Atlantic Slave Trade from West Central Africa, 1780-1867 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 
142-166.  
900 In 1770, there was an attempt by Governor Sousa Coutinho to prohibit the practice of pawnship in Angola. This 
governor of Angola was especially concerned with the increasing practice of slave traders embarking people originally 
offered as collateral (pawns) for the Americas as enslaved individuals: BNL, Códice 8744, fls. 57-58, “Bando que 
proíbe aos pais e parentes mais velhos empenharem os seus filhos, ou dá-los em caução de dívidas” (7 November 
1770). Miller, Way of Death, 179, has argued that pawns were ordinarily used as collateral for slaving transactions 
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In many African societies, slavery was an integral part of prescribed punishment in judicial 
proceedings, even for full members of these communities901. The increase in demand for slaves in 
the Atlantic caused a surge in criminal accusations, such as witchcraft and adultery, that could lead 
to enslavement902. With the further corrosion of African customary laws, other lesser crimes 
became punishable by enslavement, while the condemnation of one individual could trigger the 
enslavement of their entire kin903. 
Failure to repay incurred debts also often resulted in the enslavement of debtors or their 
dependents904. Many of the accusations and legal procedures against African individuals were 
indeed associated with commercial disputes905. Hence, slavers occupying positions of authority 
recurrently corrupted “legal” procedures to advance their slaving businesses906. Roquinaldo 
Ferreira has argued that the recurrent use of local judicial courts for the enslavement of people 
routinized it into an acceptable form of conflict resolution, since enslavement became an ordinary 
                                                 
between Atlantic traders and African brokers on the coast of Angola. See also Joseph C. Miller, “Credit, captives, 
collateral and currencies: debt, slavery, and the financing of the Atlantic world,” in Debt and Slavery in the 
Mediterranean and Atlantic Worlds, G. Campbell and A. Stanziani, eds. (London: Pickering and Chatto, 2013), 105-
121.  More recently, Paul E. Lovejoy, “Pawnship, Debt and ‘Freedom’ in Atlantic Africa during the Era of the Slave 
Trade: A Re-Assesment”, Journal of African History, Vol. 55 (2014): 1-24, has cast doubt on the use of pawning in 
Portuguese Angola, although in a previous work, Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson, “The Business of Slaving: 
Pawnship in Western Africa, c. 1600-1810”, in Pawnship, Slavery and Colonialism in Africa, Paul E. Lovejoy and 
Toyin Falola, eds. (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2003), 37, pointed to references to pawnship in Loango and Mpinda 
(kingdom of Kongo) still in the seventeenth century. Vanessa dos Santos Oliveira, “The Donas of Luanda, c. 1770-
1867: From Atlantic Slave Trading to ‘Legitimate’ Commerce” (PhD Dissertation, York University, 2016), has even 
more recently shown that pawning (hipoteca) can be found in commercial transactions in nineteenth-century Angola 
in the form of land and enslaved people. For more on the institution of pawnship in Africa, see Toyin Falola and Paul 
E. Lovejoy, eds. Pawnship in Africa: Debt Bondage in Historical Perspective (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994); Paul 
E. Lovejoy and Toyin Falola, eds. Pawnship, Slavery and Colonialism in Africa (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2003). 
G. Campbell and A. Stanziani, eds. Debt and Slavery in the Mediterranean and Atlantic Worlds (London: Pickering 
and Chatto, 2013). See also Paul E. Lovejoy and David Richardson. “Trust, Pawnship and Atlantic History: The 
Institutional Foundations of the Old Calabar Slave Trade”, The American Historical Review, Vol. 104, No. 2 (1999): 
333-355.  
901 Daniel Domingues Silva, The Atlantic Slave Trade from West Central Africa, 1780-1867 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), 158; Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World, 66-67.  
902 Vansina, “Ambaca Society and the Slave Trade”, 12-13; Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World, 
71; Daniel Domingues Silva, The Atlantic Slave Trade from West Central Africa, 1780-1867 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), 164.  
903 Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World, 70-71.  
904 Daniel Domingues Silva, The Atlantic Slave Trade from West Central Africa, 1780-1867 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), 159. 
905 Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World, 76. 
906 Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World, 71. 
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form of punishment recognized in the African customary laws followed throughout Angola’s 
interior907.  
Ferreira also affirmed that punishment by enslavement in the seventeenth century was 
“restricted to outsiders or people already born into slavery” because institutional mechanisms 
existed to prevent the enslavement of individuals considered “freeborn people” 908. As Curto 
explained, in mid-seventeenth-century Angola, there were two groups outside the range of what 
was considered the “legal” enslavement of Africans. The first was made up of “freeborn Africans” 
who had been born within a Portuguese settlement, especially Luanda and Benguela, and thus 
comprised a relatively small number of individuals. The other, much larger, group included the 
subjects of African vassal rulers. However, even though Portuguese, Luso-African and Africans 
slavers clearly understood that individuals from either group could not be enslaveable, the 
principle was often disrespected909.   
Historians have also recently discussed the enslavement of freeborn individuals in African 
communities through raids. Despite constituting a serious crime punishable by death, accusations 
of enslavement of Africans born of a “free womb” became common by the end of the seventeenth 
century. Weak colonial regulations did not curb the enthusiasm and defiance of slave traders in an 
environment of increasing Atlantic demand for enslaved labour910.  By the eighteenth century, 
these practices were widespread not only among Portuguese and Luso-African slavers roaming the 
sertões, but among Africans as well911. According to Daniel Domingues da Silva, “as demand for 
slaves increased, it would be not surprising that African elites felt particularly tempted to 
manipulate the laws governing the sale of criminals, debtors and others on the coast of West 
Central Africa”912. Curto, on his turn, was precise when he argued that few people were immune 
from captivity in the context of increasing demand of slaves in the Atlantic and the proliferation 
                                                 
907 Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World, 69-70. 
908 Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World, 67-68. 
909 José C. Curto, “A restituição de 10.000 súbditos Ndongo ‘roubados’ na Angola de meados do século XVII: Uma 
análise preliminar,” in Isabel C. Henriques, ed., Escravatura e Transformações Culturais: África-Brasil-Caraíbas 
(Lisbon: Vulgata, 2002), 186-187.  
910 As Frank Luce, “A history of Labor Law in Angola” (M.A. Dissertation, University of Toronto, 1990), 20, explains, 
“a legal norm which is never enforced cannot properly be described as law, because it is not a part of any juridic 
relationship. The law is not found exclusively in legal norms, it is found in juridic relationships, which are determined 
by the articulation of legal norms and social relations”. 
911 Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World, 82. 
912 Daniel Domingues Silva, The Atlantic Slave Trade from West Central Africa, 1780-1867 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), 165.  
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of violence and insecurity associated to it913. Despite formal concerns over the protection of the 
African “freeborn” subjects of Portugal, enforcement of these “legal” protections was rare914.   
As argued in Chapter 3, the apparent contradiction that Ferreira and Candido915 observed 
in the way that the “colonial” administration seemed to try to protect “freeborn individuals” while 
at the same time supporting the expansion of the slave trade was, in fact, a deliberate attack by 
slavers with little concern about orders emanating from Luanda or even Lisbon. Although it is true 
that the disregard for the rights of free individuals caused unrest among colonial officials in high 
positions916, such as governors, who repeatedly asked for constraint in the violence associated with 
the collection of tribute from and the overall treatment of African vassals, capitães-mores in the 
interior repeatedly disrespected such recommendations.  
The increase in demand for enslaved persons at the beginning of the eighteenth century 
also promoted the corruption of African traditions and customary laws, especially those regarding 
enslavement as punishment for crimes. It corrupted traditions regarding the institution of pawnship 
as well, since individuals used temporarily as collateral for debts became commodities sold into 
permanent slavery917. The commercial opportunities opened by the slave trade further encouraged 
the kidnapping of young men, the preferred victim of this kind of abduction918. There were also 
cases in which freeborn Africans became slaves by sheer trickery, like in the extraordinary case of 
Nbena, a slave-owning free woman from Ndombe who was deceived into captivity by an old 
female slave919. 
                                                 
913 Curto, “Experiences of Enslavement in West Central Africa”, 381-415; Curto, “Struggling against Enslavement”, 
96-122.  
914 José C. Curto, “The Story of Nbena, 1817-1820: Unlawful Enslavement and the Concept of 'Original Freedom' in 
Angola,” in Paul E. Lovejoy and David V. Trotman, eds., Trans-Atlantic Dimensions of Ethnicity in the African 
Diaspora (London: Continuum, 2003), 60.  
915 Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World, 84; Mariana P. Candido, “African Freedom Suits and 
Portuguese Vassal Status: Legal Mechanisms for Fighting Enslavement in Benguela, Angola, 1800-1830,” Slavery & 
Abolition, Vol. 32, No. 3 (2011): 455.  
916 Daniel Domingues Silva, The Atlantic Slave Trade from West Central Africa, 1780-1867 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), 154.  
917 Vansina, “Ambaca Society and the Slave Trade”, 12; Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World, 78. 
See also Daniel Domingues Silva, The Atlantic Slave Trade from West Central Africa, 1780-1867 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2017), 161-163; Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World, 79. 
918 Daniel Domingues Silva, The Atlantic Slave Trade from West Central Africa, 1780-1867 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017), 152.  
919 For more on the case of Nbena, see José C. Curto, “The Story of Nbena, 1817-1820: Unlawful Enslavement and 
the Concept of 'Original Freedom' in Angola,” in Paul E. Lovejoy and David V. Trotman, eds., Trans-Atlantic 
Dimensions of Ethnicity in the African Diaspora (London: Continuum, 2003), 43-64. See also Curto, “Experiences of 
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Sometimes individuals who worked for slave traders became victims of their employers as 
well. Ferreira has brought to light a case of kidnapping involving twenty-five porters from 
Bailundo who had come to São Filipe de Benguela working in the caravan of sertanejo Jerônimo 
Corrêa Dias. After their arrival, this sertanejo organized a celebration in which he distributed large 
amounts of alcohol to the African porters, later enslaving the intoxicated men. To justify their 
enslavement, Dias alleged that the soba of Mbailundo owed him ten slaves. Since he planned never 
to return to Bailundo, he decided to sell the porters in the slave market of São Filipe de Benguela 
to clear the soba’s debt. This kind of justification for the enslavement of subjects of vassal sobas 
who were in debt to slave traders was far from a rare occurrence, as Ferreira’s research has 
shown920.    
In the episode presented above, the soba of Mbailundo tried to intervene in favor of his 
subjects by writing to his commercial partners in Benguela and threatening to take revenge on 
future caravans crossing the sertões, to which the traders replied assuring the soba that Dias would 
be punished for his treachery. The slave traders feared attacks on their caravans in Bailundo and 
the closing of the trade routes to the central plateau. Nevertheless, the then governor of Benguela, 
Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcelos (1796-1800), had an arrangement with Dias. The governor 
provided military support and allowed Dias to complete the sale of his slaves, receiving in 
recompense four captives for his assistance921.   
The cases of unlawful enslavement of Africans rarely resulted in the reversion of the 
“illegal” status of the enslaved person and the reestablishment of their freedom. The case of Nbena, 
a freeborn woman enslaved along with her daughter at the beginning of the nineteenth century in 
Benguela, is a rare case in which claims of “original freedom” by African subjects of Portugal 
resulted in their release. Even the subjects of powerful African rulers, such as the ngola of Ndongo, 
were not protected from the claws of slavers in the interior of Angola922.   
                                                 
Enslavement in West Central Africa”, 381-415; Curto, “Struggling against Enslavement”, 96-122; Candido, An 
African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 221-225; Daniel Domingues Silva, The Atlantic Slave Trade from West 
Central Africa, 1780-1867 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 153-156.  
920 Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World, 52-57.  
921 Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World, 57-58.  




African rulers were not the only ones under pressure to settle debts incurred with the slave 
market. The same was true for itinerant traders (sertanejos and pumbeiros) who also acquired 
merchandise on credit from major businessmen (negociantes) in the coastal areas of embarkation, 
such as Luanda, Benguela and Novo Redondo (Map 3). In order to guarantee the means necessary 
to settle their debts, these itinerant traders acted aggressively against their African debtors in the 
interior. Failure to re-pay their loans could not only hinder further credit, but could also send them 
to jail923. As brought to light by Curto, the case of José Manuel, a pumbeiro in Benguela during 
the later 1810s, is a good example of the dangers of debt for Luso-African itinerant traders924.  
In brief, the submission of African rulers by Portuguese and Luso-African slavers through 
debt exposed everyone in the sertões to the threat of sudden enslavement. Itinerant traders sold 
much of their merchandise to sobas on credit and routinely forced African rulers to buy goods they 
did not want or could not afford. Many of them expected sobas to default on their payments, which 
created the “legal” justification for the violent settlement of the debt through the enslavement of 
their subjects925.   
 I will now turn to the conflicts between the regents of Quilengues and the soba of Socoval 
during the last decade of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries. As the following 
sections of this chapter show, Socoval was subjected to many of the “illegal” procedures discussed 
above and became a recurrent victim of slavers in positions of authority in the “colonial” 
administration. These slavers repeatedly overreached their jurisdiction, extorting the soba and 
“illegally” enslaving his people, ultimately pushing the African ruler into “rebellion”. News of the 
conflicts between the regents of Quilengues and the soba of Socoval reached Luanda in 1797 and 
triggered a “legal” defense by the governor of Angola in favor of the African ruler and those of his 




                                                 
923 Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World, 68. 
924 Curto, “Struggling against Enslavement”, 96-122.  
925 Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World, 63.  
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From ally to rebel soba: the case of Socoval  
The territory of Quilengues (Map 1), as defined by Governor Alexandre Botelho de 
Vasconcelos in 1799926, consisted of several powerful sobados, such as Quipungo, Huila, Njau, 
Gambos, Handa and Humbe, among others927 (Map 3). Although the power of these “southern” 
sobados was never underestimated, Socoval featured as the most powerful polity in Quilengues 
according to eighteenth and nineteenth-century colonial sources. Until the end of the eighteenth 
century, Portuguese and Luso-African officials also regarded the soba of Socoval as their greatest 
ally within Quilengues928. 
It is not clear exactly when Socoval established diplomatic and commercial relations with 
Portuguese and Luso-Africans traders from Benguela, but it is safe to say this relationship dates 
back to the second half of the seventeenth century. Ralph Delgado affirmed that by 1672 the soba 
of Socoval had already developed stable commercial relations with itinerant traders who crossed 
the region. This was a moment in which Portuguese and Luso-Africans tried to “contain the 
rebelliousness” of the soba of Kakonda and his allies. Socoval did not participate in the military 
expeditions then organized by Captain Francisco da Távora to “punish” Kakonda, as did the sobas 
of Peringue e Molundo. But, by that time, Delgado pointed out that both Socoval and Quipungo 
had developed “the best relations” with the presídio of Caconda-a-Velha929.   
In 1768, Governor Sousa Coutinho listed the soba of Socoval as an old vassal of Portugal, 
together with the potentates of Huila, Quipungo, Luceque, Bembes, Caluquembe, Quimalangue, 
                                                 
926 Vasconcelos, “Descripção da Capitania de Benguella”, 147-161. 
927 As discussed in Chapter 1, not only the geographical extension, but also the general “ethnolinguistic” composition 
of Quilengues changed over time. In the seventeenth century, it was considered a separate territory from Quipungo 
and Huila. In the eighteenth century, however, Quilengues came to encompass an enormous region that included the 
entire Humpata/Huila plateau, the inner Cunene basin and the territory that would become the district of Moçamedes 
after 1840. It remained the largest “province” of Benguela for most part of the nineteenth century, until it was reshaped 
and reclassified as both a municipality and a small village, formally known as Salvaterra dos Magos, within the 
province of Huila. After Angola became independent in 1974-75, Quilengues became a comuna, which constitutes 
the third level of Angolan administrative bureaucracy. To this day, the comuna of Quilengues is composed by 
Quilengues, Dinde and Impulo.  
928 In the twentieth century, the sobado of Socoval decreased in power and political importance. Carlos Estermann, 
Ethnography of Southwestern Angola: The Nyaneka-Nkumbi Ethnic Group - Vol. II (New York/London: Africana 
Publishing Company, 1979), 10, acknowledged Socoval (Socovala) and Impulo (Empulu) as the two most important 
ombalas of the Tyilenge-Muso. He stated that Socoval was less important than Impulo, despite being better known. 
The U.S. Army map of Benguela from 1943 corroborates this information, showing the location of Impulo but bearing 
no reference to Socoval: “Benguela” (1943), by U.S. Army Map Service. Perry-Castañeda Library Map Collection at 
the University of Texas Library. 
929 Ralph Delgado, História de Angola, Vol. 3 (Luanda: Banco de Angola, 1948), 356.  
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Catala (where they would soon build Caconda-a-Nova), Quitata, Quingolo, Bailundo, Tinde, 
Bongo (Caconda-a-Velha), Jangalla and Quipasso930. Despite this old reference about Socoval as 
a vassal of Portugal, a closer examination of the relationship (below) shows that he was not 
“legally” subject to the Portuguese, because no vassalage treaty was ever signed. Indeed, he was 
not a vassal, but an ally.  
In the 1780s, as seen in Chapter 3, Quilengues was raided for several years by military 
expeditions commanded by Captain Antonio José da Costa, who camped within the lands of local 
vassal sobas, extorting them and attacking those who did not comply with his demands. During 
these slaving campaigns, Captain Costa developed a good relationship with the soba of Socoval, 
having remained for some time in his company while in Quilengues. This relationship was 
registered by the naturalist Joaquim José da Silva, who accompanied Captain Costa’s expedition 
and wrote an account of their time in Socoval, with details about its social and military 
organization, oral traditions, religious beliefs and even burial rituals931. There is no reference to 
conflicts between Costa’s expedition and the soba of Socoval, which indicates the existence of 
previous good diplomatic and commercial relations between the African ruler and Portuguese 
slavers. 
Chapter 3 also showed the relationship between the early 1790s surge in slave exports from 
Benguela and the increase in slaving operations disguised as military expeditions in Quilengues 
and Caconda during the first years of that decade. Socoval, however, seems to have kept good 
relations with both slavers and the regent in Quilengues during this period as well. This peaceful 
relationship with the slave traders ended in the second half of the 1790s, when the soba of Socoval 
allegedly morphed from “ally” to “rebel”. 
                                                 
930 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 52, Doc. 45, “Bando que ordena as feiras nos sertões de Benguela e Caconda”, (23 
September 1768). For a similar version of this document, see “Províncias que compreendem os certões de Benguella 
e Caconda, 1770”, Documento No. 9, in Felner, Angola: Apontamentos sobre a colonização..., 187. See also BNL, 
Códice 8744, fl. 1, “Províncias conquistadas desde o tempo do descobrimento, e nos governos de vários Exmo. 
governadores”, c. 1770. 
931 Joaquim José da Silva, “Extracto da viagem que fez ao sertão de Benguela no anno de 1785: Viagem ao sertão de 
Benguella”, in O Patriota: Jornal Litterário, Político, Mercantil, Nos. 1-3 (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Régia, 1813), 
49-100, spent at least two months in the sobado of Socoval between September and November of 1785. Naturally, his 
description of Socoval was guided and limited by his knowledge of and prejudices over “Africans”. His informants 
and translators were mainly Luso-Africans and he must have heard some of the stories and opinions he reproduces in 
his work from sertanejos in Benguela. Hence, it is a biased and in many ways uninformed description of the soba of 
Socoval and his people. Nevertheless, it is a valuable and unique source, which includes na oral tradition about the 
origins of the people of Socoval.  
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As seen previously, the slaver and military officer Joaquim Vieira de Andrade occupied 
the position of regent of Quilengues on several occasions between 1789 and 1808 and helped to 
transform his family into the most powerful slaving enterprise in Quilengues during the peak in 
slave exports from Benguela. The Andrade brothers – Joaquim, João and Elias – controlled most 
of the slave business in Quilengues and were also the biggest cattle owners among the moradores 
of the region. Captain Andrade became infamous for his violent methods and the disrespectful way 
he treated sobas under his jurisdiction, often being accused of extorting local rulers and of waging 
“unjust” wars against them.  
During the administration of Manuel de Almeida Vasconcelos, governor of Angola during 
1790-1797, Captain Andrade commanded several military expeditions against sobetas in 
Quilengues, such as Quiaca, Ganda and Bongo, many of them related to Socoval. In 1795, he 
decided to turn against the soba of Socoval himself. Captain Andrade convened the moradores 
under his jurisdiction to help him “punish” Socoval for refusing to pay the annual tribute. He 
gathered an army composed of moradores, local slaves and quimbares932, and proceeded to raid 
the sobado of Socoval, looting the libatas of its soba and of his macota and setting everything on 
fire on their way out933.  
According to Delgado, the regent of Quilengues expected that the governor of Benguela 
would arrest the soba of Socoval for insubordination, so that they could find a more “friendly” 
ruler to replace him. He informs that the regent of Quilengues considered the current soba a 
problem because of his resistance to vassalage. The colonial historian thus concluded that the 
constant complaints about the “rebelliousness” of the people of Socoval were the tragic result of a 
“policy of despoilment” practiced against African rulers934.  
The governor of Benguela, Botelho de Vasconcelos, was outraged when he learned about 
the raid against the sobado of Socoval. This unprovoked violence was counterproductive and 
                                                 
932 Ralph Delgado, Ao Sul do Cuanza: Ocupação e aproveitamento do antigo reino de Benguela, 1843-1942, Vol. 1 
(Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional. 1940), 112, defined quimbares as “a kind of private militia with good and bad intents”.    
933 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 4-4v, “Carta do governador de Benguela Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcelos para o capitão-
mor de Quilengues Joaquim Vieira de Andrade”, (11 August 1796). 
934 Ralph Delgado, A Famosa e Histórica Benguela: Catálogo de governadores, 1779 a 1940 (Lisboa: Edições 
Cosmos, 1940), 32. 
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against colonial instructions on how to deal with African rulers935. The governor of Benguela 
advised Captain Andrade by letter that the sertões should be governed through “finesse” (jeito), 
not violence. He also complained that tribute should be collected from every vassal soba in 
Quilengues, not only Socoval. Finally, he demanded that the regent treat all sobas under his 
jurisdiction with the same respect demanded from them. He ordered the regent to summon the 
soba of Socoval and send him to Benguela to be judged for his “rebelliousness”936. 
In August 1796, the governor wrote again to the regent of Quilengues ordering him to 
resume the collection of tribute from all vassals within his jurisdiction. Nevertheless, he warned 
Captain Andrade that he should only collect from those who were accustomed to paying the royal 
tithe (Quinto Real). He could try to convince new sobas to voluntarily pay annual tributes, but 
never through violent means. As the governor explained, only the Crown could authorize the 
collection of such tribute, and he believed that with time, and “finesse”, they would peacefully 
convince every soba to pay up937. 
One month later, the governor of Benguela received the visit of the sobeta of Quipuças, 
Cacombo. He had come to town to make a representation against the regent of Quilengues, whom 
he accused of attacking him and enslaving his people. The sobeta’s denunciation of the regent 
generated an official inquiry (devassa). The governor also complained to the judge of Benguela 
about the regent of Quilengues. He had heard rumors that Captain Andrade treated the soba of 
Socoval and his sobetas with “disaffection and disrespect”. The governor informed the judge that 
he had sent troops to Quilengues to escort the soba of Socoval to Benguela, in order to have an 
audience about the case. He also informed that the soba’s defense would be presented by the 
tendala or interpreter used to communicate with African authorities from the backlands, since it 
was a matter that deserved much attention938. 
                                                 
935 BNL, Códice 8744, fls. 44v-45, “Carta circular para todos os capitães mores dos presídios e distritos” (3 October 
1770); BNL, Códice 8744, fls. 88v-89, “Carta circular para todos os capitães mores das povoações de Benguela e 
Caconda” (26 February 1771). 
936 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 4-4v, “Carta do governador de Benguela Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcelos para o capitão-
mor de Quilengues Joaquim Vieira de Andrade”, (11 August 1796). 
937 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 5, “Carta do governador de Benguela Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcelos para o capitão-mor 
de Quilengues Joaquim Vieira de Andrade”, (18 August 1796). 
938 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 8, “Carta do governador de Benguela Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcelos para o Juiz de Fora 
de Benguela Jerônimo Caetano Barros Araújo e Beça”, (15 September 1796); ANA, Códice 443, fl. 6, “Carta do 
governador de Benguela Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcelos para o Juiz de Fora de Benguela Jerônimo Caetano Barros 
Araújo e Beça”, (16 September 1796). 
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I will now turn to two of these inquiries (devassas) regarding the alleged “crimes” 
committed by the regent of Quilengues against local African authorities. The first one, the devassa 
of Quipuças, confirmed rumors of an attack commanded by the regent of Quilengues against 
sobeta Cacombo of Quipuças. These accusations against the regent of Quilengues were backed by 
the soba of Socoval in private audience with the governor of Benguela, and later confirmed by the 
regent’s attempt to pay the royal fifth for his slaving operations in the interior with slaves who 
were, in fact, free subjects of Cacombo.   
The second inquiry referred to attacks commanded by the regent of Quilengues against the 
soba of Socoval himself. This devassa of Socoval is a very detailed inquiry about the 
administration and the general behaviour of the regent of Quilengues, including questions 
regarding bribery and use of his position for personal gain, especially drawing upon groups of 
quimbare soldiers under his command to raid sobados and defying the authority of local African 
rulers. This second inquiry also produced more knowledge on the crimes committed against the 
sobeta Cacombo and the involvement of the regent of Quilengues in the rise of a new ruler in 
Quipuças.         
The investigations about the crimes committed against the soba of Socoval did not curb 
the actions of slavers in Quilengues, who under the orders of a new regent carried out another 
attack against Socoval and his people. Despite previous conclusions presented by both inquiries – 
exonerating the soba of Socoval of any wrongdoings and pointing out the unjust and violent way 
in which the regent treated him and his allies – the community of slave traders in Benguela 
mobilized to justify such more attacks and to continue the enslavement of the peoples of 
Quilengues. They launched a series of new “investigations”, led by the judge of Benguela, which 
concluded that all attacks against the soba of Socoval were justifiable because he was a “rebel” 
who had committed “crimes of disobedience” and resisted to pay the tribute he owed.   
The sources containing these devassas were gathered from different archives in Angola 
and Portugal. The first inquiry comes from the Arquivo Nacional de Angola in Luanda, while the 
second from the Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino in Lisbon. Combined, these sources allows us a 
good glimpse into the strategies used by the slave traders operating in the interior of Benguela to 
acquire slaves and evidence the boldness of slavers occupying positions of authority in the 
“colonial” administration, in this case the regent of Quilengues. The governor of Angola, Manuel 
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de Almeida e Vasconcelos de Soveral (1790-1797), had access to both inquiries regarding the soba 
of Socoval and the regent of Quilengues. He sought to enforce what he considered the right 
interpretation of the regulations and instructions given by Lisbon about the treatment dispensed to 
African vassals and allies. 
The inquiries about the conflicts between Socoval and the regents of Quilengues were also 
followed closely by the governor of Angola, Dom Miguel Antonio de Melo (1797-1802), a career 
bureaucrat from Lisbon who had recently arrived in Angola and was only too willing to leave his 
mark. After studying them, he absolved the soba of Socoval, thus reverting the judge’s decision 
that condemned the African ruler and ordering the return of those sold as slaves to Brazil, as we 
will see below.   
 
Inquiry 1: The devassa of Quipuças 
The inquiry into the case of Quipuças confirmed rumours that the regent of Quilengues, 
Captain Andrade, had raided sobeta Cacombo and enslaved his people. According to witnesses, 
Captain Andrade’s quimbares, with the help of some moradores, attacked the libata of Cacombo, 
capturing more than thirty people and much cattle. The governor of Benguela, Botelho de 
Vasconcelos, could personally confirm the veracity of the raid upon Quipuças because Captain 
Andrade’s solicitor, the sertanejo Joaquim José Coimbra, had recently arrived in the coastal urban 
centre with three slaves to be “deposited” in the royal treasury as payment of the royal fifth from 
raids commanded by the regent of Quilengues. The slaves were identified by sobeta Cacombo as 
his subjects from Quipuças. The governor, unsure of how to proceed, sent the slaves to the judge 
of Benguela, who was to decide if the “colonial” administration could receive revenues originating 
from an “illegal” war939. 
The soba of Socoval arrived in São Filipe de Benguela in September 1796 for his audience 
with Botelho de Vasconcelos. At the audience, Socoval made serious accusations against Captain 
Andrade. He told the governor of Benguela about raids against he and his people and confirmed 
the denunciations of sobeta Cacombo. Among the “crimes” promoted by the regent of Quilengues, 
                                                 
939 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 8-8v, “Carta do governador de Benguela Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcelos para o capitão-
mor de Quilengues Joaquim Vieira de Andrade”, (22 September 1796). 
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Socoval highlighted the treachery against Quilumata. In July 1796, Captain Andrade was on his 
way from Benguela to Salvaterra dos Magos and made a stop in Quilumata to request porters for 
his caravan. According to reports, the soba of Quilumata provided him with five of his subjects in 
good faith. When his caravan arrived in Salvaterra dos Magos, however, Captain Andrade enslaved 
the porters and gave them to Manuel José de Sousa as payment for a debt that the soba of 
Quilumata had with that morador. Governor Botelho de Vasconcelos wrote to the regent of 
Quilengues reprimanding and ordering him to free the individuals thus enslaved and return them 
to Quilumata940.   
Besides these accusations made by the soba of Socoval and the sobeta of Cacombo, the 
governor of Benguela collected testimonies from settlers (moradores) and African “potentates” 
from Quilengues denouncing the regent for sponsoring unjustified acts of violence. They accused 
Captain Andrade’s quimbares of roaming the sertões of Quilengues armed with guns and 
committing all sorts of extortions. They acted like bounty hunters, collecting other people’s debts 
(dívidas alheias), often without their consent. Captain Andrade would often keep the collected 
debts for himself and use his power to hinder distressed settlers from going to Benguela to 
complain about his “crimes”941.  
Botelho de Vasconcelos heard Socoval’s complaints, but also used the opportunity to 
lecture the soba about maintaining peace and about the respect and obedience he owed to the 
regent. He also warned the soba not to offend the “whites” living within Quilengues, or the 
sertanejos crossing its sertões with passports and licences to trade. After some preaching, the 
governor gave the soba of Socoval authorization to return to his land. The soba, however, made a 
rather surprising request: he asked Botelho de Vasconcelos to give him another land to settle with 
his people, somewhere outside the district of Quilengues. The soba justified his extraordinary 
request by saying that he wanted to avoid the constant violence practiced by the regent of 
Quilengues. The governor did not grant the request for new lands, but promised the soba of 
Socoval that he would order the regent to stop all aggression against him and his people942. 
                                                 
940 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 7-7v, “Carta do governador de Benguela Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcelos para o capitão-
mor de Quilengues Joaquim Vieira de Andrade”, (22 September 1796). 
941 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 7-7v, “Carta do governador de Benguela Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcelos para o capitão-
mor de Quilengues Joaquim Vieira de Andrade”, (22 September 1796). 
942 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 7-7v, “Carta do governador de Benguela Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcelos para o capitão-
mor de Quilengues Joaquim Vieira de Andrade”, (22 September 1796). 
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Governor Botelho de Vasconcelos effectively ordered Captain Andrade to leave Socoval 
and Cacombo in peace, at least until a decision from his superiors ordering otherwise. He revealed 
that sobeta Cacombo was afraid of being attacked again by forces stationed in Quilengues after 
returning to his lands with the soba of Socoval943. The governor of Benguela also wrote to Luanda 
informing on the findings of the inquiry regarding the crimes of Captain Andrade against the soba 
of Socoval and the sobeta Cacombo. In the meantime, Socoval and Cacombo returned to their 
lands without further conflicts with the regent944. 
In Luanda, the governor of Angola, Almeida e Vasconcelos, read what he classified as 
“horrifying” accusations of crimes against the regent of Quilengues and demanded a second 
inquiry (devassa) into the matter. He was not satisfied with the evidence presented, or the quality 
of the witnesses and their testimonies. Almeida e Vasconcelos wanted a proper investigation in 
which witnesses and testimonies followed the necessary formality for such serious cases. The 
inquiry should obey all legal procedures because the consequences were dire. If the gravity of the 
accusations were confirmed, the governor of Angola declared that he would authorize “the greatest 
punishment” (o maior castigo) against the regent of Quilengues and the complete restitution of 
losses945. As for the regent of Quilengues, he should be removed from his position, escorted back 
to Benguela and arrested upon arrival. His patrimony should be seized to provide means for the 
restitution and indemnification due to those he had wronged. According to Almeida e Vasconcelos, 
seizing Captain Andrade’s property was not only justifiable, but should serve as example against 
this type of “thefts” (ladroeiras). It was dishonorable and useless to try to steal in the sertões, the 
governor of Angola concluded946. Almeida e Vasconcelos then ordered his counterpart in Benguela 
to find a replacement for the regent of Quilengues from among the “whites” in the region947.  
The governor of Angola also sent two letters attached to his orders to Governor Botelho de 
Vasconcelos in Benguela: one was addressed to the disgraced regent of Quilengues and the other 
to his substitute. In the first letter, he ordered Captain Andrade to surrender his position to the new 
                                                 
943 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 7-7v, “Carta do governador de Benguela Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcelos para o capitão-
mor de Quilengues Joaquim Vieira de Andrade”, (22 September 1796). 
944 ANA, Códice 4094, fls. 25-25v, “Autos de inquirição do soba do Socoval”, (27 October 1796). 
945 ANA, Códice 4094, fls. 25-25v, “Autos de inquirição do soba do Socoval”, (27 October 1796). 
946 ANA, Códice 4094, fls. 25-25v, “Autos de inquirição do soba do Socoval”, (27 October 1796). 
947 ANA Códice 4094, fls. 23-25, “Ofício do Exmo. Snr. Genal. para o governador de Benguela com duas cartas, uma 
para o capitão-mor de Quilengues e outra para o oficial que o deve render”, (27 October 1796).  
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regent, handing over all military equipment and official documents under his possession. He 
should also leave the official residence immediately and return to the town of Benguela to present 
himself to his superiors. Almeida e Vasconcelos made special recommendations about the future 
collection of tribute, which should suffer no alteration following these administrative changes. The 
tribute collected by the regency of Quilengues was much needed in the Hospital of Benguela, the 
governor of Angola explained948.   
The second letter, addressed to the new regent, brought instructions about the transition of 
power, including recommendations that he should base his actions on “love and fear” for the laws 
of God and men. Hence, he should always seek to improve the “Santa Religião”, or “Holy 
Religion” and to impose respect and obedience to the Portuguese crown. He should also make sure 
that the peoples under his jurisdiction lived in peace and prosperity, freeing them from “idleness”, 
the root of all their vices, according to Almeida e Vasconcelos949. The new regent of Quilengues 
should further take good care of commerce, assuring business flowed without grievances or 
dishonesties. He should punish those who behaved with indolence. Nevertheless, before applying 
any kind of punishment, the regent had to be sure of the faults committed by those to be punished 
and the consequences of such punishment. Moreover, the governor of Angola made a series of 
recommendations on how to collect tribute in arrears. The collection should be based on common 
sense and with limited use of force. Thus, in case a vassal proved that he could not pay the full 
tribute, the regent should try to collect whatever was possible and reasonable950.  
Governor Almeida e Vasconcelos ended his letter to the new regent of Quilengues 
reminding him that he owed total obedience to his immediate superiors in Benguela. He should 
execute every order from both the governor and the judge of that “colonial” urban centre. The 
governor of Angola also declared that experience had shown him that regents and capitães-mores 
                                                 
948 ANA Códice 4094, fls. 23-25, “Ofício do Exmo. Snr. Genal. para o governador de Benguela com duas cartas, uma 
para o capitão-mor de Quilengues e outra para o oficial que o deve render”, (27 October 1796). In another document, 
the successor of Governor Almeida e Vasconcelos further explained that the Hospital of Benguela was maintained by 
the tithe collected in the interior, but the amount collected was so small that it could not even cover the acquisition 
medicine and other basic needs of the hospital: AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 80, “Carta do governador de 
Angola Dom Miguel António de Melo sobre as injustiças praticadas contra o Soba de Socoval”, (30 April 1798). See 
also Arquivos de Angola, 1790-1797, 1ª Série, No. 6. (Luanda: Arquivo Nacional, 1933), Doc. IX.  
949 ANA Códice 4094, fls. 23-25, “Ofício do Exmo. Snr. Genal. para o governador de Benguela com duas cartas, uma 
para o capitão-mor de Quilengues e outra para o oficial que o deve render”, (27 October 1796).  
950 ANA Códice 4094, fls. 23-25, “Ofício do Exmo. Snr. Genal. para o governador de Benguela com duas cartas, uma 
para o capitão-mor de Quilengues e outra para o oficial que o deve render”, (27 October 1796).  
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were quickly inebriated by their power and the assurance of impunity provided by the distance 
from his superiors, who rarely left town to venture into the sertões. Governor Almeida e 
Vasconcelos finally ordered the new regent to make sure to notify Captain Andrade that he had 
fifteen days to present himself back in town951. As we will see below, Captain Andrade was never 
punished for his “crimes”.  
 
Inquiry 2: The devassa of Socoval 
The governor of Benguela, Botelho de Vasconcelos, chose Captain Miguel Antonio Serrão 
to replace Captain Andrade as regent of Quilengues. Captain Serrão received orders to assume the 
post of regent of Quilengues in late November 1796, but it took him another month to make his 
way to Salvaterra dos Magos952. Shortly after his arrival in the settlement, he began looking for 
witnesses among local residents to testify for the new inquiry ordered by the governor of Angola 
about the crimes committed against the soba of Socoval and his sobeta Cacombo. The governor 
of Benguela elaborated a detailed questionnaire concerning Captain Joaquim Vieira de Andrade’s 
behaviour towards moradores and African rulers under his jurisdiction953. 
The new inquiry included questions about Captain Andrade’s personal behaviour, such as 
if he feared God and worked for the expansion of the Christian faith, as well as his role as regent, 
including if he collected tribute in arrears and allowed the development of trade without negative 
interference. There were also questions about certain of his decisions as regent and if they were 
driven by attempts at bribery or “personal passions”. Much of the questionnaire focused on the 
relationship of Captain Andrade with sobas in Quilengues, and if he had overreached his powers 
                                                 
951 ANA Códice 4094, fls. 23-25, “Ofício do Exmo. Snr. Genal. para o governador de Benguela com duas cartas, uma 
para o capitão-mor de Quilengues e outra para o oficial que o deve render”, (27 October 1796).  
952 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 10, “Carta do governador de Benguela Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcelos para o capitão-
mor de Quilengues Joaquim Vieira de Andrade”, (29 November 1796); ANA, Códice 443, fl. 11v, “Carta do 
governador de Benguela Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcelos para o Tenente de Infantaria Miguel Antonio Serrão”, 
(25 December 1796). 
953 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 12, “Edital do Regente de Quilengues e Tenente de Infantaria Miguel Antonio Serrão”, 
(1796); ANA, Códice 443, fl. 12, “Carta do governador de Benguela Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcelos para o 
Tenente de Infantaria Miguel Antonio Serrão”, (7 January 1797). 
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by interfering in African “legal matters” (mucanos954). One question in particular enquired if he 
had enslaved any “freeborn” person or freed any slave for his personal gain. 
In another part of the inquiry, there was a series of specific questions about the relationship 
between the regent of Quilengues and the soba of Socoval. Governor Botelho de Vasconcelos 
believed that the soba of Socoval was loyal because he had been paying tribute and had personally 
participated in an expedition to defend Caconda, providing many porters for the artillery. Most of 
the questions were based on rumors circulating in Benguela about the infamous regent: Was it true 
that Captain Andrade received gifts of slaves, cattle and ivory from the soba of Socoval? Did he 
usurp Socoval’s right to decide local legal matters (mucanos), especially those concerning 
“witchcraft”, that is “crimes” punishable with enslavement, because of personal ambition?  
Moreover: Was it true that Captain Andrade’s quimbares crossed the district of Quilengues 
insulting sobetas and macotas, attacking their libatas, all with the deliberate support of their 
master? Was it true that these quimbares became so audacious that they looted the libata of the 
soba of Socoval, despite the fact that the said soba had previously given them some cattle to avoid 
any problems? What happened after the attack? Once the soba of Socoval defended himself from 
the offenses and provocations of the regent and his quimbares, did Captain Andrade turn against 
him? Was it true that the regent organized a military expedition merging his quimbares, slaves and 
some moradores to attack the libata of Socoval, who was forced to flee for his life? Rumors also 
indicated that after the soba escaped, Captain Andrade decided to destroy and burn his libata and 
threatened to kill the soba in case he complained to the governor of Benguela, all the while stating 
that he was not subject to the authority of the latter.  
Another set of questions revolved around sobeta Cacombo: Did Captain Andrade betray 
Cacombo, helping his nephews to take over power? If so, this was against customary law and the 
will of the macotas, who should be the only ones responsible for choosing the next soba. Cacombo 
denounced this betrayal to the governor of Benguela, who issued orders for the regent of 
Quilengues to support Cacombo as the legitimate ruler of Quipuças: Was it true that Captain 
Andrade received ten slaves from Cacombo’s nephew (Quipia) to disobey the orders from 
                                                 
954 Catarina Madeira Santos, “Entre deux droits: les Lumières en Angola, 1750-1800”, Annales. Historie, Sciences 
Sociales, 60e, (2005): 821, explains that mukano derives from Mbundu customary laws connected to their social and 
religious practices aiming at establishing social balance. As we will see below, Luso-African agents in Angola and 
Benguela had their own understanding of “mucanos”.  
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Governor Botelho de Vasconcelos? Was it true that the regent attacked the libata of Cacombo, 
capturing thirty-five slaves and four hundred and eighty head of cattle, keeping most of the loot 
for himself? 
According to witnesses, the conflicts with Cacombo started when the Andrade brothers 
tried to influence the succession of power in the sobado of Quipuças, located on the western margin 
of the Calunga River, a region close to the settlement of Salvaterra dos Magos and the sobado of 
Socoval (Map 4). Quipuças was ruled by soba Gonga. Cacombo was his brother. Besides sharing 
blood ties, Cacombo was very close to Gonga, and they lived together in Quipuças for a long time. 
Sobeta Cacombo was the next in line to assume power in Quipuças, should anything happen to his 
brother.  
Cacombo had a nephew called Quipia. For reasons not explained in the testimony, Gonga 
and Quipia hatched a plan to kill Cacombo, with his nephew replacing him. They attacked 
Cacombo, who managed to gather his “minions” (sequazes) and resist the strike long enough to 
escape to the lands of Nano. During the attack, Cacombo’s warriors allegedly killed soba Gonga. 
This left the way open for Quipia to become the soba of Quipuças955.  
Cacombo then travelled to Benguela to have an audience with the governor of Benguela, 
Francisco Paim de Câmara e Ornelas (1791-1796), to reclaim his right over the territory of 
Quipuças. The governor decided in favor of Cacombo and sent orders to the regent of Quilengues 
to ensure that he re-assumed the position as soba of Quipuças. Captain Andrade, however, did not 
obey the orders emanating from Benguela because he already had an agreement with Quipia. 
According to witnesses, when Quipia learned that Cacombo had travelled to Benguela to have an 
audience with the governor, he sent a bribe of ten slaves to the regent of Quilengues956.  
Cacombo returned to Quilengues, but Quipia remained as ruler of Quipuças. After some 
time, Cacombo received a message from his nephew, inviting him to return to Quipuças. In his 
message, Quipia said that he wanted to have his uncle once again by his side. Cacombo accepted 
the invitation in good faith and returned to Quipuças, only to meet Quipia and his warriors waiting 
                                                 
955 ANA, Códice 443, fls. 12v-16, “Auto de Devassa sobre o capitão-mor de Quilengues Joaquim Vieira de Andrade”, 
(1797).  




for him, guns in hand. Quipia’s men fired upon Cacombo, who managed to defend himself long 
enough to escape once again. Nonetheless, another of Cacombo’s nephew died during the fight957.  
Cacombo decided then to move to the libata of Miguel Joaquim Ignácio, an important 
sertanejo in Quilengues, who was also his creditor and business partner. When Captain Andrade 
learned that he was living in this sertanejo’s compound, he invited Cacombo to move to his own 
libata and live amongst he and his brother, João Vieira de Andrade. The Andrade brothers also 
promised to help Cacombo get back into power as soba of Quipuças. But the sobeta feared that 
was another trap. Cacombo knew that Captain Andrade had accepted a bribe of ten slaves sent by 
Quipia. He refused to move into the compound of the Andrade brothers, saying that he felt better 
living within the domains of his associate Ignácio because they had business together958.  
Fearing that Captain Andrade would be displeased with his refusal to move to his libata, 
Cacombo sent him five slaves, including a “molecona”, or young female. Despite this gift, Captain 
Andrade sent orders to Quipia to dispatch his warriors to Salvaterra dos Magos. Quipia’s warriors 
did not enter the settlement, but rather camped in the surrounding bush. Captain Andrade sent them 
a good ox for their ritual feast before the raid. At night, Captain Andrade gathered his quimbares, 
joined Quipia’s warriors and marched on the libata where Cacombo was living. They looted and 
razed it to the ground. Captain Andrade and his men also killed one of Cacombo’s slaves. They 
captured thirty-nine people and more than four hundred head of cattle. In a last act of betrayal, 
Captain Andrade kept most of the loot for himself, giving the warriors from Quipuças only ten 
slaves and twenty head of cattle, threatening with death anyone who complained about it. There is 
no register that the royal fifth was put aside for the royal treasury959. 
The witnesses called for the inquiry confirmed most of the rumors regarding the crimes 
committed against Socoval. In their view, the soba of Socoval was a humble and loyal friend of 
Portugal who paid annual tribute and obeyed the regent of Quilengues as his superior. He used to 
send the regent “gifts” such as slaves, cattle and ivory. He had also served the “royal service” on 
different occasions, including participating in a recent expedition sent from Luanda to punish 
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“rebel” sobas in Caconda. Socoval had personally led his porters, who carried the military 
equipment of the expedition, all the way up to the presídio of Caconda960.  
According to the witnesses, moreover, Socoval became seriously ill during this journey to 
Caconda. He asked the commander of the Luanda expedition permission to return home, which 
was granted. Socoval left one of his macota representing him in Caconda and returned with his 
people to his libata. However, he did not ask permission from the then regent of Quilengues, 
allegedly because he thought it was not necessary. In the soba’s understanding, permission from 
the commander of the Luanda expedition should have been enough. The regent of Quilengues, 
however, began using this “fault” as the reason to accuse the soba of “insubordination”961.  
According to the witnesses, from this moment onwards the regent of Quilengues became 
hostile towards the soba of Socoval, displaying signs of “open hatred” against him. He began by 
usurping the soba of his rights to decide mucanos in his territory, especially those concerning 
witchcraft and the inheritance of land. Captain Andrade’s overreach was based on greed, the 
witnesses reported. Interestingly, the same witnesses testified that the soba of Socoval decided not 
to denounce Captain Andrade because he did not dislike the regent962.  
The inquiry revealed that the quimbares of Captain Andrade boldly roamed the sertões of 
Quilengues attacking and pillaging libatas with the approval of their master. They also repeatedly 
attacked the sobado of Socoval, despite the fact that the soba tried to maintain good relations with 
them, even offering gifts of cattle in order to avoid conflict. Recent news received by the new 
regent of Quilengues informed that Captain Andrade had ordered a man called Francisco Xavier, 
also known as Quiçonde, to move to a residence in an undisclosed place in the sertões. He ordered 
his quimbares to escort Quiçonde to his new residence. Along the way, they passed by libatas of 
subjects of Socoval and, as usual, decided to raid them. After pillaging them, Andrade’s quimbares 
decided to attack the big libata of the soba of Socoval himself. When Socoval’s subjects noticed 
that his libata was about to be attacked, they rushed to block its entrance. The quimbares did not 
                                                 
960 ANA, Códice 443, fls. 12v-16, “Auto de Devassa sobre o capitão-mor de Quilengues Joaquim Vieira de Andrade”, 
(1797).  
961 ANA, Códice 443, fls. 12v-16, “Auto de Devassa sobre o capitão-mor de Quilengues Joaquim Vieira de Andrade”, 
(1797).  




take this obstruction kindly and attacked the “sons” of Socoval. The people of Socoval resisted 
and struck back, seriously injuring one of Captain Andrade’s quimbares in the head963.  
After the attack, Andrade’s men returned to Salvaterra dos Magos and complained to their 
master that they were injured by the people of Socoval, omitting the truth about who started the 
fight, according to witnesses. The regent of Quilengues, who was known for his “impetuous” and 
“heated” personality, decided to remove the soba of Socoval from Quilengues for good. He 
summoned the “white” moradores in Quilengues with their slaves to join his quimbares in the 
march against Socoval. Captain Andrade personally commanded this raiding expedition964.  
Captain Andrade then attempted to assassinate the soba, who managed to escape with some 
of his people. The raiders seized the belongings of the soba and of his subjects and, once again, 
set his libata on fire. Still according to witnesses, the soba of Socoval refused to send his warriors 
to attack any official of the “colonial” administration, which indicated that he was still a “loyal 
friend”. Captain Andrade, in turn, threatened to kill the soba of Socoval in case he complained to 
the governor of Benguela. He still defied the authority of his superiors by openly stating that he 
was the subordinate of no one965.   
The inquiry about the conflict between the soba of Socoval and Captain Andrade pointed 
towards the acquittal of the former and the condemnation of the latter. Despite orders to arrest the 
regent as soon as he arrived in Benguela, there is no record of such a development. Indeed, after 
Dom Miguel Antonio de Melo, who succeeded Almeida e Vasconcelos as governor of Angola in 
1797, carried out his own investigation into the denunciations of unauthorized attacks against 
Socoval, he issued a new order on 11 March 1798 to arrest Captain Andrade for the crimes he had 
committed while serving as regent of Quilengues966. But this order, too, was never carried.   
 
                                                 
963 ANA, Códice 443, fls. 12v-16, “Auto de Devassa sobre o capitão-mor de Quilengues Joaquim Vieira de Andrade”, 
(1797).  
964 ANA, Códice 443, fls. 12v-16, “Auto de Devassa sobre o capitão-mor de Quilengues Joaquim Vieira de Andrade”, 
(1797).  
965 ANA, Códice 443, fls. 12v-16, “Auto de Devassa sobre o capitão-mor de Quilengues Joaquim Vieira de Andrade”, 
(1797).  
966 ANA Códice 4094, fls. 77-77v, “Ofício do governador de Angola Dom Miguel Antonio de Melo para o governador 
de Benguela Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcellos”, (11 March 1798); AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 42 - 




New attacks against Socoval 
The man chosen by the governor of Benguela to replace Captain Andrade as regent of 
Quilengues was not much different from his predecessor. As one governor of Angola once 
acknowledged, violent slavers were the only ones who could do the job of managing the outposts 
in the sertões. Captain Serrão had become Lieutenant of the Infantry of Benguela on 18 August 
1791, under orders from Governor Francisco Paim da Câmara e Ornelas967. A Few years later, he 
rose to the position of regent of Quilengues and thus became responsible for the maintenance of 
the slave routes that passed through the region.    
The new regent, Captain Serrão, took over the administration of Quilengues towards the 
end of 1796. He spent most of the following year working on the inquiry about Captain Andrade’s 
alleged crimes against Socoval, collecting testimony from various witnesses and writing extensive 
reports about his findings. As a result, Captain Serrão was not able to carry out as many slaving 
expeditions in Quilengues as his predecessor had managed to undertake. This had two immediate 
consequences. The number of captives arriving in Benguela decreased considerably, pushing   
slave exports downwards from more than eleven thousand slaves in 1795 to some six thousand in 
1797968. On the other hand, the sudden decrease in “punitive” expeditions in Quilengues made the 
sobas and warlords more audacious in their attacks on sertanejos and moradores. In September 
1797, the regent of Quilengues complained to the governor of Benguela that the soba of Socoval 
had turned quite “insubordinate” following the departure of Captain Andrade969. 
Governor Botelho de Vasconcelos saw this lack of activity on the part of the new regent of 
Quilengues as a sign of weakness. If the former regent was too violent and too eager to impose his 
                                                 
967 AHU, Angola, Códice 1628, Livro 2, 1791-1792, fls. 13v-16v., “Carta para o governador de Benguela Francisco 
Paim Câmara e Ornellas”, (18 August 1791). 
968 The numbers of legal exports from Benguela kept on falling in the following years: 4,581 slaves in 1798 and 3,834 
in 1799, see José C. Curto, “The Legal Portuguese Slave Trade from Benguela, Angola, 1730-1828: A Quantitative 
Re-Appraisal,” África, 16-17, no. 1 (1993/1994): 101-116. In José C. Curto, “Another Look at the Slave Trade from 
Benguela: What We Know and What We Do Not Know”, Portuguese Studies Review, Vol. 23, No. 2 (forthcoming), 
7-10 – Table I, he estimates 6554 slaves exported from Benguela in 1798 and 5862 in 1799. Daniel Domingues da 
Silva, “The Transatlantic Slave Trade from Angola: A Port-by-Port Estimate of Slaves Embarked, 1701-1867,” 
International Journal of African Historical Studies, 46, n. 1 (2013): 121-122 – Appendix A, also presents a decline in 
slave exports from Benguela in the second half of the 1790s, in comparison to the first half of that decade. According 
to Silva’s estimates, Benguela would experience another surge in slave exports between 1836 and 1850.  
969 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 80, “Carta do governador de Angola Dom Miguel António de Melo sobre 
as injustiças praticadas contra o Soba de Socoval”, (30 April 1798); Arquivos de Angola, 1790-1797, 1ª Série, No. 6. 
(Luanda: Arquivo Nacional, 1933), Doc. IX; AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 42 - “Devassa sobre a guerra 
contra o soba do Socoval liderada pelo regente de Quilengues Miguel António Serrão”, (11 March 1798). 
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authority over Africans and Luso-Africans alike, Captain Serrão was seen as too prudent. The 
governor of Benguela wrote Captain Serrão a harsh letter on 4 October 1797, arguing that his 
“excess of prudence” was detrimental to both the royal service and peaceful relations with local 
subjects, because it made the Portuguese seem weak. According to the Botelho de Vasconcelos, 
Captain Serrão’s excessive prudence was the reason why his subordinates abused him and did not 
respect his authority. Hence, the governor of Benguela dispatched a contingent of soldiers to help 
the regent of Quilengues re-establish order in his district970.  
Not surprisingly, the following month saw Captain Serrão organize a new slaving 
expedition against the soba of Socoval. The regent of Quilengues returned from this expedition in 
late November 1797 with forty-five captives and seventy-nine head of cattle seized from Socoval: 
representing the royal fifth of the raid just carried out, this booty was handed over to the royal 
treasurer in Benguela, Joaquim José de Almeida971. The latter produced a list describing the forty-
five slaves received from Captain Serrão972. It is important to bear in mind that these individuals 
represent only the royal fifth of the slaving operation that carried out, not the actual number of 
captives (and cattle) apprehended during the raid973.  
As soon as the captives representing the royal fifth were handed over to the royal treasurer, 
José de Almeida named two of the most important members of the community of slave traders in 
Benguela, Antonio José Viana and Joaquim José Coimbra, to gauge the value of the “merchandise” 
to be sold in the local market. The traders quickly examined and priced the enslaved individuals, 
                                                 
970 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 19v, “Ofício dirigido ao regente de Quilengues Miguel António Serrão”, (4 October 1797); 
AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 42 - “Devassa sobre a guerra contra o soba do Socoval liderada pelo regente 
de Quilengues Miguel António Serrão”, (11 March 1798). 
971 ANA, Códice 516, fls. 51-51v, “Relação de escravos e gado trazidos de Quilengues pelo capitão Miguel António 
Serrão, (26 November 1797); AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 28 - “Devassa dos crimes do Soba do Socoval, 
com o inventário do confisco dos seus bens”, (27 November 1797 to 26 January 1798). 
972 “Relação dos escravos que de Quilengues trouxe o Capitão Miguel Antônio Serrão, pertencentes a Sua Majestade. 
A 1ª dezanove Negras Velhas = três ditas ditas com cria = Duas molequinhas de quatro palmos = Quatro moleconas, 
uma dita muito magra = Cinco barbados = hum dito cego de um olho = hum molecão = hum dito com os pés inchados 
= hum molecote muito magro e pés inchados = Duas molecas de 5 ½ palmos = duas ditas de seis ditos = um moleque 
de seis ditos = um dito dito com umbigo grande = hum dito de 5 ½ palmos = hum dito de quatro palmos = são 
quarenta e cinco =  Benguela 26 de 9bro de 1797 = O Tesoureiro e Almoxarife da Real Fazenda Joaquim José de 
Almeida = Botelho = Relação das cabeças de gado que vieram de Quilengues em companhia do Capitão Miguel 
Antônio Serrão pertencentes a Sua Majestade = Sessenta e oito vacas = Quatro ditas, quatro crias das ditas = três 
Touros = São setenta e nove = Benguela 26 de 9bro de 1797 = O Tesoureiro e Almoxarife da Real Fazenda Joaquim 
José de Almeida”: ANA, Códice 516, fls. 51-51v, “Relação de escravos e gado trazidos de Quilengues pelo capitão 
Miguel António Serrão, (26 November 1797). 
973 We can estimate a minimum of 225 slaves and 395 head of cattle as captured, overall, during this raid. 
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classifying them with “positive qualities” to increase their market value (see table below). On the 
following day, the human merchandise was already available for purchase974. 
1- List, made by the Treasurer of the Real Fazenda 
Joaquim José de Almeida, of the captives and cattle from 
Socoval brought by capitão-mor Miguel Antonio Serrão 
(regent of Quilengues) to Benguela on 26 November 
1797975. 
2- List of the slaves and cattle from Socoval to be 
sold in the public market of Benguela as evaluated 
by Antonio José Viana and Joaquim José Coimbra 
on 27 November 1797976.  
#  Classification  Portuguese version #  Re-classification  Portuguese 
version 
19 old black women negras velhas 3  premium black slaves negros peças da 
índia 
3 old black women with 
children 
negras velhas com 
crias 
3  boys  moleques  
2 small infant girls molequinhas de 4 
palmos 
6  old black men negros velhos 
4  teenage girls, one very 
thin 
moleconas, 1 muito 
magra 
25  black women skilled in 
leatherworking   
negras 
talabardeiras  
5  bearded men barbados 6  teenage girls  molecas 
1 bearded man, blind of 
one eye 
barbado cego de 1 olho 2  infants   crias de pé 
1  teenage boy molecão    
1  teenage boy with 
swollen feet 
molecão com os pés 
inchados 
   
1  small boy, very thin and 
with swollen feet 
molecote muito magro 
e pés inchados 
   
2  girls molecas de 5 ½ palmos    
2  girls molecas de 6 palmos    
1  boy moleque de 6 palmos    
1  boy, with a big 
bellybutton 
moleque de 6 palmos 
com umbigo grande 
   
1 boy moleque de 5 ½ palmos    
1 small boy moleque de 4 palmos    
 Total: 45   Total: 45  
      
3 Bulls Touros 3 bulls  Touros 
68 Cows Vacas 72 cows Vacas 
4 Calves Crias    
 Total: 79   Total: 75  
                                                 
974 “Relação dos escravos, e gado que se apreendeu para a Real Fazenda ao soba do Socoval da província de 
Quilengues = Quarenta e cinco escravos, a saber três negros peças da Índia, três moleques, seis negros velhos, vinte 
e cinco negras talabardeiras, seis molecas, e duas crias de pé avaliados todos na quantia de oitocentos e cinquenta e 
quatro mil seiscentos réis = setenta e cinco cabeças de gado vacum que são setenta e duas vacas e três touros, 
avaliados tudo na quantia de cento e oitenta mil reis = soma esta relação a quantia de um conto trinta e quatro mil e 
seiscentos réis. Benguela, vinte e seis de janeiro de mil setecentos e noventa e oito = Bento Fernandes Barreto, 
escrivão do Foro Contencioso da Provedoria da Real Fazenda”: AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 28, “Devassa 
dos crimes do Sova do Socoval, com o inventário do confisco dos seus bens”, (27 November 1797 to 26 January 
1798). 
975 ANA, Códice 516, fls. 51-51v, “Relação de escravos e gado trazidos de Quilengues pelo capitão Miguel António 
Serrão, (26 November 1797). 
976 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 28, “Devassa dos crimes do Sova do Socoval, com o inventário do confisco 
dos seus bens”, (27 November 1797 to 26 January 1798). 
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 The two documents concerning the captives from the sobado of Socoval, located in 
archives in two different continents977, provide a unique window into the operation of the slave 
trade in Benguela, allowing us to better understand the process of evaluation and sale of captives. 
The first document shows the victims of the slavers as they arrived from Socoval, while the second 
reveals the process of labeling them for the slave market978. They represent a documental 
manifestation of the process of transforming African captives into enslaved individuals for the 
Atlantic trade. 
Although both lists account for the same forty-five captives from Socoval, their 
classification in each list is dissimilar. The first is a list of the captives as they arrived in Benguela 
from the sertões of Quilengues. It focuses on identifying them as best as possible, highlighting 
their physical characteristics and “defects”. The captives are loosely classified by sex and age 
groups. The age groups were determined using Portuguese expressions that there and then tried to 
convey the approximate age of the individual: molequinha, moleca, molecona, negra, negra velha, 
and so on979. Some of the physical features presented were also meant to determine age, for 
instance “bearded” (barbado). Others were meant to determine the health condition of the captives, 
such as “blind of an eye”, “swollen feet”, “very thin” or yet “big bellybutton”980.    
In the second list, all of the physical features that could be considered “defects” are 
eliminated, as are those that tried to determine age. Hence, the number of “classifications” on the 
second list is reduced to less than half, while a few new ones are added. The new labels were meant 
to increase the value of the “merchandise” in the slave market. Perhaps the most important 
classification was “peça d’Índia”, which meant a “premium” male slave with the right age and 
physical stature, who fetched the highest price in the Atlantic slave trade981. Skills were also added 
                                                 
977 Produced only one day apart from each other (26 and 27 November 1797) these documents are today found in 
different archives. The first list comes from the Arquivo Nacional de Angola (Luanda), while the second is in the 
Arquivo Histórico Ultramarino (Lisbon). Both are copies of original documents. See also AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, 
Cx. 87, Doc. 42 - “Devassa sobre a guerra contra o soba do Socoval liderada pelo regente de Quilengues Miguel 
António Serrão”, (11 March 1798). 
978 Although Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 206, analyses the first document, she does not 
deal with the second and more readily accessible one, where the captives are reclassified for market. Thus, Candido 
erroneously concludes that they must had been sold at a lower price.  
979 See José C. Curto, “The Population of the Lower Kwanza Valley, 1792-1796”, Ponta de Lança, Vol. 12, No. 23 
(2018): 97-117, for similar classifications. 
980 ANA, Códice 516, fls. 51-51v, “Relação de escravos e gado trazidos de Quilengues pelo capitão Miguel António 
Serrão, (26 November 1797). 
981 According to the glossary included in a document about vassalage in Angola in early sixteenth century, the 
expression “peças de índias” referred originally to those slaves of Angola sold to the “Índias de Castella”, that is 
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to this second list, as in “talabardeiras”, a term derived from old Portuguese “talabarte”, meaning 
the leather “belt” used for holding the sword or yet a horse “saddle”982. Hence, “talabardeiras” 
were women skilled in leatherworking983.  
The analysis of the valuation and reclassification undergone by the captives from Socoval 
as they were “transformed” into slaves for the Atlantic market is a fascinating exercise. All old 
black women “disappeared”, as did the partly blind man. Similarly, those with swollen feet were 
no longer found in the new list, although one day was surely not enough to change their condition. 
The twenty-five skilled women in the second list in fact included the twenty-two “old black 
women” (three of them who had just lost their young babies, since the babies disappeared from 
the new list) and three of the four female teenagers, since the fourth was probably “too thin” to be 
re-classified as a “woman”. 
The first list also records seventy-nine head of cattle captured in Socoval as handed over 
to the royal treasurer on 26 November 1797. Four of these were calves. The second list, on the 
other hand, presents only seventy-five head of cattle, which suggests that the calves met another 
destiny (as did the babies). The final list of slaves ready for market was presented to the governor 
of Benguela on 27 November and he authorized their sale that same day. The value of all of the 
slaves was placed at 854$600 réis, while the seventy-five head of cattle were evaluated at an 
overall 180$000 réis. According to the source, most of the 1:034$600 réis acquired with their sale 
was used to pay the costs of their own maintenance (food and shelter). The rest was deposited in 
the royal treasury984. 
 
The investigations of a corrupted judge 
Although the governor of Benguela, Alexandre José Botelho de Vasconcelos, swiftly 
authorized the sale of the captives from Socoval, probably under pressure from members of the 
                                                 
Spanish America and the Caribbean. Later, it became a term to identify premium slaves who had “greater value than 
the others”: BPE, Códice 531, (Manizola), “Autos de Vassalagem e Baculmento”, 1619, fl. 20. 
982 Rafael Bluteau, Diccionario da Lingua Portugueza, Tomo I (Lisboa: Simão Thaddeo Ferreira, 1789), 440.  
983 The word “talabarte” is still used in the Spanish language in reference to “saddlery” and other objects made of 
leather. 
984 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 28, “Devassa dos crimes do Sova do Socoval, com o inventário do confisco 
dos seus bens”, (27 November 1797 to 26 January 1798). 
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local community of slave traders, he seems to have suspected that something was wrong with this 
sudden supply of enslaved individuals personally brought to town by the regent of Quilengues. 
Botelho de Vasconcelos ordered the new judge in Benguela, Alberto Antonio Pereira, to lead an 
investigation into the origins of the captives brought from Quilengues by Captain Serrão. The 
judge began his investigation on 1 December 1797985.   
Antonio Pereira, the new judge, had been having a series of conflicts with Governor 
Botelho de Vasconcelos, keeping up with the tradition of clashes between the executive and the 
judicial powers in Benguela. There was a constant dispute over jurisdiction between the two 
powers, due to lack of specific colonial legislation about them. This was an old complaint from 
governors of both Angola and Benguela regarding the administration of the captaincy986. The 
animosity between the two parties was public knowledge and generated moments of petty disputes 
and awkward social interactions. Besides, judge Antonio Pereira took the side of Benguela’s 
community of slave traders, as his predecessors had done, by supporting their misconduct and 
extortions. He forwarded to the governor a request from its principal members demanding the 
immediate punishment of the soba of Socoval, who they blamed for recent attacks on the 
moradores of Quilengues. These declared that they feared that Socoval’s aggressions would only 
get worse if nothing was done to punish his “rebellious” attitudes987.  
Judge Antonio Pereira finished his inquiry at the beginning of 1798. Contradicting previous 
investigations, his conclusions exonerated Captain Serrão and instead condemned the soba of 
Socoval. He determined that Socoval committed “crimes of disobedience”, including non-
compliance as a vassal of Portugal and encroaching upon Portuguese royal jurisdiction by resisting 
to pay tribute. Judge Antonio Pereira also accused the soba of Socoval of deserting during a 
military venture against the soba of Huambo. Moreover, the soba of Socoval had not only 
abandoned his position by the side of the colonial forces, but began “fomenting, animating and 
                                                 
985 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 80, “Carta do governador de Angola Dom Miguel António de Melo sobre 
as injustiças praticadas contra o Soba de Socoval”, (30 April 1798); Arquivos de Angola, 1790-1797, 1ª Série, No. 6. 
(Luanda: Arquivo Nacional, 1933), Doc. IX 
986 Ralph Delgado highlights this conflict between governors and judges in Benguela in several of his books. In his 
opinion, the executive power in Benguela was an institution weakened by the members of the judicial and 
ecclesiastical powers, who often used their positions for personal gain. Delgado, A Famosa e Histórica Benguela, 29-
30, cites Sousa Coutinho to argue that this was an old problem and that it was at the core of a supposed “failure” of 
the colonial administration to colonize Angola properly. 
987 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 28, “Devassa dos crimes do Sova do Socoval, com o inventário do confisco 
dos seus bens”, (27 November 1797 to 26 January 1798). 
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sustaining” the rise of the “gentiles” against them after deserting. And, last but not least, the soba 
of Socoval allegedly took advantage of the weakness of the colonial forces in Quilengues to stir 
up his allies against Luso-African settlers, using threats and extortion to promote insubordination 
and total disobedience. As a result, the “gentiles” turned against the “white” moradores of 
Quilengues, who were “viciously and inhumanely” attacked, according to the investigation. The 
“blacks”, the judge reported, had committed terrible acts of cruelty. In summary, “a perfect revolt” 
had developed, he argued988.  
In conclusion, Judge Antonio Pereira found the soba of Socoval guilty of being the main 
leader of this “perfect revolt”. The soba was soon arrested and sent to Luanda to be questioned by 
the governor of Angola. His properties were seized, including cattle and slaves. The judge argued 
in his sentence that the regent of Quilengues had heard and rightfully addressed the “just pleas” of 
the moradores and negociantes against the soba of Socoval. He warned the governor of Benguela, 
however, that he should be careful with future rebellions that could result from current events. 
Judge Antonio Pereira predicted that the peoples of Quilengues would not take peacefully this 
attack on the soba of Socoval, to whom most of them (if not all) paid homage989.   
The verdict of the judge of Benguela was transmitted to Luanda, where a new governor, 
Dom Miguel Antonio de Melo (1797-1802), had recently arrived. Dom Melo was a career 
bureaucrat who would later occupy the position of governor of the Azores, before returning to 
Lisbon to become Minister and Secretary of State (Ministro e Secretário de Estado dos Negócios 
da Fazenda e Presidente do Real Erário). He assumed his position as governor of Angola very 
motivated to leave his mark990.     
In his verdict, Judge Antonio Pereira had ultimately justified the attack against Socoval by 
saying that the governor of Benguela had authorized it. He explained that the governor’s decision 
was based on complaints forwarded by the regent of Quilengues because the soba of Socoval 
refused to pay tribute. According to Dom Melo’s own investigation, however, the governor of 
Benguela had given the regent authorization to reach out to the soba peacefully, with the help of 
                                                 
988 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 28, “Devassa dos crimes do Sova do Socoval, com o inventário do confisco 
dos seus bens”, (27 November 1797 to 26 January 1798). 
989 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 28, “Devassa dos crimes do Sova do Socoval, com o inventário do confisco 
dos seus bens”, (27 November 1797 to 26 January 1798). 
990 Or as Governor Luis da Mota Feo e Torres later put it: “with the greatest zeal for the royal service, giving many 
and excellent orders related to military and civil affairs”: Torres, Memórias contendo a biografia..., 296-297 
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the moradores, and to use “soft means” (meios suaves) to pressure him to pay tribute. Governor 
Botelho de Vasconcelos had not authorized the regent of Quilengues to raid Socoval991. 
Besides, Dom Melo had learnt that, prior to the raid, the regent of Quilengues was 
investigating similar crimes committed by his predecessor against Socoval. Captain Serrão had 
concluded in his own inquiry that Socoval was a victim of Captain Andrade’s ambition, 
exonerating the former of any wrongdoing and condemning the latter. Both cases seemed very 
similar, but with very different verdicts. Dom Melo became suspicious and decided to take a closer 
look into the inquiries to reach his own conclusions.  
 
Dom Melo’s conclusions about the case of Socoval  
On 12 March 1798, the governor of Angola presented his conclusions regarding the inquiry 
into the case of the soba of Socoval. He included new information that confirmed the victimisation 
of African rulers at the hands of slavers in charge of the administration of Quilengues. According 
to the governor’s report, sometime between October and November of 1797, probably after being 
accused of “excessive prudence” by the governor of Benguela, Captain Serrão summoned the soba 
of Socoval to the settlement of Salvaterra dos Magos, with a request to fulfill his duties to the 
“royal service”. Socoval, who did not suspect that the new regent of Quilengues was targeting him, 
showed up and was immediately seized upon arrival. With the soba arrested in Salvaterra dos 
Magos, Captain Serrão sent a “rigorous war” against the people of Socoval, which the governor of 
Angola classified later as a “most barbaric diligence”. More than two hundred people were 
captured, many of them free subjects of Socoval, who were turned into slaves for the Atlantic 
market. Also apprehended, among goods and provisions found in the main libata of Socoval were 
more than four hundred head of cattle992.     
                                                 
991 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 42, “Devassa sobre a guerra contra o soba do Socoval liderada pelo regente 
de Quilengues Miguel António Serrão.”, (11 March 1798); ANA Códice 4094, fl. 72v. “Edital sobre o soba do 
Socoval, publicado a toque de caixas”, (28 March 1798); A transcription of the latter document can be found in 
Delgado, A Famosa e Histórica Benguela, 444, Document 2. 
992 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 42, “Devassa sobre a guerra contra o soba do Socoval liderada pelo regente 
de Quilengues Miguel António Serrão.”, (11 March 1798); ANA Códice 4094, fl. 72v, “Edital sobre o soba do 
Socoval, publicado a toque de caixas”, (28 March 1798). 
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The governor of Angola highlighted the “injustices” carried out by the regent of 
Quilengues. Firstly, the regent did not try to solve the problems with the soba of Socoval through 
“soft means”. Dom Melo argued that the Portuguese crown explicitly prohibited the type of 
violence that Captain Serrão practiced against the sobado of Socoval, actions that resembled more 
“the deeds of a ruffian than of a regent”. The military expeditions against Socoval were not 
“legitimate” wars, because they lacked the “scrupulous formalities” that granted “legality” to such 
“aggressive maneuvers”. The governor of Angola also noted that the soba was tricked by the regent 
into coming to Salvaterra dos Magos in the name of the “royal service” and then was arrested for 
insubordination. He pointed out the contradiction in this account: if the soba was a rebel, why had 
he showed up when summoned? This was further proof that the soba of Socoval had been lured 
into a trap993.  
Dom Melo concluded that the attack on the sobado of Socoval was “illegitimate”, as were 
the spoils it produced. He thus ordered immediate measures to rectify the wrongdoings of the 
regent of Quilengues, which included:  
1. Disapproval and nullification of the seizing of captives and cattle from Socoval and his 
people. The governor also recognized that there were “free” people among the captives 
sent to Benguela and sold as slaves. 
2. Release of all “free” people made prisoners during the raid on Socoval and return of 
those who were slaves to their rightful masters. All cattle and provisions apprehended 
should be handed over to the colonial administration and deposited in the royal 
treasury.  
3. Restitution and release of the free subjects of Socoval taken to Brazil as slaves. The 
governor and the judge of Benguela should provide the necessary legal and documental 
support to guarantee their release and return to Quilengues.  
4. Refunding (at its just cost) of any cattle or provisions consumed during the period 
between the raid and the end of the inquiry. Compensation for slaves from the soba of 
Socoval and his subjects who had been sold to the Americas and could not be recovered 
should also be provided. 
                                                 
993 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 42, “Devassa sobre a guerra contra o soba do Socoval liderada pelo regente 
de Quilengues Miguel António Serrão”, (11 March 1798). 
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5. Return of all revenue of the royal fifth that originated from any properties seized from 
Socoval.  
6. Nomination of the governor and the judge of Benguela as personally responsible for 
the execution of these orders, especially the release of those unjustly captured. They 
should also make sure to return their slaves and cattle. 
7. Publication of these orders for all moradores to be informed of these decisions. All 
those who failed to comply with them should be arrested994. 
 
On 24 March 1798, the governor of Benguela ordered the release of the subjects of Socoval 
captured by Captain Serrão. According to Botelho de Vasconcelos’ order, those proven “free” 
subjects of Socoval should be released immediately, or rescued from the hands of their captors if 
necessary. Those who were identified as slaves of the soba or his subjects should be “deposited” 
in the royal treasury until a subsequent order995. Four days later, on 28 March, the governor of 
Benguela reinforced his previous orders while replying to a letter from the regent of Quilengues. 
Botelho de Vasconcelos instructed the regent to report back and register all of his actions in writing 
(certidão autenticada), to be forwarded to the governor of Angola996. On this same day, Dom Melo 
issued an edict with the verdict about the case of the soba of Socoval. The document was produced 
“on the double” (a toque de caixas), meaning that its publication was hastened997. Time was of the 
essence in trying to rescue those individuals sold into slavery before their tracks were forever lost 
in the Atlantic world.  
The soba of Socoval had been arrested and dispatched to the capital before the conclusion 
of Dom Melo’s investigations (accompanied by at least one of his macotas), which constituted 
further evidence of “illegality”. Since the soba of Socoval was already in the dungeons of the 
Penedo prison, in Luanda, Dom Melo ordered the governor of Benguela to sell his properties and 
those of his macotas, and send the proceeds to the capital. In the same letter, Dom Melo 
reprimanded Botelho de Vasconcelos for allowing crimes to be committed in Quilengues under 
                                                 
994 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 42, “Devassa sobre a guerra contra o soba do Socoval liderada pelo regente 
de Quilengues Miguel António Serrão”, (11 March 1798). 
995 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 26, “Oficio para o capitão regente de Quilengues”, (24 March 1798). 
996 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 27, “Oficio para o capitão regente de Quilengues”, (28 March 1798). 
997 ANA Códice 4094, fl. 72v, “Edital sobre o soba do Socoval, publicado a toque de caixas”, (28 Mar 1798). 
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his watch: both regents of Quilengues accused of starting illegal wars against the sobado of 
Socoval, Joaquim Vieira de Andrade (1796) and Miguel Antonio Serrão (1798), had been chosen 
by the governor of Benguela himself998.  
One month after the publication in Angola of the edict on the case of Socoval, Dom Melo 
informed his superiors in Portugal about the conflicts between the regent of Quilengues and the 
soba of Socoval. On 30 April 1798, he wrote to his Portugal’s Secretary of State999, Dom Rodrigo 
de Sousa Coutinho1000, explaining the case. It is a very long and complex document1001, in which 
Dom Melo summarizes and explains the context surrounding the crimes committed against 
Socoval and why the actions of the regents of Quilengues should be considered “illegal”1002.  
Dom Melo began his exposition by saying that as soon as he received the inquiry (devassa) 
concerning the case of Socoval from the governor of Benguela, accompanied by documents signed 
by the secretary1003 and the judge of Benguela1004, he realized that the issue required attention. He 
decided that the first step should be to determine if the soba of Socoval was indeed a “rebellious 
vassal”, so as to determine the measures to punish him. Dom Melo explained that before being a 
rebel, the soba was supposedly a vassal of Portugal. Therefore, his people were under the 
protection of the Crown. Any punishment should be limited to the soba as the leader of the 
supposed “rebellion” and to those who joined him. Punishment should not be extended to his 
peaceful subjects1005.     
                                                 
998 ANA Códice 4094, fls. 78v-79, “Ofício do governador de Angola Dom Miguel Antonio de Melo para o governador 
de Benguela Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcellos”, (28 April 1798). 
999 Ministro e Secretário de Estado da Marinha e do Ultramar. 
1000 He was also son of the former governor of Angola, Francisco Inocêncio de Sousa Coutinho. 
1001 Although this document repeats issues already discussed above, it is important to go over it again for the sake of 
the bigger argument in this thesis, concerning the Portuguese “colonial” administration’s lack of control (and 
sometimes even knowledge) and the unapologetic way in which slavers in positions of authority behaved to improve 
their personal business. Moreover, Dom Melo’s report to his superiors contains important additional information about 
the social and political organization of the interior of Benguela and the relationship between the “colonial” 
administration and local African rulers.  
1002 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 80, “Carta do governador de Angola Dom Miguel António de Melo sobre 
as injustiças praticadas contra o Soba de Socoval”, (30 April 1798); Arquivos de Angola, 1790-1797, 1ª Série, No. 6. 
(Luanda: Arquivo Nacional, 1933), Doc. IX. 
1003 Secretário do Governo. 
1004 Ouvidor Geral and Juiz de India e Mina. 
1005 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 80, “Carta do governador de Angola Dom Miguel António de Melo sobre 
as injustiças praticadas contra o Soba de Socoval”, (30 April 1798); Arquivos de Angola, 1790-1797, 1ª Série, No. 6. 
(Luanda: Arquivo Nacional, 1933), Doc. IX. 
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According to Dom Melo’s interpretation of the colonial regulations of 12 February 1676 
(Chapters 27 and 28), if the soba of Socoval had disobeyed his duties as a vassal of Portugal, he 
should be punished through normal procedures and in accordance with the law, and not by a violent 
attack on all of his people. Indeed, even if the soba was not a vassal of Portugal, he continued, the 
attack on Socoval was “illegal” because the governor of Benguela had not authorized it1006.  
The governor of Angola also pointed out the absurd contradiction in the attitude of those 
involved in the punishment of Socoval, who only ordered the inquiry on the supposed misdeeds 
committed by the soba after the attack. According to the timeline elaborated by Dom Melo, the 
first complaints about the soba of Socoval from the regent of Quilengues were sent to the governor 
of Benguela on 19 September 1797, and were answered on 4 October. By 24 November, the regent 
of Quilengues was writing back to the governor of Benguela informing about the success of the 
attack on the sobado. The governor of Benguela, however, only launched the inquiry on the crimes 
of Socoval on the day his subjects were put on sale in the local slave market, that is 27 November. 
The judge of Benguela, in turn, only began his investigation on 1 December 1797.1007   
In order to clarify the intricacies of the case to his superiors in Lisbon, Dom Melo 
summarized the main issues covered by the devassas into five questions: (1) How much tribute 
did Socoval pay per year?; (2) Since when did Socoval pay tribute?; (3); Did mucanos belong 
exclusively under the jurisdiction of the regent of Quilengues or were they under that of the 
soba’s?; (4) Did the soba of Socoval always decide upon the mucanos or was there doubt over 
this, and was the soba really a vassal of Portugal?; (5) What was the meaning of mucano in the 
local languages (línguas Benguella e Ambunda)?1008.  
Dom Melo began his verdict explaining that the settler population (moradores) in the 
Captaincy of Benguela was very small and weak, and that the territory was largely populated by 
“blacks”. He informed that Benguela had only one presídio, Caconda, but there was no real 
                                                 
1006 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 80, “Carta do governador de Angola Dom Miguel António de Melo sobre 
as injustiças praticadas contra o Soba de Socoval”, (30 April 1798); Arquivos de Angola, 1790-1797, 1ª Série, No. 6. 
(Luanda: Arquivo Nacional, 1933), Doc. IX. 
1007 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 80, “Carta do governador de Angola Dom Miguel António de Melo sobre 
as injustiças praticadas contra o Soba de Socoval”, (30 April 1798); Arquivos de Angola, 1790-1797, 1ª Série, No. 6. 
(Luanda: Arquivo Nacional, 1933), Doc. IX. 
1008 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 80, “Carta do governador de Angola Dom Miguel António de Melo sobre 
as injustiças praticadas contra o Soba de Socoval”, (30 April 1798); Arquivos de Angola, 1790-1797, 1ª Série, No. 6. 
(Luanda: Arquivo Nacional, 1933), Doc. IX. 
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fortification in it. Dom Melo stated that the “gentiles” in the interior of Benguela were braver 
warriors than those from north of the Cuanza River, that is Angola, and that they were more 
difficult to dominate than were their northern counterparts. The governor of Angola confirmed that 
the earnings of the colonial administration through the royal tithe in the sertões of Benguela were 
insignificant. In fact, only “a few blacks” in Caconda were “real” subjects of Portugal and paid 
tribute regularly. In reply to the first question of the questionnaire, he also confirmed there was no 
record in the archives (Contadoria Geral da Junta da Real Fazenda) about the collection of any 
tribute in Quilengues before 17881009.  
In response to the second question, Dom Melo affirmed that the soba of Socoval was not 
obliged to pay tribute to Portugal. He presented two arguments for this interpretation.  First, he 
explained that “blacks” in the sertões of Benguela were all “gentile”, meaning that they had not 
converted to Christianity1010. Proof of this fact was the lack of the presence of the Church in the 
interior of Benguela. There was only one parish and one clergyman settled in Caconda. Secondly, 
Dom Melo explained that the tithe was a royal right that should be used for the “maintenance of 
the Ministers of the Catholic Church in Benguela”. Hence, those who were not members of the 
Church should not be forced to pay the said tithe1011. He concluded that only African rulers who 
had been baptized should pay tribute destined for the Church. In the case of Quilengues, there were 
not even a church to receive such revenue1012.  
From this point onwards, Dom Melo began to analyze the motives used by the regent of 
Quilengues to justify his attack on the soba of Socoval. The main reason presented by Captain 
Serrão was desertion from defending the presídio of Caconda in the war against the sobas of 
Quitata and Huambo in 1796. The governor of Angola explained that such conflict among African 
rulers and “potentates” was quite common, and that these constant wars were largely responsible 
                                                 
1009 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 80, “Carta do governador de Angola Dom Miguel António de Melo sobre 
as injustiças praticadas contra o Soba de Socoval”, (30 April 1798); Arquivos de Angola, 1790-1797, 1ª Série, No. 6. 
(Luanda: Arquivo Nacional, 1933), Doc. IX. 
1010 This information contradicts Candido’s statement that the soba of Socoval embraced the Christian faith: 
Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 205-206. 
1011 A similar argument was put forth earlier by Governor Sousa Coutinho. He argued that only sobas who had been 
baptized and converted to Christianity should be forced to pay taxes and that “gentiles” were exempt from such tribute: 
Santos, “Um governo ‘polido’ para Angola”, 127.  
1012 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 80, “Carta do governador de Angola Dom Miguel António de Melo sobre 
as injustiças praticadas contra o Soba de Socoval”, (30 April 1798); Arquivos de Angola, 1790-1797, 1ª Série, No. 6. 
(Luanda: Arquivo Nacional, 1933), Doc. IX. 
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for producing the slaves exported to Brazil. He highlighted, however, that the supposed desertion 
of Socoval did not happen during the regency of Captain Serrão, but during that of his predecessor, 
Captain Andrade1013. Ironically, in his own inquiry Captain Serrão had found Captain Andrade 
guilty of crimes against Socoval during that period.  
 Dom Melo, at this point, added a new, revealing piece of information showing that Socoval 
had only recently began paying regular tribute. He found an old devassa in the Cartório da 
Ouvidoria of Benguela detailing the participation of Socoval in the war against Quitata and 
Huambo and the alleged crimes he had committed. In 1796, the then regent of Quilengues, Captain 
Andrade, had sentenced the soba of Socoval to pay a “temporary tithe” as punishment for his 
supposed desertion during the war against Quitata and Huambo, which the soba initially agreed to 
pay1014. Captain Serrão had attempted to make the tribute permanent.  
Dom Melo found yet another document, a “Devassa de Residência” of Captain Andrade, 
containing important information that confirmed his suspicions about the violence suffered by the 
sobados and “potentates” of Quilengues. He was surprised to learn that Captain Andrade, now a 
resident of Benguela, was one of the witnesses in the investigation conducted by Judge Antonio 
Pereira against Socoval, although he had recently been condemned for crimes against its soba. The 
governor of Angola also noticed that all other witnesses consulted by the judge were “exiles” 
(degredados) who had been condemned for committing various crimes, and thus had a “bad 
reputation”. Just like Captain Andrade, these witnesses had personal interests in the matter and 
were often accused of exploiting “local blacks” in name of the “royal service”1015.  
According to Dom Melo, the greatest proof of the “evil nature” of the business carried out 
by these slavers in the sertões of Benguela was the fact that although they sponsored many wars, 
they did not generate any revenue for the Crown, including the “Quintos de Guerra”, or the royal 
fifth. In fact, the costs of the “punitive expeditions” carried out by the regents of Quilengues were 
                                                 
1013 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 80, “Carta do governador de Angola Dom Miguel António de Melo sobre 
as injustiças praticadas contra o Soba de Socoval”, (30 April 1798); Arquivos de Angola, 1790-1797, 1ª Série, No. 6. 
(Luanda: Arquivo Nacional, 1933), Doc. IX. 
1014 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 80, “Carta do governador de Angola Dom Miguel António de Melo sobre 
as injustiças praticadas contra o Soba de Socoval”, (30 April 1798); Arquivos de Angola, 1790-1797, 1ª Série, No. 6. 
(Luanda: Arquivo Nacional, 1933), Doc. IX. 
1015 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 80, “Carta do governador de Angola Dom Miguel António de Melo sobre 
as injustiças praticadas contra o Soba de Socoval”, (30 April 1798); Arquivos de Angola, 1790-1797, 1ª Série, No. 6. 
(Luanda: Arquivo Nacional, 1933), Doc. IX. 
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so high, the governor of Angola argued, that even when they were “just, legal and commanded by 
competent militaries” they were rarely profitable1016. 
Replying to the third question of the devassa, concerning the jurisdiction over mucanos in 
Quilengues, the governor of Angola began by giving an important explanation about what was a 
“mucano” and the different kinds of mucanos found in Angola and Benguela. He defined 
“mucano”, as understood by capitães-mores, as legal cases regarding one’s condition as a free 
person or a slave. The “Juízo dos Mucanos” was also known as “Juízo das Liberdades”, or the 
“Court of Freedom”. In practice, due to the lack of colonial officials in the interior, regents also 
assumed the role of judges. Hence, he should judge cases that happened within his jurisdiction, 
but only where the “Portuguese code of law” could be applied, that is in those cases predicted by 
the Portuguese legislation. Sobas, on the other hand, should judge cases founded in “gentile law”, 
according to their customs and traditions. Dom Melo complained that there had always been 
disputes over jurisdiction between African rulers and colonial officials. He predicted that these 
problems would continue to happen, as long as the Portuguese crown did not decide what exactly 
were the rights of sobas in the Conquista1017.  
The colonial historian Carlos Couto tried to explain this constant conflict for power 
between colonial officials and African authorities and the endless accusations of the usurpation of 
jurisdiction by both sides. Similar to Dom Melo, he blamed the lack of clear regulations and basic 
instructions given to military commanders in Angola. Many of them had no previous 
administrative experience and did not know the range of their jurisdiction and power. Couto used 
the case of the governor of Benguela, Francisco Paim da Câmara Ornelas, to make his point, 
highlighting that that governor complained to Martinho de Melo e Castro in 1792 about the lack 
of administrative instruments, such as a formal statute1018.  
                                                 
1016 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 80, “Carta do governador de Angola Dom Miguel António de Melo sobre 
as injustiças praticadas contra o Soba de Socoval”, (30 April 1798); Arquivos de Angola, 1790-1797, 1ª Série, No. 6. 
(Luanda: Arquivo Nacional, 1933), Doc. IX. This statement by the governor of Angola contradicts the analysis by 
Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 205, about the importance of the revenue acquired from 
slaving campaigns. She has affirmed that “It is clear that slaves paid as part of the royal fifth were fundamental to the 
colonial budget…”.    
1017 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 80, “Carta do governador de Angola Dom Miguel António de Melo sobre 
as injustiças praticadas contra o Soba de Socoval”, (30 April 1798); Arquivos de Angola, 1790-1797, 1ª Série, No. 6. 
(Luanda: Arquivo Nacional, 1933), Doc. IX. 
1018 Couto, Os Capitães-Mores de Angola no Século XVIII, 118. 
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 Dom Melo explained that sobas always argued for their “right” to judge their own people. 
The regents of Quilengues, however, got involved in local legal disputes (mucanos) because they 
could profit from the “exorbitant and unjust costs” they imposed upon these legal procedures. Dom 
Melo indicated that sobas usually yielded jurisdiction to the regents depending on how much they 
respected them. In this case, such “respect” was directly related to the amount of threats and 
pressure the local sobados and potentates could support. This was especially true for those closer 
to a center of the Portuguese “colonial” administration, such as Salvaterra dos Magos1019.  
According to Dom Melo, colonial officials in Angola had more jurisdiction over the 
mucanos because of its greater number of presídios and the fact that Portuguese presence there 
was older and better consolidated. Moreover, according to this governor, the peoples of Angola 
were more docile and more inclined to subjugation. In the sertões of Benguela, one found the 
opposite situation: an early “Conquista” with only one presídio and inhabited by warrior peoples 
who did not respect the authority of “whites”1020.  
While complaining about the insubordination of Africans in the interior of Benguela, Dom 
Melo made a revealing commentary. He highlighted that the lack of respect for the “whites” 
inhabiting the sertões originated from the “great vices” of the Portuguese over the “blacks of 
Benguela” (negros Benguellas), in a clear reference to the enslavement of local people for the 
Atlantic slave trade. He added that these Africans only sought “just defense” against their 
aggressors. They only wanted to “extirpate their stalkers” (extirpar seus perseguidores). 
Unfortunately, the governor of Angola lamented, the “blacks” could not see that these “injustices” 
came from the hands of “bad Portuguese men” and not from the “just” and “gentle” colonial 
administration. The Portuguese Crown, Dom Melo fantasized, did not have preferences while 
administrating justice, and treated equally “Christians and Gentiles, whites and blacks, freemen 
and slaves, men and women”1021.      
                                                 
1019 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 80, “Carta do governador de Angola Dom Miguel António de Melo sobre 
as injustiças praticadas contra o Soba de Socoval”, (30 April 1798); Arquivos de Angola, 1790-1797, 1ª Série, No. 6. 
(Luanda: Arquivo Nacional, 1933), Doc. IX. 
1020 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 80, “Carta do governador de Angola Dom Miguel António de Melo sobre 
as injustiças praticadas contra o Soba de Socoval”, (30 April 1798); Arquivos de Angola, 1790-1797, 1ª Série, No. 6. 
(Luanda: Arquivo Nacional, 1933), Doc. IX. 
1021 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 80, “Carta do governador de Angola Dom Miguel António de Melo sobre 
as injustiças praticadas contra o Soba de Socoval”, (30 April 1798); Arquivos de Angola, 1790-1797, 1ª Série, No. 6. 
(Luanda: Arquivo Nacional, 1933), Doc. IX. 
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Replying to the fourth question, regarding the jurisdiction of the soba of Socoval over 
mucanos in Quilengues and about his vassalage to the Portuguese Crown, the governor of Angola 
confirmed that Socoval was always responsible for deciding mucanos among his people. In fact, 
the soba had previously complained to the previous governor of Angola, Almeida e Vasconcelos 
(1790-1797), that Captain Andrade wanted to usurp the mucanos from his jurisdiction. This 
governor of Angola had made inquiries into the matter, but witnesses from Salvaterra dos Magos 
declared that the regent had not made such an attempt. Still, Governor Almeida e Vasconcelos 
decided that Captain Andrade did not have the right to judge the mucanos.  
Hence, if it was established long ago that the jurisdiction of mucanos belonged to the soba 
of Socoval, Dom Melo asked rhetorically, how could the judge in Benguela have accused the soba 
of usurping the said jurisdiction? “Isn’t this a clear indication, if not proof, of the ambition of the 
colonial officials that cause and move questions of this order?” He consequently concluded that 
sobas deserved more “justice” than did the regents, and that the accusations of usurping 
jurisdiction against the soba of Socoval were only an excuse to attack him and enslave his 
people1022.  
While discussing the “rebelliousness” of the soba of Socoval, Dom Melo argued that it was 
necessary to demonstrate if he was, in fact, a vassal of Portugal. Did he or his ancestors promise 
obedience and vassalage to the Portuguese Crown? According to his investigations, there was no 
vassalage treaty (Auto de Vassalagem) signed by the soba of Socoval in the colonial archives. The 
governor of Angola concluded that since there was no record of the acceptance of vassalage by the 
soba of Socoval he could not be considered a rebel and a traitor. Socoval was an “ally and a friend” 
of Portugal, not a vassal: therefore, there was no rebellion. All of the military campaigns against 
Socoval and other potentates of Quilengues under the same circumstances were thus “illegal wars”. 
Even worse, the regent of Quilengues betrayed the good faith of an African ally when he arrested 
the soba in order to attack his people. Dom Melo highlighted that the soba of Socoval was lured 
into a trap, thinking that he was working for the royal service1023.  
                                                 
1022 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 80, “Carta do governador de Angola Dom Miguel António de Melo sobre 
as injustiças praticadas contra o Soba de Socoval”, (30 April 1798); Arquivos de Angola, 1790-1797, 1ª Série, No. 6. 
(Luanda: Arquivo Nacional, 1933), Doc. IX. 
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Replying to the fifth and last question, concerning the meaning of “mucano” in the local 
languages, the governor of Angola explained that the expression “tanar mucanos” meant “to 
verbally decide litigation according to the customs of the country”. The Portuguese had created 
the verb “tanar” to describe all actions in the oral proceedings, but Dom Melo clarified that the 
actual verb was “huacatana”. He also explained that the term “mucano” was used in Angola, but 
that in Benguela the proper local term was “obimbo”. Hence, the people inhabiting the backlands 
of Benguela would use the term “obimbo muquiti” when deliberating about crimes of homicide; 
“obimbo biohuanga” in judging cases of witchcraft; “obimbo biafuca” in litigating over debts; 
“obimbo buimuno” in accusations of theft; and “obimbo biombaro” in cases of insult and injury1024.  
As such, Dom Melo saw no option but to reverse the previous verdict over case of the soba 
of Socoval. In his view, the “whites” should be punished for what happened, not the “blacks”. He 
continued to blame the decadence of the Conquista for the wrongdoings of Europeans living in 
this part of Africa. In the opinion of this governor of Angola, despite the “barbaric nature of the 
blacks”, which he blamed on the geography and the climate, it was the “lack of good white men” 
that drove the whole region into chaos. Most of those working for the “colonial” administration, 
he gasped, did not have the “consciousness” and the “honor” required to occupy their positions1025.  
 
The fate of Socoval and his people 
According to Dom Melo’s decision on the offenses committed against Socoval, all of his 
subjects who had been enslaved during the unauthorized raids should be returned to Quilengues, 
including those who had been embarked for Brazil. The first group of thirteen captives from the 
sobado of Socoval returned to Quilengues in August of 1798, escorted by Corporal José Valentim 
and four other soldiers to “guarantee their safety”. Once in Quilengues, the regent was to request 
the help of moradores and sobas to figure out which captives were in fact slaves and which ones 
                                                 
1024 Although colonial officials in both Angola and Benguela used the word “mucano” in reference to any civil or 
criminal judicial case, the term took a different meaning in the colonial statute (Regimento dos Capitães-Mores) of 
1775, according to which “mucanos” was reserved for cases related to the enslavement of local “free” people (causas 
de mucanos de liberdades): AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 80, “Carta do governador de Angola Dom Miguel 
António de Melo sobre as injustiças praticadas contra o Soba de Socoval”, (30 April 1798); Arquivos de Angola, 1790-
1797, 1ª Série, No. 6. (Luanda: Arquivo Nacional, 1933), Doc. IX. 
1025 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 87, Doc. 80, “Carta do governador de Angola Dom Miguel António de Melo sobre 
as injustiças praticadas contra o Soba de Socoval”, (30 April 1798); Arquivos de Angola, 1790-1797, 1ª Série, No. 6. 
(Luanda: Arquivo Nacional, 1933), Doc. IX. 
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were free. The latter should be released immediately, while the former were to be returned to their 
rightful owners. The governor of Benguela also ordered the regent of Quilengues to send him the 
soba’s “wife” or nana, Naculo, who was under his custody1026. She embarked for Luanda the 
following month and remained with the soba awaiting his trial.1027 
On 9 October 1798, Governor Botelho de Vasconcelos, informed his superiors in Luanda 
that all subjects of Socoval had been freed1028. Three months later, however, he wrote again 
informing that he had just learned that the regent of Quilengues had not properly followed orders. 
Botelho de Vasconcelos did not explain which part of the orders were not executed properly, but 
assured his superiors that he had taken the necessary measures to solve the issue. Despite protests 
from Judge Antonio Pereira, the governor of Benguela decided to replace Serrão as regent of 
Quilengues1029.  
In the meantime, the soba of Socoval was kept under arrest in Luanda in the company of 
his nana and at least one of his macotas. While in custody in the dungeons of Penedo, the soba 
became seriously ill and died before his final trial. On 7 November 1798, in a letter to the governor 
of Benguela, Dom Melo informed that the soba of Socoval had passed from an “unidentified 
illness”.  
The governor of Angola ordered his counterpart in Benguela to oversee the return of 
Socoval’s properties that had been confiscated to his rightful heirs. In case no one appeared to 
claim what was rightfully theirs, the valuables were to be deposited in the royal treasury. 
Unsurprisingly, there was no order to inform the subjects of Socoval that their soba had perished 
in Luanda.1030 On 18 February 1799, the governor of Benguela wrote to the local judge informing 
about the execution of the orders concerning the soba of Socoval’s properties that had been 
                                                 
1026 ANA, Códice 518, fls. 70-71v, “Ofício do governador de Benguela Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcelos”, (23 
August 1798); ANA, Códice 518, fl. 71v, “Ofício do governador de Benguela Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcelos”, 
(24 August 1798); ANA, Códice 442, fl. 63v.-64, “Ofício do governador de Benguela Alexandre José Botelho de 
Vasconcellos”, (29 August 1798). 
1027 ANA, Códice 4094, fls. 84v-85, “Carta do governador de Angola Dom Miguel António de Melo para o governador 
de Benguela Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcellos”, (26 September 1798).  
1028 ANA, Códice 442, fl. 64v-65, “Ofício do governador de Benguela Alexandre José Botelho de Vasconcellos para 
o Exmo. Snr. General do Estado”, (9 October 1798). 
1029 ANA, Códice 442, fl. 72v-73, “Ofício do governador de Benguela Alexandre José Botelho de Vasconcellos para 
o Exmo. Snr. General do Estado”, (3 January 1799). 
1030 ANA, Códice 4094, fls. 85-85v, “Oficio do governador de Angola Dom Miguel António de Melo para o 
governador de Benguela Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcellos”, (7 November 1798). 
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apprehended during 1796-1797.1031 There is, however, no information on the return of captives 
from Brazil.  
 
Six of one, half a dozen of the other  
Dom Melo’s verdict condemning the regent of Quilengues for crimes against Socoval led 
the governor of Benguela to replace him. There were, indeed, several previous accusations against 
Captain Serrão, some even from soldiers under his command. The governor of Benguela 
complained to his superiors that he knew of no military officer in the sertões of Benguela who 
possessed the virtues necessary, “honor, zeal and probity”, to occupy the position of regent of 
Quilengues. There was perhaps one exception, a certain ensign in Caconda, Manoel de Carvalho 
Rabelo: but the latter had just received authorization to leave for Brazil. Hence, the governor of 
Benguela chose a civilian as the new regent of Quilengues1032.  
Governor Botelho de Vasconcelos chose Antonio Pires Louzada, a well-established slaver 
who had been living in the interior of Benguela for decades, to assume the position of regent of 
Quilengues. In 1800, Louzada was listed as a “white” member of a militia operating in the sertões 
of Benguela, but with no information about his birthplace. There were rumours that he was a 
Portuguese exiled criminal (degredado) but the governor could not confirm this. Louzada had been 
in the sertões of Benguela for so long that specific information about his origins had faded 
away1033. In a list of moradores of Quilengues from 17981034, Captain Louzada1035 was described 
as a 47-year-old, single man. Several complaints had been made against him for involvement in 
                                                 
1031 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 35-35v, “Carta do governador de Benguela Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcelos para o Juiz 
de Fora de Benguela Alberto Antonio Pereira”, (18 February 1799). 
1032 ANA, Códice 442, fl. 72v-73, “Ofício do governador de Benguela Alexandre José Botelho de Vasconcellos para 
o Exmo. Snr. General do Estado”, (3 January 1799). 
1033 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 100, Doc. 29, “Relação dos postos de milícia desta cidade e de ordenanças das 
províncias do sertão, que foram providos pelo governador que foi Alexandre José Botelho de Vasconcelos” (9 
November 1800). 
1034 AIHGB, DL 32, 2. 37 (Doc. 146), fls. 37-48v, “Relação dos moradores e sobas do Distrito de Quilengues” (18 
February 1798) 
1035 Although Captain Louzada was not part of the Portuguese military he was often called “captain” as a sign of 
respect, which also evidences his importance and power as slave trader.  
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“unauthorized” purchase of slaves. These accusations came from both moradores and “blacks of 
the sertões”, meaning sobas and potentates in Quilengues1036. 
Captain Louzada assumed the position of regent of Quilengues on 24 April 17991037. The 
governor of Benguela ordered him to maintain peace and resume the collection of the royal tithe 
from all sobas in Quilengues, which included everyone from Lumbimbe and Quilumata in the 
northwest to Quipungo in the south (Map 3). During the following month, the new regent began 
sending caravans to Benguela with cattle collected from some local sobados as the annual tithe. 
On 22 May 1799, Botelho de Vasconcelos confirmed that he received forty-three head of cattle 
from Quilengues (meaning Socoval), twelve from Lumbimbe and six from Quilumata. The 
governor warned the regent that Lumbimbe still owed two cows, so the regent should make sure 
to order his soldiers conducting the cattle to collect them on their way to Benguela. The regent had 
previously informed that he had sent collectors to Quipungo to gather the cattle owed to the royal 
treasury, but there was still no response1038.   
On 24 September 1799, the governor of Benguela wrote again to the regent concerned 
about the collection of tithes in Quipungo. Located far from Salvaterra dos Magos, the sobado of 
Quipungo was known for its resistance against vassalage. Botelho de Vasconcelos instructed the 
new regent to act with the utmost moderation when collecting tribute from this potentate. He 
should bear in mind the troubles caused by the lack of his predecessors’ temperance in the case of 
the soba of Socoval. The amount of cattle charged should not exceed “the largest possible safe 
number” (o número mais prudente que se possa conseguir)1039. The governor even sent 
reinforcements to help the regent with the collection of this tribute, dispatching Corporal João 
Valentim and six soldiers for the task1040.  
                                                 
1036 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 100, Doc. 29, “Relação dos postos de milícia desta cidade e de ordenanças das 
províncias do sertão, que foram providos pelo governador que foi Alexandre José Botelho de Vasconcelos” (9 
November 1800). 
1037 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 100, Doc. 29, “Relação dos postos de milícia desta cidade e de ordenanças das 
províncias do sertão, que foram providos pelo governador que foi Alexandre José Botelho de Vasconcelos” (9 
November 1800). 
1038 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 36-36v, “Carta do governador de Benguela Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcelos para o 
regente de Quilengues Antonio Pires Louzada”, (22 May 1799). 
1039 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 36-36v, “Carta do governador de Benguela Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcelos para o 
regente de Quilengues Antonio Pires Louzada”, (22 May 1799).  
1040 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 40-40v, “Carta do governador de Benguela Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcelos para o 
regente de Quilengues Antonio Pires Louzada”, (24 September 1799); Delgado, A Famosa e Histórica Benguela, 38. 
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Despite some initial accomplishments, the new regent of Quilengues was soon accused of 
also overreaching his jurisdiction and using his position for personal gain. A new governor of 
Benguela, José Maurício Rodrigues (July 1800 to October 1801), began receiving complaints from 
different sources that Captain Louzada committed much violence against “blacks” in Quilengues 
and acquired slaves through shady means. The regent often ignored denunciations by moradores 
of Salvaterra dos Magos that slaves were being sold by people other than their real owners. In fact, 
one of the slaves sent by Captain Louzada to the governor of Benguela was under dispute of 
ownership. Since he did not know who the slave’s legitimate owner was, Governor Rodrigues 
decided to “deposit” the captive in the royal treasury until he could figure out what was 
happening1041. 
There were at least three formal representations against Captain Louzada during his time 
as regent of Quilengues. His accusers declared that he acquired his slaves “more by force than by 
justice”. In one of these complaints, a “black man” accused him of buying one of his slaves from 
someone else. Since the governor of Benguela did not have anyone else to investigate such 
accusations, he ordered the regent of Quilengues himself to identify and punish those who had 
being selling stolen slaves to him. In other words, the regent was supposed to arrest his own 
business partners for these wrongdoings, which obviously never happened1042.  
Although the governor of Benguela was more worried about avoiding insurrection and 
conflicts in the sertões that disrupted commerce and the collection of tribute than to punish the 
actions of slavers who abused their positions of power, he could not ignore the complaints against 
Captain Louzada, who accumulated accusations of violence and crimes against African rulers and 
Luso-African settlers alike. The governor worried that violence promoted by “punitive 
expeditions” triggered many people to flee from Quilengues, which caused loss to commerce and, 
consequently, decreased in the revenues of the royal treasury. Governor Maurício Rodrigues again 
wrote to the regent demanding that he respect the African rulers under his jurisdiction and 
rightfully deliver justice to them. He also ordered the regent to stop intimidating and threatening 
settlers who wanted to go to Benguela to complain about what was going on in the interior1043.  
                                                 
1041 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 48-48v, “Ofício para regente de Quilengues António Pires Louzada”, (27 August 1800). 
1042 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 48-48v, “Ofício para regente de Quilengues António Pires Louzada”, (27 August 1800). 
1043 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 48-48v, “Ofício para regente de Quilengues António Pires Louzada”, (27 August 1800). 
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In October 1800, the governor of Benguela finally ordered Captain Louzada to hand over 
the administration of Quilengues to João Vieira de Andrade, brother of former regent Joaquim 
Vieira de Andrade. Governor Maurício Rodrigues justified the replacement of Louzada by arguing 
that he was “too old” to perform the duties of regent and briefly citing “other justifiable 
reasons”1044.   
With this decision, the Andrade brothers returned to power in Quilengues less than four 
years after the dismissal of Captain Joaquim Vieira de Andrade for crimes against Socoval. The 
governor of Benguela later registered that the transfer of power in Quilengues did not go as 
smoothly as it should have. He had to order Captain Louzada twice to hand over the regency, 
which included turning in all official papers and letters related to the administration of Quilengues. 
Governor Maurício Rodrigues explained that the orders and official papers should remain with 
whoever was succeeding him, but authorized Captain Louzada to make copies of them1045. 
The complaints about the misconduct of Captain Louzada did not cease with his departure 
from Quilengues. The new regent quickly and duly informed the governor of Benguela that his 
predecessor did not take good care of the military equipment under his responsibility. Captain 
Louzada was blamed for mishandling the royal ammunitions (munições reais), that is letting the 
stockpile spoil. The mishandling of military equipment was such that one of his soldiers had sold 
his gun to an undisclosed person. The governor complained that even if Captain Louzada had not 
colluded with the soldier to sell his gun, he was at least negligent for not having noticed that one 
of his men was walking around without a gun. Governor Maurício Rodrigues ordered the new 
regent to punish the soldier and arrest whoever had bought the gun from him. In the same letter, 
the governor of Benguela repeated his prohibition of war against any of the sobados and potentates 
under his jurisdiction, especially the so-called “currarias”, or attacks on local “corrals” (currais) 
where Africans kept large quantities of cattle1046.     
 
                                                 
1044 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 55-55v, “Ofício que nomeia João Vieira de Andrade regente de Quilengues”, (15 October 
1800); ANA, Códice 443, fl. 69v, “Ofício dirigido ao regente de Quilengues João Vieira de Andrade”, (2 March 1801); 
ANA, Códice 443, fl. 71-71v, “Ofício dirigido ao regente de Quilengues João Vieira de Andrade”, (11 March 1801).   
1045 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 59-59v, “Ofício para regente de Quilengues João Vieira de Andrade”, (21 November 1800). 
1046 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 61v.-62, “Ofício para regente de Quilengues João Vieira de Andrade”, (6 December 1800). 
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The return of the Andrade brothers to power 
After the fall of Captain Louzada, the regency of Quilengues returned into the hands of the 
Andrade brothers, owners of the greatest slaving enterprise operating in the region during the late 
eighteenth century. With their return to power, the Andrade brothers slave enterprise remained in 
control of the trade in Quilengues for almost another decade.  
As mentioned in Chapter 3, the new regent of Quilengues, João Vieira de Andrade, was 
one of the most important moradores in Quilengues since the last decade of the eighteenth century. 
He was the first morador listed in the 1798 nominal census of Quilengues, which indicates his 
importance in Salvaterra dos Magos. He was also the single largest proprietor of cattle in Salvaterra 
dos Magos, with more than double the amount of the second largest owner. He also had twenty 
slaves in his household, thirteen male and seven female1047. His ascension to administrative power 
meant the return of the Andrade brothers in directly controlling the slave routes that crossed the 
settlement, although they had never really lost their leading role as major slavers in Quilengues.   
After being expelled from the regency of Quilengues, Captain Joaquim Vieira de Andrade 
moved to Benguela, where he had direct access to imported goods that the Andrade brothers used 
to acquire slaves from their associates in Salvaterra dos Magos. Despite his absence from the 
regency, Joaquim kept working on behalf of the “royal service”, sometimes leading caravans of 
slaves and cattle destined for the royal treasury in the coastal town, at others making payments for 
the troops stationed in Quilengues1048. Although he no longer commanded “colonial troops”, the 
former regent of Quilengues maintained control over his family’s militia, composed of the 
Andrade Brother’s slaves and quimbares, which he used to protect and further his business in the 
interior. In addition, Joaquim used his influence and authority to recruit soldiers as private 
pumbeiros, as in the case of a certain Henrique Pedro de Almeida1049.  
                                                 
1047 AIHGB, DL 32, 2. 37 (Doc. 146), fls. 37-48v, “Relação dos moradores e sobas do Distrito de Quilengues” (18 
February 1798). 
1048 ANA, Códice 443, fls. 55-55v., “Ofício que nomeia João Vieira de Andrade regente de Quilengues”, (15 October 
1800); ANA, Códice 443, fl. 69v., “Ofício dirigido ao regente de Quilengues João Vieira de Andrade”, (2 March 
1801); ANA, Códice 443, fls. 71-71v., “Ofício dirigido ao regente de Quilengues João Vieira de Andrade”, (11 March 
1801).   




In an attempt to hinder the abuse of power and the use of the regent position for personal 
gain, Governor Maurício Rodrigues instructed the new regent of Quilengues to abstain from 
receiving any payments in the name of the royal treasury. The governor also repeatedly advised 
Captain João Vieira de Andrade about delivering justice to Africans under his jurisdiction without 
grievances or humiliation (sem vexames), a clear reference to his brother’s behavior towards 
Socoval while occupying the regency1050. Despite these attempts, the Andrade brothers could 
neither be controlled, nor have their local power curbed. 
The Andrade brothers used their militia to keep their grip on Quilengues and to extort 
African rulers as well as local Luso-African settlers1051. Some settlers in Salvaterra dos Magos also 
accused the brothers of stealing from sertanejos trading within Quilengues. According to these 
allegations, the former regent, Joaquim Andrade, had associated himself with a tendala from 
Quilengues, called Agostinho. Together, they had taken imported goods on credit from sertanejos, 
which they later refused to pay1052.    
The Andrade brothers tried to maintain control over the new soba of Socoval, after the 
previous one was arrested by Captain Serrão in 1797. They sought to manipulate military forces 
sent to Caconda to fight on behalf of their slave business. The military detachments from Benguela 
had camped in Quilengues and, once no longer required, were to return immediately town, where 
their presence was much needed1053. However, the new regent of Quilengues, João Andrade, 
detained these soldiers and their commander, Captain Domingos Pereira Diniz, arguing that the 
new soba of Socoval was also a rebel who needed to be punished1054.  
The accusations against the new soba of Socoval were the same as those against the 
previous one: insurrection and refusal to comply with the “royal service”. It was understandable, 
                                                 
1050 ANA, Códice 443, fls. 55-55v., “Ofício que nomeia João Vieira de Andrade regente de Quilengues”, (15 October 
1800). 
1051 One of the accusations of abuse against João Vieira de Andrade as regent of Quilengues alleged that he seized the 
slaves of deceased morador Ventura Ferreira and sent them to a certain Dona Maria, who lived in Quitata, without 
following the “lawful” procedures that the case required: ANA, Códice 443, fl. 77v-78, “Ofício para o regente de 
Quilengues João Vieira de Andrade”, (27 April 1801).  
1052 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 76-76v., “Ofício dirigido ao regente de Quilengues João Vieira de Andrade”, (10 April 
1801); ANA, Códice 443, fl. 84v-86, “Ofício dirigido ao capitão-mor e regente de Caconda Francisco Ignácio de Mira 
e Araújo”, (15 May 1801). 
1053 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 63, “Ofício dirigido ao regente de Quilengues João Vieira de Andrade”, (7 January 1801). 




in the opinion of the governor of Benguela, that the people of Socoval did not trust the new regent 
of Quilengues. The people of Socoval had not forgotten the destruction sponsored by the new 
regent’s brother, Joaquim Andrade. As we have seen above, many of Socoval’s subjects who had 
been captured and sold in Brazil as slaves never returned to Quilengues. Even worse, their soba 
had been taken away and died in the hands of his captors. The memory of what Captain Andrade 
had done while in power made the people of Socoval leave their libatas and take refuge in the 
nearby hilltops1055.   
João Vieira de Andrade remained in power until 1801, when he was replaced by his 
predecessor, the “old” slaver Antonio Pires Louzada. The regency of Quilengues thus circulated 
through the hands of the same major slavers operating during the early nineteenth century. João 
Vieira de Andrade would also return to power in 1806, accompanied by his brother Joaquim Vieira 
de Andrade and by Miguel Antonio Serrão1056.  
 
Conclusion 
Chapter 4 has shown that, although the Portuguese defeated the kingdom of Ndongo in the 
second half of the seventeenth century, the effective conquest of the landscape that later became 
known as “Angola” and the dismantling of the supremacy of local African rulers only happened 
centuries later. The region dubbed by colonists as Benguela remained a “conquest” until the so-
called “wars of pacification” during the early twentieth century, in spite of previous narratives of 
colonial control put forward by Portuguese colonial historians regarding their early presence in 
West Central Africa. Until then, African rulers held their sovereignty over their lands and peoples, 
even when subjected as vassals by Portuguese forces. Hence, I argue that the documentation 
produced by Portuguese colonial officials and explorers before the twentieth century was 
“colonial” in its essence and in the way it portrayed Benguela and its backlands, while the 
territories they referred to were beyond any “colonial control”. This was the case of Quilengues.  
I have also argued in Chapter 4 that the acceptance of vassalage by some African authorities 
was often an act of resistance. By becoming a vassal of Portugal, these African rulers earned the 
                                                 
1055 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 70v-72, “Ofício dirigido ao regente de Quilengues João Vieira de Andrade”, (11 March 
1801).  
1056 Delgado, Ao Sul do Cuanza, Vol. 1, 306. 
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chance to fight another day and withheld foreign control over their lands and people. Hence, while 
many historians highlight only subjugation in the acceptance of vassalage by Africans in Angola 
and Benguela, I argue for traces of resistance in this same context. Additionally, the acceptance of 
vassalage by African authorities marked their independence from other African polities. And, no 
less significant, regular access to imported goods expanded the political capital of many of these 
African vassals, allowing them to spread their influence among other local polities, and thus shift 
the power structures of the interior.  
Nevertheless, the opening of regular commercial and diplomatic relations with the 
Portuguese could mean the beginning of the end for many of these African vassals and allies, since 
the same routes that brought itinerant traders with valuable foreign goods also facilitated the 
invasion of exogenous raiders that could decimate entire communities at once to feed the 
increasing demand for enslaved people in the Atlantic world. This was especially true by the end 
of the eighteenth century, in the case of Quilengues. Therefore, this chapter also discusses the 
“legality” of such slaving raids in the interior of Benguela, which were often disguised as 
“punitive” military expeditions against “rebel” vassals.  
Moreover, this chapter scrutinizes the supposed “legal protections” given to “freeborn” 
African subjects of Portugal. Although the acceptance of vassalage by African rulers should 
protect them and their peoples from the claws of the slave trade, in practice it did not guaranteed 
that they, including  those “born of a free womb”, would not eventually fall into the hands of 
Portuguese and Luso-African slavers. Itinerant traders overflowed African polities with imported 
goods on credit, expecting payments to be defaulted by sobas, which triggered the so-called 
“punitive” expeditions and the kidnapping of individuals to settle those debts. The greater the 
demand for slaves in the Atlantic world, the greater the dangers for Africans in the interior of 
Benguela, no matter if vassals or allies.   
The inquiries (devassas) about the attacks perpetrated by the regents of Quilengues against 
subsequent sobas of Socoval and their allies show the process of transforming former African 
allies into rebels and enemies of the Luso-Africans, pushed by increasing demands for slaves that 
reached the interior of Benguela. The sources presented in Chapters 3 and 4 show that a significant 
amount of slaves sold in Benguela in the end of the eighteenth century and beginning of the 
nineteenth century came from Quilengues. This provides further proof of a great number of slaves 
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sold into the Atlantic market, especially Brazil, came from areas much closer to the coast than was 
previously thought, an argument recently developed by historians such as Curto, Silva, Ferreira, 
and Candido1057.  
Moreover, it also indicates that the expansion of the “slave frontier” did not mean the 
consolidation of peaceful commercial relations and the end of violence as the main form of the 
acquisition of slaves in the areas closer to the coast, as previously argued by Miller and 
Birmingham1058. In fact, numerous “waves” of enslaving operations constantly hit areas in the 
close interior of Benguela, such as Quilengues and Caconda. Nevertheless, rather than discrediting 
Miller’s “slaving frontier” thesis, I suggest that these were simultaneous processes. As the slaving 
frontier expanded eastward, the areas within Portuguese influence remained subject to constant 
“waves” of slaving raids, many of them commanded by “colonial” officials and disguised as 
punitive expeditions.   
Despite repeated attempts by the Portuguese Crown and their higher representatives in 
Luanda, such as Governor Dom Miguel Antonio de Melo, to curb the slaving operations 
commanded by their subordinates, slavers operating in the interior of Benguela were virtually 
outside the reach of “colonial” jurisdiction, often disrespecting orders and promoting conflicts to 
improve their personal business. Powerful Luso-African families, such as the Andrade brothers, 
used their positions of authority and social connections to maintain a steady inflow of foreign 
merchandise and outflow of slaves, many of the latter “illegally” acquired through war, kidnapping 
and debt. These powerful and well-connected Luso-African slavers, whether stationed in Benguela 
or throughout its backlands, were rarely punished for their crimes and often remained important 
members of the local “white” community.    
  
                                                 
1057 José C. Curto, “Rethinking the Origin of Slaves in West Central Africa”, in Changing Horizons of African History, 
Awet T. Weldemichael, Anthony A. Lee and Edward A. Alpers, eds. (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2017), 23-47; 
Silva, The Atlantic Slave Trade from West Central Africa, 18-19, 73-99; Candido, An African Slaving Port and the 
Atlantic World, 198-214; Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World, 52-87. For more, see Chapter 3 
above. 
1058 For more on the “slave frontier”, see Miller, Way of Death, 140-169. See also Birmingham, Trade and Conflict in 




Strategies of resistance in Quilengues in the first half of the nineteenth century 
 
As we have seen, slave exports from Benguela experienced a surge during the last decade 
of the eighteenth century, when an average of 8,362 human beings were forcibly embarked for the 
Americas. This surge was particularly acute during the first half of that decade, after which the 
commerce began to slowly contract. The first decade of the nineteenth century saw an annual 
medium of 7,140 enslaved individuals “legally” shipped from this town. The declined continued 
onto the 1810s, when 5,463 captives were annually shipped therefrom. By the 1820s, the volume 
of the traffic contracted further still to 4,718 enslaved persons exported per annum. Benguela’s 
trade in human beings then reached one of its lowest ebbs in 1830, when 3,926 captives were 
embarked against their will for destinations on the other side of the Atlantic1059.  
Yet, in spite of declining slave exports, the commerce in enslaved individuals continued as 
the major economic activity in Benguela during the first half of the nineteenth century, especially 
if we considered a probable increase in contraband trade as the Portuguese announced the end of 
the slave trade in 1830. To be sure, governors and Luso-African officials engaged in various 
initiatives to diversify the dependence on slave exports, including the development of agriculture 
and the consolidation of the production of sulfur in the mines of Dombe Grande1060. But even then, 
the economy of Benguela was to remain largely related to the acquisition and movement of slaves 
from the interior and their embarkation to the Americas until the middle of the nineteenth 
century1061.   
                                                 
1059 For more numbers of the slave trade from Benguela from the first half of the eighteenth to the first half of the 
nineteenth century, see José C. Curto, “The Legal Portuguese Slave Trade from Benguela, Angola, 1730-1828: A 
Quantitative Re-Appraisal,” África, 16-17, no. 1 (1993/1994): 101-116;  José C. Curto,“Another Look at the Slave 
Trade from Benguela: What We Know and What We Do Not Know”, Portuguese Studies Review, Vol. 23, No. 2 
(2015): 9-26.  
1060 See Estevam C. Thompson, “A Caustic Smell: Dombe Grande’s Sulfur Industry in the Nineteenth Century”, 
(forthcoming).  
1061 The estimated data in Daniel Domingues da Silva, “The Transatlantic Slave Trade from Angola: A Port-by-Port 
Estimate of Slaves Embarked, 1701-1867”, International Journal of African Historical Studies, 46, n. 1 (2013): 121-
122, Appendix A, show that there was a new surge in the export of enslaved people from Benguela between 1836 and 
1850, before the import of slaves into Brazil was prohibited in 1851. This allowed slaving to remain the main economic 
activity in Benguela and its immediate backlands until the mid-nineteenth century: 51,107 captives were exported 
during 1836-1840; 54,314 enslaved persons were forcibly embarked between 1841 and 1845; and another 47,184 
individuals in shackles were shipped from 1846 to 1850. 
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As detailed in Chapter 4, historians of Angola have recently argued that many of the slaves 
exported from Benguela in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries came from areas relatively close 
to the coast such as Quilengues and Caconda1062. This means that many were subjects of African 
vassals of Portugal and that they, at least in theory, should have been shielded from enslavement. 
Such prohibitions, however, were largely ignored by slave traders operating in the interior of 
Benguela, especially those in positions of authority1063. As a result, we need to revise existing 
theories about the development of peaceful commercial relations between Luso-African traders 
and African vassals of Portugal in the nineteenth century, as put forth by Birmingham and 
Miller1064. This chapter therefore develops a critique of the “slaving frontier” and refines the 
process.  
According to Mariana P. Candido, new data on the origins of slaves in regions like Dombe 
Grande, Quilengues and Caconda during the nineteenth century show that “the slaving frontier 
was not moving inland”1065. I have argued in the previous chapter, however, the thesis of an 
expanding “slaving frontier” is not completely wrong, since there is plenty of documentation on 
long-distance trading routes moving eastward: but such expansion did not bring peace to those 
living inside its boundaries1066. Neither did it replace raids or warfare as violent means of acquiring 
                                                 
1062 José C. Curto, “Rethinking the Origin of Slaves in West Central Africa”, in Changing Horizons of African History, 
Awet T. Weldemichael, Anthony A. Lee and Edward A. Alpers, eds. (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2017), 23-47; 
Daniel Domingues Silva, The Atlantic Slave Trade from West Central Africa, 1780-1867 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2017); Mariana P. Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World: Benguela and its 
Hinterland (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Roquinaldo A. Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange in the 
Atlantic World: Angola and Brazil during the Era of the Slave Trade (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
1063 Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 201, points out that “During the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, Angolan authorities accused Benguela officials of being more interested in seizure than in being 
committed to maintain order and security”.   
1064 David Birmingham, Trade and Conflict in Angola: The Mbundu and Their Neighbours Under the Influence of the 
Portuguese, 1483-1790 (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 133-161; Joseph C. Miller, Way of Death: Merchant 
Capitalism and the Angolan Slave Trade, 1730-1830 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 140-169. For 
complementary information, see Chapter 3. 
1065  Mariana P. Candido,An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 209.  
1066 Miller, Way of Death, 140, defends the idea that the advancement of the “slaving frontier” into Central Africa 
during the nineteenth century “drove its violence off toward the east”.    
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slaves in Quilengues or Caconda1067. As pointed out by Roquinaldo Ferreira, warfare in the interior 
of Benguela coexisted with commercialized forms of slaving1068. 
As I have also argued in Chapter 4, the realization that violent raids and wars still played 
an important role in the enslavement of individuals living in areas close to the coast, many of them 
under vassalage, does not necessarily mean there was no expansion of the “slaving frontier”. In 
fact, these are not mutually exclusive arguments. The matter at hand is not whether the “slaving 
frontier” expanded to the interior1069, but rather that its expansion did not result in the establishment 
of peaceful commercial relations with peoples behind the frontier and the end of raids organized 
by Luso-African and Portuguese slavers. 
In this Chapter 5, I will thus bring to life more examples of slaving operations disguised as 
“punitive expeditions” against “rebel” African authorities in Quilengues, to show that violence 
remained one of the main ways for Luso-African slavers to acquire their “merchandise” during the 
first decades of the nineteenth century. The case study presented here revolves around the slaving 
campaigns commanded by Captain Domingos Pereira Diniz, a Luso-African literate black slaver 
born in Benguela who had a successful military career and a thriving slaving business1070. They 
show the persistent continuation of violent means to acquire captives in areas under the direct 
influence of the Portuguese, including among some of their African vassals.  
This chapter also shows some strategies used by African rulers to protect themselves and 
their subjects from the claws of the slave trade1071. As we will see, they used a variety of tactics to 
avoid becoming the victims of Luso-African slavers, including spying on military and trading 
caravans crossing the sertões in order to flee to nearby rocky hills before the slavers’ arrival in 
their lands. African ruling authorities also intercepted messages exchanged between slavers and 
                                                 
1067 Although Birmingham, Trade and Conflict in Angola, 136, defends the thesis that there developed peaceful 
commercial relations in the “back country” of Angola, but admits that this fragile peace was eventually disrupted by 
the participation of “colonial” military officers in the slave trade. 
1068 Roquinaldo Ferreira, “Slaving and Resistance to Slaving in West Central Africa”, in David Eltis and Stainley 
Engerman. The Cambridge World History of Slavery, AD 1420 – AD 1804, Vol. 3 (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011), 118.  
1069 Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 213-214. 
1070 For more about Captain Domingos Pereira Diniz’s trajectory as a slave trader in Benguela, see Estevam C. 
Thompson, “Um indigno deste paiz: a trajetória de um militar luso-africano no comércio de escravos em Benguela”, 
1800-1830” (forthcoming).  
1071 For more on resistance in Angola, see José C. Curto, “Resistência à Escravidão na África: O Caso dos Escravos 
Fugitivos Recapturados em Angola, 1846-1876,” Afro-Ásia, 33 (2005): 67-86.  
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used their contacts in Luso-African settlements to learn on the objectives of “punitive expeditions” 
before these reached the interior. Additionally, African rulers blocked the advance of expeditions 
inland by refusing to provide the necessary porters for caravans. As we will see below, the sobas 
of Quilengues understood the logistic limitations of invading soldiers and were aware that invaders 
could not pursue them without local porters.   
Chapter 5 further reinforces some ideas discussed in Chapter 4 related to indebtedness on 
the part of sertanejos and other agents of the slave trade in Benguela. African political authorities 
were not the only ones who could suffer serious consequences from defaulting on payment of 
imported goods acquired on credit. In fact, pumbeiros and sertanejos could also lose their freedom 
for not honoring their debts, as discussed previously. This chapter brings new insights onto the 
strategies adopted by indebted itinerant traders to escape the consequences of not settling their 
debts with their creditors. As one military officer from Benguela, who commanded several 
“punitive expeditions” in Quilengues and Caconda revealed, many of the conflicts between Luso-
African traders and African rulers were in fact attempts by indebted itinerant traders to find a way 
out of their situation. Whenever they could not repay their creditors, pumbeiros and sertanejos 
passed on the blame of their failure to local African rulers, accusing “blacks” of assaulting their 
caravans and taking all the merchandise. In order to validate their accusations, these itinerant 
traders provoked African rulers into conflicts, attacking them with the help of “white” deserters 
who also roamed the sertões of Benguela.  
Meanwhile, Chapter 5 throws more light on the complex political landscape in the interior 
of Benguela, where sobas from different regions found themselves involved in a series of cattle 
raids that often developed into full warfare. Those under vassalage tried to manipulate Portuguese 
forces to help them defeat local enemies, while simultaneously trying to protect their own local 
allies in the path of these “punitive expeditions”. As mentioned above, African vassals knew the 
real commercial intentions of slavers in command of “punitive expeditions” and feared that they 
could not safeguard their own people from becoming spoils of war that would later be sold as 
slaves to the Americas.   
Finally, this chapter shows the power of the community of slave traders in Benguela in the 
first decades of the nineteenth century, and how their members, especially those in positions of 
authority, disregarded their duties and orders from their superiors in favor of their personal slaving 
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businesses. After the independence of Brazil from Portugal in 1822, the most important slavers of 
Benguela organized themselves around a “Brazilian party” to guarantee the continuation of their 
slaving transactions with the new Brazilian Empire. The slavers took the streets of Benguela, 
declared the independence of the province and rose the Brazilian flag. The proclamation of the end 
of the “legal” slave trade in Benguela in 1830 led to the rise of new cycles of violence on the coast 
and in the backlands: On the coastal town, the slave traders tried to maintain the regular outflow 
of captives to the Atlantic, while in the sertões the African rulers fought to maintain their autonomy 
and their own slaving transactions. 
 
Luso-African classifications for the peoples of Benguela 
I have argued in Chapter 1 that the territory of Quilengues was formed by a multiplicity of 
“ethnolinguistic” groups from the sixteenth to the nineteenth centuries. These communities 
developed specific economic and social structures that allowed them to adapt to the geographic 
and environmental characteristics of the lands they occupied. As mentioned previously, in areas 
of higher precipitation levels and richer soils, there developed agropastoralist societies, while in 
dry and desert areas there emerged a prevalence of nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralist 
societies. The political landscape also depended on these natural features, as Jean-Luc Vellut has 
explained: “Ethnic solidarity among the peoples of the region resulted from sharing a common 
historical experience dictated by environmental similarities”1072. 
Most of the African communities in the interior of Benguela lived far from the coast when 
the first Portuguese traders disembarked at the beginning of the seventeenth century. In fact, the 
population density of the semi-arid coastal lowlands (Mbuelo) was much lower than that of the 
highlands (Nano). Most of the local communities in Quilengues preferred to build their settlements 
close to water streams, but the prevalence of perennial rivers and the recurrence of long droughts 
incentivised mobile features even in agropastoralist societies. It was not rare for a sobado to move 
to another location due to environmental concerns or because of wars, triggering constant waves 
of transhumance and internal migration. Besides, as seen in previous chapters, running into the 
                                                 
1072 Jean-Luc Vellut, “The Congo Basin and Angola”, in J. F. Ade Ajayi ed. General History of Africa, Volume VI. 
Africa in the nineteenth century until 1880s (Berkeley: UNESCO / University of California Press, 1989), 303. 
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bush or climbing onto rocky hills were common tactics used by individuals trying to flee slaving 
expeditions and other conflicts. Whenever these communities moved, their borders migrated with 
them1073.   
The semi-nomadic features of many of the local communities complicates any attempt to 
identify the exact location of sobados and jagados in the interior of Benguela (Map 3), as well as 
their cultural (“ethnolinguistic”) composition, as discussed in Chapter 1. This was already a 
problem in the eighteenth century, which led Luso-African settlers to develop their own labels to 
classify and identify the multitude of peoples and languages they found in the interior of Benguela. 
This led to the creation of some broad “ethnic” labels that actually placed people from different 
“ethnolinguistic” backgrounds into the same group1074.  
These Luso-African “ethnic” labels separated the different peoples in the interior through 
imaginary geographic boundaries, mostly created by the foreigners and not by local African 
inhabitants. Such boundaries sometimes corresponded to local natural features of the land, such as 
the central plateau, but many were delineated by outsiders who, indeed, knew little about those 
territories and the peoples who occupied them. Luso-African officials frequently use these broad 
“ethnic” labels to identify African communities in their reports and letters to superiors. 
For instance, Africans living within the “district of Quilengues”1075 (a Luso-African 
fabrication, as argued in Chapter 1) were identified as “Muquilengues”. Similarly, those from the 
highlands of Nano were called “Munanos”, while those from Dombe Grande were called 
“Mundombes”. There were also groups of refugees from the far-southern lands of Humbe, dubbed 
the “Muhumbe” potentates1076. Moreover, there were different nomadic groups, such as 
“Mucuandos”, “Mucubaes”, “Mocorocas”, etc., who roamed semi-arid and desert portions of the 
interior and were usually identified in relation to the local rivers and streams they frequented: 
                                                 
1073 Maria Emília Madeira Santos, “A cartografia dos poderes: da matriz africana à organização colonial do espaço”. 
Africana Studia, No. 9 (2006): 132. 
1074 For more about these different “ethnolinguistic” groups of Benguela, see Chapter 1.  
1075 In the nineteenth century, the “district of Quilengues” lost a large portion of its territory. The explorer Bernardino 
José Brochado, who travelled throughout the interior of Benguela in the middle of that century, described the territory 
of Quilengues as extending between the regions of Dombe Grande to the northwest, Nano to the east and Huila to the 
south: Bernardino José Brochado, “Notícia de alguns territórios, e dos povos que os habitam, situados na parte 
meridional da Província de Angola”, Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino, parte não oficial, Série I, Dezembro (Lisboa: 
Imprensa Nacional, 1855), 204. 
1076 For more about the “Muhumbe” potentates in Quilengues, see Estevam C. Thompson, “Refugees from the south: 
the Muhumbe potentates in Quilengues, Benguela, 18th and 19th centuries” (forthcoming). 
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Cuando River, Cubal River, Cororca River, and so on1077. Finally, there was a group of Luso-
African settlers, which the documentation refers to as moradores, that is dwellers.      
Let us now examine more closely the Luso-African labels given to the peoples that 
inhabited the interior of Benguela, starting with “Muquilengues”. This label encompasses most of 
the inhabitants of Quilengues, excluding the moradores and several communities of “Muhumbe” 
potentates who took refuge in the region, as we will see below. One of the best reports about the 
social organization and culture of the “Muquilengues” was produced by the naturalist Joaquim 
Jose da Silva1078 during the time he sojourned in the sobado of Socoval as part of the expedition 
commanded by Captain Costa that raided several polities in Quilengues in the 1780s (Chapter 3). 
He described some local customs and rituals of the peoples of Quilengues, including information 
about their religious beliefs and their martial culture. In his description of the “Muquilengues” in 
Socoval, the naturalist highlighted their connections to the Mbangala bands that roamed the area 
in previous centuries. Besides praising their martial abilities, Silva also denounced their supposed 
“cannibalistic practices” and their use of captives of war to satisfy both their “appetite and 
superstition”1079. 
Another explorer, Bernardino José Brochado, who crossed the lands of Socoval in the mid-
nineteenth century gives a complementary version for the history of the “Muquilengues” in 
Socoval, in which the people of Socoval were descendants of the “Mucubais”, groups of nomadic 
pastoralists who lived around the Cubal River1080. He explained that the name of the soba of 
Socoval, whom he called Sucuballa, meant “lord of the Cubaes” (Senhor dos Cobães), regarded 
as the most powerful of the sobas of Quilengues1081.   
                                                 
1077 José Maria de Lacerda, “Observações sobre a viagem da costa d’Angola a costa de Moçambique, 1797”, in Annaes 
Marítimos e Coloneaes, 4ª série, parte não oficial, (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1844), 198. 
1078 Part of this report was published in Brazil in three different volumes of a local literary and news magazine: Joaquim 
José da Silva, “Extracto da viagem que fez ao sertão de Benguela no anno de 1785: de Luanda para Benguela”, part 
I, in O Patriota: Jornal Litterário, Político, Mercantil, No. 1 (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Régia, 1813), 97-100; Joaquim 
José da Silva, “Extracto da viagem que fez ao sertão de Benguela no anno de 1785: Viagem ao sertão de Benguella”, 
part II, in O Patriota: Jornal Litterário, Político, Mercantil, No. 2 (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Régia, 1813), 86-98; 
Joaquim José da Silva, “Extracto da viagem que fez ao sertão de Benguela no anno de 1785: de Luanda para 
Benguela”, part III, in O Patriota: Jornal Litterário, Político, Mercantil, No. 3 (Rio de Janeiro: Imprensa Régia, 
1813), 49-60.  
1079 Silva, “Extracto da viagem que fez ao sertão de Benguela no anno de 1785”, parte 3, 49-60. 
1080 As mentioned in Chapter 1, there were more than one Cubal River in the interior of Benguela, according to 
eighteenth and nineteenth century cartographic sources: Quicombo-Cubal, Cubal da Hanha, and Cubal de Namibe.  
1081 Brochado, “Notícia de alguns territórios”, 202-204. 
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The peoples living in Dombe Grande and Dombe Pequeno, on the other hand, were called 
“Mundombes”. Dombe Grande was the closest “district” to Benguela and was located on the outer 
basin of the Coporolo River, while Dombe Pequeno represented the lands in the inner Coporolo 
basin1082. Some of the oldest and most important vassals of the Portuguese were the “Mundombes”, 
including sobas Peringue, Molundo, Capembe, Quizamba, Mama and Quiera. Many of the 
“Mundombes” provided different services for the Portuguese administration in Benguela. Soba 
Capembe, for instance, was responsible for the brimstone mines and the production of sulphur1083, 
as briefly mentioned above. The “Mundombes” also often worked in Luso-African caravans as 
porters and guides, rendering a very important service for the development of the slave trade. They 
sometimes were requested as escorts and guards of caravans carrying valuable cargo, such as 
ivory1084. Both “Mundombes” and “Muquilengues” were regarded as great hunters and excellent 
ranchers, both being highly skilled in leatherworking as well1085.    
The “Munanos”1086, in turn, were the peoples who occupied the highlands of the central 
plateau, locally known as Nano1087. Today, these peoples identify themselves as “Ovimbundu” 
(speakers of “Umbundu”): but, in the nineteenth century, this identity had not yet formed1088. 
Among the main sobados of the Nano in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, one finds: 
Caluquembe, Bailundo, Quiaca, Quipeo, Tinde, Quingolo, Huambo, Bihé and Galangue (Map 3). 
                                                 
1082  José Falcão, A Questão do Zaire (Coimbra: J. Diogo Pires, 1883), 105. For more about Dombe Grande, see Ralph 
Delgado, Ao Sul do Cuanza: Ocupação e aproveitamento do antigo reino de Benguela, 1843-1942, Vol. 1 (Lisboa: 
Imprensa Nacional. 1940) 179-214. 
1083 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 121-123v, “Cinco cartas de oficio dirigidos em ano próximo passado de 1811, pelo Capitão 
Administrador da Mineração de Enxofre Hipólito Ferreira da Silva”, (12 August to 30 November 1811). According 
to one Luso-African official, the “Mundombes” indeed hated to work in the sulfur mines and factory: ANA, Códice 
445, fls. 103v-104v, “Em data de 17 de outubro de 1811 no sítio de Quilumata”, (17 October 1811). 
1084 On 1 December 1812, the Desembargador Provedor da Real Fazenda, António de Carvalho Fontes Henriques 
Pereira asked the governor of Benguela, Joaquim Doutel de Almeida, to send some “Mundombes” to carry and escort 
a shipment of ivory to be loaded in the Bergatim Mercúrio: ANA, Códice 445, fl. 172, “Ofício do Desembargador 
Provedor da Real Fazenda António de Carvalho Fontes Henriques Pereira”, (1 December 1812). Stephen J. Rockel, 
Carriers of Culture: labor on the road in nineteenth-century East Africa (Portsmouth: Heinemann, 2006), 19 and 79, 
argues that professional porters were preferred over slaves for carrying valuable cargo, such as ivory.  
1085 Augusto Bastos, “Traços gerais sobre a Ethnographia do Districto de Benguella”, Boletim da Sociedade de 
Geographia de Lisboa, série 26, (1908), 55; 94-96.  
1086 Paulo Martins Pinheiro de. Lacerda, “Notícia da cidade de São Filippe de Benguella e dos costumes dos gentios 
habitantes daquele sertão” (10 November 1797), Annaes Marítimos e Coloneaes, 5ª série (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 
1845), 490, called them “Munanos or Quimbundos”. .  
1087 João Francisco Garcia, “Explorações no sul de Benguela”, Annaes Marítimos e Coloneaes, 4ª série (Lisboa: 
Imprensa Nacional, 1844), 249-250.  
1088 Candido, An African Slaving Port and the Atlantic World, 242-243, argues that “The conviction held by many of 
those who believe they are Ovimbundu is a result of intense interaction among different groups throughout a long 
period of time…”  
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In the eyes of Portuguese and Luso-African officials in Benguela, there was a tendency to see a 
natural opposition between the peoples from Nano, the highlanders, and Mbuelo, the lowlanders. 
However, the documentation drawn upon here shows complex political relations between 
“Muquilengues” and “Munanos”, who despite recurrent conflicts sometimes joined forces to fight 
endogenous and exogenous enemies1089.    
In all the regions mentioned above there were groups of refugees who arrived in migratory 
movements from the south during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. They were generically 
identified as “Muhumbe potentates” and, as their name suggests, fled the distant lands of Humbe 
to escape local conflicts and persecution from their soba. After migrating, all of these refugees 
broke with their subordination to the soba of Humbe, but different groups seem to have chosen 
different new political associations. The “Muhumbe” refugees in Dombe Grande, for one, became 
subjects of local “Mundombe” sobas1090, while those who moved to Quilengues from at least the 
second half of the eighteenth century declared themselves subjects of Portugal1091. This put the 
“Muhumbe” potentates in Quilengues at odds with some of the local rulers, such as the soba of 
Socoval1092. References to new migratory movements of refugees from Humbe arriving in 
Quilengues and Nano persist into the nineteenth century1093.  
Besides these agropastoralist communities settled in Quilengues, Dombe Grande and 
Nano, there were nomadic groups of pastoralists who roamed the backlands of Benguela. They 
lived off their cattle, eating meat mostly when their animals died of natural causes, and did not 
grow any crops: milk was their staple. Hunting and gathering complemented their subsistence. 
They dug shallow wells (cassímas) in the desert from where they acquired brackish water (água 
salobra) for themselves and their animals1094. All of these nomadic groups, including “Mucubaes”, 
                                                 
1089 ANA, Códice 445, fl. 115v-117, “Três ofícios do Capitão-mor de Quilengues Manoel José de Souza, remetidos a 
este governo no ano de 1811”, (June-November 1811).  
1090 The “Muhumbes” usually fought alongside the “Mundombes” to protect their lands and sometimes worked with 
them in the production of sulfur: ANA, Códice 445, fls. 121-123v, “Cinco cartas de oficio dirigidos em ano próximo 
passado de 1811, pelo Capitão Administrador da Mineração de Enxofre Hipólito Ferreira da Silva”, (12 Augusto to 
30 November 1811).  
1091 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 80v-83, “Ofício do regente de Quilengues João Vieira de Andrade”, (13 May 1801). 
1092 A long inquiry into the raids commanded by the soba of Socoval against the “Muhumbe potentates” of Quilengues 
(on behalf of the soba of Humbe) is found in ANA, Códice 443, fl. 80v-83, “Ofício do regente de Quilengues João 
Vieira de Andrade”, (13 May 1801); ANA, Códice 443, fl. 87v-88v, “Ofício dirigido ao regente de Quilengues João 
Vieira de Andrade”, (29 May 1801). See also Thompson, “Refugees from the south”. 
1093 Delgado, Ao Sul do Cuanza, Vol. 1, 140. 
1094 Brochado, “Notícia de alguns territórios”, 203. 
268 
 
“Mucuandos”, “Mucororcas”, “Mucuambundos”, and “Mocuanhangues”, were excellent ranchers 
and had large herds of cattle1095, which made them frequent victims of both African and Luso-
African raiders.  
Lastly, there were the moradores of the interior, which included foreign settlers, some 
Africans who moved closer to the “white” settlements and locally born Luso-Africans (filhos do 
país)1096. Since the creation of “white” settlements in the interior by Governor Sousa Coutinho in 
1769, these moradores were supposed to live within these settlements or in their surroundings 
(Chapter 3). Nevertheless, most of the moradores in Quilengues and Caconda sought to isolate 
themselves as much as possible from Portuguese “colonial” officials. According to a nominal 
census of Caconda, prepared by capitão-mor João da Costa Frade in 1798, most of the moradores 
preferred to live away from “white” settlements and did not respect the “colonial authority” of 
Portugal1097.  
As mentioned previously, cattle was the most important form of accumulation of wealth in 
many of the communities in the interior of Benguela and, until the arrival of Europeans with 
imported goods, the most important capital for African rulers who wanted to expand their political 
influence. Cattle were used as currency, as payment for tribute, and in a number of social 
transactions, such as marriage. Hence, possessing and hoarding these animals created a strong 
social hierarchy in which “masters controlled clients who herded cattle for them while both groups 
lorded it over their cattleless servants, whose livelihood lay totally in their hands”1098. Besides, 
cattle were essential for agropastoralist societies, especially in areas of poor soil, because they 
provided organic compost or manure for crops1099. 
                                                 
1095 Garcia, “Explorações no sul de Benguela”, 242.  
1096 According to Brochado, “Notícia de alguns territórios”, 204, the regent of Quilengues had authority only over the 
“whites” and locally born individuals (filhos do país) who did not owe obedience to any soba. All other decisions by 
the regent should be taken in agreement with the African authorities, which in his understanding transform Quilengues 
in a form of Portuguese-African mixed government.  
1097 AIHGB, DL 31, 5. 7, fls. 3v-19, “Relação dos moradores e sobas do Presídio de Caconda”, 4 November 1797); 
ANA, Códice 4094, fls. 80-80v, “Carta do governador de Angola Dom Miguel António de Mello para o capitão 
regente de Caconda”, (9 May 1798). 
1098 Jan Vansina, How Societies are Born: Governance in West Central Africa before 1600 (Charlottesville and 
London: University of Virginia Press, 2004), 116.  
1099 Bastos, “Traços gerais sobre a Ethnographia do Districto de Benguella”, 303. 
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The high cultural and economic value given to the possession of herds drove communities 
in the interior of Benguela to ritualize their disputes over cattle and praise those warriors who 
could prove their raiding abilities1100. As Desch-Obi explains: 
“The constant reality of potential raids from other areas encouraged the 
development of militaristic strategies and values, and valorous soldiers were 
rewarded with cattle, clients, and wives. Thus, the king, chiefs, and other wealthy 
men would have wanted to attract into their service the most skilled soldiers in the 
society”1101.  
 
The constant raids among local rulers in search of political validation and capital 
engendered cycles of wars and violence into which the slave traders of Benguela tapped in order 
to acquire captives for the Atlantic trade. The primary sources used in the remainder of this chapter 
have plenty of references about raids, some of which I have included below. As we will see, there 
is a complex network of alliances between some sobas to raid others, including those based on old 
“grudges” and previous conflicts.  
Beforehand, let us take a closer look at a group of African professionals who were the 
backbone of transport and communications in the interior of Benguela: the porters.   
 
The importance of porterage logistics for trading and military expeditions  
The importance of porters as commercial and cultural intermediaries has recently attracted 
the attention of historians working on both East Central1102 and West Central Africa1103. This is 
                                                 
1100 For more on ritualistic cattle raids, see Marta Salokoski, “On the dynamics of Pre-Colonial Society in Northern 
Namibia” (National Archives of Namibia: Windhoek, 1985), 15-18; Marta Salokoski, “Symbolic Power of Kings in 
Pre-Colonial Ovambo Societies” (Licensiate Thesis in Sociology / Social Anthropology, University of Helsinki, 
1992); Marta Salokoski, “How Kings are Made – How Kingship Changes: A Study of Rituals and Ritual Change in 
Pre-Colonial and Colonial Owamboland, Namibia” (PhD Dissertation, University of Helsinki, 2006), 117-131. See 
also Joseph C. Miller, “Angola central e sul por volta de 1840”, Estudos Afro-Asiáticos, No. 32, (1997): 20. 
1101 Thomas J. Desch-Obi, Fighting for Honor: The History of African Martial Art Traditions in the Atlantic World 
(Columbia: The University of South Carolina Press, 2008), 20. 
1102 Rockel, Carriers of Culture.   
1103 Maria da Conceição Neto, “In Town and Out of Town: A Social History of Huambo, Angola, 1902-1961” (PhD 
Dissertation, University of London, 2012); Eliane Ribeiro Santos, “Barganhando sobrevivências: os trabalhadores 
centro-africanos da expedição de Henrique de Carvalho à Lunda, 1884-1888” (M.A. Thesis, Universidade de São 
Paulo, 2010); Eliane Ribeiro Santos, “Sociabilidades em trânsito: os carregadores do comércio de longa distância na 
Lunda, 1880-1920” (Phd Dissertation, Universidade de São Paulo, 2016); Ivan S. Gonçalves, “Apontamentos Vindos 
dos Sertões: negociação, comércio e trabalho nas Caravanas de Antonio Francisco Ferreira da Silva Porto (década de 
1840)” (M.A. Thesis, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, 2017).  
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not, however, a recent topic in the historiography of Angola. Earlier sources repeatedly mention 
the importance of porters for the slave trade and the management of settlements in the interior, 
including many complaints about the hardships involved in hiring and controlling them1104. 
Historians of Angola have also previously analysed the importance of porters in the development 
of commerce1105 and waged labor1106 in Angola, as well as their role as agents of cultural diffusion 
throughout the interior1107.  
This chapter shows how the control of porterage and the management of local porters 
became defensive tactics used by African rulers in Quilengues to hinder the advance of slaving 
campaigns into their territories. As seen previously, African vassals were supposed to provide 
porters for the “royal service”, a definition frequently manipulated by slavers in positions of 
authority to further their personal interests. African rulers also helped itinerant traders to hire 
                                                 
1104 Antonio da Silva Porto, Viagens e Apontamentos de um portuense em África, Maria Emília Madeira Santos, ed., 
Volume 1 (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra, 1986); Hermenegildo Capello and Roberto Ivens, From Benguella to 
the Territory of Yacca, 1877-1880, 2 Vols. (London: Sampson, Low, Marston, Searle and Rivington, [1881]1882); 
Luciano Cordeiro, Viagens, explorações e conquistas dos portuguezes: escravos e minas de África, segundo diversos. 
Coleção de documentos, 1516-1619 (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1881); Manuel Alves de Castro Francina, “Viagem 
a Cazengo pelo Quanza, e regresso por terra”, in Annaes do Conselho Ultramarino, parte não oficial, Série I (Lisboa: 
Imprensa Nacional, 1867), 432-464; Garcia, “Explorações no sul de Benguela”, 240-254; Alexandre Alberto de Serpa 
Pinto, How I Crossed Africa: From the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean , through Unknown Countries; Discovery of the 
Great Zambezi and Affluents (San Francisco: R.W. Bliss and Company, 1881); Augusto Antonio de Oliveira, 
“Primeiras explorações no sul de Angola, 1784-1791”, Boletim da Sociedade de Geographia de Lisboa, 7ª série, 
(Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1887), 417-453; Henrique Augusto Dias de Carvalho, Expedição Portuguesa a 
Muatiânvua, 1884-1888: Descrição da viagem à Mussumba do Muatiânvua, Vol. 1. De Luanda a Cuango (Lisboa, 
Imprensa Nacional, 1890); Augusto de Andrade, Viagem de exploração geographica no districto de Benguella e Novo 
Redondo, 1898-1899 (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1902); Beatrix Heintze, Exploradores alemães em Angola: 
apropriações etnográficas entre comércio de escravos, colonialismo e Ciência (Frankfurt am Main: 
Universitätsbibliothek Johann Christian Senckenberg, 2011), 31-33.  
1105 Alfredo Margarido, “Les porteurs: forme de domination et agents de changement en Angola (XVIIe-XIXe 
siècles)”, Revue française d'Histoire d'Outre-Mer, No. 240 (1978): 377-400; Isabel Castro Henriques, Percursos da 
Modernidade em Angola. Dinâmicas Comerciais e Transformações Sociais no Século XIX (Lisbon: Instituto de 
Investigação Científica e Tropical, 1997), 402-419; Maria Emília Madeira Santos, Nos caminhos de África: serventia 
e posse, Angola, século XIX (Lisboa: Instituto de Investigação Científica Tropical, 1998); Linda M. Heywood, 
Contested Power in Angola: 1840s to the Present (Rochester: University of Rochester Press, 2000); Linda M. 
Heywood, “Porters, trade and power: The politics of labor in the central highlands of Angola, 1850-1914”, in Catherine 
Coquery Vidrovitch and Paul Lovejoy (eds). The Workers of African Trade (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1985), 243-268. 
1106 Antonio Carreira, Angola da Escravatura ao Trabalho Livre (Lisbon; Arcádia, 1977); Maria da Conceição Neto, 
“De escravos a ‘serviçais’, de ‘serviçais’ a ‘contratados’: omissões, percepções e equívocos na história do trabalho 
africano na Angola colonial”, Cadernos de Estudos Africanos, No. 33 (2017): 107-129. Similar to West Central Africa, 
wage-earning porters in East Central Africa played a key role in economic, social and cultural change: Rockel, 
Carriers of Culture, 4. 
1107 Margarido, “Les porteurs”, 377-400; Beatrix Heintze, Pioneiros Africanos: Caravanas de carregadores na África 
Centro-Ocidental entre 1850 e 1890 (Lisboa: Caminho, 2004).   
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freemen as porters1108, who should receive a previously negotiated payment for their services1109. 
As Heywood has argued, the fact that commerce depended on caravans meant that slave traders 
depended on the “good-will of African rulers who had to be convinced to accept the circulation of 
caravans and to allow the recruitment of porters”1110 . 
Some caravans had hundreds of porters carrying not only merchandise, but also people in 
tipóias or “sedan chairs”1111. The status of these porters varied from slaves to free waged workers. 
Within this spectrum, some free individuals were forced to work in caravans, although the practice 
of “forced porterage” had been abolished in Benguela since 17961112. All of these types of porters 
could be found working side by side in a single caravan1113. Hence, while some of the porters in 
slaving caravans were captives themselves, others were highly valued professionals working for 
hire1114.  
Porterage could become a high-skilled occupation and porters were often granted 
differentiated social status within African communities. Many African men favored the profession 
of porter because it allowed them mobility and trading opportunities1115. Thus, besides carrying 
the merchandise of Luso-African itinerant traders, some porters also acted as private merchants 
themselves, pursuing their own slaving business. In fact, some of these professionals only accepted 
to participate in a caravan if they could undertake their own deals. Others, armed with guns, 
                                                 
1108 There are reports that porters payed a small amount of what they received as tribute to their sobas: Henriques, 
Percursos da Modernidade em Angola, 404-406.  
1109 Neto, “In Town and Out of Town”, 63. Porters were often paid in merchandise (fazendas): Santos, Nos caminhos 
de África, 445-475. This payment could vary depended on the type of load the porter carried: Henriques, Percursos 
da Modernidade em Angola, 406. 
1110 Heywood, “Porters, trade and power”, 75.  
1111 Heintze, Exploradores alemães em Angola, 62. Porters who carried the tipóias were known as “bambeiros” or 
“mutemos”: Henriques, Percursos da Modernidade em Angola, 133, note 91.  
1112 Forced porterage remained a common practice in the interior of Angola for good part of the nineteenth century: 
Neto, “In Town and Out of Town”, 63, note 79. In Angola, the practice was only prohibited in 1839, although there 
were attempts to regulate the activity since 1666: Henriques, Percursos da Modernidade em Angola, 126, 413.  
1113 Rockel, Carriers of Culture, 23-28, compares caravan porters to crews in slave ships. Both were specialist 
professionals engaged in lengthy journeys who lived and worked in gangs: “Like crews elsewhere, caravan porters 
developed a peculiar labor culture that drew on local genius and familiar meanings, which then became transformed 
in the work process”.   
1114 Neto, “De escravos a ‘serviçais’, de ‘serviçais’ a ‘contratados’”, 123; Heintze, Exploradores alemães em Angola, 
54-57; See also Henriques, Percursos da Modernidade em Angola, 402-430. The same was true for East Central 
Africa: Rockel, Carriers of Culture, 8-23. 
1115 Heintze, Exploradores alemães em Angola, 55; Henriques, Percursos da Modernidade em Angola, 419. 
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doubled as hunters and guards for the caravans. These large caravans drew much attention from 
local populations, which meant that “bandits” could jump out of the bush at any time1116.  
Sometimes these professional porters asked for payment for their services in advance, and 
demanded to know the final destination of the caravan1117. Paying in advance, however, increased 
chances of desertion during the journey1118. As we will see below, there were also agreements 
between porters from different regions determining where each group could operate. Hence, in a 
caravan from Benguela to Salvaterra dos Magos, “Mundombe” porters hired in Dombe Grande 
often carried their loads only to the sobado of Quilumata, last stop before Quilengues. From there, 
“Muquilengue” porters replaced them for the rest of the journey.  
It is clear that the enlistment of porters was a decisive part of the Luso-African military 
logistic to engage the sertões1119. There were, however, other strategic uses for porters in times of 
war. For instance, they also served as courier messengers, carrying letters with information and 
requests to and from the frontlines. Hence, by co-opting these messengers or forcing them to hand 
over the messages they carried, local African rulers managed to anticipate the arrival of “punitive 
expeditions”. This seems to have been the case with the expedition led by Captain Domingos 
Pereira Diniz to Quilengues. 
The work of porters and the rhythm of caravans was also connected to religious traditions, 
like other aspects of socioeconomic life in the interior of Benguela. Hence, a series of religious 
rituals preceded the departure of caravans, some concerning porters specifically: failure to fulfill 
them could hinder the advance of caravans and bring the slave trading to a halt1120.  
                                                 
1116 Neto, “In Town and Out of Town”, 63-67; Heintze, Exploradores alemães em Angola, 57-74; Henriques, 
Percursos da Modernidade em Angola, 410-411. 
1117 The price of porterage depended on the destination of the caravan. Porters usually refused to participate in caravans 
with no precise destination and without a time limit: Heintze, Exploradores alemães em Angola, 60. 
1118 The desertion of porters was one of the great problems faced by caravan leaders. As we will see below, military 
campaigns could come to a halt because of desertion. Hence, it features among the tactics used by African rulers to 
stop the advance of their enemies. Desertion was also a problem for itinerant traders and is a recurrent theme in their 
memoirs. See Henrique Augusto Dias de Carvalho, Expedição Portuguesa a Muatiânvua, 1884-1888: Descrição da 
viagem à Mussumba do Muatiânvua, Vol. 2. De Cuango ao Chipaca (Lisboa, Imprensa Nacional, 1892), 186; Richard 
Burton, The Lands of Cazembe (London: John Murray, 1873), 55-67. Heintze, Exploradores alemães em Angola. See 
also Henriques, Percursos da Modernidade em Angola, 413-417; Santos, “Sociabilidades em trânsito”, 142-143.  
1119 Neto, “De escravos a ‘serviçais’, de ‘serviçais’ a ‘contratados’”, 123. 
1120 Isabel Castro Henriques, “O pássaro do mel: Estudos de História Africana (Lisboa: Colibri, 2006), 39-56, has 
argued for local African control over commerce in the interior through the manipulation of rituals related to the 
departure of the caravans. See also Henriques, Percursos da Modernidade em Angola, 404.  
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Porterage remained the main form of transport of merchandise and people in the interior of 
Benguela until the end of the nineteenth century. It only began to change with the arrival of Boer 
migrants with their ox wagons1121, a transformation consolidated with the construction of the 
Benguela railroad in the twentieth century1122.  
 
Slaving campaigns in Quilengues in the early nineteenth century 
Since their arrival on the shores of Benguela at the beginning of the seventeenth century, 
Portuguese and Luso-African slavers tapped into local conflicts to acquire captives for the Atlantic 
slave trade. As shown in Chapter 3, these foreign traders arrived at a moment of great political and 
social turmoil in the interior of Benguela related to the rise of the Mbangala bands in the sixteenth 
century and their swift expansion throughout the interior in the following century. The first 
governors of Benguela established alliances with some of these “jagas” or Mbangala warlords, 
which proved essential for the consolidation of the slave trade from those shores. Other “jagas” 
became their enemies, demonized as “cannibals” and used as justification for the violent actions 
of slave traders operating in the region.  
As we have seen above, cattle were the most common form of capital accumulation in West 
Central Africa until the arrival of imported goods. During centuries, local communities fought for 
control over large herds through ritualized cattle raids. This led to the development of groups of 
warriors specialized in raiding and on strategies of defence, such as the construction of fortified 
corrals known as quipacas1123, inspired by Mbangala fortified camps (kilombos). With the arrival 
of foreign slavers with imported goods, the core of the local economy shifted from cattle ranching 
in the interior to the slave trade in coastal areas. Cattle and slaves remained the two main sources 
                                                 
1121 Henriques, Percursos da Modernidade em Angola, 123.  
1122 Santos, Nos caminhos de África, 59. Despite the construction of the Benguela railroad at the beginning of the 
twentieth century, porterage remained very important in the interior of Benguela: Andrade, Viagem de exploração 
geographica no districto de Benguella e Novo Redondo. 
1123 According to Antonio de Assis Jr., Dicionário Kimbundu-Português: linguístico, botânico, histórico e corográfico 
(Luanda: Argente, Santos e Cia, n/d [19--]), 136, kipaka means (1) corral for cattle; (2) defensive structures such as 
trenches, barriers and fences. In Nyaneka (Olunyaneka) the word otyimpaka translates as fortress: see Diccionário 
Portuguez-Olunyaneka, pelos padres missionários da Congregação do Espírito Santo e do Sagrado Coração de Maria 
(Huilla: Typographia da Missão, 1896), 68. 
 For more on quipacas, see Estevam C. Thompson, “Kilombos, quipacas and impuris: African fortifications in the 
wars of Benguela” (forthcoming). See also, Chapter 1.  
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of wealth for African rulers and warlords in Benguela until the twentieth century. In both 
“kingdoms” of Angola and Benguela, slaves and cattle served as currency in commerce and to pay 
tribute, which according to some historians pushed African rulers to actively participate in raids to 
acquire the means necessary to pay the tribute1124. At the dawn of the nineteenth century, African 
polities in the interior of Benguela were thus deeply involved in cycles of violence including cattle 
raids and slaving operations1125.  It is against this backdrop that I now turn my attention to a 
singular “punitive” expedition: that of 1811-1812 to Quilengues led by a Luso-African, Domingos 
Pereira Diniz.  
Captain Diniz1126 was a literate black slaver, born in Benguela, who began his career as a 
scribe1127 and a sergeant-major1128 in the 1790s. He was promoted to ensign1129 and scribe of both 
Benguela and Caconda in January 18001130. The following year saw him command a series of 
“punitive expeditions” in Caconda1131. Indeed, we have already encountered Captain Diniz in 
Chapter 4 when, returning from Caconda to Benguela in 1801, he stopped in Salvaterra dos Magos 
and was there convinced by the regent of Quilengues to attack the soba of Socoval1132.  
The first decades of the nineteenth century represented a period of personal growth for 
Domingos Pereira Diniz. In 1806, he became a lieutenant1133. Three years later he then rose to the 
                                                 
1124 Silva, The Atlantic Slave Trade from West Central Africa, 97.  
1125 For instance, in 1803 the soba of Bailundo asked the colonial administration authorization to wage war against 
the sobado of Huambo, but his request was declined because both sobas were “vassals” of Portugal: Delgado, Ao Sul 
do Cuanza, Vol. 1, 383.  
1126 As mentioned previously, “Captain” was a title commonly used in Angola and Benguela to identify powerful men, 
despite them being part of the Portuguese military. In some cases, as with Captain Diniz, the title was used even when 
he rose to higher military ranks, as we will see below.  
1127 Captain Diniz was not only literate, but in fact a good writer, when compared with the writing of most of his 
counterparts. He was considered intelligent, well organized and a good scribe by his superiors, to whom Diniz wrote 
elaborated fancy-worded letters and reports: ANA, Códice 4094, fl. 135, “Carta do governador de Angola Dom Miguel 
António de Melo para o governador de Benguela Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcellos”, (22 January 1800). He also 
wrote his own defense in different occasions when he was accused of misconducts: AIHGB, DL 125, 11 (Doc. 309), 
fls. 5-36v, “Oficio do tenente coronel das duas companhias de artilharia e infantaria de Benguela, Domingos Pereira 
Diniz”, (1 February 1827). 
1128 Sargento-mor da Companhia de Infantaria de Benguela 
1129 Alferes da Companhia de Infantaria de Benguela 
1130 ANA, Códice 4094, fl. 135, “Carta do governador de Angola Dom Miguel António de Melo para o governador de 
Benguela Alexandre Botelho de Vasconcellos”, (22 January 1800). 
1131 AIHGB, DL 125, 11 (Doc. 309), fls. 5-36v, “Oficio do tenente coronel das duas companhias de artilharia e 
infantaria de Benguela, Domingos Pereira Diniz”, (1 February 1827). 
1132 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 63, “Ofício dirigido ao regente de Quilengues João Vieira de Andrade”, (7 January 1801); 
ANA, Códice 443, fl. 70v-72, “Ofício dirigido ao regente de Quilengues João Vieira de Andrade”, (11 March 1801). 
1133 Tenente da Companhia de Infantaria de Benguela 
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rank of captain1134. In 1810, the governor of Benguela, Joaquim Doutel de Almeida (October 1809 
to September 1810) became very ill and the administration of the town was put briefly on his hands 
(23 September to 19 October 1810)1135, which helped him rise to the position of major in the 
following year1136. By 1816, he had climbed one more step in the local social ladder, being 
decorated with the Hábito de São Bento de Aviz. Five years later, Captain Diniz rose to the position 
of lieutenant colonel1137. Then in 1826, he became captain-major (capitão-mor) of Caconda,1138 
from where he witnessed a slight reprieve in Benguela’s export slave trade until it stumble in 1830. 
The governor of Angola who selected him as capitão-mor of Caconda, Nicolau de Abreu Castelo 
Branco (1824-1829), considered Captain Diniz quite adequate to occupy such position because of 
his intelligence, physical strength, and knowledge of the country, peoples and local traditions1139.  
While still an ensign, Diniz led several “punitive expeditions” in Nano against the soba of 
Caluquembe, who was then (1800-1801) at war against the presídio of Caconda under the  
command of capitão-mor Francisco Ignácio de Mira e Araújo1140. Shortly thereafter, a band of 
warriors from the highlands of Nano, who had been fighting in Caconda, descended onto 
Quilengues, raiding sobados, “potentates” and moradores alike1141.  
While in Caconda, Ensign Diniz managed to capture the soba of Caluquembe by luring 
him into a trap, similar to the one set up by Captain Serrão to arrest the soba of Socoval in 1797 
(Chapter 4). He invited the soba of Caluquembe to come to the capitão-mor’s official residence 
for some tea and quickly arrested him upon arrival. Caluquembe was immediately sent to 
Benguela, where he remained in the custody of Captain Serrão, who was now serving in the fortress 
                                                 
1134 Capitão da Companhia de Infantaria de Benguela 
1135 Ralph Delgado, A Famosa e Histórica Benguela: Catálogo de governadores, 1779 a 1940 (Lisboa: Edições 
Cosmos, 1940), 55.  
1136 Major da Companhia de Infantaria de Benguela 
1137 Tenente-Coronel das Companhias de Infantaria e Artilharia de Benguela 
1138 AIHGB, DL 125, 11 (Doc. 309), fls. 5-36v., “Oficio do tenente coronel das duas companhias de artilharia e 
infantaria de Benguela, Domingos Pereira Diniz”, (1 February 1827). 
1139 AIHGB, DL 125, 11 (Doc. 309), fls. 5-36v., “Oficio do tenente coronel das duas companhias de artilharia e 
infantaria de Benguela, Domingos Pereira Diniz”, (1 February 1827). 
1140 ANA, Códice 442, fl. 123v-128, “Ofício do governador interino de Benguela José Mauricio Rodrigues”, (17 
August 1800); ANA, Códice 443, fl. 62, “Ofício para regente de Caconda Francisco Ignácio de Mira e Araújo”, (6 
December 1800). Captain Mira e Araújo later occupied the position of governor of Benguela in the 1810s. See also 
Delgado, Ao Sul do Cuanza, Vol. 1, 242. 
1141 Delgado, Ao Sul do Cuanza, Vol. 1, 284; Carlos Estermann, Ethnography of Southwestern Angola: The Nyaneka-
Nkumbi Ethnic Group - Vol. II (New York/London: Africana Publishing Company, 1979), 17. 
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of Benguela, until embarking on the Portuguese ship Medusa for the dungeons of the Penedo prison 
in Luanda1142.  
One cannot help but question the official version given by the military officials involved 
in the arrest of the rebel soba of Caluquembe, as did Dom Melo when presented with a similar 
report about the arrest of Socoval (Chapter 4). If the soba was a rebel, why did he travel to the 
presídio of Caconda to have tea with his enemies?  
Governors were well aware of the deep involvement of regents and capitães-mores under 
their command in the slave trade. After the conclusion of the expedition against the soba of 
Caluquembe, the governor of Benguela ordered the immediate return of the soldiers involved to 
the coastal town. He probably suspected that Ensign Diniz was using the military forces at his 
disposal to capture victims for the Atlantic slave trade. At first, Diniz did not comply with the 
direct order from the governor and remained in Caconda a little longer. It was on his way back to 
Benguela that he stopped at Salvaterra dos Magos and was convinced by the regent of Quilengues, 
Captain Andrade, to “punish” the new soba of Socoval for “insubordination” (Chapter 4)1143.  
When Captain Diniz led the “punitive” expedition to Quilengues in 1811-1812, he was thus no 
stranger to this kind of belligerence. 
 
Cycles of violence: cattle raids, “punitive expeditions” and the Atlantic slave trade 
In 1809, the peoples in the interior of Benguela were faced a long period of drought that 
led to hunger, sickness and migration. Not only did some local communities put themselves on the 
move, looking for better pastures and access to water, but desertion became a problem among 
settlers and soldiers based in Salvaterra dos Magos. The then regent of Quilengues, Captain João 
da Silva Monteiro, complained to his superiors in Benguela that he could do little to alleviate these 
hardships. In April 1810, he wrote to the governor informing that the situation was so dire that his 
                                                 
1142 ANA, Códice 442, fl. 123v-128, “Ofício do governador interino de Benguela José Mauricio Rodrigues”, (17 Aug 
1800); See also Delgado, Ao Sul do Cuanza, Vol. 1, 242 
1143 ANA, Códice 443, fl. 62, “Ofício para regente de Caconda Francisco Ignácio de Mira e Araújo”, (6 December 
1800); ANA, Códice 443, fl. 63, “Ofício dirigido ao regente de Quilengues João Vieira de Andrade”, (7 January 1801); 
ANA, Códice 443, fl. 70v-72, “Ofício dirigido ao regente de Quilengues João Vieira de Andrade”, (11 March 1801). 
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soldiers had asked him to send them back to the coast because there were no supplies available in 
Quilengues: they were hungry1144. 
In November 1810, Captain Monteiro wrote again to the governor of Benguela, Antonio 
João de Menezes, who assumed the position on an interim basis from September 1810 to January 
1811, giving further information about the consequences of the long drought and the conditions of 
life in Quilengues. He justified a decrease in the collection of tribute by arguing that there was 
widespread hunger in the region. Yet, Captain Monteiro further explained that the real problem 
was not the extended drought (a recurrent condition in the region) but the widespread wars among 
African rulers. The constant state of warfare had forced moradores and other “blacks” to flee 
Quilengues, abandoning their crops and taking their cattle. He complained again that the soldiers 
were hungry and could not sustain themselves because they had received neither their payment 
(soldos) nor their rations (farinha)1145. 
The regent of Quilengues provided information about the “gentile” wars between 
“Mucuandos” and “Mundombes”, conflicts that could also be related to access to natural resources 
during times of drought1146. He further offered news of war between the soba of Capembe (Dombe 
Grande) and the sobetas of Jhoa and Tinde (Quilengues and Nano), who had raided his quipacas 
in the previous year. After “summoning a war” to avenge the attack, soba Capembe was 
approached by the sobetas, who returned all cattle looted and slaves captured1147.  The soba of 
Socoval too attacked the “Mundombe” of Dombe Grande in 18101148. This strike was followed by 
another organized by the soba of Quilumata, who lived on the border of Quilengues. In both cases, 
the invaders raided several quipacas in Dombe Grande, including those belonging to soba 
Capembe. Because of these attacks, many “Mundombes” who worked at the mines in Dombe 
Grande dispersed into the sertões to escape violence. The administrator of the sulphur plant 
                                                 
1144 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 56v.-57, “Carta do Regente Interino de Quilengues João da Silva Monteiro” (16 April 
1810).  
1145 ANA, Códice 445, n.p., “Carta do Regente Interino de Quilengues João da Silva Monteiro”, (12 November 1810). 
1146 ANA, Códice 445, fl. 61, “Carta do Regente Interino de Quilengues João da Silva Monteiro” (16 June 1810). 
1147 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 64-64v., “Carta do alferes comandante do Dombe Grande Manuel Zuarte de Andrade”, (12 
August 1810); ANA, Códice 445, fl. 64v., “Carta do alferes comandante do Dombe Grande Manuel Zuarte de 
Andrade”, (14 August 1810).  
1148 Delgado, Ao Sul do Cuanza, Vol. 1, 184. 
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complained that few “blacks” remained to work in the mines1149. These constant conflicts also 
blocked the trading routes between Quilengues (Salvaterra dos Magos) and the coast1150.   
By the beginning of 1811, Quilengues had a new regent, Captain Manoel José de Souza. 
As soon as he arrived in Salvaterra dos Magos, he was informed by moradores that African rulers 
in Quilengues did not obey the “colonial authority” of Portugal and that they had waged wars 
against the settlement and attacked the libatas of “Muhumbe” potentates who considered 
themselves vassals of Portugal. The moradores also warned the new regent of attacks carried out 
by the “Mucuandos” against slave caravans on the road to Quilengues. Captain Souza decided to 
request help from the soba of Socoval to hunt down the “Mucuando bandits” that terrorized the 
road to Salvaterra dos Magos and its surrounding libatas1151. He planned to use Socoval’s forces 
to attack the nearby rocky hills where the “Mucuandos” were hiding1152.  
Around the same time, the soba of Lumbimbe (Quilengues) attacked the sobados of Dombe 
Grande, raiding four quipacas and stealing many cattle. He also killed four “Mundombes” and 
enslaved five other individuals. Soba Capembe immediately summoned his people for a counter-
attack, ordering all men old enough to carry a weapon to join him in war. Soba Capembe then 
marched to Quilengues to reclaim his cattle and free his subjects who had been captured by 
Lumbimbe. Since the “sons” of Capembe were the main people responsible for work in the sulphur 
plant, this meant that production would suffer again from the lack of workers1153.     
The governor of Benguela tried to intervene in the conflicts between sobas Lumbimbe 
(“Muquilengue”) and Capembe (“Mundombe”). He dispatched a soldier with a message to the 
soba of Lumbimbe, ordering him to stop his aggressions against the “Mundombes”. In case he had 
a dispute with soba Capembe, he should come to Benguela to request an audience with the 
                                                 
1149 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 63-63v., “Carta do alferes comandante do Dombe Grande Manuel Zuarte de Andrade”, (1 
August 1810); ANA, Códice 445, fl. 63v. “Carta do Capitão Administrador da Mineração de Enxofre Hipólito Ferreira 
da Silva”, (1 August 1810). 
1150 Miller, Way of Death, 227.  
1151 In 1808, the regent of Quilengues, Captain Manoel Barbosa de Melo, reported that Salvaterra dos Magos was 
surrounded by at least thirteen libatas, and that some of these had more than one hundred and fifty houses. He promised 
the governor of Benguela that he would attempt to travel around to learn more about the large territory that was mostly 
unknown to colonial authorities: ANA, Códice 445, n.p., “Carta do Regente de Quilengues Manoel Barbosa de Mello”, 
(24 April 1808); Garcia, “Explorações no sul de Benguela”, 241. 
1152 ANA, Códice 445, fl. 77, “Carta do Capitão-mor de Quilengues Manoel José de Souza”, (6 February 1811). 
1153 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 121-123v., “Cinco cartas de oficio dirigidos em ano próximo passado de 1811, pelo Capitão 
Administrador da Mineração de Enxofre Hipólito Ferreira da Silva”, (12 August to 30 November 1811). 
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governor and make a representation. Lumbimbe ordered his warriors to beat up the soldier who 
brought the message before sending him back to Salvaterra dos Magos as a reply of refusal. 
Moreover, the soba of Lumbimbe sent emissaries to the Nano to summon allied “Munano” 
warlords to help him destroy his “Mundombe” enemies1154.  
The regent of Quilengues tried to explain the reason for the war between sobas Lumbimbe 
and Capembe. In his view, “Mundombe” warriors raided the sobado of Lumbimbe sometime in 
1811, burning the main libata of the soba and capturing one hundred and thirty head of cattle. 
Capembe also enslaved fifty subjects of Lumbimbe. The “Muquilengues” managed to kill two 
“Mundombe” invaders and capture another seven. At this point, the soba of Lumbimbe decided to 
travel to the highlands to summon “Munano” warlords to march against Dombe Grande. 
Meanwhile, the regent of Quilengues urged the soba of Lumbimbe to abandon his plan of revenge, 
promising that he would seek support from the governor of Benguela to deal with the “Mundombe” 
invaders, which he was not able to do1155.  
In September 1811, the regent of Quilengues reported the movement of “Muquilengue” 
warriors on the road to Dombe Grande1156. One month later, the governor of Benguela received 
news of two attacks against the sobados of Dombe Grande perpetrated by the “gentiles of the 
centre”, that is the lowlands of Quilengues. Soba Capembe was away from Dombe Grande at the 
time. He had gathered his warriors and marched to Quilengues to attack Lumbimbe, leaving a 
macota named Ganja in command, under the orders of the nana. During his absence, the 
“Mundombe” suffered the two attacks mentioned above. Warlords of Quiaca, in association with 
those of Sapa, led the first wave. They raided five quipacas with cattle that belonged to sobas 
Capembe, Molundo, Peringue and their respective macotas, enslaving numerous “Mundombe” 
subjects in the process1157. Socoval’s brother, Buriangombe, led the second wave of attacks. He 
raided four quipacas that belonged to soba Capembe and his macotas. Buriangombe knew that 
soba Capembe was away and accompanied by most of his warriors, hence he also raided the main 
                                                 
1154 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 121-123v., “Cinco cartas de oficio dirigidos em ano próximo passado de 1811, pelo Capitão 
Administrador da Mineração de Enxofre Hipólito Ferreira da Silva”, (12 August to 30 November 1811). 
1155 ANA, Códice 445, fl. 115v-117, “Três ofícios do Capitão-mor de Quilengues Manoel José de Souza, remetidos a 
este governo no ano de 1811”, (June to November 1811).  
1156 ANA, Códice 445, fl. 115v-117, “Três ofícios do Capitão-mor de Quilengues Manoel José de Souza, remetidos a 
este governo no ano de 1811”, (June to November 1811).  
1157 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 121-123v., “Cinco cartas de oficio dirigidos em ano próximo passado de 1811, pelo Capitão 
Administrador da Mineração de Enxofre Hipólito Ferreira da Silva”, (12 August to 30 November 1811). 
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libata and captured several of Capembe’s “sons”. Some managed to escape and fled south to ask 
for help from “Mucuando” (“Muquando”) warriors with whom Capembe had an alliance (da 
confederação do seu souva)1158.  
With the support of their “Mucuando” allies, the “Mundombes” who had escaped returned 
to their sobado in time to find Buriangombe and his men amidst raiding another of Capembe’s 
quipacas. The army composed of “Mundombes” and “Mucandos” surprised the “Muquilengues” 
with a quick strike against their rear. At least ten “Muquilengue” warriors were killed in this 
surprise attack, while the rest dispersed into the bush. The “Mundombes” managed to recover part 
of the stolen cattle from their quipaca. According to macota Ganja, Buriangombe also intended to 
invade the trading post (feitoria) of Dombe Grande to steal its supply of alcohol (aguardente) and 
tobacco1159. 
In order to suppress the wars and raids perpetrated by the sobas of Quilengues against 
Portuguese vassals in Dombe Grande, the governor of Benguela launched in 1811 a major 
“punitive expedition” to punish all “rebels” in Quilengues and restore peace in the sertões, 
replacing antagonist African rulers if necessary. Captain Domingos Pereira Diniz was the man 
chosen to command the expedition. His main target was the soba of Lumbimbe, but he was also 
to punish anyone involved in the conflict, including the soba of Socoval.  
 
The “punitive expedition” of 1811-1812 against the sobas of Quilengues  
By September 1811, the punitive expedition to Quilengues commanded by Captain Diniz 
was ready to leave Benguela. He had orders to investigate the cattle raids led by “Muquilengue” 
sobas against the quipacas of vassals in Dombe Grande. The most affected was soba Capembe, 
who had had several of his stockyards (quipacas) raided by the soba of Lumbimbe with the help 
of warlords from Quilengues and Nano. In order to fight the “Muquilengue forces”, Captain Diniz 
relied on the support of four powerful “Mundombe” rulers: sobas Peringue and Molundo from 
Dombe Pequeno and sobas Capembe and Quizamba from Dombe Grande. He also had supporting 
                                                 
1158 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 121-123v., “Cinco cartas de oficio dirigidos em ano próximo passado de 1811, pelo Capitão 
Administrador da Mineração de Enxofre Hipólito Ferreira da Silva”, (12 August to 30 November 1811). 
1159 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 121-123v., “Cinco cartas de oficio dirigidos em ano próximo passado de 1811, pelo Capitão 
Administrador da Mineração de Enxofre Hipólito Ferreira da Silva”, (12 August to 30 November 1811). 
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“black troops” (guerra preta) led by the corporal of Dombe Grande, Joannes José Gaspar. Captain 
Diniz’s troops also planned to incorporate deserters and prisoners captured along the way1160. 
From the point of view of Portuguese and Luso-African “colonial” officials, the “punitive 
expedition” led by Captain Diniz failed miserably. As we will see below, after six months in the 
sertões, he returned to Benguela with starving troops and not having solved the dispute between 
soba Capembe and the soba of Lumbimbe. In fact, his presence in Quilengues only furthered 
tension and warfare. It also exposed the limitations of the so-called “colonial power” in the sertões 
of Benguela. From the point of view of the slave trade, however, the expedition was a resounding 
success. Captain Diniz enslaved people in all of the regions in which the expedition camped 
(Quiculo, Quilumata and Quilengues), leaving a trail of destruction in his wake. This slaver always 
found a “reason” to “punish” sobas in his path and to enslave their people. Indeed, he enslaved so 
many people that the expedition ran out of shackles.   
The expedition was not able to “punish” soba Lumbimbe and others involved in the attacks 
against Dombe Grande because of a lack of porters to carry artillery pieces, ammunitions and 
necessary provisions. After being stuck in the sertões for weeks, Captain Diniz learned that the 
soba of Socoval had given verbal orders prohibiting all sobados and potentates in Quilengues from 
helping the expedition with either porters or provisions. This completely sabotaged the “colonial” 
intention to “punish the rebels” and to show its strength. African rulers had been able to defeat the 
“mighty colonial army” simply by refusing to collaborate and avoiding direct conflict. In March 
1812, without enough porters and provisions to advance against the “Muquilengues”, the 
expedition retreated to the coast leaving the “rebels” unpunished1161. 
A close analysis of the logistical problems and operational limitations of the Luso-African 
soldiers in the sertões shows that their supposed military superiority was not enough to impose 
real control over Quilengues, at least not until they had overcome their dependency on African 
porters. Captain Diniz’s had two companies of military personnel at his disposal for the expedition 
to Quilengues. One was the Infantry Company composed of one ensign (alferes), one sergeant 
(sargento), one quartermaster (furriel), one adjutant (ajudante), three corporals (cabos), two fife 
                                                 
1160 ANA, Códice 445, fl. 96v., “Em data de 10 de setembro de 1811, entrando no Dombe Grande, (10 September 
1811) 
1161 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 124, Doc. 73, “Vários documentos sobre a rebelião do gentio no sertão de Benguela 
e da expedição comandada por Domingos Pereira Diniz”, (9 March 1812). 
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players (pífanos), one military drummer (tambor) and thirty soldiers. The other was the Artillery 
Company with also thirty soldiers, one sergeant and one military drummer, but only one corporal. 
Another infantry ensign occupied the corresponding position in the artillery company for lack of 
personnel1162. The guerra preta commanded by Corporal Joannes José Gaspar added twenty-two 
armed soldiers to the expedition1163. Corporal Gaspar later complained, however, that many of his 
soldiers’ guns were broken or in terrible shape, and that some guerra preta soldiers fought armed 
with spears and arrows1164. Nevertheless, the lack of porters was the expedition’s greatest 
handicap.   
The expedition left Benguela on 7 September 1811, making camp that night in the sobado 
of Quipupa, near the Marimbombo River. This was also close to Quizamba, the main sobado of 
Dombe Grande (Map 4). The following morning, the expedition arrived at the trading post 
(feitoria) of Dombe Grande, where it was to be reinforced by local “Mundombe” sobas and their 
warriors. As mentioned above, Capembe was the local soba of the feitoria and his people carried 
out most of the work in the mines and in the sulphur plant. Since he was also one of the main 
victims of the “Muquilengue” raid, soba Capembe was committed to accompanying the “punitive” 
expedition to Quilengues: this worried the feitor of Dombe Grande, for he knew it would be 
difficult to control the “Mundombes” working in the sulphur plant and mines in the absence of 
their soba1165.   
When sobas Molundo and Peringue (from Dombe Pequeno) presented themselves to the 
commander of the expedition, they were accompanied by only a fraction of the forces they ought 
to have brought. Soba Molundo was expected to present fifty warriors but only brought ten. Soba 
Peringue, on the other hand, only brought six out of the eighty warriors the commander expected 
him to bring. Captain Diniz complained that their contribution was not enough and demanded that 
they summon more warriors from their sobados. The sobas refused. This infuriated Captain Diniz, 
                                                 
1162 ANA, Códice 445, fl. 113v., “Mapa do estado atual da Tropa de Linha das duas Companhias de Infantaria e 
Artilharia da Guarnição de Benguela em Diligência do Real Serviço na Povoação de Quilengues da mesma Capitania”, 
(1 December 1811). See also Delgado, A Famosa e Histórica Benguela, 59.   
1163 ANA, Códice 445, fl. 113v., “Lista da Guerra Preta armada e carregadores que existem até 1 de dezembro de 
1811”, (1 December 1811). 
1164 “Lista da guerra preta armada e carregadores que ficam existindo até 9 de março de 1812”, in AHU, Angola, 1a 
Secção, Cx. 124, Doc. 73, “Vários documentos sobre a rebelião do gentio no sertão de Benguela e da expedição 
comandada por Domingos Pereira Diniz”, (9 March 1812). 




who ordered their arrest for insubordination. The sobas protested saying that they would gather 
more people along the way, but the captain was resolute in his decision. After some days under 
arrest, both sobas agreed to send orders to assemble warriors and porters from local libatas. Diniz 
needed many porters to carry the heavy pieces of artillery. The number of porters that was actually 
assembled, however, barely met the necessities of the expedition1166.  
The expedition remained almost two weeks, from 10 to 23 September 1811, stationed in 
Dombe Grande da Quizamba. During this period, Captain Diniz tried to obtain reinforcements 
from local sobados, which proved a frustrating task. One of the reasons that he presented for the 
lack of collaboration from the local sobados of Dombe Grande was their distance from the feitoria. 
It took him almost one week just to assemble the sobas and persuade them to participate in the 
expedition. Even then, the sobas of Dombe Grande only provided enough porters to carry part of 
the provisions. No one wanted to be responsible for carrying the heavy artillery pieces, the captain 
noticed. During his stay in Dombe Grande, Captain Diniz wrote several times to the governor of 
Benguela complaining about the lack of porters and the uncompromising way in which the sobas 
behaved, even those most interested in the success of the “punitive expedition”1167.  
Soba Capembe, for instance, also seemed reluctant to provide porters, despite his personal 
interest in revenge against the “Muquilengues”. Captain Diniz complained to the governor that 
soba Capembe had brought only seventy men, which he suggested was much below this sobado’s 
capacity. The commander also protested that soba Capembe and his macotas neither showed 
respect for him nor fully obeyed his orders. Captain Diniz concluded that the only reason that 
Portuguese and Luso-African officials in Benguela endured this insubordination was the soba’s 
role in the sulphur plant in Dombe Grande1168.  
Two other local sobas presented themselves to the commander of the expedition with few 
warriors. Soba Janjala (a sobado very close to Quilumata) presented seven men, while Soba 
                                                 
1166 ANA, Códice 445, fl. 113v., “Lista da Guerra Preta armada e carregadores que existem até 1 de dezembro de 
1811”, (1 December 1811); ANA, Códice 445, fls. 97-97v., “Em data de 19 de setembro do dito ano, achando-se no 
mesmo lugar acima”, (19 September 1811); ANA, Códice 445, fls. 98-99, “Em 30 de setembro de 1811 Arraial do 
Sítio de Quiculo”, (30 September 1811). 
1167 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 97-97v., “Em data de 19 de setembro do dito ano, achando-se no mesmo lugar acima”, (19 
September 1811). 
1168 ANA, Códice 445, fl. 97v.-98, “Em data de 23 de setembro de 1811, estando no mesmo Arraial do Dombe 
Grande”, (23 September 1811). 
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Ndaiaya brought ten1169. Captain Diniz still managed to assemble some more people from other 
local vassals, but not as many as he expected. A list of members of the guerra preta from October 
1811 recorded how many subjects the sobas were expected to present and how many they actually 
brought. Soba Capembe, for instance, should have presented one-hundred and twenty men but the 
actual number never exceeded seventy.  Soba Mama should have presented one-hundred men, but 
only twenty warriors showed up. While soba Quizamba brought seven of the fifteen he should 
have brought, Soba Quiera showed up followed by twenty warriors out of sixty expected and Soba 
Calunga with only six warriors out of the twenty he was supposed to bring. Soba Peringue should 
have presented eighty warriors but only twenty eight appeared; soba Molundo should have brought 
fifty men but had only twenty-seven presented themselves; soba Janjala brought ten warriors out 
of twenty-four expected and soba Quilumata sixteen out of thirty warriors he was supposed to 
bring1170.  
In the meantime, the soba of Molundo received news that a slaver from Benguela had 
bought one of his “sons”, Sungo, from the soba of Lumbimbe. Sungo had been captured during 
one of Lumbimbe’s raids upon the quipacas of Dombe Grande and was now in the shackles (no 
libambo) of Captain João Batista Benites. Captain Diniz arranged a ransom for Sungo: the “son” 
of Molundo was to be exchanged for an adult male slave. Although the soba of Molundo agreed 
to the ransom, Captain Diniz did not authorized him to return to his libata to get one of his slaves. 
Unable to rescue Sungo at once, the soba then petitioned that his “son” remain under the custody 
of the expedition until he was able to send one slave to Captain Benites as ransom. After this 
episode, the governor of Benguela ordered that all “Mundombes” who had recently been sold as 
slaves by the soba of Lumbimbe should be freed1171.    
After waiting for almost two weeks, Captain Diniz managed to resume his march on 23 
September. He camped in the sítio of Gorombo, in Quiculo. After only a half-day’s march, the 
expedition was forced to wait for another two days for the arrival of soba Capembe and his people, 
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1811”, (1 December 1811). 
1170 “Relação da Guerra Preta e Povos auxiliares que marcharam do Dombe da Quizamba acompanhando a expedição 
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1171 ANA, Códice 445, fl. 97, “Em data de 16 de setembro de 1811, estando na Real Feitoria do Dombe Grande”, (16 
September 1811); ANA, Códice 445, fl. 97v-98, “Em data de 23 de setembro de 1811, estando no mesmo Arraial do 
Dombe Grande”, (23 September 1811). 
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who were responsible for carrying provisions for the troops (petrechos de boca). Upon arriving, 
the soba informed that he was trying to acquire additional porters, but had not been successful. 
They marched together to Benhuma on 26 September. The next day, soba Capembe delayed once 
again the departure of the expedition, although it is not clear what was the reason for such 
postponement. Captain Diniz thus decided to move the troops to Quiculo without the soba, 
transporting only part of the provisions. Capembe’s delays and allegations of lack of porters led to 
suspicions that he was deterring the expedition on purpose1172.   
After three days in Quiculo, Captain Diniz had not yet been visited by the soba of the land, 
Canacanzamba. As the commander of the expedition explained to the governor of Benguela, 
although soba Canacanzamba belonged to the “State of Quilumata”, he was very close to the sobas 
of Dombe Grande, especially sobas Capembe and Mama, whose cattle were partially kept in the 
corrals of Quiculo. After a few days of waiting in vain, Captain Diniz dispatched a group of guerra 
preta to summon soba Canacanzamba. He then learned that this soba had fled to nearby rocky hills 
with his people and cattle. Moreover, Captain Diniz’s soldiers had found a group of Africans 
spying on the expedition. Two men were captured, while the others escaped. They turned out to 
be “sons” of sobas Capembe and Mama who were tipping off the macotas of Quiculo about the 
advance of the expedition1173.  
As soon as Captain Diniz found out that the soba of Quiculo (Canacanzamba) had escaped 
with his people, he dispatched a detachment after them composed of nine of his own soldiers 
backed by warriors from sobas Peringue e Molundo. The scouts did not find the soba of Quiculo, 
but were able to apprehend three of his “sons” who were moving part of his cattle to the hills. 
Some of the animals apprehended were used for sustenance of the troops, while others were given 
to the sobas whose warriors had been part of the detachment. Still, eighty head of cattle, as well 
as seven captives from Quiculo, were sent to Benguela as earnings of the royal treasury1174.  
Since the first weeks of the expedition, soba Capembe proved to be a liability. Captain 
Diniz complained about his insubordination and the lack of support displayed from the beginning 
of the expedition. This included recurrent delays in the transportation of provisions, followed by 
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1174 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 98-99, “Em 30 de setembro de 1811 Arraial do Sítio de Quiculo”, (30 September 1811); 
ANA, Códice 445, fl. 102v., “Em data de 11 de outubro de 1811 no Sítio de Quiculo”, (11 October 1811).  
286 
 
the realisation that the soba was purposely delaying the caravan’s movement in order to allow his 
allies to run away. Moreover, there now emerged news that he had sent threats to the sobas of 
Quilengues saying that he was coming to get his revenge against the “Muquilengues” with the 
support of Luso-African soldiers1175.  
There were also requests from the overseer (feitor) of Dombe Grande to send soba 
Capembe and his men back to resume their work at the sulphur plant. Production had been greatly 
harmed since his absence. The “Mundombe” hated their work at the sulphur plant, Captain Diniz 
pointed out to the governor of Benguela: so they would do anything to absent themselves.  
Although soba Capembe had left one of his macota in charge of the sulphur production, he had 
taken most young men who worked at the plant to war, leaving all the heavy work to old men and 
some women who replaced them. Other workers used their soba’s absence to justify their own 
retreat to hideouts in nearby hills1176.     
The problems of the expedition piled up: all the time wasted in Quiculo, the lack of porters 
to carry artillery pieces, the desertion of members of the expedition (mainly porters), the lack of 
provisions and soldiers, especially guerra preta. On top of all that, Captain Diniz became sick 
while stationed in Quiculo. Despite all of this, he decided to march to Quilumata with whatever 
the remaining porters could carry. Since he could not trust soba Capembe, he ordered the “sons” 
of Peringue and Molundo to carry the provisions, which had decreased considerably following 
weeks in Quiculo1177.  
 
Delays and Desertions 
On 5 October 1811, the expedition was camped close to the libata of Quilumata, which 
constituted the border between the district of Dombe Grande and Quilengues. According to the 
“Mundombe” porters, tradition and old agreements authorized them to carry loads only until 
Quilumata. From there, “Muquilengue” porters were responsible to carry the expedition’s 
                                                 
1175 ANA, Códice 445, fl. 97v.-98, “Em data de 23 de setembro de 1811, estando no mesmo Arraial do Dombe 
Grande”, (23 September 1811). 
1176 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 103v.-104v., “Em data de 17 de outubro de 1811 no sítio de Quilumata”, (17 October 
1811). 




provisions and armaments to Salvaterra dos Magos1178. Captain Diniz sent word to the regent of 
Quilengues, Captain Manoel José de Souza, requesting one-hundred and fifty porters to continue 
his journey. These new porters were to be enough to replace Capembe’s men, who had been 
carrying the provisions, and take care of the artillery pieces and ammunitions as well1179. 
The fact was that the load of provisions was getting lighter: the expedition was taking much 
longer than previously expected to reach its destiny and the soldiers had eaten great part of what 
they brought from Benguela. The situation was worsened by the fact that the production of food 
in Quilengues had been very low in the preceding years, a consequence of both droughts and wars. 
No provisions could be found in Quilumata. Hence, both soldiers and porters began suffering from 
the lack of food. Some began to flee1180. One of these deserters confessed when captured that 
hunger was the reason that had made him run away1181. In Salvaterra dos Magos, the situation was 
not much different. The regent of Quilengues reported that his soldiers suffered great deprivations, 
such as lack of food and basic medical supplies, and that they had not been paid their salaries in 
nine months1182.    
Captain Diniz tried to acquire more porters with the soba of Quilumata. He also sent a 
message to the soba of Socoval questioning his absence and his lack of support for the expedition. 
By then, Captain Diniz had already heard rumors that Socoval was opposed to the expedition 
because of the presence of soba Capembe, who had threatened him. The commander of the 
expedition also sent messages to other sobas of Quilengues asking for help, but they too did not 
reply. Rumors had it that the soba of Socoval had threatened to punish anyone helping the 
expedition1183. Despite all of these problems, Captain Diniz explained to the governor of Benguela 
                                                 
1178 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 121-123v., “Cinco cartas de oficio dirigidos em ano próximo passado de 1811, pelo Capitão 
Administrador da Mineração de Enxofre Hipólito Ferreira da Silva”, (12 Augusto to 30 November 1811). 
1179 ANA, Códice 445, fl. 99, “Em 5 de outubro de 1811, estando em Quilumata”, (5 October 1811). 
1180 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 124, Doc. 73, “Vários documentos sobre a rebelião do gentio no sertão de Benguela 
e da expedição comandada por Domingos Pereira Diniz”, (9 March 1812); ANA, Códice 445, fls. 144-149v., “Duas 
cartas do Capitão Comandante da Expedição Domingos Pereira Diniz”, (9 and 26 March 1812). 
1181 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 106v-107, “Em 28 de outubro de 1811, estando no Sítio de Quilumata”, (28 October 1811). 
1182 ANA, Códice 445, fl. 77, “Carta do Capitão-mor de Quilengues Manoel José de Souza”, (6 February 1811). 
1183 ANA, Códice 445, fl. 99, “Em 5 de outubro de 1811, estando em Quilumata”, (5 October 1811). 
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that he could only dismiss soba Capembe and his people once the soba of Quilumata or the regent 
of Quilengues had answered his calls for help1184. 
After two weeks of waiting in vain for help from either Quilumata or Quilengues, Captain 
Diniz wrote a long letter to the governor of Benguela with a summary of complaints. One of these 
reveals the level of distrust that had developed between the captain and the sobas accompanying 
him. He first asserted that they had presented fewer warriors and porters than they were capable 
of. According to Captain Diniz, the latter did not amount to one fifth of the sobas’ subjects ready 
for war. He also had doubts about the circumstances surrounding a great number of desertions that 
the expedition had recently experienced and conjectured that the sobas endorsed many of them1185.  
On October 21, Captain Diniz still expected to get porters from Quilengues, Sapa and 
Janjala in order to move to the sobado of Lumbimbe, where he planned to question the soba about 
his raids against the “Mundombes”. Once again, however, he did not receive a reply from the local 
sobas. So he decided to march to Lumbimbe only with the ammunition, leaving all provisions 
behind in Quilumata. On the eve of their departure, twenty-five of Capembe’s subjects deserted, 
after the corporal of the guerra preta gave them the signal, by shaking a “rattle” (chocalho), that 
they would march the following morning1186. The expedition thus became once again paralyzed in 
Quilumata.  
When Capembe and his macotas informed Captain Diniz about the desertions, the latter at 
first decided not to punish them. After all, this could harm the advance of the expedition even 
further. However, he soon demanded that they provide the names of those who had deserted, so 
that they could be punished later, once the expedition had returned to Dombe Grande. Captain 
Diniz claimed that this was the procedure adopted when the same happened with the “sons” of 
Peringue and Molundo. However, soba Capembe and his macotas refused to provide their names, 
arguing this was not the tradition. Besides, soba Capembe tried to justify their desertion by saying 
that hunger had forced them to flee. Captain Diniz considered their reply an “act of intolerable 
                                                 
1184 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 102-102v., “Em data de 7 de outubro de 1811”, (7 October 1811); ANA, Códice 445, fls. 
103v-104v., “Em data de 17 de outubro de 1811 no sítio de Quilumata”, (17 October 1811); ANA, Códice 445, fls. 
106v-107, “Em 28 de outubro de 1811, estando no Sítio de Quilumata”, (28 October 1811). 
1185 “Souva Capembe que não deixa com dissimulação de estar contra seus filhos que o tem desamparado com as 
cargas”, in ANA, Códice 445, fls. 103v-104v., “Em data de 17 de outubro de 1811 no sítio de Quilumata”, (17 October 
1811). 
1186 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 106v.-107, “Em 28 de outubro de 1811, estando no Sítio de Quilumata”, (28 October 1811). 
289 
 
audacity” and quickly arrested soba Capembe and eleven of his macotas for eight days to set an 
example1187.  
 
The attack on Quilumata  
At the beginning of November 1811, the expedition remained stuck close to the libata of 
Quilumata. Captain Diniz then wrote to the governor of Benguela complaining yet again about the 
delays caused by the lack of porters. He also reported that the soldiers were going through harsh 
times because of the lack of provisions. The captain further informed that since leaving Dombe 
Grande the expedition had not found one place with agricultural produce available: “not even one 
root of manioc, not a corn cob, and not even beans”1188. Sick soldiers were given small amounts 
of dry fish and rice to sustain themselves. If it was not for the manioc flour brought from Benguela 
and the cattle seized from soba Canacanzamba, Captain Diniz confessed, there would be no 
soldiers or porters left under his control1189.  
During this second, forced stay in Quilumata, Captain Diniz learned of a new attack against 
quipacas that belonged to sobas Peringue and Molundo in Dombe Grande. The nephew of a 
macota of Quilumata, Chandumbo, had led a raid on five quipacas that contained cattle belonging 
to both sobas. According to informants, soba Canacanzamba of Quiculo, who had his cattle seized 
by the expedition with the help of Peringue and Molundo, was involved in the attacks. Quilumata 
was accused of sheltering the “bandits”. To the captain’s surprise, the soba of Quilumata did not 
deny his involvement with the “bandits”, but justified that he did not convoke the attack. He 
disclosed that the real person behind the attack was Candomba, nephew of soba Capembe1190.  
This was another story of betrayal and secret alliances among African rulers. Candomba of 
Capembe and Chandunbo of Quilumata had summoned the “sons” of Canacanzamba of Quiculo 
to attack the quipacas of the sobas Peringue and Molundo in Dombe Grande. The soba of 
Quilumata seems not to have participated directly in the attack, but he held part of the cattle looted. 
                                                 
1187 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 106v-107, “Em 28 de outubro de 1811, estando no Sítio de Quilumata”, (28 October 1811). 
1188 “…se não tem encontrado uma só raiz de mandioca, nenhuma só espiga de milho, e menos feijão”, in ANA, Códice 
445, fls. 107-108, “No sítio de Quilumata em data de 4 de novembro de 1811”, (4 November 1811).  
1189 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 107-108, “No sítio de Quilumata em data de 4 de novembro de 1811”, (4 November 1811). 
1190 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 110-110v, “Outro ofício em data de 6 de novembro de 1811, estando no mesmo sítio de 
Quilumata”, (6 November 1811). 
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Sobas Peringue and Molundo wanted to solve their problem with Quilumata through their own 
traditions (mucanos), what Captain Diniz called “gentile laws”. First, they reminded Quilumata 
that he also had part of his cattle in quipacas of Dombe Grande. Then, the sobas sent him their 
“ritual canes” (bastões), which traditionally symbolized, according to Captain Diniz’s 
understanding, the desire to reach a friendly agreement1191.   
The accusers of the soba of Quilumata alleged that he had already received his part of the 
loot from the warlords who had raided the quipacas of the sobas of Dombe Pequeno. Quilumata 
said he could return the cattle and promised that he would try to bring those responsible for the 
raid to repay sobas Peringue and Molundo as well. But, fearing he would run to the hills, Captain 
Diniz decided to arrest the soba of Quilumata until he had paid his debts. The arrest of the soba of 
the land outraged the macotas of Quilumata. They visited their soba, who was being held at the 
military camp, and deliberated with him about the situation1192.   
The elders of Quilumata, together with their soba, decided to resist and not to pay ransom 
for their ruler. After leaving for their libatas, the macotas later returned with a group of warriors 
who invaded the military camp in an attempt to free their soba. Along the way, they attacked 
“black servants” of the expedition who were in the bush gathering wood. They also kidnapped a 
“son” of Molundo and an enslaved woman owned by a member of the expedition1193. The rampage 
created a great tumult in the camp, and led to an immediate response from Captain Diniz. He 
dispatched fifteen soldiers, led by two junior officers, backed by their entire guerra preta. The 
Luso-African troops overran the libata of the soba of Quilumata and burned everything. The 
captain bragged to the governor of Benguela that the loot from that libata generated enough 
provisions to feed the troops and all other “blacks”. Captain Diniz further mentioned that some 
“old black women”, who happened to be relatives of the soba, had been captured during the assault 
and that they remained under arrest in the company of their ruler1194.  
                                                 
1191 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 110-110v., “Outro ofício em data de 6 de novembro de 1811, estando no mesmo sítio de 
Quilumata”, (6 November 1811). 
1192 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 110-110v., “Outro ofício em data de 6 de novembro de 1811, estando no mesmo sítio de 
Quilumata”, (6 November 1811). 
1193 Ajudante de Cirurgia of Quilengues. 
1194 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 110-110v., “Outro ofício em data de 6 de novembro de 1811, estando no mesmo sítio de 
Quilumata”, (6 November 1811). 
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Interestingly, there is no mention of any other captives made during the assault, which does 
not mean that there were none. Indeed, that the attack on Quilumata generated a great number of 
captives for the slave trade is confirmed in a requisition by Captain Diniz for forty to fifty 
additional “iron shackles” (malungas de ferro) for the libambo of the corporal of the guerra preta. 
The request was made on 7 November, the day after the leader of the expedition informed the 
governor of Benguela about the success of the attack against Quilumata that left them without 
shackles1195.  
 
On the road to Quilengues 
Captain Diniz expected to get help from Salvaterra dos Magos in order to move out of 
Quilumata after the end of the raid. However, it took more than two weeks for the regent of 
Quilengues, Captain Souza, to receive the letter from Diniz requesting help. Despite his best 
intentions, the regent could not gather all of the porters requested by Captain Diniz at once. He 
sent orders to several moradores in Quilengues to gather as many men as they could, among 
subjects of the sobas and their own slaves, and march to Quilumata to rescue the expedition. The 
regent sent soldier João Bento to Calunga with orders for morador Francisco Carvalho Velho. 
Soldier Joaquim de Santa Anna was dispatched to Bongo with a letter for morador Joaquim João 
de Boaventura. Soldier João left for Mussango with orders for morador Antonio Pacheco de Paiva. 
Corporal Manoel João Mathias was dispatched to the big libata of Socoval, and from there 
Liutenant Thomas Nicolau and soldier João Manoel were sent to Embambas with similar orders 
for morador Pedro Vicente Durão1196. 
In a letter from 28 October 1811, the then regent of Quilengues, Captain Souza, explained 
that the “gentiles” were “restless”, that they had abandoned the “royal service”, and that most of 
them no longer obeyed his orders. They were especially resistant to providing porters for the 
expedition camped in Quilumata. Moreover, many had begun fleeing from their libatas because 
of the threat of war. Captain Souza argued that it was useless to arrest one or two macotas to force 
                                                 
1195 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 110v.-111, “Em data de 7 de novembro de 1811 achando-se no dito sitio de Quilumata”, 
(7 November 1811). 
1196 “... cada um destes moradores é assistente nestes mesmos lugares”, in ANA, Códice 445, fl. 99, “Em 5 de outubro 
de 1811, estando em Quilumata”, (5 October 1811). 
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them to provide the necessary help, because the others would simply run away. Although he could 
threaten moradores and African rulers to follow his orders, the regent of Quilengues pondered that 
these threats could lead to rebellions and deaths, especially if they involved violence against 
macotas1197.  
On 1 November 1811, Captain Souza informed the governor of Benguela about the 
situation of the expedition commanded by Captain Diniz. He informed that the “Mundombes” had 
abandoned the artillery pieces and ammunition in Quilumata and that Captain Diniz had requested 
one hundred and fifty porters to continue his march. The regent of Quilengues explained how 
difficult it was to obtain porters in Quilengues, but asserted that he had sent word to the most 
important moradores of Quilengues ordering them to summon all vassal sobas in the surrounding 
region. These sobas should provide the necessary porters1198.  
However, to Captain Souza’s surprise, the sobas replied they would not send porters 
because they knew that the expedition led by Captain Diniz was helping their enemies, including 
soba Capembe. They understood that the goal of the expedition was to destroy the sobados of 
Quilengues and enslave their people. After their refusal to collaborate, the regent sent new orders 
to all moradores who owned libatas in Quilengues instructing them to gather their slaves and 
march to Quilumata on 5 November. Not all of the moradores replied to the new orders, especially 
those who lived far from Salvaterra dos Magos: and those who did were full of excuses, as we will 
see below1199.  
Pedro Vicente Durão, morador in Embambas, replied to Captain Souza saying that he could 
not comply with the request to send forty men to the expedition because he did not have access to 
such a large number of porters. The morador tried to get help in the libata of his agregado Catebe, 
but the latter’s “sons” had been dispatched to Quissungo and Bumbo with the fazendas of the 
sertanejo Luiz Gonzaga. Pedro Vicente Durão then sent his own slaves, but the number was still 
not sufficient. In his reply, the morador in Embambas confirmed the rumors that there was a verbal 
                                                 
1197 “Alvoroçado”, in ANA, Códice 445, fl. 99, “Em 5 de outubro de 1811, estando em Quilumata”, (5 October 1811). 
1198 ANA, Códice 445, fl. 115v-117, “Três ofícios do Capitão-mor de Quilengues Manoel José de Souza, remetidos a 
este governo no ano de 1811”, (June to November 1811).  
1199 ANA, Códice 445, fl. 115v-117, “Três ofícios do Capitão-mor de Quilengues Manoel José de Souza, remetidos a 
este governo no ano de 1811”, (June to November 1811).  
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order from the soba of Socoval prohibiting everyone from sending porters to assist the 
expedition1200.  
Lieutenant Thomas Nicolao was sent to Socoval and Embambas. He too failed in his 
mission to acquire porters for the expedition. Lieutenant Nicolao explained himself thus: after days 
of hearing from local African rulers that they were gathering people and provisions for the trip, he 
realized that he was being fooled. None of them appeared as promised. Lieutenant Nicolao then 
sent a soldier under his command to question the “gentiles” as to what happened, only to hear their 
defiant reply that if Captain Diniz wanted the artillery he should carry it himself1201.  
Morador Francisco Carvalho Velho also forwarded an excuse for not presenting the 
requested porters. He said that after days spent gathering twenty porters from Calunga, they 
refused to do the job by themselves. According to this morador, as soon as they realized that no 
one else was sending help, they started to shake their heads. According to these Calunga porters, 
the artillery and ammunition were too heavy for them to carry alone. It was a job for eighty to one 
hundred men. They informed that they would march to meet the expedition only when the morador 
Carvalho Velho had gathered the remaining porters1202.  
Even morador Carvalho Velho did not present himself, although he asserted that 
everything on his part was ready: “only” the porters were missing. He justified his absence because 
he “did not want to show up empty handed” (não ir assim com as mãos abanando). Without 
porters, this morador argued, he would be a mere adornment (porque eu lá sem carregadores vou 
fazer figura de pau). When the regent of Quilengues informed Captain Diniz about Carvalho 
Velho’s decision not to integrate the expedition, he complained that “everyone in the sertões is an 
absolute ruler, and they only obey colonial orders when it pleases them”1203.     
The regent of Quilengues, Captain Souza, further warned the governor of Benguela that 
the expedition was under great threat because sobas Tinde, Quibonga, and Bongo had summoned 
their warriors to invade the roads of Quilengues and attack the expedition. They were to be later 
joined by soba Quingolo. The regent further warned Captain Diniz that the road from Benguela to 
                                                 
1200 ANA, Códice 445, fl. 99, “Em 5 de outubro de 1811, estando em Quilumata”, (5 October 1811). 
1201 ANA, Códice 445, fl. 99, “Em 5 de outubro de 1811, estando em Quilumata”, (5 October 1811). 
1202 ANA, Códice 445, fl. 99, “Em 5 de outubro de 1811, estando em Quilumata”, (5 October 1811). 
1203 ANA, Códice 445, fl. 99, “Em 5 de outubro de 1811, estando em Quilumata”, (5 October 1811). 
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Quilengues was unsecure and that local warriors were unbeatable in this environment. If they 
ambushed the expedition, they could very well destroy it. Captain Souza justified, in turn, his delay 
in rescuing the expedition by pointing out that it took a lot of effort to gather the necessary armed 
men to march to Quilumata1204. 
On 11 November 1811, Captain Diniz decided to resume his march to Salvaterra dos 
Magos, where he would set a base camp. Despite news that some moradores from Quilengues 
were on their way with porters to help the expedition, he decided to leave before their arrival. Since 
there were not enough porters to carry all of the disassembled parts of the artillery, Captain Diniz 
ordered his men to assemble and carry it whole. On the road, the caravan met the moradores from 
Quilengues with forty-six slave porters. The commander ordered his men to disassemble the 
artillery and use the new porters to carry it. As the Calunga porters had warned, this was work for 
a hundred men. A greater number of porters meant that they could constantly alternate the heavy 
load among themselves. The few porters brought by the moradores of Quilengues suffered a lot to 
complete their task, because they could not to take turns carrying the military equipment. This also 
meant a slow march with many stops along the way. The heavy loads provoked serious injuries on 
the porters’ shoulders and at least five of them ran away. Captain Diniz confessed that he thought 
that they would not make it to Salvaterra dos Magos. Five days of marching and another to rest 
were required before reaching their destination1205.     
The road to Quilengues was full of danger. Local warlords expected the expedition, as the 
regent of Quilengues had previously warned1206, because it could not travel through the sertões 
unnoticed. The main caravan alone totaled more than two-hundred and fifty men, including one 
hundred and thirty six porters, sixty soldiers in both companies, ten superior and lower level 
officers, and fifty-five guerra preta soldiers1207. Then there were the sobas and their warriors, and 
behind them lines of slaves in shackles (libambos). The caravan moved slow and drew much 
                                                 
1204 ANA, Códice 445, fl. 115v.-117, “Três ofícios do Capitão-mor de Quilengues Manoel José de Souza, remetidos a 
este governo no ano de 1811”, (June to November 1811).  
1205 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 111-111v., “Em data de 11 de novembro de 1811, achando-se arraialado no sítio de 
Quilumata, (11 November 1811).  
1206 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 111v.-113v., “Em data de 1 de dezembro de 1811, escrita na Povoação de Quilengues”, (1 
December 1811). 
1207 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 113v., “Mapa do estado atual da Tropa de Linha das duas Companhias de Infantaria e 
Artilharia da Guarnição de Benguela em Diligência do Real Serviço na Povoação de Quilengues da mesma Capitania”, 
(5 December 1811); ANA, Códice 445, fls. 113v., “Lista da Guerra Preta armada e carregadores que existem até 1 de 
dezembro de 1811”, (5 December 1811). 
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attention, being closely observed wherever it passed. Captain Diniz pondered about the danger of 
ambush by “black warriors” that used guerilla tactics to assault parts of the main caravan, breaking 
their line and creating havoc. The attackers would then grab whatever they could and disappear 
into the bush1208. 
Captain Diniz marched straight to Salvaterra dos Magos, from where he planned to 
dispatch military personnel to Lumbimbe, probably under the advice of the regent of Quilengues. 
He placed the soldiers brought by the regent at the rear of the main caravan and warned his men 
to remain vigilant. The rest of the march to Salvaterra dos Magos was harsh, but safe. The only 
losses were the five injured porters who ran away. Nevertheless, Captain Diniz reported “traces of 
hordes of black bandits” (rastros de multidão de negros ladrões), with some heading east, deep 
into the sertões, where they would attack the caravans of pumbeiros who traded in slave markets 
(pumbos) in the far interior of the continent. Others marched west, aiming at the “Mundombes” in 
Dombe Grande. Both sobas Peringue and Molundo also brought him news of recent raids upon 
their own quipacas1209. 
 
Military camp in Salvaterra dos Magos 
Once in Salvaterra dos Magos, the expedition was met with apathy by local sobas and 
moradores alike. Captain Diniz accused everyone of disobedience, including the “Muhumbe” 
potentates, who used to be considered among the most loyal and servile vassals in Quilengues. 
After fifteen days camped close to the settlement of Salvaterra dos Magos, he complained that no 
“Muhumbe” leader had come to pay him homage. Even, the soba of Socoval did not show up and 
did not respond to several attempts at contact on his part1210.   
On the same day that the expedition arrived in Salvaterra dos Magos, Captain Diniz 
received reports of an attack on a local libata owned by morador Thomas Rodrigues da Conceição. 
He heard the screams coming from the libata and dispatched all of his soldiers and guerra preta 
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to intervene. When the troops arrived, however, the attackers had swiftly retreated into the bush, 
so that no one was caught. According to witnesses, the attack was carried out by a combined force 
of “Mundombe” and “Mucuando” warriors. They stole cattle that belonged to the morador and 
killed one of his quimbares who was grazing them1211.  
The expedition had brought the soba of Quilumata in shackles to Salvaterra dos Magos. 
After almost one month under arrest, Quilumata negotiated his freedom with sobas Peringue and 
Molundo. They reached a friendly agreement that the soba of Quilumata would pay three-hundred 
head of cattle and ten sheep. Quilumata had already returned eighty-two head of cattle when he 
was captured, and he agreed to pay the remaining two hundred and eighteen head of cattle and ten 
sheep if Captain Diniz allowed him to return to his libata to gather the animals1212. When the soba 
of Quilumata was about to leave the military camp to return to his libata, sobas Peringue and 
Molundo stopped him and demanded more guarantees that he would return with their cattle. They 
demanded that Quilumata hand over two of his favorite women, in addition to the pawns he had 
already given. Since these women were daughters of close allies of Quilumata, Peringue and 
Molundo expected him to hurry to rescue them. According to Captain Diniz’s understanding of 
what he called “gentile law”, these pawns were a very important part of African political and 
commercial agreements1213. Thus, the soba of Quilumata “knew the dangers” in not rescuing a 
pawn. The two females were handed over to Captain Diniz and were to stay under his protection 
until the fulfilment of the agreement: but they were later sent to the fortress in Benguela. Captain 
Diniz charged the royal treasury of Benguela for his expenses with the maintenance of these pawns 
from 5 December 1811 to 26 March 18121214.  
In response to the agreement reached by the sobas, Captain Diniz ordered the release of 
the subjects of Quilumata who had been arrested during the attack on his libata. There were 
probably some macotas in the group as well, because he mentioned that they were always debating 
cases related to their “sons” while under captivity. These discussions were so heated that 
                                                 
1211 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 111v.-113v., “Em data de 1 de dezembro de 1811, escrita na Povoação de Quilengues”, (1 
December 1811). 
1212 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 112v.-113v., “Em data de 5 de Dezembro de 1811 estando em Quilengues”, (5 December 
1811).  
1213 For more on the institution of pawnship in West Central Africa, see Chapter 4.  
1214 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 112v.-113v., “Em data de 5 de Dezembro de 1811 estando em Quilengues”, (5 December 
1811); ANA, Códice 445, fls. 144-149v., “Duas cartas do Capitão Comandante da Expedição Domingos Pereira 
Diniz”, (9 and 26 March 1812). 
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sometimes the captain was forced to intervene to avoid greater turmoil. In fact, Captain Diniz 
revealed that he was happy to free the soba and his macotas, and thereby get rid of that problem1215.  
Before he left for his lands, the soba of Quilumata shared one last piece of information he 
had gathered from his subjects about the cattle raided from the quipacas of sobas Peringue and 
Molundo. He told Captain Diniz that Chandumbo (Quilumata) and Camdomba (Capembe) had in 
fact brought the stolen cattle to Quilumata, but in order to move them to another site, they 
associated themselves with a local “black” man called Soma. The cattle were moved back to 
Dombe Grande where they remained in the quipacas of Soma’s uncles Chacatua, Chaquipera, and 
Chamungongo. Part of the cattle, he revealed, was later taken to the libata of soba Capembe. The 
soba of Quilumata said he feared the “bandits” would vanish if they saw his men arriving in Dombe 
Grande to collect the cattle, so he petitioned Captain Diniz to order the corporal of Dombe Grande 
to arrest the said thieves and Soma’s uncles who were hiding them. Quilumata also expressed the 
desire to present himself to the governor of Benguela, together with the other two disputing sobas 
to have a final decision about their mucano, thus using the governor as meditator for their 
conflict1216. 
After the revelations that soba Capembe was involved in the attack on the quipacas of 
sobas of Peringue and Molundo his presence in the expedition became unsustainable. Captain 
Diniz ordered soba Capembe to return to Dombe Grande and resume his work in the sulphur plant. 
He advised the soba to leave one of his macota behind to represent him at the audience with the 
soba of Lumbimbe about the attacks on his quipacas. Soba Capembe, however, refused to leave. 
He argued that his presence in the audience with the soba of Lumbimbe was indispensable and 
that he could not simply leave a macota representing him in a mucano. A macota could not speak 
against a soba, thus only he could respond to any lies or offenses the soba of Lumbimbe might 
present during his testimony. Captain Diniz understood the point made by soba Capembe and did 
not press the matter for a couple of days, allowing the latter and his people to remain in Salvaterra 
dos Magos. However, he soon received a letter from the governor of Benguela, Antonio Rebelo 
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de Andrade Vasconcelos e Sousa (January 1811 to July 1812), ordering the immediate return of 
soba Capembe to Benguela to answer for what the governor classified as “crimes”1217.  
The governor of Benguela accused soba Capembe of disobedience and treason. Capembe 
was blamed for disrupting the march by refusing to provide porters for the expedition and warriors 
for the guerra preta. Because of communication problems between Quilengues and Benguela, 
which Captain Diniz suspected were intentionally created by Capembe and his men, the governor 
still did not know about the more serious accusations of how the soba and his men had supported 
the escape of Canacanzamba and were behind the recent raids on the quipacas of sobas Peringue 
and Molundo1218.  
 
The escape of Lumbimbe 
On 26 December 1811, the governor of Benguela informed the governor of Angola, José 
de Oliveira Barbosa (1810-1815), about the “rebellious acts” promoted by the sobas of Socoval 
and Lumbimbe and by the “Muhumbe” potentates of Quilengues. Captain Diniz accused the sobas 
of Quilengues of denying assistance to the expedition, which they were obliged to provide as 
“vassals of Portugal”. They were also behind several cattle raids against the “Mundombes”, even 
during the expedition launched to punish these same “crimes”. The governor of Benguela 
confirmed Captain Diniz’s report by citing similar news from the regent of Quilengues about 
recent acts of “disobedience” from the “gentile”: they had completely refrained from the “royal 
service” and made constant assaults on moradores and other “gentiles”1219. 
After receiving the governor’s orders, Captain Diniz tried to convince soba Capembe to 
travel to Benguela in the company of the regent of Quilengues, but the soba still refused to leave. 
The captain was concerned that if he further pressured soba Capembe he could simply flee and 
disappear into the sertões. He tried to convince the soba to collaborate by freeing one of his macota 
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and two other subjects who had been captured by a local patrol while trying to flee, with their guns, 
back to Dombe Grande1220. 
Since Captain Diniz could not convince soba Capembe to leave Quilengues before the 
meeting with the soba of Lumbimbe, he tried to have it take place as soon as possible. He sent 
orders to the soba of Lumbimbe to come to Salvaterra dos Magos immediately, but his emissaries 
found no one at his libata: everyone had left to some hideout on the hills of Quilengues. The 
captain also tried to summon the soba of Socoval to be part of the meeting, but was equally 
unsuccessful. In fact, according to informants, the soba of Socoval had left his libata with his 
entire people even before the arrival of the expedition to Quilumata.  The “Muhumbe” potentates 
could not be found in their lands either1221.  
Captain Diniz blamed the “Mundombes” for disseminating news about the expedition and 
attacks on the sobados of Quilengues, which scared the sobas into hiding. In addition, the death of 
a wife (nana) of the soba of Lumbimbe, who had been kept as a pawn, had caused outrage among 
the local populations. Since most “gentiles” in the interior had some kind of family tie (many of 
them being relatives of macotas and sobas), the news about the death of the nana of Lumbimbe 
spread fast. The news passed on from mouth to ear, Captain Diniz explained, until it reached the 
soba of Lumbimbe, who decided to abandon his libata with all his people to avoid a new encounter 
with the expedition1222. Soba Capembe, in his turn, concluded that the sobas of Quilengues wanted 
to remain at war with him, since they all fled the meeting, spoiling their chance to make peace. 
Capembe informed the captain that he had a great number of “sons” that he could bring from 
Dombe Grande to rescue his cattle from the quipacas of Lumbimbe. They were probably the same 
“sons” he had refused to present to the expedition earlier and that Captain Diniz always complained 
about1223.  
Captain Diniz refused Capembe’s proposition and told him to return home and resume his 
work at the sulphur plant, while he remained in Quilengues and waited for an opportunity to 
                                                 
1220 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 114-115v., “Em data de 11 de Dezembro de 1811 estando em Quilengues”, (11 December 
1811). 
1221 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 114-115v., “Em data de 11 de Dezembro de 1811 estando em Quilengues”, (11 December 
1811). 
1222 ANA, Códice 445, fls. 114-115v., “Em data de 11 de Dezembro de 1811 estando em Quilengues”, (11 December 
1811). 




apprehend the soba of Lumbimbe. Some moradores told Captain Diniz that Lumbimbe never 
really intended to make a peace agreement and that his plan had always been to run to the hills. It 
was common knowledge among African rulers that the Luso-Africans forces were unable to chase 
them once they had taken refuge in the rocky hills of Quilengues, especially without porters to 
carry their military equipment. Cutting their supply of porters and retreating to the bush or nearby 
hills proved efficient tactics of resistance. The sobas in the sertões of Benguela knew, according 
to those moradores, that the “war of the king [of Portugal] could only punish those who waited for 
it”1224. 
 
Rebellion and resistance in Quilengues 
On 10 January 1812, Captain Diniz wrote to the new regent of Quilengues, Captain Manoel 
José da Silva Pereira, requesting help to summon all moradores under his jurisdiction with their 
slaves and agregados to help the expedition in the name of the “royal service”. They should present 
themselves at the military camp in Salvaterra dos Magos in 8 days. Otherwise, he threatened, they 
would be punished accordingly. He also made a summary of the 54 days he spent stuck in 
Quilengues because of lack of porters. Captain Diniz confessed that he felt hopeless and frustrated 
because despite being “gentle” and “friendly” to moradores and other inhabitants of Quilengues, 
he had received no support from them. He blamed this rebellious behaviour on the soba of Socoval, 
whose verbal orders prohibiting any kind of help for the expedition scared lesser sobas, potentates 
and moradores alike. In the case of moradores, the majority owed respect to African authorities 
because most had some kind of family tie with local sobas and macotas1225.    
In his 3 February, 1812, letter to the new regent of Quilengues (later forwarded to the 
governor of Benguela), Captain Diniz revealed that the soba of Socoval had now the support of 
the soba of Caluquembe (Nano). They intended to besiege his troops and starve them to death, 
according to the captain. He reported that some moradores of Salvaterra dos Magos knew where 
the soba of Socoval was hiding and were helping his so-called “rebellion”. They visited Socoval 
in his hideout in the bush and brought him gifts. Captain Diniz decided then to turn the soba of 
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Socoval into his main target. Everyone helping him should be punished as well, together with all 
of those who did not provide porters and guerra preta within the period stipulated1226.  
Captain Diniz was also aware that Socoval’s warriors spied on the expedition before his 
arrival in Quilumata. They followed the caravan closely and kept their soba informed about its 
movements, or lack thereof. On one occasion, Luso-African scouts managed to capture four 
subjects of Caluquembe spying on the caravan from a certain distance. They also spotted about 
eight “sons” of Caluquembe carrying loads of ammunition to the libata of Socoval. Although the 
libata was abandoned by its inhabitants, who took refuge in the fortified hills with their soba, there 
were reports of great movement of people at the main libata of Socoval gathering for war1227.     
According to Captain Diniz, the soba of Socoval was in collusion with the sobas of Bonga, 
Lumbimbe and Caluquembe to destroy the expedition. The “Mundombe” members of the caravan 
feared leaving their military camp because “Muquilengues”, “Muhumbe” potentates and “other 
blacks” were hidden in the bush waiting for an opportunity to attack. The unification of all peoples 
of Quilengues against him seemed to be Diniz’s main but unintended accomplishment, besides the 
great number of slaves that he captured along the way1228.  
The caravan had recently received more shackles (malungas), but the lack of porters did 
not allow Captain Diniz to put them to use. The slaver repeatedly requested help from the regent 
of Quilengues and the capitão-mor of Caconda, reminding them that if he did not punish the rebels 
and pacify the sertões the few vassals that the Portuguese still had in Quilengues would suffer the 
consequences as soon as his troops left for the coast1229. Indeed, Captain Diniz had to act fast if he 
wanted to “punish” any “rebel” and put some more captives in his libambo because the rainy 
season had long begun and the roads were getting difficult to cross for the bush was tall and dense, 
which helped the enemy guerrilla tactics and increased the danger of attacks by wild beasts. 
Moreover, the rivers had overflowed due to the rains and were crowded with crocodiles1230.  
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Nonetheless, the main problem that jeopardized the presence of the expedition in 
Quilengues was the lack of provisions. Hunger became the main tactic used by Socoval to defeat 
Captain Diniz and his soldiers. The soba of Socoval prohibited the local population 
(“Muquilengues” and moradores) to sell provisions, creating an environment of malnutrition, 
sickness and despair that pushed soldiers and porters into desertion. Captain Diniz complained that 
the moradores stopped accepting goods commonly used for trade in the sertões of Benguela, 
tobacco in this case, and that African rulers began attacking whoever insisted in buying provisions 
from them1231. He further reported that some of his men had been attacked when trying to buy 
provisions from a former macota of Caluquembe, who was now a subject of Socoval. He had sent 
two emissaries to the libata of Bumba-ia-Lombe to buy some chickens to feed a few sick soldiers. 
When the macota saw the emissaries entering his libata, he rushed to the gates armed with javelins 
(azagaias) and shot at them without ever asking what they wanted. A “Mundombe” warrior tried 
to intervene, but Bumba-ia-Lombe shouted for help. A “crowd of black warriors” quickly 
responded and scared the emissaries away. Bumba-ia-Lombe ordered his men to warn the fleeing 
emissaries that he was a macota of Socoval now, and that he did not recognize the authority of the 
captain of the Luso-African expedition. He did not want spies in his libata: hence, he was not 
going to sell provisions to any soldiers1232.  
After the emissaries reported back to their military camp in Salvaterra dos Magos, Captain 
Diniz ordered the arrest of the macota for disobedience. On the following day, three soldiers 
accompanied by guerra preta warriors commanded by Corporal Joanes José Gaspar marched on 
the libata of Bumba-ia-Lombe. Once again, as soon as they were seen entering the libata, the 
Luso-African soldiers were overrun by a crowd of warriors armed with guns, composed of people 
from that libata and neighbouring ones. The sounds of the battle and the screams of the warriors 
could be heard back at the military camp, which prompted Captain Diniz to dispatch 
reinforcements1233.  
At the end of the skirmish, the Luso-African troops counted three wounded men (one 
soldier, one guerra preta and another “black man”), while the forces of macota Bumba-ia-Lombe 
lost at least one man before retreating to the hills. The soldiers looted the libata, seizing three 
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women with their children and sixty-six head of cattle. The cattle were shared among those 
involved in the skirmish: forty cows for the colonial soldiers, ten for the corporal of the guerra 
preta and his men, and sixteen for the other “Mundombe” sobas and their subjects. The captives 
remained in the captain’s possession. At the end of his report, Captain Diniz praised the skills of 
the “Mundombe” warriors who had joined in the skirmish, suggesting that they had developed a 
special distaste for the “rebellious Muquilengues” that they had been fighting against1234.    
The “punitive expedition” faced another deliberate act of resistance in a region called 
Tinde. While trying to gather porters, Captain Diniz attempted to get hold of another corporal who 
was serving as regent of Tinde. He ordered two moradores from Salvaterra dos Magos to deliver 
his request to the corporal, who was stationed in Pacuto. The moradores had to pay a visit to the 
soba of Tinde to ask for authorization to cross his lands to Pacuto, but when they arrived on the 
margins of the Coporolo River, they could not find the rope bridge used to cross this large river 
full of crocodiles. They saw a “black man” grazing cattle on the opposite margin and shouted for 
help, asking him to inform the soba of Tinde they had an embassy for him from the expedition 
camped in Quilengues, as well as orders for the regent of Tinde1235.  
The moradores ordered their quimbares to set up a rope bridge while they waited for the 
reply from the soba. Suddenly, they started hearing shouts coming from the libata across the river. 
A few moments later, about “a thousand armed black warriors” swarmed the opposite margin, 
aggressively shouting at them. The warriors threatened the moradores, ordering them to leave 
immediately if they did not want to lose their lives. They also said that their soba did not want 
either friendship or embassies from Captain Diniz, because they knew that the expedition had 
come to make war on their libatas due to their disputes with the “Mundombes”. The local warriors 
allegedly had acquired this information from “white” traders who had recently crossed their land, 
on their way down from Caconda1236.  
The moradores were then fired upon and had to flee under enemy bullets, which was only 
possible, according to them, because the rope bridge was still down and the Coporolo River was 
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too full to be crossed otherwise1237. Some time later, Captain Diniz was informed that the “rebel” 
sobas of Tinde, Bongo and Pacuto and the sobetas of Nioa, Mireca, Quipasseu and Sapa had 
gathered in the territory of Tinde to resist against any attempt at an incursion by the expedition. 
He also received reports that a war party led by the “Mucuandos” who had just crossed Lumbimbe 
to the Nimbo River1238.  
 
Return to the coast 
After four months in the field, including two stationed in Salvaterra dos Magos, the Luso-
African soldiers had consumed all manioc flour brought from Benguela and had become 
completely dependent on local supplies. Captain Diniz complained that the “Mundombes” could 
not stand being hungry (não toleram fomes) and that hunger was the main reason behind desertion. 
Therefore, he resorted to raids to acquire provisions, since local sobas and potentates refused to 
sell them supplies because of Socoval’s prohibition1239. Captain Diniz’s new attacks against local 
populations destroyed the little support that he still had from some moradores in Quilengues who 
had rescued him in Quilumata and kept supporting his soldiers in Salvaterra dos Magos by 
providing them some cattle and cornstarch. He admitted that, if not for these provisions, he would 
have lost all of his soldiers: but even moradores began to refuse helping the expedition. Captain 
Diniz explained that perhaps only one or two moradores had not been born locally (filhos da terra) 
and did not have family ties to sobas and macotas in Quilengues1240. Now, without their support, 
the expedition was stuck and hungry, as had been planned by the soba of Socoval. Captain Diniz 
began considering retreating to Benguela, but he also lacked the porters to return to the coast, 
turning the ordeal into a circular problem1241. 
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In a desperate act of self-preservation, Captain Diniz tried once again to get help from the 
soba of Socoval. Ignoring his own condemnations against Socoval as a “rebel”, he sent three 
soldiers to his libata with a final request. The captain told the soba that since he did not want to 
help the expedition carry out the “royal service”, in this case by punishing the “rebel” soba of 
Lumbimbe, he could at least send “twenty or ten porters” to Salvaterra dos Magos to carry the 
military equipment back to Benguela. He hoped that once the other sobas, macotas and potentates 
of Quilengues saw that Socoval had sent his own “sons” to help the expedition, they would also 
provide some porters. However, Captain Diniz added, in case Socoval still did not want to send 
his “sons” to do the job, the soba could send his quissongos to the libatas of his subjects to request 
the necessary porters1242.  
Captain Diniz’s emissaries left Salvaterra dos Magos on a Saturday, 7 March 1812, and 
marched to the big libata of Socoval (a libata grande do soba do Socoval), but found no one there. 
The soba was still hidden in the nearby hills (furnas). After waiting for some time, the emissaries 
saw the arrival of the macotas of Socoval, who were “sent by him to speak in his name”. The 
soldiers carefully followed all formalities to deliver the message in a polite and “soft manner”, as 
they were instructed by their captain1243. Despite the soldiers’ best behaviour, the response given 
by the macotas was rather harsh. They said that the soba of Socoval was not going to execute any 
of the orders coming from Captain Diniz because they knew that he had come to arrest the soba 
of Lumbimbe. The macotas added that they knew this was indeed a slaving campaign (cangue) 
promoted by slavers in Benguela. They further revealed that they knew that no soldiers had arrived 
from Luanda nor from Brazil to assist the expedition, which meant that it had not been launched 
by high positioned officials in Angola, but by local slavers in Benguela. Besides, the expedition 
brought along their enemy, soba Capembe, who had sent word to sobados in Quilengues that he 
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was coming to take revenge for previous attacks with Luso-African forces on his side. The macotas 
concluded by saying that, although their soba had no personal problems against either the regent 
of Quilengues or the captain, he was not going to comply. If Captain Diniz wanted to return to 
Benguela, he should call the porters who had brought him from Quilumata to Quilengues to take 
him back1244. 
After gathering but few “Mundombe” porters, the expedition finally returned to Benguela 
on 26 March 1812, more than six months after its departure. Despite the successful slave raids it 
promoted, both the governors of Benguela and Angola considered the venture a failure, because 
neither Lumbimbe nor Socoval had been punished. Colonial historians subsequently also used it 
as evidence of the limitations of “colonial power” in the sertões of Benguela and the incompetence 
of its subordinates1245. Yet, I maintain that Captain Diniz was quite “competent” in reaching his 
real “slaving” goals.  
After the return of the expedition to the coast, the new regent of Quilengues, Captain 
Mathias José da Costa, wrote to the governor of Benguela complaining about its results. He 
suggested that Quilengues was left in disarray, with a great number of libatas deprived of labour 
to carry out the “royal service”. The arrest of African rulers by Captain Diniz and the treatment 
given out to their peoples stirred up the “gentiles” and triggered many of them to run to the hills 
or join the fight against Luso-African forces1246.  
Following his return, Captain Diniz wrote several reports justifying his actions in 
Quilengues. He discoursed extensively on the absence of soldiers and guerra preta, the low quality 
of their weapons, the insubordination of “vassals” accompanying the expedition, the high level of 
desertion along the way to Quilengues, the lack of provisions, the disease environment that had 
made him and his men ill, and above all, the lack of porters1247. He also complained that the 
commander of his guerra preta, Corporal Joanes José Gaspar, did not know how to read and was 
not even able to deliver a message properly. He went on to describe him as very humble, but too 
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lazy to occupy such a position. Besides, Gaspar knew little about the sertões of Quilengues, since 
he was from Dombe Grande da Quizamba. Hence, the expedition was forced to rely on some 
veteran soldiers and local informants with whom Diniz could communicate because he understood 
a little of the local language1248.  
Captain Diniz further argued that the interference of enemy spies had contributed to the 
rebels’ escape. Not only did they follow the movements of his caravan in the sertões, they also 
interfered in his communication with Benguela, since several of his letters never reached their 
destination. He affirmed that his enemies knew details of “secret orders” and were aware of “all 
the points” indicated in the orders given by the governor of Benguela on 6 September 18111249. 
Diniz assured his immediate superior officer that he had not shared any of its content with anyone, 
not even his subordinates, and confessed that he was baffled by their knowledge of his orders1250.  
Captain Diniz had his own theories about why the “gentiles” had “rebelled” and offered 
his explanation. According to what he had learned, some of the locally born moradores were 
responsible for exciting the “gentiles” into conflicts. These moradores used their quimbares and 
slaves as itinerant traders (pumbeiros) to sell imported goods, mainly textiles, firearms and spirits 
that they acquired from their partners in the coastal markets Benguela and Novo Redondo. All of 
this merchandise was acquired on credit from businessmen (negociantes) based at the coast who 
had their own creditors in Brazilian ports, especially Rio de Janeiro. A long line of creditors thus 
connected the interior of Benguela to ports on the other side of the Atlantic1251. 
The moradores (also identified as sertanejos) inhabiting and trading in regions such as 
Quilengues, Diniz argued, lived under constant fear that they could not repay the credit they 
                                                 
1248 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 124, Doc. 73, “Vários documentos sobre a rebelião do gentio no sertão de Benguela 
e da expedição comandada por Domingos Pereira Diniz”, (9 March 1812). 
1249 “...cientificados de todos os pontos indicados nas ordens instrutivas de VSa que baixou em seis de setembro do 
ano findo de mil oitocentos e onze...” in AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 124, Doc. 73, “Vários documentos sobre a 
rebelião do gentio no sertão de Benguela e da expedição comandada por Domingos Pereira Diniz”, (9 March 1812). 
1250 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 124, Doc. 73, “Vários documentos sobre a rebelião do gentio no sertão de Benguela 
e da expedição comandada por Domingos Pereira Diniz”, (9 March 1812); ANA, Códice 445, fls. 144-149v., “Duas 
cartas do Capitão Comandante da Expedição Domingos Pereira Diniz”, (9 and 26 March 1812). 
1251 For more on commercial networks connecting Rio de Janeiro and Benguela in the second half of the eighteenth 
century and beginning of the nineteenth centuries, including the social relations between the members of the main 
slave trading family enterprises in both Atlantic markets, see Estevam C. Thompson, “Negreiros in South Atlantic: 
The Community of ‘Brazilian’ Slave Traders in Late Eighteenth Century Benguela,” African Economic History 39 
(2011): 73-128. See also Estevam C. Thompson, “Negreiros nos Mares do Sul: Famílias traficantes nas rotas entre 
Angola e Brasil em fins do século XVIII” (M.A. Thesis, Universidade de Brasília, 2006). 
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acquired to engage in the slave trade. When they could not repay their creditors for some reason, 
the sertanejos found ways to pass on the blame, usually by accusing sobas of attacking them along 
the roads and robbing their merchandise. In order to validate their stories, these sertanejos would 
provoke local African rulers into conflict with the help of “white” deserters and other bandits who 
roamed the sertões of Benguela1252.  
Although he recognized that sobas were often tricked into these conflicts, Captain Diniz 
still considered them “insubordinates” who deserved “punishment”. He asserted that the colonial 
administration should not try to negotiate or “to grace the gentiles with politics” (não se pode 
adornar com políticas ao gentio)1253, but had to use force to prevent any disobedience and 
rebellion. Thus, after justifying his failure to punish the “rebel” sobas of Lumbimbe and Socoval, 
Captain Diniz laid out a new plan for a bigger expedition against the sobas of Quilengues: a major 
military campaign composed of 200 veteran infantrymen, backed by four pieces of artillery and an 
obus (morteiro). This large expedition would need a skilled artillery official (who could mix the 
gunpowder and prepare enough ammunition for such a big enterprise) and a mighty guerra preta. 
Warriors could be summoned in Nano through local vassals in Caconda, although Captain Diniz 
preferred that they came from the sertões of Angola, with no connection to other local African 
rulers. More importantly, the commander chosen for such a mighty expedition should have 
knowledge of the local “gentiles” (like himself), which clearly excluded officers coming from 
Angola. Therefore, Captain Diniz concluded, only an “impartial” military leader with a mighty 
army at his disposal could punish the heads of the rebellions (sobas, macotas and quissongos) and 




                                                 
1252 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 124, Doc. 73, “Vários documentos sobre a rebelião do gentio no sertão de Benguela 
e da expedição comandada por Domingos Pereira Diniz”, (9 March 1812). 
1253 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 124, Doc. 73, “Vários documentos sobre a rebelião do gentio no sertão de Benguela 
e da expedição comandada por Domingos Pereira Diniz”, (9 March 1812); ANA, Códice 445, fls. 144-149v., “Duas 
cartas do Capitão Comandante da Expedição Domingos Pereira Diniz”, (9 and 26 March 1812). 
1254 AHU, Angola, 1a Secção, Cx. 124, Doc. 73, “Vários documentos sobre a rebelião do gentio no sertão de Benguela 
e da expedição comandada por Domingos Pereira Diniz”, (9 March 1812); ANA, Códice 445, fls. 144-149v., “Duas 
cartas do Capitão Comandante da Expedição Domingos Pereira Diniz”, (9 and 26 March 1812). 
309 
 
The dominance of the “Brazilian party” in Benguela 
The mighty expedition proposed by Captain Diniz never became a reality, but he remained 
in control of “colonial” military forces for decades, strengthening his commercial and political 
positions in Benguela in association to some of the most important members of that merchant 
community. Together, these slavers defied the authority of governors and judges who tried to 
control the slave trade and to curb their actions of insubordination.  In 1816, for instance, Captain 
Diniz and other important local slavers1255 were accused of attempted murder against the judge of 
Benguela, José Antonio Cantargalo. They invaded the judge’s house, who previously had a quarrel 
with some members of the local trading community (including the local priest) in search of 
Cantargalo, but the mob was detained by the recently-arrived governor of Benguela, Manuel de 
Abreu de Melo e Alvim (1816-1819), before they could do the judge any harm1256. Some days 
before, the new governor was forced to reprimand the same group of slavers for staging the burial 
of the former governor, José Joaquim Marques da Graça (January to September 1816) through the 
streets of Benguela1257. Captain Diniz was later absolved by the Military Courts (Conselho de 
Guerra) for all accusations of misconducts, which led to a reprimand from the governor of Angola, 
Luis da Mota Feo (from 11 March 1819) against the actions taken by the governor of Benguela to 
control the slaver traders in town1258.  
   These increasingly bold actions promoted by the most important moradores of Benguela 
(which included merchants, military officers, judges and the clergy) boosted by an increasing sense 
of granted impunity for their actions, culminated in the attempted secession of Benguela from 
Portugal after the independence of Brazil in 1822. In fact, the rise of the Brazilian Empire and the 
prospect of dismantlement of the commercial networks that connected West Central Africa to the 
ports of Rio de Janeiro, Bahia and Pernambuco led to the crystallization of old internal disputes 
and also the hardening of political relations between outsiders occupying administrative positions 
                                                 
1255 The group consisted of Major Domingos Pereira Diniz, Ensign Antonio Ezequiel de Carvalho, Captain José 
Leonardo Severo da Gama and Lieutenant Manoel Garcia Mendes.    
1256 The judge died a couple of months later of a mysterious health condition (defined just as apoplexy) who left him 
lethargic and subsequently gave him strong convulsions. His death solved many of the political conflicts in Benguela: 
Delgado, A Famosa e Histórica Benguela, 69.    
1257 Delgado, A Famosa e Histórica Benguela, 66-68. 
1258 AIHGB, DL 125, 11 (Doc. 309), fls. 5-36v, “Oficio do tenente coronel das duas companhias de artilharia e 
infantaria de Benguela, Domingos Pereira Diniz”, (1 February 1827). See also Delgado, A Famosa e Histórica 
Benguela, 71  
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in Benguela and important members of the local merchant community, such as Antonio Lopes 
Anjo, Franciscos Ferreira Gomes and Domingos Pereira Diniz. The latter presided over a 
provisional junta that governed Benguela1259 from January 1822 until the arrival of a new governor, 
João Antonio Pussich, in the following year1260. Captain Diniz led celebrations on the streets of 
Benguela that ended with a public declaration of independence of the province and the rising of 
the Brazilian flag1261.  
João Antonio Pussich (July to November 1823) arrived in Benguela under literal armed 
opposition and immediately engaged in open confrontation with the local group of separatist 
slavers. Governor Pussich alerted his superiors that Benguela was controlled by a “large Brazilian 
party” that attempted to hinder him from disembarking in São Filipe de Benguela and that planned 
on arresting and even killing him. These insurgents (inconfidentes) also planned to sail to Rio de 
Janeiro to ask for the support of the Brazilian emperor for their plans of secession. Governor 
Pussich proceeded to arrest great part of his local rivals, including Captain Diniz, who was sent to 
prison in Luanda. In an attempt to control the situation, Governor Pussich placed a ban on the slave 
trade with the Brazilian ports and ordered the confiscation of the assets of the slave traders involved 
in the attempted secession, but he was latter accused of accepting bribes to let the slave trade flow 
and destitute from his post and sent to Luanda to answer for his alleged “crimes”, while Antonio 
Lopes Anjo became the new interim governor1262.  
With the arrival of a new governor from Portugal, Joaquim Bento da Fonseca (June 1824 
to November 1824), there as a new attempt to confront the “Brazilian party” and their plans of 
secession. The new governor formally accused Captain Diniz of “treason” and “insurrection” and 
arrested his accomplices in Benguela, which included a considerable part of the commercial elite 
in town: Justiniano José dos Reis, Francisco Ferreira Gomes, Antonio Lopes Anjo and the priest 
of Benguela, João Mendes de Oliveira. He also had quarrels with Vicar Tomé Afonso Fernandes 
                                                 
1259 The junta was composed by: Domingos Pereria Diniz as president, Justiniano José dos Reis representing justice 
and commerce, Father João Mendes de Oliveira representing the clergy, João da Costa Lemos representing the 
military, and Francisco José Vieira Nunes representing agricultural interests.  
1260 Delgado, A Famosa e Histórica Benguela, 76; Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World, 225-241. 
1261 AIHGB, DL 125, 11 (Doc. 309), fls. 5-36v, “Oficio do tenente coronel das duas companhias de artilharia e 
infantaria de Benguela, Domingos Pereira Diniz”, (1 February 1827). See also Ribeiro, Maria Cristina Portella. “A 
ideia de independência nos jornais republicanos em finais do século XIX”, Anais do XXIX Simpósio Nacional de 
História. Contra os preconceitos: História e Democracia, (São Paulo: ANPUH Brasil, 2017), 2-15. 
1262 Delgado, A Famosa e Histórica Benguela, 87; Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World, 236-237. 
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da Penha. They were accused of rising the Brazilian flag, trying to steal the royal treasury, and 
planning to kill members of the “European” opposition in town. According to Bento da Fonseca, 
the insurgents had even an “escape plan” that would take them to Rio de Janeiro on board of 
bergatim “Desengano Feliz”1263. 
While in Luanda, Captain Diniz wrote to Dom Miguel Antonio de Melo, former governor 
of Angola (Chapter 4) and then occupying the position of Portugal’s Secretary of State1264, who 
the captain treated with some intimacy1265. He complained about both the governor of Angola, 
Nicolau de Abreu Castelo Branco, and the governor of Benguela, Joaquim Bento da Fonseca, and 
requested authorization to return home, while complaining his wife was left in Benguela without 
support from him and that one of his daughters had recreantly died1266. He accused several former 
governors and other officials of trying to defame his name and his almost three decades of military 
career, probably because he was locally born and a “non-white” (não ser de côr branca)1267.  
Captain Diniz also used his influence with Dom Melo to harm his rival in Benguela. He 
accused Governor Bento da Fonseca of using his position to enrich himself as fast as possible, and 
that he just cared about getting enough money to buy some land (a quinta) when he returned to 
Lisbon. After failing to convince the local slave traders to pay him bribes in exchange for 
authorization to trade without problems, the new governor of Benguela would have started 
accusing the most important members of the local trading community, including the priest, of 
“crimes”, such as “treason” and “insurrection”, while bashing them as “thieves”, “blacks” and 
                                                 
1263 AIHGB, DL 125, 11 (Doc. 309), fls. 5-36v, “Oficio do tenente coronel das duas companhias de artilharia e 
infantaria de Benguela, Domingos Pereira Diniz”, (1 February 1827). See also Delgado, A Famosa e Histórica 
Benguela, 92-93; Ferreira, Cross-Cultural Exchange in the Atlantic World, 225-241. 
1264 Ministro e Secretário de Estado da Marinha e do Ultramar. 
1265 Captain Diniz claimed he felt like “an orphan” after Dom Melo’s departure from Angola: AIHGB, DL 125, 11 
(Doc. 309), fls. 5-36v, “Oficio do tenente coronel das duas companhias de artilharia e infantaria de Benguela, 
Domingos Pereira Diniz”, (1 February 1827). 
1266 Captain Domingos Pereira Diniz was married to a locally-born woman, Joana Rodrigues da Costa, who died in 
1849. She left a will declaring she did not have any living heirs and that her two children had died. However, the local 
judge found out she had, for undisclosed reasons, deliberately omitted the existence of four grand-daughters: Mariana 
Pereira Diniz and Maria Pereira Diniz, who lived in São Filipe de Benguela, as well as Laura Pereira Diniz and Ignácia 
Pereira Diniz, who lived in the presídio of Caconda: Tribunal da Província de Benguela, Inventários, maço 12, número 
28, “Inventário de Joana Rodrigues da Costa” (13 May 1850); See also Mariana P. Candido, “Understanding African 
Women access to landed property in nineteenth-century Benguela”, Canadian Journal of African Studies, August 
(2020): 11-12. See also Estevam C. Thompson, “Um indigno deste paiz: a trajetória de um militar luso-africano no do 
comércio de escravos em Benguela”, 1800-1830” (forthcoming). 
1267 AIHGB, DL 125, 11 (Doc. 309), fls. 5-36v, “Oficio do tenente coronel das duas companhias de artilharia e 
infantaria de Benguela, Domingos Pereira Diniz”, (1 February 1827).  
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“goats”. Still according to Diniz, this was yet another strategy on the part of the governor to enrich 
himself, since he agreed to release those who paid him considerable bribes. Those who could not 
pay up where put in shackles and sent to Rio de Janeiro1268. The power of the community of slave 
traders was again evidenced with the removal of Bento da Fonseca from government and his return 
to Portugal for alleged “health reasons”1269.  
In January 1826, the governor of Benguela, João Victor Jorge (November 1825 to 
December 1826), wrote a letter of recommendation to the governor of Angola, Nicolau de Abreu 
Castelo Branco, in favor of Captain Diniz and requesting his return to Benguela, where his services 
were required, but also mentioning concerns about his family. Governor Victor Jorge considered 
that Captain Diniz’s removal from Benguela by the former governor of Benguela, João Antonio 
Pussich, was an untimely decision. In November of that same year, the governor of Angola chose 
Lieutenant-Colonel Domingos Pereira Diniz to be the new capitão-mor of Caconda. According to 
Governor Castelo Branco, Captain Diniz possessed the physical (muito robusto), intellectual (hé 
inteligente) and cultural (conhecedor dos uzos do paiz) features necessary to occupied such 
position in times of “turmoil” in the interior. One the orders of the new captain-major of Caconda 
was to give military support to the regent of Quilengues and other “colonial officials” sent to 
Quitata and Quingolo1270. As capitão-mor of Caconda, Captain Diniz was soon involved in the 
Nano wars between the sobas of Quitata, Hanya, Caluquembe and Sambos, on one side, and the 
sobas Lubando, Ganda, Luceque and Quipungo, on the opposite side1271. 
 
New cycles of violence at the end of the “legal” slave trade in Benguela 
The independence of Brazil from Portugal (1822) had, for obvious reasons, profound 
consequences in the commercial, social and political networks that connected Benguela to the 
major Brazilian ports. As mentioned previously, the slave trading community of Benguela was 
greatly depended on credits acquired with their partners in Brazil, especially Rio de Janeiro. The 
                                                 
1268 AIHGB, DL 125, 11 (Doc. 309), fls. 5-36v, “Oficio do tenente coronel das duas companhias de artilharia e 
infantaria de Benguela, Domingos Pereira Diniz”, (1 February 1827).  
1269 Delgado, A Famosa e Histórica Benguela, 92-93. 
1270 AIHGB, DL 125, 11 (Doc. 309), fls. 5-36v, “Oficio do tenente coronel das duas companhias de artilharia e 
infantaria de Benguela, Domingos Pereira Diniz”, (1 February 1827). 
1271 ANA, Códice 508, fl. 125, “Ofício do regente de Caconda Domingos Pereira Diniz”, (18 April 1828). 
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capital of the Brazilian Empire not only provided these slavers with most of the merchandise they 
needed to buy captives from the backlands of Benguela, but also many of the slavers had their 
children living in Rio de Janeiro, at the house of relatives and compadres1272. The independence 
of Brazil threatened the Atlantic networks that connected Benguela to Rio de Janeiro through the 
exchange of goods and people.  
As Leslie Bethell explains, the British Foreign Secretary George Canninr fairly argued that:  
“… the entire Portuguese transatlantic slave trade had become de facto illegal from the 
moment Brazil and Portugal were separated: transporting slaves to territories outside the 
Portuguese empire had been prohibited as long ago as 1761; under article 4 of the treaty of 
1815, Dom João had specifically engaged not to permit the Portuguese flag to be used in 
the slave trade except for the purpose of supplying with labor ‘the transatlantic possessions 
belonging to the Crown of Portugal’; and article I of the Additional Convention of 1817 
had defined as illicit that trade carried on by Portuguese vessels to ports outside the 
dominions of the Portuguese Crown”1273. 
 
It took, however, decades for the complete dismantlement of the slaving networks 
connecting Angola and Brazil. Despite much pressure from the British Empire and the signing of 
several laws, only in 1850 the Brazilian Empire took effective measures to end the slave trade, 
with the signing of the bill dubbed Lei Eusébio de Queirós1274. Nevertheless, despite the 
continuation of trade from Benguela to Brazil even after independence, in 1826 there was a new 
attempt to end the slave trade that created much anxiety in Benguela and its sertões. An Anglo-
Brazilian anti-slave trade treaty was signed on 23 November 1826 and ratified by the emperor of 
Brazil, Dom Pedro I, on board of a warship anchored at his capital1275. On 3 May 1830, Dom Pedro 
I announced that under the terms of the 1836 treaty, the slave trade was illegal1276. In Brazil, 
members of the Chamber of Deputies denounced the 1826 anti-slave trade treaty as “derogatory 
                                                 
1272 For more on commercial and social networks connecting Benguela and Rio de Janeiro, see Thompson, “Negreiros 
in South Atlantic, 73-128; Estevam C. Thompson, “Sociedades negreiras: a comunidade de comerciantes “brasileiros” 
em Benguela em fins do século XVIII”, in África: histórias conectadas, Alexandre Ribeiro, Alexandre Gebara, Marina 
Berthet, eds.  (Niterói: PPGH-UFF, 2014), 99-116. 
1273 Leslie Bethell, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade: Britain, Brazil and the Slave Trade Question, 1807-
1869 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 28 
1274 Eusébio de Quieirós was the name of the Brazilian polititian and magistrate who wrote the law that finaly ended 
the Brazilian slave trade. Ironicaly, his father, Eusébio de Queirós Coutinho da Silva, worked as judge (ouvidor-geral) 
in Angola and was involved in the slave trade in that region.   
1275 Bethell, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade, 27-61. 
1276 Bethell, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade, 67. 
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to the honour, interest, dignity, independence and sovereignty of the Brazilian nation” 1277. News 
of the end of the slave trade with Brazil was not well received in Benguela and its backlands, as 
expected, and as the 1830 deadline approached, tension boiled in the sertões.   
In a letter from December 1829, the governor of Benguela, Joaquim Aurélio de Oliveira 
(1827-1830), warned his counterpart in Luanda that the “colonial” administration should be careful 
when announcing the end of the slave trade in the backlands of Benguela, because such news was 
bound to create turmoil and unrest. Governor Oliveira foresaw great danger to all “white” settlers 
and traders living in the interior, since African rulers would not take the end of the slave trade 
lightly. In fact, the governor of Benguela informed that some sobas attempted to hinder the 
sertanejos operating in their lands from leaving, and that those who managed to return to São 
Filipe de Benguela had to flee in the middle of the night and were resolute not to return to the 
sertões. There were also rumors that the sobas threatened to march with their warriors onto the 
town of Benguela to question the governor about the reasons behind the Portuguese decision to 
stop buying slaves from them1278.  
According to news brought by returning sertanejos, the sobas in the backlands of Benguela 
declared that if the Portuguese did not want to trade in slaves anymore, they should leave the coast 
and let others buy from them, because they knew there were other “nations” interested in doing 
business with them. The governor of Benguela finished his letter reminding those in Luanda that 
the “blacks” from the interior of Benguela were “resolute and brave people”, used to constant 
warfare, and could easily invade the unfortified town if they so desired. Hence, the “colonial” 
administration should take measures to reinforce the local military by providing Benguela and its 
backlands with soldiers and new artillery pieces. 
Once again, the slave trade was the true reason behind much of this concern about the 
“protection” of “white” settlements and its moradores in Benguela. Local slavers and their Atlantic 
partners, in fact, were simply trying to extract as many captives as possible during the last months 
of what many believed to be the end of the slave trade in Luanda and Benguela. Similar requests 
for reinforcements were made by the regent of Quilengues, Joaquim Ferreira Nunes dos Santos, 
                                                 
1277 Bethell, The Abolition of the Brazilian Slave Trade, 63. 




and the new capitão-mor of Caconda, Domingos Pereira Diniz. Governor Oliveira was also forced 
to intervene in a series of cases of “illegal” enslavement of Africans from the interior who had 
been kidnapped by itinerant traders leaving the sertões for good and who tried to justify their 
actions attesting the captives were payment for old transactions they had with local sobas who had 
never repaid their debts1279.   
The regent of Quilengues requested the construction of a small fortification in Salvaterra 
dos Magos, since even the building that served them as headquarters was “rotten” and “falling 
apart”. He also requested 4 of 5 pieces of artillery to “protect” the settlement and 16 additional 
soldiers, who could come from nearby Caconda. The captain-major of Caconda, on his turn, 
complained about the lack of military personnel and ammunition, and about the condition of the 
old artillery pieces at his disposal, while resonating rumors about the negative reaction on the part 
of African rulers in Nano when they heard news of the end of the slave trade. Captain Diniz claimed 
that only by reinforcing the presídio of Caconda could they safeguard their “white” settlements1280.  
In order to protect Portuguese colonial interests in Benguela and its interior, the governor 
of Benguela proposed the construction of a military fort in Calundo, reinforced by 6 to 8 pieces of 
artillery and with a permanent detachment of 24 soldiers sent from Luanda, since those roaming 
the sertões of Benguela could not be trusted. Some of the most important slave traders of Benguela, 
Justiniano José dos Reis and Francisco Ferreira Gomes, promised to finance the construction of 
the Calundo fort, and Lieutenant-Colonel Domingos Pereira Diniz was chosen to direct its 
construction1281. 
Captain Diniz had been recently involved in a war convoked by the sobas of Caluquembe 
and Quitata. This time the African rulers had united against the sobados in Dombe Grande and 
raided several quipacas of the “Mundombes”, allegedly in retaliation for raids carried out against 
Quitata during the previous year. Captain Diniz warned his superiors that the roads were overtaken 
by “bandits” and that sertanejos should travel together with the Luso-African soldiers that 
transported official letters between the presídio of Caconda and Benguela1282.  
                                                 
1279 Delgado, A Famosa e Histórica Benguela, 99-101.  
1280 Delgado, A Famosa e Histórica Benguela, 99-101.  
1281 “Carta do governador de Benguela para o de Angola de 1 de dezembro de 1829”, in Delgado, A Famosa e Histórica 
Benguela, 481-482. 
1282 ANA, Códice 508, fl. 128, “Ofício do regente de Caconda Domingos Pereira Diniz”, (24 May 1828). 
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On the other side, the soba of Socoval also remained a powerful and largely independent 
political authority in Quilengues, at least until 1830. In August of that year, the regent of 
Quilengues, Diogo Vieira Lima, bought thirteen “daughters” of Luconde at “very good price” from 
the soba of Socoval, suggesting that commercial relations between the soba and Luso-African 
traders had normalized. Nonetheless, the regent complained that this soba refused to work for the 
“royal service” and provide porters without payment. Socoval tried to control the terms of the trade 
with Salvaterra dos Magos, at times refusing to sell captives to certain particular sertanejos, thus 
acting as an autonomous power in Quilengues1283. Ironically, the prospect of end to the slave trade 
reignited the cycles of violence in the backlands of Benguela for decades to come. In fact, the slave 
trade not only did not end in 1830, but would reached its peak between 1836 and 18501284. 
  
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown the great complexity of the political and diplomatic relations 
between the many African polities of the interior of Benguela, which included the existence of 
secret alliances and old vendettas behind an appearance of friendship. Ritualized raids of cattle 
and people triggered wars between neighboring potentates throughout the sertões. The political 
landscape in the interior of Benguela was much richer than the generic labels created by Luso-
Africans could encompass. Thus, it was not a simple rivalry between “Muquilengues” and 
“Mundombes” or “Munanos” and “Mucuandos”, but an environment of overlapping political 
disputes and rivalries arranged around temporary alliances.  
The governors of Benguela responded to the recurrent and mutual attacks between African 
vassals by launching investigations and military expeditions to “punish” and “pacify” the “rebels”, 
while ensuring the continuation of the collection of tribute and of the slave trade. Military officers 
deeply involved in the slave trade, however, often commanded these incursions and used the power 
in their hands to advance their own private businesses, transforming these “punitive expeditions” 
in full-fledged slaving campaigns.   
                                                 
1283 ANA, Códice 508, fl. 131v, “Ofício do regente de Quilengues Diogo Vieira Lima”, (8 August 1828). 
1284 Silva, “The Transatlantic Slave Trade from Angola”, 121-122, Appendix A. 
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African rulers in places like Quilengues had been victims of slavers in positions of 
authority for decades and had developed strategies to avoid becoming captives. The most common 
tactic was simply evacuating their lands and taking refuge in hideouts in nearby rocky hills, where 
they knew Luso-African forces could not pursue them. Hence, the refusal in providing porters for 
the “royal service” became another important tactic to avoid the advance of slaving caravans. 
Finally, the lack of supplies led to hunger, sickness and desertion, completing the picture of chaos 
and desperation of those Luso-African forces stuck in the sertões and surrounded by enemies. 
African rulers also used espionage as one of the tactics to defeat their enemies. Their scouts 
followed expeditions’ movements and intercepted messages exchanged between military officers 
and their superiors. African rulers in Quilengues even gained access to secret orders and knew 
precise details about the campaigns launched against them, including the composition of the 
military forces that marched against them and the slaving ambitions of their commanders.   
Chapter 5 also brings an interesting perspective on the recurrent attacks of “bandits” upon 
the caravans that crossed regions like Quilengues and Caconda that so often appear in the sources. 
In fact, Captain Diniz gave a reasonable explanation for the constant complaints about attacks 
perpetrated by African warriors against the sertanejos and pumbeiros that roamed the interior of 
Benguela, suggesting that many of these supposed attacks were actually actions of deception from 
indebted traders who could not pay their creditors. Hence, in order to legitimize their versions of 
attacks on their caravans, indebted itinerant traders used the service of Luso-African deserters 
roaming the interior of Benguela to raid local African rulers so as to push them into “rebellion”.  
Finally, this chapter shows the power of the community of slavers operating from Benguela 
(especially those in positions of authority), the way they disregarded orders from their superiors to 
advance their own slaving businesses, and how they threatened African rulers from the interior 
and governors arriving from Lisbon. These slavers organized themselves around a “Brazilian 
party” after the independence of Brazil to guarantee the preservation of the commercial and social 
networks that bonded Benguela to the Brazilian Empire. With the prospect of end to the slave 
trade, these slavers used, once again, their positions of authority to reinforce their businesses, while 
African rulers from the interior organized themselves to avoid the new wave of slaving 





Violence, enslavement and resistance 
 
Between the early seventeenth and the mid-nineteenth centuries, the history of the interior 
of Benguela is one of violence, enslavement and resistance. Violence already plagued the political 
and social relations of the peoples living in this landscape before the arrival of Portuguese and 
Luso-African slave traders in the early seventeenth century, especially due to the rise of Mbangala 
bands in the previous century. The appearance of these bands represented a “social revolution” 
against “violent” traditional practices of lineage-based communities, in which elders and rulers 
accumulated all means of wealth and social status (including control over women, enslaved 
persons and cattle), generating masses of deprived young warriors. The Mbangala attacked these 
traditional communities bonded by lineage and kinship ties and denied their own ancestry through 
initialization rites and martial cults related to the institution of the kilombo and the laws of yijila. 
Mbangala bands destroyed crops and fields of palm trees, seized cattle and adolescents 
from the local communities they raided, sold the remaining captives as slaves, and prompted the 
survivors of their attacks to flee and take refuge elsewhere. Ritualized practices of cattle raiding 
also sponsored acts of violence among African polities that triggered fierce responses from those 
victimized by them, thus engendering cycles of violence that often developed into full-fledged 
warfare. Local communities oppressed by these cycles of violence developed their own ways to 
deal with them, which included taking refuge in natural defensive positions offered by rocky hills 
(impuris) and the construction of fortified corrals (quipacas), inspired by Mbangala fortifications 
(kilombos). This ritualized violence also promoted the rise of strongmen and warlords to power, 
the valorization of good warriors and bands of raiders, as well as the consolidation of a martial 
culture with specific religious practices associated to violence. 
Even the landscapes and the environment in the interior of Benguela could perform 
“violently” against the peoples who inhabited them, a “violence” that took the form of drought, 
hunger and sickness. Combined with the general state of warfare and constant raids, the 
impositions of the weather had much more profound consequences, displacing entire communities 
from their lands, who abandoned their crops and move away with their herds. Defenceless and on 
the run, these refugees became ideal victims for slavers “hunting” in the sertões of Benguela from 
the beginning of the seventeenth century onwards.   
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Over time, these Mbangala bands of nomadic warriors settled down and diluted themselves 
into local communities, soon creating their own lineages and kinship ties. Their actions and 
practices, however, did not completely vanish from local memory and oral traditions after their 
integration. The Mbangala remained an important reference for their descendants, constituting 
indeed an identity shared by different peoples in the interior of Benguela and Angola until the 
twentieth century, although explorers and ethnographers misunderstood these references and 
ended up creating new identities for some of them, as in the case of the Nyaneka-Nkhumbi.   
The arrival of Portuguese and Luso-African traders on the coast of Benguela amplified this 
state of violence. The foreigners tapped into local conflicts to acquire captives for the Atlantic 
slave trade and sponsored new conflicts by hiring local Mbangala warlords (“jagas”) to fight on 
their side during their slaving campaigns in the interior. The imported goods they brought changed 
the core of trade and wealth from cattle in the backlands to slaves on the coast. Hence, participation 
in the slave trade gave some local rulers the political capital to expand their power and influence, 
while it weakened those who did not take part in it since they had no luxury goods to maintain 
control over their subjects and to attract new ones.  
Nevertheless, as this thesis has shown, the participation of African rulers in the slave trade 
could prove to be a dangerous path for them to take, since those capturing people today could 
become the victims of the Atlantic trade tomorrow. Besides, itinerant traders who visited these 
African rulers in the interior overloaded them with merchandise on credit knowing that most could 
not repay. By indebting African rulers and forcing them to default upon their payments, slavers 
thus forged a justification for raiding and enslaving their debtors and their peoples. Moreover, as 
revealed by one experienced Luso-African military officer, many of the attacks supposedly 
suffered by itinerant traders in the backlands of Benguela were in fact attempts by indebted traders 
to get rid of their obligations, thus passing blame to African rulers (who they accused of being 
“bandits”) while, with the help of “white” deserters, provoking the same potentates into 
“rebellion”.  
Slavery was a central institution in the history of the interior of Benguela from the 
seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries. From a marginal institution in local traditional societies, 
slavery became a central feature of their economic and political lives after the development of the 
slave trade and the local, productive use of these enslaved individuals. The demand for captives 
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created by the Atlantic trade corrupted the political and cultural practices of some local African 
communities, altering their “customary laws” in cases involving “slavery” and “freedom”. At the 
same time, this increasing demand for slaves sponsored the rise of Luso-African networks of 
slavers in the interior with connections to traders on the coast that engendered long distance trading 
routes linking the backlands of Benguela to Brazil and other parts of the Atlantic, while 
incentivizing the increase in local kidnappings, raids and wars. Luso-African itinerant traders 
(sertanejos) and their agents (pumbeiros) also brought new weapons and introduced imported 
products that would later become essential elements of social and religious rituals (like 
aguardente) that these local rulers could only acquire in exchange for captives. 
The rise of the slave trade in Benguela, as this thesis has shown, was a collective project 
that involved local and foreign slavers, in which internal and external factors helped create the 
necessary conditions for its success. The first governors of Benguela used the services of Mbangala 
warriors to develop the trade while pretending to look for copper mines in the interior. Many Luso-
African slavers later occupied positions of authority in the “colonial” military and administration 
and used these positions to enhance their private slaving businesses. Since the slave trade was the 
main economic activity of Benguela and the main reason for its existence, the bulk of Luso-African 
settlers was involved in the trade, as were many Portuguese officials, including governors, judges 
and priests.  
The deep involvement of the majority of settlers in Benguela in the slave trade led the small 
town to become one of the major exporters of enslaved individuals into the Atlantic world. The 
last decade of the eighteenth century experienced a surge in slave exports, during which Benguela 
surpassed Angola for a brief moment.  This increase in slave exports was associated to a 
momentary decrease in the contraband trade and the launching of a series of military expeditions 
in Quilengues and Caconda. The slavers in command of these expeditions attacked enemies and 
vassals alike, painting them all with a broad brush of “rebelliousness”. Traditional allies of the 
Portuguese, such as the soba of Socoval, became victims of these slaving campaigns disguised as 
“punitive” expeditions. 
The soba of Socoval represents a good example of African ally who became a “rebel” due 
to conflicts with slavers in positions of authority. After decades working in partnership with Luso-
African traders in Quilengues, the soba of Socoval was arrested in 1797 for “insubordination” and 
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died in the dungeons of the Penedo prison in Luanda before his innocence was proven, while his 
people were raided by “punitive” campaigns commanded by the regents of Quilengues. As a 
consequence, subjects of Socoval, freeborn and enslaved alike, were sold to Brazil. Despite 
attempts by a Portuguese career bureaucrat who served as governor of Angola (Dom Melo) to 
punish the regents of Quilengues for their actions against Socoval and return those “illegally” sold 
to Brazil, the slavers were protected by their isolation and their influence in Benguela. Besides, 
corrupted local judges working for the community of slave traders justified those attacks as “legal” 
and protected the slavers involved.      
The data presented here about violent enslavement in Quilengues and other areas in the 
sertões of Benguela furthers recent critiques on the classic thesis of the “slaving frontier” and the 
development of peaceful relations between Luso-African slavers and African rulers who accepted 
vassalage from Portugal. It also challenges the idea that captives sold in Benguela in the nineteenth 
century came from the borders of the “slaving frontier” far from the coast. Indeed, the recent 
historiography of Benguela (and Angola) has shown that many of the slaves exported to Brazil in 
the late eighteenth and early the nineteenth centuries came from regions like Quilengues, as this 
thesis corroborates.  
The administration of Luso-African commercial outposts in the interior of Benguela, like 
Caconda and Quilengues, relied on the services of local slavers, most of them also serving as 
military officers. They lived distant from the centres of “colonial power”, far away from the control 
of their superiors, and were usually members of local slaving networks. Hence, they used the power 
invested in them to enslave people for their personal gain, sometimes by presiding over local cases 
of mucanos, others by organizing slaving campaigns against local authorities accused of 
“insubordination”. These slavers also controlled personal militias made up of their own slaves and 
their “aggregates” (quimbares), who roamed the sertões attacking local hamlets (libatas) and 
working as bounty hunters.  
Slavers in positions of authority, such as regents and capitães-mores, often ignored the 
orders of their superiors to maintain peace with local African rulers. They overreached their 
jurisdiction in favor of their slaving interests and provoked complaints to the governors of 
Benguela from African rulers and Luso-African settlers alike. They also led raids and enslaved 
people that, according to “colonial” regulations, should have been protected from slavery. This 
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thesis shows that there was no real protection for “African vassals” of Portugal: anyone could (and 
did) become a victim of the Atlantic slave trade, even when complying with the orders given to 
them.  
The Portuguese strategy to occupy the interior of Benguela relied on treaties of vassalage, 
medieval instruments of political alliance and submission that were adapted to the African reality. 
Vassalage in Africa was usually a Portuguese imposition onto local polities who had been defeated 
in combat, but there were also several cases of “voluntary vassalage”, which complicates the 
definition of “vassalage” from an African perspective. Moreover, defeated African rulers often 
“accepted vassalage” as an act of resistance since upon becoming vassals of Portugal they received 
their lands back from their conquerors and maintained authority over their peoples. In other cases, 
African vassals saw clear advantages in allying themselves to outsiders with guns against their 
local enemies. Indeed, by becoming vassals of the Portuguese, these African polities became 
autonomous and independent in relation to other local African rulers.   
Violent enslavement and the slave trade were the backbones of the “conquest” of Benguela, 
a process that lasted centuries for its completion and was only consolidated with the wars of 
“pacification” of the twentieth century. The Atlantic slave trade remained the main economic 
activity in the region until the mid-nineteenth century.  Up to then, African rulers in the interior of 
Benguela resisted the occupation of their land, even when subjected as vassals of Portugal. They 
developed different strategies to protect themselves from Luso-African raiders. Enslavement 
triggered resistance.  
Resistance, in turn, could take different forms. The phenomenon varied from direct conflict 
to the complete avoidance of conflict. Hence, besides ambushing slaving caravans and using 
guerilla warfare tactics against “colonial” soldiers crossing their lands, African rulers invested in 
“intel” to know the movement of enemy troops and plan their retreat to fortified hills with their 
people and cattle. African scouts and spies followed the caravans and intercepted letters between 
traders and military officers, while informants from “white” settlements and within caravans gave 
details of an expedition’s composition and goals.  
The very act of accepting vassalage, as mentioned above, was is some cases also an act of 
resistance. Once a “vassal” of Portugal, African rulers tried to manipulate Luso-African military 
forces against their local enemies, as demonstrated several times in this thesis. Some African rulers 
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also made formal complaints to the governor of Benguela, which in some cases triggered official 
inquiries (devassas) into the actions of capitães-mores and regents deeply involved in slaving 
networks. Other African rulers, such as post-1797 soba of Socoval, learned to distrust Luso-
African expeditions within their lands. The soba of Socoval used his control over porterage to 
block his enemy’s advances and his political influence to choke his enemy’s lines of supply, thus 
forcing a retreat. 
Finally, this thesis shows that resistance, in its varied forms, was a fundamental factor that 
slowed down Portuguese “colonial ambitions” in the interior of Benguela. As evidenced here, 
Portuguese “explorers” arrived in West Central Africa with a clear project of conquest and 
colonization. However, logistic limitations and local resistance delayed such a process until the 
early twentieth century, when the Portuguese overcame most of these limitations (such as 
transportation and communications), and found themselves in a better position to effectively 
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4. ANA, Códice 445, n.p., “Carta do Regente de Quilengues Manoel Barbosa de Mello”, (24 
April 1808).  
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6. ANA, Códice 445, n.p., “Carta do Regente de Quilengues Manoel Jose de São Pedro”, (17 
August 1808). 
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13. ANA, Códice 445, fl. 77, “Carta do Capitão Mor de Quilengues Manoel Jose de Souza”, (6 
February 1811). 
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2. ANA, Códice 445, 162v-163, “Carta do Doutor Desembargador Juiz de Fora António de 
Carvalho Fontes Henriques Pereira” (7 September 1812).  
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3. ANA, Códice 445, fl. 97, “Em data de 16 de setembro de 1811, estando na Real Feitoria 
do Dombe Grande”, (16 September 1811). 
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20. ANA, Códice 445, fls. 113v, “Lista da Guerra Preta armada e carregadores que existem até 
1 de dezembro de 1811, (5 December 1811)”. 
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11. ANA, Códice 508, fls. 175-176, “Ofício do regente de Quilengues Diogo Vieira Lima”, (27 
May 1829). 
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4. ANA, Códice 519, fl. 154v, “Ofício do governador de Benguela No. 299”, (3 November 
1814).  
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5. ANA, Códice 525, fls. 40, “Ofício do governador de Angola Manoel Bernardo Vidal”, (9 
July 1838).  
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Appendix 1 – Africa, 1708: “L' Afrique: Dressée sur les observations de Mrs. de l’Academie 
Royyale des Sciences, et quelques autres. & sur les memoires les plus recens” (1708), by 










Appendix 2 – Kongo, Angola and Benguela, 1754: “Carte des royaumes de Congo, Angola et 
Benguela avec les pays voisins tiré de l'Anglois” (1754), by Jacques Nicolas Bellin. Digital 











Appendix 3 – Kongo, Angola and Benguela, 1790: “Carta geographica da costa occidental da 
África” (1790), by Luis Pinheiro Furtado, in: Torres, J. C. Feo Cardozo de Castellobranco. 
Memórias contendo a biographia do vice-almirante Luiz da Mota Feo Torres: A história dos 














Appendix 4 – Angola and Benguela, 1846: “Carta geographica dos reinos de Angola e 
Benguella” (1846), by José Joaquim Lopes de Lima, in: Lima, J.J. Lopes de. Ensaios sobre a 
statistica das possessões portuguezas na África Occidental e Oriental; Ásia Occidental; China, e 














Appendix 5 – Angola, 1860: “Mappa dos reinos de Angola e Benguela” (1860), by Manuel 










Appendix 6 – Angola, 1885: Oliveira, Antonio Augusto de. “Carta de Angola, contendo 
indicações de produção e salubridade” (1885). Comissão de Cartographia de Portugal. Biblioteca 









Appendix 7 – Southern Africa, 1886: Oliveira, Antonio Augusto de. “Carta da Africa Meridional 












Appendix 8 – Southern Africa, 1891: Oliveira, Antonio Augusto de. “Carta das possessões 
portuguezas da Africa meridional segundo as convenções celebradas em 1891”, Comissão de 











Appendix 9 – Different spellings for geographic and cultural references of “Quilengues”  
Geographic references 
1. Quilengues (Pinheiro Furtado, 1790) 
2. Quillengues (Bastos, 1908) 
3. Quillangues (Bastos,1908) 
4. Quillengas (Cadornega, 1680) 
5. Quilongas (Cadornega, 1680) 
6. Quilengas (Cadornega, 1680)  
7. Quilingue (Mcqueen, 1860) 
8. Quilenges (Guedes, 2012) 
9. Quillenjes (Bellin, 1754) 
10. Quilengues e Sambos & Quilengues e Huila (Motta Feo, 1825) 
11. Kilengues (Desch-Obi, 2008) 
12. Kwillengues (Arnot, 1889) 
13. Kilengues-Muso & Kilengues-Humbe (Desch-Obi, 2008) 
14. Kilenge-Muso & Kilenge-Nkhumbi (Vansina, 2004) 
15. Tyilengue-Muso & Tyilengue-Humbi (Estermann, 1979) 
16. Cilenge (Melo, 2005) 
17. Gemge (Cadornega, 1680)  
18. Genge (Delgado, 1945) 




1. Muquilengues (Joaquim Jose da Silva, 1785) 
2. Moquilengues (Paulo Lacerda, 1797) 
3. Mutxilengues (Milheiros, s/d) 
4. Quilengue Muso & Quilengue Humbe [Ethnographic Map] (José Redinha, s/d) 
5. Otyilenge (Vansina, 2004) 
6. Tyilengue (Redinha, 1955 / Childs 1960) 
7. Txilengue (Milheiros, 1967)  
8. Cilengi (Childs, 1969) 
9. Cilenge (Melo, 2005) 
10. Chilengue (Duparquet, 1953) 
11. Chilengues (Childs 1960) 
12. Kilengi [Bantu word] (Haenlein 1997) 
13. Vatxilengue [Song] (Milheiros n/d)  
14. Vacilenge (Melo, 2005) 
15. Olucilenge (Melo, 2005) 







Appendix 10 – Three lists de Sobas and Sobetas of Quilengues (1798-1799) 
# List of sobas of Quilengues by 
Governor Botelho de 
Vasconcelos (1 August 1799) 
published in Annaes Marítimos e 
Coloneaes, 18441285.  
List of sobas of Quilengues 
(1798), AIHGB, Rio de 
Janeiro1286. 
List of sobas of Quilengues 
(2 January 1798), Arquivo 
Nacional de Angola, 
Luanda1287. 
 
1 Sova de Socoval com seus Povos  Socoval  Souva do Socoval com seus 
Povos 
2 Soveta Tunda  Soveta da Tunda  Soveta da Tunda  
3 Dito Bonga Dito da Bonga  Seus souvetas da Bonga  
4 Dito Quicuco Dito do Quicuco Dito do Quicuco 
5 Dito Ecore    
6 Dito Lucondo  Soveta do Lucondo  Soveta do Lucondo  
7 Dito Calunga Soveta de Calunga  Soveta de Calunga  
8 Dito Camburo Soveta de Comburo Soveta de Comburo 
9 Dito Canhama maio Soveta de Canhama maio  Soveta de Canhama maio  
10 Dito do Hambo Soveta de Hambo  Soveta de Hambo  
11 Dito de Quipussas Soveta de Quipussas Soveta de Quipussas 
12 Dito Malengue  Souva do Malengue  Soveta do Malengue  
13 Dito Quitomo   Soveta Quitomo 
14 Dito dos Bembes  Souvas do Bembe Soveta dos Bembes 
15 Dito das Numpacas  Souveta dos Numpacos  Soveta dos Numpacos 
16 Dito da Huenja   Soveta da Huenja 
17 Dito da Massanzalacata Souva do Musanzallacata Soveta da Massanzalacata 
18 Souva da Huila Souva da Huila  Souva da Huila 
19 Sova do Injao Souva dito do Injas   Souva do Injao 
20 Sova de Quipungo Souva do Quipungo  Souva de Quipungo 
21 Sova de Gambos Souva do Gambos Souva dos Gambos 
22 Sova Hinha Souveta de Hinha  Souva da Hinha 
23 Sova dos Moimbas  Souva dos Moinbas Souva dos Moimbas 
24 Dito Bolenga  Souveta de Bulenga  Souveta Bolenga 
25 Sova de Quiaungu o maior Sova 
do Grande terreno do Humbe 
grande, à margem do Rio Cunene   
Souva Quiango, que he o 
mais poderozo dos Sovas do 
Humbe a margem do Rio 
Conene e dois dias adiante 
dos Gambos  
Souva de Quiaungo, que hé 
o maior souva do grande 
terreno do Humbe, a 
margem do Rio Conene, 2 
dias adiante dos Gambos 
26 Sova da Camba  Souva de Camba  Souva da Camba 
27 Sova do Molondo  Souva de Malondo  Souva de Molondo 
28 Sova do Handa Souva da Handa Souva da Handa 
29 Sova de Cafima Souva de Cafima Souva de Cafima 
                                                 
1285 Alexandre Jose Botelho de Vasconcelos, “Descripção da Capitania de Benguella... 1º d’Agosto em 1799”, in 
Annaes Marítimos e Coloniaes, 4ª. Série, Parte Não Oficial (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional, 1844), 147-161. 
1286 AIHGB, DL, 32, 2. 1 (Doc.. 131), fls. 1-6v, “Relação dos sobas, sovetas, seus vassalos, e sobas agregados da 
capitania de Benguela” (1798). 
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agregados pelos nomes das suas terras, que tem na capitania de Benguela”, (2 Jan 1798). 
393 
 
30 Sova do Balle Souva do Balle  Souva do Balle  
31 Os Mucanhamas que são vários 
Povos com seus sovetas 
Souva dos Mucanhamas com 
muitos Povos 
Souva dos Mucanhamas 
com muitos Povos 
32 Sova de Cabetto  Souva Cabeto  Mais para terra dentro: 
Souva de Cabeto  
33 Sova da Cabona Souva da Caboma Dito de Cabona  
34 Sova de Quiabiqua  Souva de Quia bigua  Dito Quiabiqua  
35 Dito Tolala naquenda Souva de Talala naquenda Dito de Tallala naquenda 
36 Dito Dongona Souva Dongona  Dito Dongona  
37 Dito Quianda  Souva de Quiande  Dito Quianda 
 Mais chegado à Costa do Mar:  Pela beira mar: 
38 Sova Quitoco Dangalasanda Souva Quitoco Danga Sanda Dito de Quitoco 
Dangalasanda 
39 Dito Colanja  Souva de Colanja  Dito de Colanja 
40 Sova Quitidy  Souva de Quitindy  Dito de Quitidy 
41 Dito Bittiaba  Souva de Bitiaba Dito Bitiaba 
42 Dito Guenda Longo  Souva de Quendelongo  Dito Quendelongo 
43 Dito Biballa Souva de Biballa  Dito Biballa 
44 Dito Munene ocullo   
45 Dito Punda Hinene    
46 Dito Anda Eulo    
47 Dito Quipangulula muquangindi    
48 Sova Hunguã, na Barra do Rio 
Bombeiro  
  
49 Dito Muagary    
50 Dito do Bumbo  Souva do Bumbo  Dito do Bumbo 
51 Dito Tumpa Souva Tumba  Dito Tumba 
52 Dito Balla Cuballe  Souva Ballacuballe  Dito Ballacubata 
53 Dito Himba  Souva Himba  Dito Himba 
54 Dito Cubal Souva de Cuball  Dito Cubal  
55 Dito Taspa Souva da Farpa Dito da Tarpa 
56 Os Mocorocas  Souva dos Mocorocas  Dito dos Mocorocas  
57 Dito Buaquempe  Souva do Bucuaquenpe  Dito Bucuaquempe  
58 Dito de Cabolle, dizem que isto 
fica ao Pé da Barra do Rio 
Cunene; e que este antes da sua 
Barra lança três braços, em que 
forma três ilhas as quaes tem os 
Povos seguintes:  
Souva de Cabolle, dizem fica 
ao pé da Barra do Conene, e 
que este Rio antes da barra 
lança 3 braços formando 3 
ilhas que tem Povos na 1a os 
seguintes  
Dito do Cabolle; dizem este 
fica ao pé da Barra do Rio 
Cunene e que este antes da 
sua Barra, lança 3 braços, e 
forma 3 ilhas, suas quais 
tem seus povos seguinte:  
59 Na 1ª ilha está o Sova Bahingy 
com seus Povos 
Na 1a Bahynay com seus 
povos 
Na 1ª Bahingy com seus 
povos  
60 Na 2ª Badombodolla com seus 
Povos 
Na 2a Badombodola com 
ditos 
Na 2ª Badombadola com 
ditos  
61 Na 3ª Bacoaquanqua com seus 
Povos 
Na 3a Bacoaquanqua com 
ditos  




 Mais por terra dentro,    
62 Sova Bacoanamatui Souva de Bocoanamatuí  Souva de Bacoannamatuy  
63 Dito Bacoanhama Souva de Bacoahama Souva de Bacoanhama  
64 Dito Ocuangay  Souva de Ocuangari  Souva de Occuangari 
65 Dito Bubunja  Souva de Babunga  Souva de Babunja 
66 Dito Marima  Souva de Marima Souva de Marima  
67 Dito dos Mondongas  Souva dos Mondongos Souva dos Mondongas  
68 Dito Inamatui  Souva do Inamatuy Souva de Inamatui 
69 Dito Bacua quitteles (são 
Ganjallas)  
Souva de Bacuaquitele Souva de Bacuaquitele (são 
Ganjallas) 
70 Dito Bacuambuy Souva de Bacuambuy, são 
ganjellas 
Souva de Bacuambuy  
71 Dito Bacualubudy Souva de Bacualubudy  Souva de Bacualubudy  
72 Dito Himba Souva da Ximba Souva Ximba 
73 Dito dos Ganjellas, dizem que 
estão ao pé de humas grandes 
Salinas de Sal  
Souva dos Gangellas, dizem 
que estão ao pé de hua 
salinas grandes  
Dos ditos Ganjellas, dizem 
estão ao pé de umas salinas 
grandes 
74 Dita de Badu, dizem que nesta 
terra Gados muito grande fora do 
natural 
Souva do Badu, que dizem 
tem todos muito grandes for 
a do Cumum  
Souva de Badu, dizem há 
nesta terra gados muito 
grande, fora do comum 
75 Dito de Demautumo, dizem há 
nesta terra vários Anoeñs muito 
feios 
Souva de Banautuno, honed 
dizem ha anoens feyos 
Souva de Banauluno, onde 
dizem há anões feios 
76 Dito dos Mucuancallas, dizem 
que estes falam por estallos, e são 
de cores um tanto avermelhadas, 
e que he terra muito remotta, e 
muito pouco conhecidos 
Souva dos Mucuancallas, 
dizem que estes fallão por 
estallos e que as gentes são 
de Cores avermelhadas, são 
terras muito remotas e pouco 
conhecidas   
Souva do Mucuancallas, 
dizem que estes falam por 
estalo, e que a gente são de 
cores avermelhadas, e que 
são terras muito remotas e 
pouco conhecidas 
77   Além dos souvas, souvetas e 
mais povos acima referidos, 
há no centro desta província 
118 negros potentados, de 
nação dos Muhumbes, que 
governam de 10 até 270 
pessoas, e muitos gados 
78   Souva Janiabala 
79  Souva dos Hingas  

























Aguardente – Sugarcane brandy  
Arimos – Farmland   
Cacimbo – Fog that covers the land in the early hours of the morning due to the dry and cold 
weather 
Cassíma – Water well dug in the sand 
Capitão-mor – Captain-major, commander of presídios 
Conselhos – Portuguese administrative unit; counties 
Degredado – Exiled criminal  
Derrota – Reconnaissance expedition; “route of the armies”  
Devasssa – Inquiry  
Districto – Portuguese administrative unit with no permanent military force   
Epungu – Maize  
Farinha – Manioc flour, staple ration of caravans crossing the sertões  
Feitorias – Trading posts  
Filhos do país or filhos da terra – Individuals born locally, in Africa  
Fidalgos – Nobles 
Guerra preta – Local “black” soldiers 
Libambos – Shackles used on slaves  
Libatas – African settlements, hamlets 
Liconde – Fiber extracted from the bark of the nkondo tree 
Imbangala – Groups of Mbangala warriors who settled in Kasanje and Matamba 
Impuri – African fortification built using the natural setting of local rocky hills  
Jaga – Generic name given by Portuguese and Luso-Africans to the leaders of the Mbangala 
bands  




Jagados – Territory under the control of the Jaga 
Kilombo – Military cult of the Mbangala; military encampment 
Kinguri – Mythical founder of the Imbangala of Kasanje, the “lion king” 
Macotas or Makota – Elders and advisers of the sobas  
Maji-a-samba – Ritual to produce a protective “magic” unguent   
Mani-Kongo – Ruler of Kongo  
Massambala – Sorghum  
Massango – Millet 
Mbangala – Nomadic warriors of the interior of Benguela who also worked as mercenaries 
Mbanza Kongo – Capital of Kongo, also São Salvador do Congo 
Mbuelo – Lowlands in the interior of Benguela  
Miombo – Brachystegia-lsoberlinia woodland ideal for ranching, also known as mato-de-panda 
Moradores – Inhabitants; dwellers living within and around Portuguese administrative units   
Mucanos or Mukano – Mbundu customary laws; for the Portuguese and Luso-Africans these 
were legal cases regarding one’s condition as a free person or a slave (Juízo dos Mucanos). 
Mucunde – Beans  
Mwaant yaav – Ruler of the territory the Portuguese called Muatiânvua  
Nano – Highlands of the central plateau in the interior of Benguela 
Negociantes – businessmen  
Ngola – Ruler of Ndongo  
Nguri – Lion  
Nkondo – Large and fibrous tree, also known as Mbondo, Imbondeiro or Baobab 
Ombala – Capital of the sobado 
Peça d’Índia – A healthy male slave in the prime of his life 
Pretos calçados – “Shod blacks”, Europeanized Africans  
Pretos descalços – “Barefoot blacks”, Africans under no or little European influence 
Presídio – Portuguese administrative unit composed by a fort and surrounded by local dwellers, 
a military outpost and its personnel.    
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Pumbeiros – Itinerant trader, often a “black” slave 
Pumbo – African market  
Quiculos – Funeral urns to keep the bones of ancestors  
Quimbares – African soldiers, who also worked as mercenaries and bounty hunters. 
Quipaca – Fortified corrals  
Sertanejos – Caravan leader and itinerant trader 
Sertões – Areas in the interior, often outside Portuguese control; “core of the lands”   
Sobas – Local African ruler 
Sobados - Territory under control of the soba 
Soldo – Salary paid to soldiers  
Tembanza - First wife of the Jaga 
Tendala – Interpreter 
Undamento – Culturally-mixed ritual of subjugation that followed the signing of a treaty of 
vassalage, which also served to confirm the local authority of the African vassal  
Yijila (sing. kijila) – Laws of the kilombo regarding the destruction of lineage and ancestry. 
 
